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The following dissertation is a political-intellectual history of German 
conservatism and national identity from the 1930s to the 1950s.  It explores the 
published and private documents of prominent conservative intellectuals, 
propagandists, journalists, and military elites who before, during, and after the 
Second World War developed a new concept of European nationalism which they 
called the “Europa-Gedanke,” or “Europe-concept.”  This dissertation traces the 
evolution of this political ideology by assessing what Europe meant for these 
thinkers, how this meaning changed over the course of a volatile historical time 
period, how it differed from other concepts of Europe, and how it informed the 
transformation of German conservatism. 
The figures analyzed in this dissertation had in common a professional and 
intellectual trajectory that began in the Conservative Revolution of the Weimar 
period.  Part 1 of this dissertation dissects their path to intellectual complicity in 
National Socialism and the propaganda apparatus behind Hitler’s “New Order of 
Europe.”  Part II traces their postwar professional rebirth as widely publicized 
journalists and influential military reformers in the first decade of West Germany.  
 
 
Surprisingly, after 1945 these figures were able to bridge their European ideology 
with the postwar Christian Democratic politics of European integration and anti-
Communism.  This alliance opened the door for liberals in West Germany and the 
American intelligence community to accommodate a previously hostile milieu 
into their postwar liberal politics. 
 The primary thesis of this dissertation is three-fold: a) the conservative 
Europe-concept is a hitherto neglected and dismissed ideology which was highly 
influential across all three examined time periods of German history; b) this 
influence was a result of the Europe-concept’s explicit reformulation of the 
enduring German völkisch tradition in such a way that expanded the definition of 
the historical ethnic community (from Germany to Europe) and thereby addressed 
the perceived political inadequacy of nationalism during and after the Second 
World War; and c) the Europe-concept contributed to the de-radicalization of 
German conservatism by assisting a transition from the anti-democratic 
Conservative Revolutionary impulse to the postwar West German politics of 
liberal democracy – a convergence that moderated the instinctive illiberalism of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Overview 
The following dissertation is a political-intellectual history of German 
conservatism and national identity from the 1930s to the 1950s.  It explores the 
published and private documents of conservative intellectuals, journalists, and 
military elites who before, during, and after the Second World War developed a 
unique concept of Europe which they called the “Europa-Gedanke,” or “Europe-
concept.”  The Europe-concept was a reformulation of German nationalism in 
which the past, present, and future could be understood from the perspective of an 
organic, ethnic European community marching a teleological path in history 
towards political, economic, and cultural unification.  This “European 
revolution,” as they often called it, would culminate in a new European nation 
capable of liberating Europeans from the East (Bolshevism), the West 
(liberalism), and, importantly, even Europe’s own past (nationalism).  This 
dissertation will trace the evolution of this political ideology by assessing what 
Europe meant for these thinkers, how this meaning changed over the course of a 
volatile historical time period, how it differed from other concepts of Europe, and 
how it informed the transformation of German conservatism. 
The figures analyzed in this dissertation have in common a professional 
and intellectual trajectory that spans the Weimar period, the era of the Third 
Reich, and the first decade of postwar West Germany.  A primary goal of this 
dissertation is to trace the evolution of the Europe-concept across all three of 
these time periods and their accompanying political peculiarities, and in doing so 
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highlight the impact of the conservative Europe-concept on mid-twentieth century 
German politics.  Part I of this dissertation traces the Europe-concept to its origins 
in the early 1930s where it was constructed by proponents of the so-called 
Conservative Revolutionary movement in the Weimar Republic.  For our 
investigation of the Europe-concept the central personality was Giselher Wirsing, 
but also important were his colleagues Hans Zehrer, Ferdinand Friedrich 
Zimmermann, and Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann.  This Berlin-based network of 
conservative intellectuals called itself the Tat-Kreis, or “Action Circle,” and 
published one of the most influential conservative magazines called Die Tat.  Like 
other Conservative Revolutionaries these intellectuals also rejected the 
conservative Wilhelminian monarchy for its inability to overcome Marxism, 
bourgeois liberalism, and the reactionary agrarian and Christian conservatism of 
Germany’s social elites; instead, they desired a future-oriented political revolution 
that could usher in a cultural awakening of the German ethnic community, the 
Volk.  But unlike other Conservative Revolutionaries, they were preoccupied with 
the consequences this would have outside of Germany’s borders and therefore 
began developing an interpretation of Europe that could complement the national 
revolution. 
After Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933 this network embedded itself into 
the National Socialist regime, gradually accumulated positions of high influence 
in the Nazi propaganda apparatus, and expanded their network into various 
institutions throughout the Third Reich such as the Foreign Office, the 
Wehrmacht, and the Waffen-SS.  During the 1930s they further developed their 
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Europe-concept with the help of Carl Schmitt’s concept of an independent 
European Grossraum, or European “continental space.”  The swift Nazi victories 
in Central and Western Europe in 1939/40 created an opportunity for these 
propagandists to enlarge their influence by further developing their Europe-
concept in the service of Hitler’s “New Order of Europe.”  They assumed 
leadership in the second-most published periodical of the entire Nazi propaganda 
apparatus, Signal, which was published in German and other languages as a 
transnational mouthpiece for the Wehrmacht in conquered Europe.  Likewise, 
they ascended into leadership positions in the sprawling propaganda machines of 
the Foreign Office, Berlin academia, and the Waffen-SS, each of which similarly 
disseminated Europe-propaganda across the continent.  Important additions to 
their network included: a) Foreign Office propaganda administrators such as Karl 
Megerle, Paul Karl Schmidt, and Klaus Mehnert; b) propagandists in Berlin 
academies such as Franz Alfred Six, Axel Seeberg, and Karl Heinz Pfeffer; c) 
commissioned officers in the military such as Waffen-SS propaganda-chief 
Gottlob Berger and Waffen-SS general Felix Steiner.  By 1940 the Europe-
concept had been thoroughly reformulated into a wide-ranging propaganda 
discourse that served Nazi imperialism in dozens of languages across the 
continent.  This marriage of the Europe-concept with National Socialism drew 
upon much of the Nazi Weltanschauung but also revised it in significant ways.  
Throughout this dissertation we will call this unorthodox, revisionist discourse 
“Nazi Europeanism.”   
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Most of these Nazi Europeanists served the regime until the bitter end, but 
by the end of the war many had become disillusioned with National Socialism and 
attempted to distance themselves from the regime.  Importantly, the Europe-
concept was the primary vehicle for their estrangement from National Socialism – 
as they came to disavow National Socialism the Europe-concept was left 
remaining as their only ideological orientation.  While some Nazi Europeanists 
stubbornly supported National Socialism until the end of the war, most came to 
oppose the regime, and some even took careful steps to express that opposition.  
This late disillusionment, however opportunistic it was, stimulated a form of 
memory politics in which they could distance themselves from the past without 
fully repudiating it.  National Socialism, they could argue, had failed Europeans 
by neglecting and falsifying the New Order of Europe and instead actually leading 
Europe further into the abyss of nationalism.  Furthermore, in the context of 
postwar European integration, the Europe-concept proved to be a useful tool for 
revising their past and reconciling themselves to the present.  Therefore, part II of 
this dissertation follows the former Nazi Europeanists across the “Zero Hour” of 
1945 into the first decade of the West German Federal Republic, illustrating 
continuities and discontinuities in their Europe-concept.  Former Nazi 
Europeanists attempted to separate the Europe-concept from National Socialism 
but also retain many of its core precepts by developing what we will call “post-
Nazi Europeanism.”  This was an attempt to salvage the radical Conservative 
Revolutionary tradition from National Socialism by projecting the post-Nazi 
Europe-concept onto the postwar politics of European integration during the 
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debates of the late 1940s and early 1950s.  Many of this dissertation’s key figures 
succeeded in resurrecting prestigious careers in postwar West Germany where 
they obtained a remarkable degree of influence in journalism as leading public 
advocates of European integration.  They included: Giselher Wirsing, Klaus 
Mehnert, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Hans Zehrer, Axel Seeberg, and Paul Karl 
Schmidt - most of whom had prolific careers as chief editors and/or leading 
editorialists in two of the most-read political periodicals in the first decade of 
postwar West Germany: Christ und Welt and Sonntagsblatt. 
Part II will also trace the continuation of the Europe-concept in the West 
German military milieu, arguing that the Europe-concept was bridged into 
postwar military circles by influential elites such as Ernst Jünger, Hans Speidel, 
and Felix Steiner who sought to revise the German military tradition by anchoring 
it in the Europe-concept as opposed to nationalism.  This advocacy took place in 
the context of the short-lived campaign to create a European Army from 1950-
1954, which opened the door for liberals in West Germany as well as American 
occupation authorities to accommodate a previously hostile milieu into their Cold 
War liberal politics.  In fact, the final chapter in this dissertation will illustrate that 
this reconciliation produced a liaison between former Nazi Europeanists and 
covert U.S. and West German public relations intelligence operations called 
“Operation KMMANLY” and “Operation QKSNITCH,” which were designed by 
American intelligence officers to democratize and de-nationalize German veterans 
while simultaneously encouraging their participation in rearmament.  These 
operations expanded the reach of the Europe-concept to West German veterans, 
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and by the end of the 1940s former Nazi-Europeanists had attained leading 
positions in the most influential veteran periodicals such as the Deutsche 
Soldaten-Zeitung as well as the most influential officers’ clubs such as the 
Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde.  These projects attracted additional social elites who 
advocated the Europe-concept within the veteran community.  Especially 
significant among these additions were former commissioned officers of the 
Wehrmacht Johann von Kielmansegg, Erich Dethleffsen, Arno Werner Uhlig, 
Robert Knauss, Georg von Sodenstern, and Günther Blumentritt.  Many of these 
figures played an important role in the official re-founding of the West German 
military in the early 1950s and the Europe-concept was at the center of their 
activities vis-à-vis this new military establishment. 
 The primary thesis of this dissertation is three-fold: a) the conservative 
Europe-concept is a hitherto neglected and dismissed ideology which was highly 
influential across all three examined time periods of German history; b) this 
influence was a result of the Europe-concept’s explicit reformulation of the 
enduring German völkisch tradition in such a way that expanded the definition of 
the historical ethnic community (from Germany to Europe) and thereby addressed 
the perceived political inadequacy of nationalism during and after the Second 
World War; and c) the Europe-concept contributed to the de-radicalization of 
German conservatism by assisting a transition from the anti-democratic 
Conservative Revolutionary impulse to the postwar West German politics of 
liberal democracy – a convergence that moderated the instinctive illiberalism of 
German conservatism.  
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The Sonderweg, Völkisch Ideology, and Europeanism 
  This thesis is anchored in the Sonderweg interpretation of German history 
- the assertion that German history, especially the disaster of National Socialism, 
was to significant extent informed by historical continuities.1  Beginning in the 
1980s the Sonderweg came under sharp criticism by historians for its purportedly 
deterministic approach to German history and for the absence of any distinct 
alternative “Western” model of historical development.2  But the most arresting 
criticisms of the Sonderweg focused primarily on the so-called Bielefeld 
interpretation of the Sonderweg, which suggested that agrarian social elites 
resisted industrialization and democratization and leveraged their political power 
against the emerging bourgeois middle class ultimately culminating in an 
aggressive Wilhelminian foreign policy designed to distract the German populace 
from domestic politics.3  As Gordon Craig argued, another altogether different 
interpretation of the Sonderweg was too often overlooked or dismissed during 
these debates; namely, the argument that a unique discourse of nationhood 
established itself in German political culture during the nineteenth century and 
 
1 For a good review of the Sonderweg school of thought see Jürgen Kocka, "German History 
before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg," Journal of Contemporary History 23.1 
(1988): 3-16.    
2 This argument was most forcefully advanced by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley.  See 
David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and 
Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 




was politically radicalized at the turn-of-the-century and afterwards.4  This 
“cultural-ideological Sonderweg”, as Craig called it, unlike the over-determined 
social-economic Sonderweg of the Bielefeld school, has stood the test of time and 
been reinforced by more recent historians.5   
The cultural-ideological Sonderweg, originally advanced most notably by 
George Mosse and Fritz Stern, asserted that in juxtaposition to the individualistic 
liberal nationalism that emerged out of the French Revolution, Germans 
articulated a definition of nationhood based on notions of an inherited and 
exclusive ethno-linguistic community, the organic rootedness of society, and the 
subservience of the individual to the mythic collective (the German Volk).  As this 
“völkisch” ideology failed to find political realization over the course of the 
nineteenth century German nationalists increasingly fled to the dream of a 
 
4 Gordon Craig, “The German Mystery Case,” in New York Review of Books 33.1 (January 30, 
1986). 
5 Much of the recent literature that has reinforced the Sonderweg has re-centered it on 
antisemitism and the Holocaust, arguing that Nazi antisemitism emerged out of German history.  
In doing so, these historians move the “vanishing point” of the Sonderweg from 1933 to 1941.  
See Helmut Walser Smith, The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and the Long 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  Saul Friedländer and Jeffrey 
Herf have illustrated that Nazi antisemitism was driven above all else by conspiratorial obsessions 
and a desire for a historical confrontation that would finally “redeem” the German nation from the 
Jews.  See Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the 
Holocaust (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2008).  Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the 
Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939 (New York: First Harper Perennial, 1998). 
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powerful cultural unification that would transcend politics.  Such neo-
romanticism provoked among German nationalists an adversarial posture towards 
modernity known as “cultural pessimism,” which entailed a flight from 
Enlightenment rationality, an anxiety that the völkisch community was 
disintegrating, and a consequent resentment of the political ideologies of the fin 
de siècle.  In particular, Marxism and liberalism, which were both gathering 
strength in the late Wilhelmine Era, were maligned as anti-nationalistic 
universalistic ideologies, because they anchored their understanding of the world 
in international humanity rather than the Volk, in “Zivilisation” rather than 
“Kultur.”  After the disastrous First World War and the Treaty of Versailles, 
cultural pessimism in German political culture metastasized into a conservative 
radicalization against liberal democracy in the Weimar Republic which resulted in 
the consolidation of German conservatism behind a fateful consensus: namely, an 
espousal of radical solutions to preserve the German Volk by reasserting the 
völkisch principle in a national revolution led by Hitler and the Nazi party.  
National Socialists, then, effectively channeled the radical völkisch nationalism 
which had come to dominate German political culture by presenting their radical 
politics as the organic redemption from the threatening universalisms of Marxism 
and liberalism.6  This cultural-ideological Sonderweg has been reinforced by a 
 
6 See George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich 
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964).  Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in 
the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of California, 1961).   Fritz Stern, 
Dreams and Delusions: The Drama of German History (New York: Knopf, 1987).  This is, of 
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consensus among historians of the Third Reich that the Nazi regime was a popular 
dictatorship that ideologically integrated the German populace into its genocidal 
politics by engendering a wide-spread conviction that the original promise of the 
völkisch tradition – the transcendent unification of the “German people’s 
community” (deutsche Volksgemeinschaft) – was in the process of being realized 
during the twelve years of Nazi rule.7 
 
course, not to suggest the inevitability of völkisch nationalism’s domination of German political 
culture.  As Thomas Nipperdey has shown, there was a strong tradition in early nineteenth century 
German history of liberal nationalism which drew from the French Revolution.  However, after the 
failure of the 1848 revolutions this discourse was gradually overwhelmed, even if not entirely 
replaced, by völkisch nationalism.  See Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte: 1800-1866 
(Munich: C.H. Beck, 1983). 
7 Frank Bajohr and Michael Wildt, Volksgemeinschaft: Neue Forschungen zur Gesellschaft des 
Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2009).   Sven Keller, 
Volksgemeinschaft am Ende: Gesellschaft und Gewalt, 1944/45 (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 
2013).   Thomas Kühne, ”Todesraum: War, Peace, and the Experience of Mass Death” in ed. 
Helmut Walser Smith, The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 527-547.   Thomas Kühne, Belonging and Genocide: Hitler’s 
Community, 1918-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).   Thomas Kühne, The Rise 
and Fall of Comradeship: Hitler’s Soldiers, Male Bonding and Mass Violence in the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).   Peter Fritzsche, Life and Death in the 
Third Reich (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009).   Ian Kershaw, The End: The Defiance and 
Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944-1945 (London: Penguin Books, 2012).   Nicholas 
Stargardt, The German War: A Nation Under Arms, 1939-1945 (Basic Books, 2017). 
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This dissertation builds upon the cultural-ideological Sonderweg by 
examining a network of German conservatives who encountered the transnational 
ruptures of the mid-twentieth century – in particular: continental expansionism, 
the Eastern Front, political collapse, divided Germany, and the Cold War – by 
expanding the definition of an organic Gemeinschaft (“community”) from 
Germany to Europe and repackaging the ideas of völkisch nationalism into a 
larger European framework.  This endeavor was deliberate; it was evident in the 
terminology of the Europe-concept.  The idea of a “national revolution” was 
replaced by a “European revolution” that would usher in the inevitable political, 
cultural, and economic unification of an organic, historical European völkisch 
community called the “europäische Völkergemeinschaft” (European Community 
of Peoples) or “europäische Schicksalsgemeinschaft” (European Community of 
Destiny).  This European revolution would be secured by the establishment of an 
enclosed continental polity called the “europäische Grossraum” (European 
continental space), which would marshal its resources to preserve the new 
European community in the existential struggle against Western liberalism and 
Eastern Marxism.  All of these terms were unambiguous appropriations of 
German nationalist terminology even though conservative proponents of the 
Europe-concept also rejected nationalism as an inhibiting reactionary relic of 
Europe’s past.8  But this rejection of nationalism is better described as a 
reinvention of the nation than a complete rejection of it.  The Europe-concept was 
 
8 Völkergemeinschaft was a plural reformulation of Volksgemeinschaft; Schicksalsgemeinschaft 
was a direct appropriation; and Grossraum functioned as an alternative to Lebensraum.   
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consistently presented not just as a surpassing of nationalism but also its 
fulfillment: a new, superior European nationalism. 
This dissertation, therefore, contributes to the historical literature that 
defines nations as modern, socially constructed “imagined communities.”9  
Following Rogers Brubaker, it understands nationalism as the product of various 
competing discourses of the nation all of which define themselves against one 
another.10  Thus, the Europe-concept was an imagined community that defined 
itself against German nationalism but also drew its meaning from the traditional 
völkisch ideology at the core of German nationalism.  This was at the heart of its 
appeal.  As Ute Frevert has argued: “…the opposition of national versus European 
tends to overlook how deeply connected and intertwined those orientations 
actually are.”11  Consequently, this dissertation employs the term “Europeanism” 
as a way to capture the ideological nature of the Europe-concept as a discourse of 
nationhood.  In this way, this dissertation builds upon the historical research that 
has investigated the especially contested nature of German nation-construction.12  
 
9 See Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983). 
10 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New 
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
11 Ute Frevert, “Europeanizing Germany’s Twentieth Century,” History and Memory 17.1-2 
(2005): 87-116, 88. 
12 Stefan Berger, Inventing the Nation: Germany (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2004).   
James J. Sheehan, “What is German History?  Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German 
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But it also contributes to the broader scholarly literature that has explored the way 
Europe emerged as a new form of identity after the First World War and the 
resulting crisis of European confidence.13  Although it began as a relatively 
marginalized idea in the Conservative Revolution, the events of the 1940s and 
1950s secured the Europe-concept remarkable reach and influence at the same 
time that German nationalism was encountering a lack of legitimacy in the 
context of an increasingly dire war situation as well as the anti-nationalist 
sentiment of the postwar period.  The Europe-concept, then, was a form of 
identity politics that camouflaged the völkisch Kulturnation and in doing so made 
the ideas of radical German conservatism accessible in the new and changing 
contexts of the war and postwar period.  Indeed, the significance of the Europe-
concept lies in its ability to traverse the ruptures of the Second World War. 
The Zero Hour, Postwar Conservatism, and Democratization 
This dissertation adopts the “transwar” framework advanced by Philip 
Nord, wherein he argues that continuities in European political history can best be 
 
History and Historiography,” The Journal of Modern History 53.1 (1981): 1-23.  This dissertation 
also complements Pieter Judson’s argument that German nationalists developed a uniquely 
subversive identity and readiness to challenge the political status quo.  See Pieter M. Judson, 
“Nationalism in the Era of the Nation-State, 1871-1945,” in ed. Helmut Walser Smith, The Oxford 
Handbook of Modern German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 499-526. 
13 Mark Hewitson and Matthew D’Auria, Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 
1917-1957 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012).   Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle, Ideas of 
Europe since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).   
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understood by investigating continuities that both transcend the end of the Second 
World War as well as reach back to the interwar period.14  This is particularly 
complicated as it pertains to the so-called Stunde Null (“Zero Hour”) of German 
history in 1945, because any conversation of continuities in German history has to 
confront the reality of blaring postwar discontinuities as well.15  Even though the 
term “Zero Hour” originated in connection to postwar apologetic memory 
politics, some recent historians have nonetheless called for its revival as way to 
highlight discontinuities in German history.  The most arresting such arguments 
point to the abrupt absence of nationalism and militarism in postwar German 
political culture.16  To be sure, there is much to be said for reading postwar 
German history through the lens of rupture; very important, for example, were the 
occupation and division of Germany and the geopolitics of the Cold War, which 
exerted an incalculable impact on the development of German politics.17  
 
14 Philip Nord, France’s New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010). 
15 For an excellent review of recent literature on the debate over the Zero Hour, see Pertti 
Ahonen, “Germany and the Aftermath of the Second World War,” The Journal of Modern History 
89.2 (2017). 
16 See, most notably, Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War to Peace (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2010). 
17 A less convincing defense of the Zero Hour, however, is the argument that Germans were de-
politicized having turned to religion, family, basic living necessities, and survival.  See William 
M. Chandler, “Integration and Identity in German Politics,” in ed. Peter H. Merkl, The Federal 
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Nevertheless, this dissertation will join the work of scholars who have sought to 
carefully investigate the nuanced ways in which political continuities survived the 
watershed of 1945.18  A suitable compromise in the debate over the Zero Hour 
can be found in Thomas Nipperdey and Jeffrey Herf’s arguments vis-à-vis 
“multiple continuities” and “multiple restorations”; namely, the co-existence of 
competing political traditions in German history.19  This is the framework that 
will be adopted in this dissertation’s investigation of post-Nazi Europeanism, 
postwar German conservatism, and the issue of democratization.   
One of the most perplexing developments in German history is the 
remarkable reversal of nationalism in West German politics.  Whereas the Social 
Democratic political Left took up the banner of nationalism (albeit shorn of 
 
Republic of Germany at Fifty: The End of a Century of Turmoil (New York: New York University 
Press, 1999). 
18 Frank Biess and Robert G. Moeller, Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second 
World War in Europe (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010).   Mark Mazower, Jessica Reinisch, 
and David Feldman, Post-War Reconstruction in Europe: International Perspectives, 1945-1949 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).   Richard Overy, “Interwar, War, Postwar: Was There a 
Zero Hour in 1945?” in ed. Dan Stone, The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 60-78.   Jan Werner Müller, German Ideologies Since 
1945: Studies in the Political Thought and Culture of the Bonn Republic (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2003).   
19 See Thomas Nipperdey, “1933 und Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte,“ Historische 
Zeitschrift 227.1 (1978): 86-111.   Jeffrey Herf, “Multiple Restorations: German Political 




militarism and irredentism), the new political Right, in contrast, abandoned 
nationalism in favor of the Christian Democratic politics of European integration.  
This development begs the question why conservative voters, who had hitherto 
been the most vocal milieu in favor of radical nationalist politics, supported 
Christian Democracy despite this incongruity.  This question is especially 
important, because in contrast to the common interpretation of postwar European 
history as a “Social Democratic moment,” the first postwar decades of Western 
European history, and West German history specifically, were in actuality a 
decidedly “Christian Democratic moment.”20  As Heinrich August Winkler has 
argued, liberal democracy’s “long road” to fruition in German political culture 
was primarily the accomplishment of Konrad Adenauer and his party (the 
Christian Democratic Union, or CDU) during the two decades of near uncontested 
 
20 For the “Social Democratic moment” argument, see Geoff Eley, “Corporatism and the Social 
Democratic Moment: The Postwar Settlement, 1945-1973” in ed. Dan Stone, The Oxford 
Handbook of Postwar European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 37-59.   Tony 
Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), chapter 11.  For the 
iteration of this argument in the historiography of West Germany specifically, see Stefan Ludwig 
Hoffman’s argument that Christian Democracy was successful precisely because it appropriated 
the Social Democratic tradition.  See Stefan Ludwig Hoffman, “Germany is No More: Defeat, 
Occupation, and the Postwar Order” in ed. Helmut Walser Smith, The Oxford Handbook of 
Modern German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 593-614.  For the “Christian 
Democratic moment” argument see Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Thought 
in Twentieth-century Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
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political power after the Second World War.21  One of the most important 
questions for postwar West German history, then, is how the German Right, 
which had only very recently been ideologically radicalized in a totalitarian 
regime, was attracted to postwar Christian Democracy and was consequently 
integrated into the politics of liberal democracy. 
This was not a forgone conclusion.  One way to interpret this phenomenon 
is to point to an “anti-Communist consensus” in which West Germans detached 
themselves from radical politics in order to cooperate with Konrad Adenauer’s 
hardline foreign policy against Communism.22  But this answer is insufficient 
because it neglects to consider the anti-Communist alternatives to Christian 
Democracy.  For example, Kurt Schumacher, the postwar leader of Christian 
Democracy’s closest competitor center-left party, the Social Democratic Party, 
remade his party into an equally fierce anti-Communist organization.23  
Furthermore, Schumacher supplemented his party’s anti-Communism with an 
explicit appeal to German nationalism and went so far as to imply that his 
opponents were un-German for supporting European integration at the expense of 
national reunification.  Additionally, the anti-Communist thesis fails to 
 
21 Heinrich August Winkler, Germany: The Long Road West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006).   Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1997).   
22 See, for example, Andrew I. Port, “Democracy and Dictatorship in the Cold War: The Two 
Germanies, 1949-1961” in ed. Helmut Walser Smith, The Oxford Handbook of Modern German 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 615-639.  
23 See Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory. 
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acknowledge that there also existed nationalist right-wing, anti-Communist 
alternatives to the CDU which, in the first few years of the West German Federal 
Republic, were not declared unconstitutional (for example, the Sozialistische 
Reichspartei and the Deutsche Partei).  Any of these alternatives could very well 
have been a more natural home for the millions of conservative Germans who 
nevertheless supported Adenauer’s CDU or his main coalition party, the Free 
Democratic Party.24   
This dissertation contributes an answer to this dilemma by suggesting that 
the Europe-concept created a bridge for many radicalized German conservatives 
to the postwar Christian Democratic politics of European integration.  As will be 
illustrated, post-Nazi Europeanists attached to the European integration project 
the continuation and fulfillment of their conservative European revolution and 
successfully created an influential voice for this interpretation of contemporary 
events in West German public discourse.  To be clear, the politics of Konrad 
Adenauer’s CDU and European integration was markedly different in motivation 
and vision than the politics advocated by post-Nazi Europeanists.  Furthermore, 
 
24 This dissertation agrees with Geoff Eley’s call for historians to acknowledge the contingency 
and plethora of possibilities as Germany transitioned across the year 1945.  See Geoff Eley, 
“Europe after 1945,” History Workshop Journal 65.1 (2008): 195-212.  Many historians who have 
answered this call highlight the possibility and missed opportunity for a left-wing transformation 
of German political culture in the late 1940s.  But given the role of radical nationalism in German 
history, this point is even more salient for considering the possibilities of right-wing entrenchment.  
See, for example, Gareth Pritchard, Niemandsland: A History of Unoccupied Germany, 1944-1945 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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although they allowed post-Nazi Europeanists to exist within the umbrella of the 
CDU voting bloc, the architects of Christian Democracy and European integration 
did not actively legitimize or confirm the fantasies of post-Nazi Europeanists.  
But as Ronald Granieri has argued, terms such as “Europe” and the “West” were 
concepts in postwar German conservatism which carried many different 
meanings, and the resulting ambiguity efficiently masked some of the 
irreconcilable political differences of the postwar period.  Granieri argues that this 
ambivalence was the key to Konrad Adenauer’s political success in the 1950s, 
because it concealed a division in Christian Democracy between a group he calls 
the “Atlanticists” (advocates of a West Germany integrated into an American-led 
liberal international order) and a group he calls the “Gaullists” (advocates of an 
independent continental Europe opposed to Anglo-Saxon influence in politics, 
culture, and economics such as was promoted by Charles de Gaulle, the President 
of the French Fifth Republic).25  Granieri is correct to identify an anti-Atlanticist 
milieu within the CDU such as Eugen Gerstenmaier, a key figure in part II of this 
dissertation, but his categorization of this group as “Gaullist” is questionable for a 
number of reasons.  Such an interpretation reads the political controversies of the 
1960s back into the 1950s.  “Gaullism” was not a meaningful category in the 
political culture of West Germany in the 1950s and anti-Atlanticist conservatives 
did not regularly engage with de Gaulle before his ascension to power in 1958.  
But even as an analytical category, the term “Gaullism” falls short because anti-
 
25 Ronald J. Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 
1949-1966 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003). 
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Atlanticist conservatives of the 1950s were markedly different in political 
ideology than the Gaullists of the 1960s.  Furthermore, anti-Atlanticist 
conservatives were not a monolithic group.  For example, while many belonged to 
the Catholic Abendländische Bewegung (“Occidental movement”), many others 
were former nationalist Protestants who escape easy categorization alongside 
Catholic conservatives. 
This dissertation will introduce a group anti-Atlanticist conservatives who 
differed from Gaullists in three fundamental ways: first, unlike de Gaulle who 
openly presented himself as a restorative nationalist, they energetically denounced 
nationalism (even and especially German nationalism); second, unlike de Gaulle 
who opposed European integration and appealed only rhetorically to a “Europe of 
Fatherlands,” they were among the most enthusiastic advocates of even the most 
radically integrationist policies of the European integration program in the 1950s; 
third, unlike de Gaulle they moderated their anti-Americanism, accommodated 
the United States as a useful ally, and eventually even came to embrace 
Atlanticism by the end of the 1950s.  While it is true that a small contingent of 
Gaullists emerged in West German politics in the 1960s to confront what had 
become the dominant Atlanticism of the CDU, this was not necessarily a product 
or continuation of 1950s anti-Atlanticism.  Although there were continuities 
between the specifically Catholic Occident movement and 1960s Gaullism, this 
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dissertation aims to show that there existed an important post-Nazi Europeanist 
discourse within the non-Catholic voting bloc of the CDU.26 
The bridge between former Nazi Europeanists and Christian Democracy 
was further aided by the sense of rupture and experimentation that surrounded the 
politics of European integration when it first began to dominate the public sphere 
in the immediate postwar period.  The initial proposals for European integration 
advanced by Western European statesmen in the late 1940s and the early 1950s 
were more ambitious than the comparatively limited integration that was actually 
implemented by the end of the 1950s.  For example, the original plans for a 
European Coal and Steel Community and, especially, the European Defense 
Community (or, European Army) were accompanied with calls for a far-reaching 
deconstruction of nation-state sovereignty and the eventual creation of a new 
European federation called the European Political Community – in short, a radical 
rupture with the postwar status quo.  Although the European Army and the 
European Political Community ultimately failed, this dissertation attempts to 
restore the centrality of these proposals to the early history of West Germany.  
These grand narratives of wide-sweeping European integration dominated West 
German political discourse during these years and in doing so created space for 
post-Nazi Europeanists to project radical and illiberal ramifications onto 
European integration - or at least the possibility to influence the process in their 
desired direction.  Consequently, for nearly a decade post-Nazi Europeanists 
 
26 Much of this conversation hinges on an important delineation between Catholic and Protestant 
conservatism in postwar West Germany.  This point is discussed in more detail below. 
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worked to advance their Europe-concept through democracy and West German 
rule of law, and, as a result, they accustomed themselves to the practice and idea 
of democracy.  But by the mid-1950s their European dream had died and, having 
worked within the parameters of liberal democracy for many years, they had 
nowhere else to go.  Their disillusionment stimulated a coming to terms with a 
new perception of liberal democracy’s reality and necessity. 
This transwar examination of the Europe-concept, therefore, is also a 
study in the democratization of German conservatism.  Specifically, this 
dissertation will build upon Jerry Muller’s paradigm of a “de-radicalization” of 
German conservatism; namely, the process by which the German conservative 
tradition was reconciled to the principles of liberal democracy, that is: 
individualism, pluralism, human rights, self-government, and popular sovereignty.  
Muller’s research on the influential intellectual Hans Freyer traces the path in 
German conservatism to and from the temptation for a utopian total state as a 
vehicle for preserving the mythic völkisch nation against modern civilization.27  
This dissertation aims to complement this argument by highlighting the 
conservative departure with the völkisch nation itself.  As argued above, historical 
research on the cultural-ideological Sonderweg has situated völkisch nationalism 
front and center in the story of German political radicalization.  This dissertation 
argues, therefore, that our understanding of the de-radicalization of German 
conservatism must seek to understand the decline of völkisch ideology in postwar 
 
27 Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God That Failed: Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of 
German Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
23 
 
German history.  De-nationalization, in other words, was a pivotal component of 
the de-radicalization of German conservatism.  The Europe-concept, it will be 
argued, was an important waystation in the transition from völkisch nationalism, 
because, although the Europe-concept repackaged substantial elements of the 
völkisch tradition, it was ultimately advanced in the name of anti-nationalism 
(including an explicit rejection of German nationalism).  This aided the formation 
of an alliance between postwar German conservatives and the postwar liberal 
architects of European integration who likewise rejected nationalism but who had 
no illusions about a völkisch Europe.  It was within the confines of this alliance 
that the fantasy of a völkisch community (völkisch Europe) safely died as it was 
gradually replaced with the Europe of incremental economic integration.  As Dirk 
von Laak has argued, the de-radicalization of German conservatism was a 
protracted process that succeeded in multiple stages.  The Conservative 
Revolution was not immediately tamed in 1945; to the contrary, significant 
elements remained in their postwar political identity and many conservatives only 
participated in postwar democracy in as much as they viewed the Federal 
Republic as a new “technocratic” vehicle for elites to govern society.  This anti-
democratic participation in democracy, von Laak argues, was only moderated 
over time and as a result of their participation in democracy.28  The argument in 
part II of this dissertation is that the Europe-concept was another important 
 
28 Dirk van Laak, “From Conservative Revolution to Technocratic Conservatism” in ed. Jan 
Werner Müller, German Ideologies Since 1945: Studies in the Political Thought and Culture of 
the Bonn Republic (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 147-160. 
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moderating force in the postwar democratization of conservatism because it 
contributed to the dissolution of völkisch politics.  In short, the Europe-concept 
assisted a transwar unpacking of the cultural-ideological Sonderweg. 
 Early postwar literature on the transformation of German conservatism 
was largely incredulous.  In fact, a predominant argument advanced by, for 
example, Eugen Kogon and Walter Dirks in the Frankfurter Hefte during the 
1950s and 1960s was the suggestion of a “restoration” of a proto-fascistic culture 
of conservative authoritarianism.29  As Norbert Frei has argued, the idea of a 
conservative restoration dominated the literature of the immediate postwar period 
until the 1980s, at which point a more optimistic turn produced the perspective of 
a “founding era” for liberal democracy in West Germany’s “long 1950s.”30  But 
as Diethelm Prowe has argued, this historiographical shift was inclined to eschew 
the role of conservative modernization and instead ascribe the achievement of 
democratization to the postwar economic boom (Wirtschaftswunder) or to cultural 
globalization and generational turn-over in the 1960s.31  Even those historians 
 
29 For one of the most well-known examples of the “restoration” thesis, see Eugen Kogon, Die 
unvollendete Erneuerung: Deutschland im Kräftefeld, 1945-1960.  Politische und 
Gesellschaftspolitische Aufsätze aus zwei Jahrzehnten (Frankfurt a.M.: Europäische Verlag-
Anstalt, 1964).  
30 Norbert Frei, “Die Langen Fünfziger: Wirtschaftliche Dynamik und biedermeierliche 
Restauration, materielle Modernisierung und Kontinuität nationalsozialistischer Funktionseliten,” 
Die Zeit, February 16, 2006.   
31 Diethelm Prowe, “The ‘Miracle‘ of the Political-Culture Shift: Democratization between 
Americanization and Conservative Reintegration” in ed. Hanna Schissler, The Miracle Years: A 
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who do situate the modernization of conservatism at the center of democratization 
narratives tend to place the process considerably later, emphasizing the 
persistence of illiberalism, especially on the German political Right, well into the 
1960s.32  These accounts of postwar West German political culture risk leaving 
the first ten to fifteen years of West German history unaccounted for and 
inexplicable; after all, it was precisely in this time period when political liberalism 
was institutionalized: the establishment of a federal constitution, three mass 
elections producing a democratic consensus behind Konrad Adenauer, West 
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German entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the founding of 
the European Economic Community.  This paradox has led some historians to 
conclude that the initial postwar years in West Germany (and elsewhere) were a 
story of liberalism without liberals, an argument that was summarized by Jan-
Werner Müller with the somewhat awkward formulation “post-post-liberal 
Order,” by which he meant a politics in postwar Europe that rejected anti-
liberalism without any positive consensus of its own.33  This is not dissimilar to 
Mark Mazower’s argument that liberal democracy in Europe was more a product 
of fascism delegitimizing popular illiberalism than any actual achievement of 
liberalism itself.34  Such arguments, although valuable, miss an important part of 
the story.  As this dissertation will illustrate, some of the most influential German 
conservatives of the Conservative Revolution and even National Socialism were, 
from positions of considerable influence, already by the mid-1950s openly 
espousing liberal democracy.  As such, this dissertation joins the work of those 
scholars who have sought to move the interpretative lens of democratization back 
to the ideas and political culture of the 1950s.35  By highlighting these figures and 
 
33 Jan-Werner Müller, “A Post-Post-Liberal Order: How Western Europe Emerged from its 30-
Year Crisis” in ed.s Lars K. Brunn, Karl Christian Lammers, and Gert Sørensen, European Self-
Reflection between Politics and Religion: The Crisis of Europe in the 20th Century (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 193-212.   Müller, Contesting Democracy.   
34 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage, 2000). 
35 Friedrich Kießling, for example, has attempted to move left-liberal intellectuals such as Dolf 
Sternberger, Karl Jaspers, and Ernst Fraenkel and their work in the “old Federal Republic” back to 
the center of the story of democratization.  See Friedrich Kießling, Die undeutschen Deutschen.  
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their relatively early reconciliation with liberal democracy, this dissertation 
attempts to reemphasize the power and centrality of ideas in the story of West 
German democratization.   
 Before moving on it is worth noting a final point on the de-radicalization 
of postwar conservatism.  The literature on West German democratization has 
witnessed a debate over the terms “Westernization” and “Americanization.”36  
Some historians have critiqued the terms “Westernization” and “modernization” 
for insinuating a deterministic end-of-history triumphalism, and instead prefer the 
term “Americanization” because it ascribes the political transformations in West 
German political culture a certain contingency, but also because it acknowledges 
the pivotal role of the United States in shaping the developments of postwar 
history.37  Other historians have argued that the term “Americanization” fails to 
appropriately weigh the role of national traditions specific to German political 
culture.38  A recurring argument throughout this dissertation is that the United 
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Gassert, “The Spectre of Americanization: Western Europe in the American Century” in ed. Dan 
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States featured prominently in the minds of conservative Europeanists precisely 
because it was the paragon of Western liberalism.  In other words, the subjects of 
this dissertation did not distinguish between terms like “West,” “liberal,” and 
“democracy.”   Furthermore, as this dissertation will show, conservative 
Europeanists were just as obsessed with the United States as they were with 
Communism; indeed, the rise of the Europe-concept in Nazi propaganda preceded 
the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.  Therefore, one of the most important 
tasks for understanding the postwar democratization of the figures in this 
dissertation is tracing the evolution of the United States, and by extension liberal 
democracy, in the minds of conservative Europeanists. 
The United States exerted an invaluable pressure, albeit indirectly, on the 
political culture of Western Europe and West Germany specifically.39  The 
occupation period, followed by the sustained presence of the American military, 
and held together by the interventionist foreign policy of the early Cold War 
created a climate in which post-Nazi Europeanists were forced to moderate their 
anti-Americanism.  In order to remain relevant, they were more easily persuaded 
to work within the limits and boundaries of the American-led postwar democratic 
order.  In fact, as part II of this dissertation will illustrate, covert CIA operations 
designed to encourage European integration cooperated directly with post-Nazi 
Europeanists, who in turn saw the United States as a useful ally in their designs 
 
39 See William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided 
Continent, 1945 to the Present (Norwell: Anchor, 2004). 
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for a European revolution.40  However opportunistic this alliance was, it was an 
essential precondition for the liberalization of German conservatism.  The United 
States was the undisputed leader of liberal democracy in the postwar period, and 
the perception held by post-Nazi Europeanists that they had American sympathy 
and support gradually eroded their illiberalism.  Over the course of the early 
1950s post-Nazi Europeanist increasingly found themselves defending the United 
States and its political principles from not only Communists, but also their 
pacifist, nationalist, and anti-European integration domestic opponents as well.  
Consequently, by the mid-1950s, when the dream for a European revolution 
failed, liberal democracy was for post-Nazi Europeanists considerably less 
treacherous than it had appeared in 1945.  Acknowledging the importance of the 
United States in the democratization of West German political culture need not 
come at the expense of analyzing developments specific to German history.  As 
this dissertation will illustrate, the two often worked hand in hand.  For this 
reason, this dissertation will use neither the term “Westernization” nor 
“Americanization,” but rather, simply, “democratization.” 
Competing Ideas of Europe 
 In all three time periods examined in this dissertation the conservative 
Europe-concept was contested by other, competing ideas of Europe.  The 
following paragraphs situate the conservative Europe-concept into the existing 
 
40 For detailed account of the United States intelligence community and its liaison with former 
Nazis during the Cold War, see Richard Breitman, Robert Wolfe, Norman J. W. Goda, and 
Timothy Naftali, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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literature concerning the idea of Europe in each of these respective time periods.  
Additionally, the following paragraphs will outline how conservative 
Europeanists encountered these opposing concepts of Europe. 
1. The Interwar Period 
Many historians trace the roots of European integration and Europe as a 
political identity back to the late nineteenth century and interwar period, where a 
small, but growing, group of European intellectuals and politicians began to 
advocate replacing nation-state rivalries with various visions of European political 
and economic unification, such as French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand’s 
proposed European economic integration in 1929 as well as the ill-fated Pan-
European movement led by Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, which sought the 
eventual formation of a “United States of Europe.”  The connection between the 
Pan-European movement and the conservative Europe-concept, however, is 
tenuous.  In part because of its reliance on the League of Nations, conservative 
Europeanists explicitly engaged with and rejected the Pan-European movement, 
which they argued was a tool of liberal internationalism and Anglo-Saxon 
imperialism and, as such, a distorted and fraudulent understanding of Europe.  In 
contrast to much of the literature on the idea of Europe, this dissertation highlights 
intellectual trajectories that do not easily fit into a progressive reading of the pre-
history of European integration.41   
 
41 Many histories of Europe as a political concept and identity isolate various early twentieth 
century liberal idealists as forerunners for the postwar liberal project of European integration.  See 
Karl Christian Lammers, “Europe between Democracy and Fascism: Hermann Heller on Fascism 
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As Dieter Gosewinkel has shown, a much more predominant intellectual 
tradition of Europe in the early twentieth century was what he calls “anti-liberal 
Europe,” a diverse intellectual tradition in European conservative circles, 
extending from political Catholicism to German and Habsburg imperialism, 
which envisioned Europe as an alternative to liberal modernity at the fin-de-
siècle.42  As Jürgen Elvert has illustrated, one particular concept in this tradition 
would become especially important for Nazi Europe-propaganda; namely, the 
Mitteleuropa (or, “Middle Europe”) concept, which was originally articulated by 
German intellectuals, politicians, and statesmen in the Foreign Office during the 
First World War, and which proposed the subjugation and coordination of Central 
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Europe under German imperial leadership in order to establish a bulwark against 
East and West. This idea, facilitated by German imperialists and right-wing 
reactionaries, was ultimately an intellectual justification for German political, 
economic, and social dominance of Europe in the early twentieth century and was 
sometimes drawn upon by conservative Europeanists before and during the 
Second World War.43  However, this dissertation will argue that a network of 
Conservative Revolutionaries of the Weimar period was the most immediate and 
important originator of what would eventually become Nazi Europeanism. The 
Third Reich’s massive transnational Europe-propaganda machine, which reached 
millions of readers across the continent during the Second World War, was 
initiated, organized, and administered by a group of radical German conservatives 
with connections to this network, and for whom “Europe” was much more than a 
new geopolitical arrangement; rather, it was an organic community imbued with 
the historical mission to resolve Europe’s modern identity crisis via the creation 
of a new European nation and polity. Nevertheless, the Conservative 
Revolutionaries who first experimented with the Europe-concept often channeled 
the Mitteleuropa concept and even used the not dissimilar term Zwischeneuropa 
(“In-between Europe”).  Furthermore, as will be shown in part I of this 
dissertation, the Nazi Europe-concept evolved over the course of the war as it was 
increasingly revised and distanced from orthodox National Socialist principles, 
 
43 Jürgen Elvert, Mitteleuropa!: Deutsche Pläne Zur Europäischen Neuordnung, 1918-1945 
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999).   Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: 
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and in its initial configurations in 1940 the Nazi Europe-concept was often 
difficult to distinguish from justifications for German hegemony in 
Mitteleuropa.44 
2. The Nazi Period 
The term “Nazi Europeanism” might seem inherently paradoxical.  After 
all, National Socialism was a political ideology defined by its insistence on the 
radical exclusion of, and uncompromising struggle against, non-racial Germans.  
For the National Socialists, all modern political concepts (especially transnational 
ones) were mere window dressing for the actual essence of politics: racial 
struggle.  This “hyper-nationalism” is arguably why the historiography has largely 
neglected transnational studies of fascism.45  This is also why Nazi Europe-
propaganda has been incorrectly dismissed in the literature as hollow, 
opportunistic, and limited sloganeering program designed merely to mask German 
imperialism or buttress a fracturing front in the face of diminishing war prospects.  
Historians who have dismissed Nazi Europe-propaganda often point to Hitler’s 
frequent demands that propagandists withhold specifics about the postwar “New 
Order of Europe” as evidence that Nazi Europe-propaganda was never more than 
 
44 The above two paragraph are drawn substantially from an article published by the present 
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an opportunistic and disingenuous charade.46  To be sure, this dissertation does 
not refute the fact that Hitler and other Nazi leaders merely viewed Europe-
propaganda as a tool for their racial conquest of the continent. 
However, a few recent scholars have illustrated that some propagandists in 
the National Socialist regime patronized a more thorough, sincere, and 
consequential Europe-propaganda than previously acknowledged.  Benjamin 
Martin, for example, has recently illustrated that Goebbels’s propaganda ministry, 
 
46 Hans-Dietrich Loock, “Zur ‘Großgermanischen Politik‘ Des Dritten Reiches,” 
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beginning already in 1934, initiated a wide-reaching project to facilitate 
transnational cultural exchange throughout the continent through various 
programs, clubs, and conferences designed to unify Europeans behind a new 
vision of traditional European cultures set against the decadent East and West.  
But Martin’s subject matter does not illustrate the full extent of Nazi 
Europeanism.  Martin uses the unique term “inter-nationalism” to describe 
Goebbels’s program, because his examined euro-fascists did not seek to integrate 
cultural traditions; instead, they sought to rally mutual support for, and admiration 
of, the cultural and racial peculiarities of the various European nations.  In short, 
he reads what one could perhaps call national segregationism - a limited platform 
for approving the nationalism of other fascists rather than constructing a shared 
identity or ideology.47  This dissertation, in contrast, will illustrate that Nazi 
Europeanists operating outside of Goebbels’s control articulated a much more 
ambitious conceptualization of Europe that was accompanied with a revision of 
orthodox National Socialism, including direct encounters with Nazi teachings on 
race and nation.   
In doing so, this dissertation joins a group of recent scholars who have 
explored concepts of Europe in various institutions largely unexplored in the 
literature on Nazi propaganda.48  To be sure, Nazi Europe-propaganda was not a 
 
47 See Benjamin George Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).  
48 One historian whose research complements this interpretation of the Nazi Europe-concept is 
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monolith.  Various scholars have pointed to a plethora of Nazi statesmen and 
functionaries who articulated different ideas about the New Order of Europe such 
as Werner Best, the administrator of occupied France and Denmark who had 
previously been a high-ranking member of the Gestapo.  Other examples include 
idiosyncratic economists connected to the Reich’s Economics Ministry who 
developed elaborate new economic models for integrating European economies, 
especially the Balkans, into the Reich.  However, these efforts rarely went beyond 
camouflaged justifications for German racial dominance of Europe and they 
remained largely confined to inner-departmental debates.  Furthermore, the 
producers of these ideas did not make serious attempts to carry these ideas 
somehow into the postwar period.49  This dissertation focuses on Nazi Europe-
 
Europeanist revisionism in Berlin’s academies during the war.  In fact, some of the figures 
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(Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2012). 
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propagandists who had the widest propaganda reach in Europe, genuinely 
believed in their new Europe ideology, and clung to the Europe-concept even 
after the war. 
This dissertation distinguishes Nazi Europeanism from what we will call 
“orthodox Nazi propaganda” in part because the ideas did not emanate from the 
ideological centers of power, which in the nature of the Third Reich means 
primarily Adolf Hitler and the indoctrination apparatus run by his immediate 
propaganda functionaries Joseph Goebbels (Propaganda Ministry) and Otto 
Dietrich (Press Chief).  Instead, Nazi Europeanism came from a network of 
conservative thinkers who operated in a space outside of the primary propaganda 
apparatus, something this dissertation calls “secondary level propaganda.”  This 
secondary level of propaganda consisted of conservative publications, academic 
institutions, military propaganda, and foreign office propaganda – none of which 
were subject to the regular supervision and censoring process found elsewhere in 
the Reich, but which nevertheless reached millions of readers across the 
continent.  As a consequence, this space proved to be a vehicle for significant 
ideological deviation and revisionism. An important question, then, is why this 
separate space for ideas was allowed to exist in a regime aspiring for 
totalitarianism.  The answer is Machiavellian. 
Hitler and Goebbels saw Europe-propaganda as a useful tool in their racial 
imperialism, a lie capable of placating opposition to their exterminationist rule.  
This opportunistic dynamic was accelerated by the increasingly dire war 
circumstances, in particular the desperate need for manpower after the failed 
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invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, much of which was addressed by foreign 
volunteers and conscripts.50  This is best evidenced by the way Joseph Goebbels 
disingenuously appropriated Europe-propaganda into his own propaganda 
apparatus beginning in early 1943 after the fall of Stalingrad.  Before Stalingrad, 
Goebbels was heard to say that all the “wish-wash about a ‘New Europe’” was 
merely unproductive “noise.” Everybody already knew, he argued, that the Nazis 
were fighting for “oil, wheat, and to improve the material standards of our 
Volk.”51 Yet after Stalingrad, Goebbels began messaging a narrative of “Fortress 
Europe” and a distressed call for a defense of European civilization against the 
godless barbarism of Bolshevism.  With his approval, Nazi Europe-propaganda 
became by the end of the war what Hannah Arendt described as “the Nazis’ most 
successful propaganda weapon.”52  In his diary Goebbels continued to be 
privately contemptuous of his own Europe narrative.53  Nevertheless, he 
 
50 Rolf-Dieter Müller, The Unknown Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and Hitler’s Foreign 
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51 Quoted from a memo by Foreign Office Secretary Martin Luther about Goebbels’s opinion 
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dramatically altered his public position, even giving interviews in foreign papers 
about the supposed voluntary nature of the “New Order of Europe” and the 
aspired equal treatment of all Europeans within it.54   
Hitler, too, was hardly genuine in his appeals to Europe.  The literature on 
Hitler has illustrated his commitment to zero-sum racial competition, some 
scholars going as far as to argue that he is best understood as a “racial 
anarchist.”55  Nevertheless, Hitler was aware of the potential propagandistic 
benefit of appeals to Europe, and in his public speeches and pronouncements 
signaled the legitimacy of Europe rhetoric, which was subsequently picked up by 
Nazi Europeanists in the secondary propaganda apparatus and used to justify their 
broader project.  Take the following two examples.  As early as June 16th, 1940 
Hitler gave an interview to an American journalist about German-American 
relations in which he implored the United States to stay out of the European 
conflict, saying: “leave America to the Americans; leave Europe to the 
Europeans!” This interview was subsequently picked up by a Foreign Office 
propaganda strategist.56   Eventually, the phrase “leave Europe to the Europeans!” 
became, as will be discussed in a separate chapter of this dissertation, the slogan 
 
54 See Goebbels’s interview with the Danish paper “Berlinske Tidende” on March 13, 1943 in: 
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55 Timothy Snyder, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning (New York: Tim 
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for the Foreign Office’s propaganda.  A second example of this legitimization 
process can be found in Hitler’s first two speeches following the invasion of the 
Soviet Union.  His first, a public proclamation issued on the day of the invasion 
on June 22nd, 1941, declared: 
Today, some 160 Russian divisions stand on our border.  For weeks, 
continual infringements of this border have been taking place….the hour 
has come in which it is necessary to go into action against this conspiracy 
of the Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and Jewish power-holders of the 
Bolshevist Centre in Moscow…. The task of this front [from Arctic 
Finland to the Black Sea] is thus no longer the defense of individual 
countries but the security of Europe and so the salvation of all.57 
 
The second speech was an eminently important speech Hitler gave on October 3rd, 
1941.  In this much anticipated speech (Hitler had not given an open speech to the 
public since before the invasion of the Soviet Union in June) Hitler broadcast 
from the Berliner Sportpalast a victory proclamation over the collapsing Soviets, 
described the war on the Eastern Front as a “European Awakening,” and praised 
the specific accomplishments of nearly a dozen different European nations at the 
front.  He also justified the attack as a preventative measure against a Bolshevist 
regime intending “to set not only Germany but all Europe aflame.”  The precise 
phrase “not only Germany but all Europe” is one he repeated four times in his 
original public announcement of the invasion in June.  This phrase and these 
speeches were enthusiastically referenced by Nazi Europeanists throughout the 
war.58  Then, in February of 1943, Goebbels wrote a secret memo to all 
 
57 Quoted in Stargardt, The German War, 159.  
58 See, for example, Karl Megerle, “Im Namen Europas,” in: Berliner Börsenzeitung, June 25, 
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propagandists and administrative leaders in the Reich in which he highlighted the 
phrase “not only Germany but all Europe” and listed the various times Hitler had 
employed it.  Based on these quotations he subsequently provided a list of seven 
propaganda principles for messaging Europe-propaganda, including the 
repudiation that Germany’s foreign policy intended to pursue any kind of 
“subjugation relationship,” “colonial politics,” or “displacement of populations.”  
Specifically discussing Eastern Europe, he explained that German intentions must 
be presented as philanthropic: to modernize the lands for their own economic and 
political benefit.  This memo was circulated by Heinrich Himmler to all SS 
administrative leaders with the note: “I find it precisely at our current moment in 
the war to be very important. It is to be followed in the strictest sense by all our 
positions.”59 And, as we will see in our chapter on Waffen-SS propaganda, it was.  
 The historian Ian Kershaw popularized the term “working towards the 
Führer” when describing Hitler’s leadership style in the administration of the 
National Socialist regime; specifically, the way Hitler’s speech signaled genocidal 
intentions which were received and implemented by lower level functionaries.60  
Nazi Europeanism functioned similarly, except that it did not reflect Hitler’s 
genuine intentions. In this case, it was his disingenuous speech which was then 
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selectively instrumentalized.  The relationship, then, of Nazi Europeanism to the 
larger propaganda apparatus in the Third Reich is the story of an unintended space 
opened up by Hitler and wartime exigencies and seized upon by a network of 
idiosyncratic conservative writers who filled it with their Europe ideology under 
the protective umbrella of various institutions that maintained various degrees of 
independence from Goebbels’s and Dietrich’s censor regime.  This partial 
independence awarded Nazi Europeanists the ability to revise core aspects of 
orthodox National Socialist ideology.  Chief among them was Nazi racial 
theory.61 
 Arguing that Nazi Europeanists were revisionists is not to deemphasize 
their complicity in National Socialism.  Indeed, Nazi Europeanists energetically 
supported the Nazi regime until nearly the very end, and many National Socialist 
principles were easily processed into the Europe-concept.  Social Darwinist racial 
theory, or Rassenkunde, on the other hand, presented considerable difficulties for 
obvious reasons.  A theme in this dissertation, therefore, is the steady dilution of 
Nazi racial theory (albeit with some exceptions).62  This process granted Nazi 
Europe-propagandists access to entire populations otherwise unreachable, such as 
 
61 The above six paragraphs are substantially drawn from an article published by the present 
author.  See Josh Klein, “Nazi Europeanism as Transnational Collaboration and Transnational 
Memory,” The Yearbook of Transnational History 2.1 (2019), 149-173. 
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Eastern Europeans and even Balkan-Muslims.63  The story of Nazi Europe-
propaganda, therefore, points to the malleability of Nazi ideology in its 
propaganda manifestations across the continent.  This is not to argue that Nazi 
Europeanists were not racists.  Although they were not biological racialists they 
were most certainly racists.  For one, the idea of Europe’s superiority over the 
barbaric, Asiatic East was an animating feature. But, even more importantly, there 
was one group which was never invited into the European fold: the Jews.  In fact, 
absent the threat of racial inferiors undermining the unification of Europe, Nazi 
Europeanists focused even more intently on the Jew as a pan-European, unifying 
threat.  As we will see, Nazi Europeanists repeatedly availed themselves of the 
Judeo-Bolshevist myth described in Paul Hanebrink’s recent book A Specter 
Haunting Europe; namely: the assertion of a Jewish plot to conquer the world.64  
Nazi Europeanists, though, told a uniquely European version of the Judeo-
Bolshevist myth in which Jews were the primordial enemies of an ancient 
European community, the manufacturers of all historical barriers standing in the 
way of the European revolution, including nationalism and its associated 
“European Civil Wars” in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.65  By 
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exploring the pliability of Nazi racism in the Europe-concept, this dissertation 
reinforces Jeffrey Herf’s argument that the literature on Nazi racism and 
antisemitism has too often focused on its biological discourses at the expense of 
politics and conspiracy.66 
3. The Postwar Period 
 That a revised version of the conservative Europe-concept rapidly attained 
currency in postwar West Germany is due in part to a broader wave of postwar 
enthusiasm for the idea of Europe that pulsated throughout Western Europe but 
especially in West Germany.  Some historians have mistakenly argued that the 
initial steps toward European integration were conducted with a democratic 
deficit.  They argue that a general era of public disinterest in politics enabled 
European idealists, politicians, and technocrats the necessary maneuverability to 
advance European integration.67  Such arguments are based on evidence that in 
the late 1950s public interest in European integration was lacking, but they 
oversee the initial groundswell of support for restructuring European politics that 
existed immediately after the war and only began to wane after various mid-
decade defeats.  This was particularly the case in the occupied German territories 
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and, subsequently, West Germany.  Already by 1946, four different Pan-European 
societies were established in the Western occupied zones.68  But the polling 
evidence shows that Europe-enthusiasm went far beyond liberal adherents of the 
fringe Pan-European movement.  A poll from the same year showed that eighty-
two percent of West Germans supported the creation of a “central government for 
all European countries.”69  This enthusiasm largely held into the early 1950s 
during the debates over the European Political Community and the European 
Defense Community.  In 1952, when asked their feelings about the frequently 
proposed “unification of Europe,” fifty-nine percent of West Germans expressed 
themselves optimistically while only fourteen percent expressed themselves 
pessimistically or skeptically.70  In 1953 forty-one percent against twenty-nine 
percent of West Germans believed that they would live to see the establishment of 
the “United States of Europe,” a confidence that only reversed a few years later 
after the defeat of the European Army.71  Nevertheless, as late as the end of 1955 
sixty-eight percent of the West German public expressed themselves in support of 
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the “United States of Europe” versus seven percent opposed.72  The suggestion 
that West Germans were apolitical is also belied by the fact that the 1949 and 
1953 federal elections each witnessed well over seventy-five percent voter 
participation.  Part II of this dissertation will illustrate that this public enthusiasm 
for a new European politics reached into conservative circles via the influential 
journalism of post-Nazi Europeanists.  As such, this dissertation joins the work of 
those scholars seeking to rescue the history of European integration from so-
called “rational-choice” models that deemphasize the role of European idealism.73  
These debates often revolve around interpretations of the motives behind the West 
European statesmen who implemented European integration.74  In contrast, this 
dissertation focuses on the constituents who supported European integration and 
the web of ideas that informed this support. 
 One way to interrogate conservative West Germans’ enthusiasm for 
Europe during the initial postwar years is to read it through the lens of the 
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Abendland concept, or “Occident” concept, an idea that was resurrected from 
interwar political Catholicism by many postwar conservatives who aligned with 
the so-called abendländische Bewegung (“Occidental movement”).  The 
Occidental movement was a collection of mostly Catholic theologians and 
professors who articulated the concept of the Occident at various universities and 
in several public magazines, most notably Neues Abendland and Rheinischer 
Merkur.  The Occident concept proclaimed the recent disasters of the Second 
World War to be an outgrowth of secular modernity.  Unleashed by the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution, secularization, they argued, had 
ultimately replaced Christian society with new forms of political association such 
as nationalism and socialism, each of which eventually mutated into 
totalitarianism.  Consequently, they called for the creation of a post-national 
Europe re-committed to and organized around the religious values of pre-modern 
Europe.75  As Axel Schildt illustrated, although the Occident movement aligned 
politically with the Christian Democratic politics of European integration, it was 
nevertheless fiercely illiberal, considering liberal democracy among the evil 
outgrowths of secular modernity and, in fact, the pre-cursor to totalitarianism.76 
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 Several historians have argued that the Occident concept was the driving 
force of West German conservative approval of European integration.77  Vanessa 
Conze, for example, has argued that there was a broad discursive struggle in 
German political culture from the 1920s to the 1960s between the Occident idea 
and what she calls the “West European liberal” idea of Europe, a struggle that 
culminated in their tactical alliance in the 1950s and, ultimately, the eventual 
victory of the latter in the 1960s.78  Historians such as Conze and Shildt are 
correct to identify the initial predominance of illiberal concepts of Europe in 
postwar West Germany, but the exclusive focus on the Occident concept risks 
oversimplifying the story of postwar conservative Europe-enthusiasm.  This is 
connected to a broad tendency in the literature to define postwar Christian 
Democracy as primarily a resurrection of interwar political Catholicism.79  To be 
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sure, there are good reasons to accentuate the role of Catholicism in postwar West 
German history.  After all, as a result of the postwar division of Germany, 
Catholics made up at least half of the population of Western occupied territories.  
This, combined with the general public assessment that Catholicism was less 
tainted than Protestantism by its association with National Socialism, meant that 
Catholics were disproportionately represented in the CDU.80    However, an 
argument in this dissertation is that postwar West German conservatism was more 
diverse than one camp in favor of Western integration and one camp in favor of a 
Catholic Abendland.  Specifically, it will aim to establish post-Nazi Europeanism 
as an important, independent constituency alongside the Catholic Occidentals in 
the illiberal wing of postwar West German conservatism.  This will be done by 
illustrating how post-Nazi Europeanists were fundamentally different than the 
Catholic Occidentals.  This post-Nazi Europeanism established itself in large part 
due to the fact that it appealed specifically to the Protestant base within West 
German conservatism which was considerably more secular and had 
disproportionately participated in National Socialism.81  As Stephen Brockmann 
has argued, the literature on West German conservatism has too often neglected 
 
Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012).   Dietmar Süß, “Lieb Abendland, 
magst ruhig sein,” Die Zeit, September 17, 2009. 
80 Benjamin Ziemann, “Religion and the Search for Meaning, 1945-1990” in ed. Helmut Walser 





the still sizable milieu of conservative Protestants.  In particular, Brockmann 
argues that this suggests it is essential to understand the pliability of the Occident 
concept; specifically, the way in which Protestants articulated their own 
Protestant definition of the Occident.82  This dissertation acknowledges 
Brockmann’s intervention but suggests that Protestant conservatives were 
motivated predominantly by the secular post-Nazi Europe-concept constructed by 
the figures of this dissertation, which dominated the pages of most-read 
conservative Protestant periodicals as well as the activities of the Protestant-
dominated veterans’ organizations.  These post-Nazi Europeanists expressly 
distanced their postwar Europe-concept to the Catholic Occident concept and to 
religious readings of European identity as such. 
 Perhaps the most important difference between the conservative Europe-
concept and the Occident concept was the relationship to modernity.  Whereas as 
the Occident movement was explicitly hostile to the modern world and advocated 
for a resurrection of the past, the conservative Europeanists analyzed in all three 
time periods of this dissertation were intensely forward-looking.  In fact, the 
Europe-concept was explicitly formulated as the modern solution to the problems 
bequeathed by the past and as the inevitable endpoint in a teleological reading of 
historical evolution.  This is evident in conservative Europeanists’ engagement 
with Oswald Spengler’s thesis of European civilizational decline put forward in 
the interwar best-seller The Decline of the Occident.  Before, during, and after the 
 




war, the figures in this dissertation repeatedly engaged with Spenglerian 
pessimism.  Although they believed that Spengler had correctly diagnosed 
European decline, they attempted to replace his fatalism with the idea of a 
redemptive European revolution that could reverse civilizational decline.  In short, 
their Europeanism was a reverse Spenglerian optimism.  Jeffrey Herf has argued 
that radical German conservatives were neither reactionary nor modernists, but 
“reactionary modernists,” which is to say that their project was an attempt to 
overcome modernity, but only selectively (for there were aspects of modernity 
which they embraced, such as technology).83  The conservative Europeanists of 
this dissertation were a unique brand of reactionary modernists.  For them, 
although modernity carried the disease of civilizational decline, it also brought 
with it the seeds of its own reversal: the economic, political, and social 
preconditions for the historically brewing “European revolution.”  Thus, the “New 
Europe” was the redeeming aspect of modernity.  It was both their vehicle for 
reacting against cultural modernity as well as the very epitome of modernity.  
This was demonstrated in their chosen terminology for the coming Europe: a 
“New Age,” a “New Order,” an inevitable “community of destiny,” a “European 
revolution,” a champion over nationalist “reactionaries.”  This reactionary 
modernism facilitated and sustained the complicity of conservative Europeanists 
in the genocidal policies of the revolutionary Nazi “New Order of Europe.”  
Paradoxically, however, the willingness to read optimism into tumultuous modern 
 
83 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the 
Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
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changes also proved essential in the de-radicalization of German conservatism 
after the war.84  
Methodology 
 This dissertation adopts a methodology that Jerry Muller calls 
“representative biography.”85  This entails isolating and examining prominent 
intellectuals who had significant influence because of their social status.  In 
particular, this dissertation focuses on intellectuals who had heightened 
intellectual influence as a result of their enlarged ability to disseminate ideas as 
high-profile journalists and propagandists.  In contrast to traditional biography, 
we will examine figures not so much for their personal history, but rather as a lens 
through which we can ascertain general patterns in political ideology.  As such, 
sources which were distributed and widely read receive special attention 
throughout this dissertation.  This is an implicit defense of traditional intellectual 
history as advanced by Clifford Geertz and Keith Michael Baker, wherein social 
elites are conceived of as the producers of “political culture” – the framework of 
ideas within which broader public mentalities materialize.86  Another argument 
 
84 The above paragraph is partially drawn from an article published by the present author.  See 
Josh Klein, “Nazi Europeanism as Transnational Collaboration and Transnational Memory,” The 
Yearbook of Transnational History 2.1 (2019), 149-173. 
85 Muller, The Other God that Failed. 
86 Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in ed. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of 
Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic, 1973).   Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French 
Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).  
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undergirding this dissertation is that political conservatism can only be understood 
by historians willing to take seriously its attendant ideas.  In the debate between 
Corey Robin and Mark Lilla - vis-à-vis whether conservatism should be 
conceptualized as a disingenuous mask for social and economic hierarchies 
(Robin) or whether it should be understood as a sincere, albeit sometimes 
dangerous, tussle with modernity (Lilla) - this dissertation comes down on the 
side of the latter.87  As such, this dissertation treats seriously its subjects’ evolving 
ideas and the resulting political consequences, and it marshals evidence 
illustrating the sincerity of these beliefs as well as the sincerity of disaffecting 
from them.  This is an essential precondition to understanding liberal democracy 
and its discontents.   
A final methodological goal of this dissertation is to pay special attention 
to political and intellectual terminology and the different meanings that 
accompany the life of words and terms.   Reinhart Koselleck’s work on 
Begriffsgeschichte, or “conceptual history,” noted that the meaning of a given 
concept changes over time even when the linguistic terminology remains 
constant.  He invited the historian to question our often anachronistic assumptions 
about what a concept meant in the past by exploring the contemporary discursive 
 
87 Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Donald Trump 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).   Mark Lilla, The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political 
Reaction (New York Review Books, 2016). For their exchange, see Mark Lilla, “Republicans for 
Revolution,” The New York Review of Books 59.1 (January 12, 2012). 
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struggles over the dominant meaning(s) of a concept.88  Melvin Richter, a leading 
American proponent of conceptual history, has explained that conceptual history 
is a particularly useful methodology for studying "periods of crisis, of accelerated, 
radical, or revolutionary change, [which] produce fundamental disagreements 
about the language of politics and society."89  This dissertation examines multiple 
such “periods of crisis.”  Begriffsgeschichte will be central to this dissertation 
because, simply put, the term “Europe” meant different things to different people 
during the tumultuous mid-twentieth century.  Consequently, this dissertation will 
pay extra attention to the way its subjects’ ideas of Europe discursively engaged 
with alternative Europe(s), and to the way their meaning of Europe changed over 







88 See Reinhart Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing 
Concepts, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
89 See Melvin Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction 













































Chapter 2: The Conservative Revolution, the Europa-
Gedanke, and Giselher Wirsing  
 
Introduction 
   
 Although the term “Conservative Revolution” had been used during the 
interwar period by Hugo von Hoffmansthal and Edgar Julius Jung, it was actually 
popularized by historians after the Second World War as a category for 
understanding a younger cohort of interwar conservative intellectuals opposed to 
both Weimar democracy as well as the restoration of the Wilhelminian Monarchy.  
Conservatism, these intellectuals argued, must go beyond the hitherto ill-fated 
attempt to preserve the values and institutions of the past against the onslaught of 
post-Enlightenment modernity; instead, the redemption of conservatism could 
only entail a revolutionary break with the past and present.  Ironically, the term 
“Conservative Revolution” was first promoted by Armin Mohler, a right-wing 
intellectual sympathetic to the ideas of these interwar conservatives who felt that 
their reputation had been unfairly tarnished by National Socialism.  In his 1950 
book titled The Conservative Revolution in Germany, Mohler attempted to 
distance the Conservative Revolution from National Socialism by arguing that 
they were the Trotskyites of National Socialism, having initially aligned with 
National Socialism but having then quickly reneged on that support during the 
1930s.1  This apologetic account of the Conservative Revolution has, of course, 
been significantly revised.  Most importantly, historians have illustrated the 
 
1 Armin Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland, 1918-1932: Grundriss ihrer 
Weltanschauungen (Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag, 1950). 
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collaborative connection between the Conservative Revolution and National 
Socialism.  Hans Mommsen pointed out that their rejection of parliamentary 
democracy was not only a feature of their anti-Weimar activism but also a source 
of their positive attraction to Hitler who fulfilled their desire for a post-party 
manifestation of politics.2  Other historians have illustrated that their alleged 
disillusionment with National Socialism was less critical than postwar apologias 
suggested - most Conservative Revolutionaries accommodated and even 
supported the Nazi regime to various degrees.  Furthermore, their ideas had an 
important impact having influenced leading National Socialists such as Joseph 
Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, and Walter Darré.3  In fact, some historians such as 
Stefan Breuer have even pushed back against the term “Conservative Revolution” 
precisely because it masks the essential affinities and entanglements between 
 
2 Hans Mommsen, “Government without Parties: Conservative Plans for Constitutional 
Revision at the End of the Weimar Republic” in ed.s Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack, 
Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 
1789 to 1945 (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993).   
3 See Frank-Lothar Kroll, “Konservative Revolution und Naitonalsozialismus: Aspekte und 
Perspektiven ihrer Erforschung,“ Kirchliche eitgeschichte 11.2 (1998): 339-354.   Larry Eugene 
Jones, „Edgar Julius Jung: The Conservative Revolution in Theory and Practice,” Central 
European History 21.2 (1988): 142-174.   Theodore S. Hamerow, “The Conservative Resistance 
to Hitler and the Fall of the Weimar Republic, 1932-34” in ed.s Larry Eugene Jones and James 
Retallack, Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance: Studies in the History of German 
Conservatism from 1789 to 1945 (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993). 
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these conservatives and National Socialism.4  This chapter contributes to this 
corrective historiographical trend with the story of Giselher Wirsing, Carl 
Schmitt, and the so-called Tat-Kreis, a network of Conservative Revolutionaries 
who began developing the Europe-concept during the Conservative Revolution 
and ultimately obtained high-ranking positions within the Nazi propaganda 
apparatus from which to disseminate their ideas about Europe. 
Understanding the roots of the conservative Europe-concept in the 
Conservative Revolution is important for a number of reasons.  First, this chapter 
underscores the argument made by Fritz Stern and Jost Hermand that the most 
important convergence between the Conservative Revolution and National 
Socialism was the long-standing German utopia of a völkisch revolution that 
could unite the German Volksgemeinschaft against its perceived liberal and 
Marxist opponents, especially the Jews.5  This chapter will illustrate that the 
 
4 See Stefan Breuer, Anatomie der Konservativen Revolution (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1993). 
5 See Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic 
Ideology (Berkely: University of California, 1961).   Fritz Stern, Dreams and Delusions: The 
Drama of German History (New York: Knopf, 1987).   Jost Hermand, Der alte Traum vom neuen 
Reich.  Völkische Utopien and Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt a.M.: Anthenaum, 1988).   George 
L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: 
Grosset & Dunlap, 1964).  The desire for radical solutions capable of ushering in a völkisch 
revolution had, as Peter Fritzsche has shown, revealed itself even before the establishment of the 
Weimar Republic when various Conservative Revolutionaries initially greeted the November 
Revolution of 1918.  See Peter Fritzsche, “Breakdown or Breakthrough? Conservatives and the 
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Europe-concept was a reinvention of the Conservative Revolutionary völkisch 
utopia which juxtaposed liberalism and Marxism against a conservative European 
revolution.  Second, as Jeffrey Herf has argued, the Conservative Revolution is 
best understood as a combination of reactionary and modernist political impulses, 
a point that is essential for understanding the Europe-concept and its capacity to 
evolve and maintain relevance in the changing circumstances of dictatorship, war, 
and defeat.  Finally, while many historians have focused on the Eastern Front as 
the impetus for Nazi Europe-propaganda, this chapter will show that Nazi 
Europeanists had already implemented the Europe-concept into their narratives 
before the Second World War had begun and subsequently expanded their project 
in the spring of 1940 after the fall of France.  This is important, because although 
the war with Soviet Communism was integral to the growth of the Europe-
concept in Nazi propaganda, the original catalyst was the encounter with the 
Western democracies and, by extension, liberal democracy.  The members of the 
Tat-Kreis, like many other Conservative Revolutionaries such as the National-
Bolshevists, were predominantly concerned with confronting Western liberalism 
which it perceived as the originator of Marxism and therefore greatest threat to 
the Conservative Revolution.  It is important to understand that the Europe-




November Revolution” in ed.s Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack, Between Reform, 
Reaction, and Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945 
(Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993).  
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Because he did not collect his life documents in a personal archival 
holding, Giselher Wirsing’s early life is especially difficult to trace.  Unlike the 
postwar years, for which one can utilize documents from the archival holdings of 
his close friends and colleagues, the documentary evidence for the interwar period 
is extremely scattered.  This is part of the reason why, despite his high-ranking 
position as a Nazi propagandist as well as his postwar reputation, there 
nevertheless exists very little biographical literature on Wirsing even in the 
German language.6  Piecing together his early life, then, necessarily depends on a 
plethora of sources.  The primary documents drawn upon in this chapter consist 
of: 1) a collection of archival documents for the Eugen Diederichs publishing 
house (which employed him during and after the war).  These documents, many 
of them written by Wirsing, close associates, and family members, range from in-
house publishing memos to postwar character-testimonials to even an 
autobiographical sketch by Wirsing himself.7  2) The records of the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency contain an entire folder with hundreds of documents 
on Wirsing, whom they followed quite closely after the Second World War.  U.S. 
intelligence services interviewed Wirsing multiple times, even as late as 1965, 
 
6 An exception is Axel Schildt’s useful mini-biography of Hans Zehrer, Giselher Wirsing, and 
Ferdinand Fried (three of the primary ideologues in the Tat-Kreis). See Axel Schildt, 
“Deutschlands Platz in einem ‘christlichen Abendland’: Konservative Publizisten aus dem Tat-
Kreis in der Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit“ in ed.s Thomas Koebner, Gert Sautermeister, and Sigrid 
Schneider, Deutschland nach Hitler – Zukunftspläne im Exil und aus der Besatzungszeit, 1939-
1949 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987).  
7 A:Diederichs/Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.  
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and even temporarily employed him in the immediate aftermath of the war.8  
Finally, 3) Carl Schmitt’s archived correspondences contain dozens of letters 
between the two conservative thinkers.9  These sources together provide helpful 
biographical insight into Wirsing’s early life and the earliest articulations of his 
Europe-concept. 
Giselher Wirsing was born in 1907 in the Bavarian city Schweinfurt, 
Germany to a wealthy business family.10  He traded his birth-name, “Max 
Emanuel,” for the more nationalistic “Giselher” while a university student in the 
interwar years.  While still attending Gymnasium (high school) he briefly joined 
the Freikorps Oberland, and was entrenched in a culture of nationalistic 
opposition to the Weimar Republic, parliamentary democracy, capitalism, 
Communism, Jews, and the Treaty of Versailles – all of which were opinions 
which, according to an interview with the American Consul in Stuttgart decades 
 
8 The reason for postwar U.S. intelligence work on Wirsing will be discussed in more detail in 
a later chapter of this dissertation.  Folder “Wirsing, Giselher,” United States National Archives 
and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, box 57. 
9 Thirty-four total correspondences can be identified between Carl Schmitt and Giselher 
Wirsing between 1932 and 1974, and, according to textual analysis, even this record is quite 
fragmentary.  See Carl Schmitt Nachlass, RW 265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg, 
Germany. 
10 Paul R. Sweet (American Consul General in Stuttgart) to the United States Department of 
State, “Dr. Giselher Wirsing and Christ und Welt: A Profile,” November 23, 1965, United States 
National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
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after the Second World War, Wirsing originally received from his father in his 
youth.11  Wirsing was, from a young age, an avid reader and, in his own 
admission to an American intelligence interrogator in 1946, deeply attracted to the 
political vision of radical conservative thinkers such as Oswald Spengler.  As the 
interrogator reported:  
Prisoner [Wirsing] did not regard himself as an unscrupulous opportunist. 
As a journalist he had observed the wrangles of politicians for many years 
and prided himself on having few illusions; to him Fascism, democracy 
and Communism were but symptoms of the age-old clash of cultures, part 
of the dynamic struggle between decay and growth, the pattern of history 
blindly and often brutally groping for fulfilment.  Nazism was injecting 
new vigor into a people forgetful of its destiny.  In his youth, he had sat at 
the feet of Oswald Spengler: his was Spengler’s philosophy brought to 
date.12 
Indeed, before, during, and even after the Second World War Wirsing grappled 
with Spengler’s apocalyptic cultural pessimism in search of an escape from 
inevitable civilizational decline, and understood his Europeanism as the answer to 
Spengler, or, as his interrogator put it, “Spengler’s philosophy brought to date.”13  
 
11 Ibid. 
12 United States Counter Intelligence Center, Interrogation Section, “Final Report on Stubaf,” 
October 25, 1946, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
13 In fact, in his last book written during the Second World War, Wirsing assured his readers 
that he had spoken with Spengler shortly before his death and that he was guaranteed by Spengler 
that the latter no longer held to his original cultural pessimism.  Wirsing went on to project his 
Europe-concept as the correction to Spengler’s apocalyptic reading of European history: Europe, 
led by the Nazi regime, was being redeemed from its decline.  See Giselher Wirsing, Zeitalter des 
63 
 
In 1926 he took this quest to the university level and began pursuing an education 
in sociology and political science at universities in Munich, Königsberg, Berlin, 
and, finally, Heidelberg (where he received a Ph.D. in 1931).14  Wirsing, since his 
childhood, had been a world traveler, and this became an integral part of his 
education.  Wirsing and many of the members in his network were an awkward 
mixture of fascists and world-travelling cosmopolitans who delighted in the 
company of non-Germans.  According to CIA records, in the years 1924 to 1945 
he visited a foreign country seventy-seven different times - mostly within Europe 
but as far East as Russia, as far South as Egypt, and as far West as the United 
States.15  While much of this was in his wartime capacity as a foreign 
propagandist, fifteen of those trips were during his collegiate studies.16  In fact, 
while at the University of Heidelberg, Wirsing became a graduate assistant in the 
 
Ikaros: Von Gesetz und Grenzen unseres Jahrhunderts (Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1944), 
69-70. 
14 United States Department of State, “Biographic Data Form – Wirsing, Giselher,” 
November, 1951, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
15 United States Counter Intelligence Center, Interrogation Section, “Final Report on Stubaf,” 
October 25, 1946, Appendix D, “Prisoner’s Travels Abroad (1925-1945),” United States National 
Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
16 This is a habit Wirsing took with him into the postwar period as well.  As editor of Christ 
und Welt magazine, Wirsing regularly took trips across the globe in order to report on them in the 
paper.   
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“Institute of Social and Political Sciences,” through which he received a research 
travel grant for his dissertation project which ultimately culminated in his first 
book titled Zwischeneuropa, or “The In-between Europe,” by which he meant an 
enlarged European federation situated in-between East and West.17  From 1928 to 
1931 Wirsing travelled to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria gathering material for his 
dissertation.18  These lands, he argued, must form a großräumliche 
Völkerordnung (“large-continental political system”) under German “leadership” 
capable of economically transcending British and American controlled world 
capitalism as well as the decrepit and dying institutions of parliamentary 
democracy.  As he put it in an article penned in November, 1930: 
If we truly want to think in new forms, then we need to accustom 
ourselves to not just think about Germany.  We in Germany must not deny 
our responsibility for the space and the people of the East with which we 
share a destiny. … A German social transformation will not find its 
purpose until said transformation transcends borders.  The mutual 
reciprocity of the ‘National’ and the ‘Supranational’ [des ‘Nationalen’ und 
‘Übernationalen’], out of which a new form of political, economic and 




17 Giselher Wirsing, Zwischeneuropa und die deutsche Zukunft (Jena: Eugen Diederichs 
Verlag, 1932). 
18 United States Counter Intelligence Center, Interrogation Section, “Final Report on Stubaf,” 
October 25, 1946, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
19 Giselher Wirsing, “Richtung Ost-Südost: das Raumbild des neuen Deutschland,” Die Tat, 
November issue 1930, 628-645, 630. 
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The In-between Europe brought these ideas together and was ultimately published 
in 1932 upon Wirsing’s completion of his Ph.D.  Even as late as 1965 the 
American Consul in Stuttgart, after interviewing Wirsing, understood the 
revolutionary and harrowing connection of his ideas to future National Socialist 
rule: 
Germany [Wirsing had argued] must shape its future by [establishing – 
sic] a new integrated relationship with these states of Zwischeneuropa.  It 
should bring into existence a new order in Central Europe, a federalistic, 
anti-capitalistic, socialistic order which would take fully into account the 
agrarian social and economic structure of the Eastern part of Central 
Europe.20 
 
Here, then, was Wirsing’s first attempt to rescue Germany and In-between Europe 
from the Spenglerian crisis.  As such, this work was his first articulation of 
Europeanism.  Wirsing was arguing that one must think beyond the capitalist 
nation-state; that a new federation of peoples in In-between Europe must be 
forged in order to give Europe economic and political stability and also establish 
itself against both the West and the East.  By 1930, the twenty-three-year-old 
Wirsing had turned many heads in the Conservative Revolutionary movement and 
as a young graduate joined the Tat-Kreis, which was already one of the most 
 
20 Paul R. Sweet (American Consul General in Stuttgart) to the United States Department of 
State, “Dr. Giselher Wirsing and Christ und Welt: A Profile,” November 23, 1965 United States 
National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
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prolific conservative intellectual clubs in Berlin.  Shortly afterwards he became 
the assistant editor of its official magazine called Die Tat.21 
Throughout the Second World War, Giselher Wirsing was, as will be 
shown, one of the most influential propagators of Nazi Europeanism.  It is 
essential, therefore, to recognize that the origins of his ideas preceded the Second 
World War, the invasion of the Soviet Union, and even the National Socialist 
take-over of German politics in 1933.  Nazi Europeanism was not only a tactical 
response to the demands of the Second World War.  Rather, it was an intellectual 
discourse genealogically tied to the German conservative tradition of cultural 
pessimism, an attempt to find a more realistic escape from modernity by a group 
of thinkers who felt that nationalism itself was too weighed down by the baggage 
of conservatism. Europe, on the other hand, was modern enough to meet the 
socio-economic and political demands of modernity while at the same time 
providing a potential vehicle for reversing cultural pessimism and preserving the 
principle of organic community. 
Carl Schmitt, the Grossraum-concept, and the Tat-Kreis 
It appears, however, that Wirsing did not develop these ideas alone; rather, 
he had help from other Conservative Revolutionaries including one of the most 
influential among them: Carl Schmitt.  Schmitt had, like Wirsing, been 
experimenting with new, post-nation-state geopolitical visions.  In April, 1939 
 
21 United States Counter Intelligence Center, Interrogation Section, “Final Report on Stubaf,” 
October 25, 1946, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
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Schmitt gave an important speech at the University of Kiel that launched a foreign 
policy debate among leading Nazi functionaries and intellectuals such as Werner 
Best and Reinhard Höhn about the relationship between the National Socialist 
revolution and its neighbors. 22  Usually better known for his arguments against 
parliamentary democracy and liberalism, in this speech Schmitt suggested 
applying the American Monroe Doctrine to Europe.  Just as the Americans had 
justified their hegemony in the New World while denouncing outside 
intervention, so too, Schmitt argued, were Europeans justified in denouncing the 
intervention of foreign continents in their affairs and so too was Germany justified 
pursuing political hegemony in the Old World.  In addendum to the European 
Monroe Doctrine Schmitt developed an idea which would prove crucial for the 
thinking of Wirsing and other Nazi Europeanists throughout the war: namely, the 
concept of the Grossraum (“continental space”).  Throughout the earth, Schmitt 
argued, natural continental areas were emerging under the dominance of a single 
country within that continent.  As such, the sovereignty of states was no longer 
applicable in the modern world unless sovereignty was re-conceptualized in 
continental terms.  Key to maintaining order in this new system of Grossräume 
(“continental spaces”) was to keep each continental space from infringing on the 
 
22 Ulrich Herbert, Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und 
Vernuft, 1903-1989 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016).   Birgit Kletzlin, Europa aus Rasse und Raum: 
die Nationalsozialistische Idee der Neuen Ordnung (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2002).   Christian Joerges 
and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh (eds.) Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National 
Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003). 
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territories of the others, or, as Schmitt put it, the original “Monroe Doctrine” must 
be extended to each emerging continental space.  Schmitt’s Kiel speech, then, was 
both a justification of German imperialism on the European continent as well as a 
repudiation of Anglo-Saxon incursions outside of their continental spaces via free 
trade and the internationalist politics of Versailles. 
As will be shown throughout this dissertation, Nazi Europeanists, 
especially Giselher Wirsing, enthusiastically took up Carl Schmitt’s Grossraum 
and Monroe doctrine concepts and began propagating them as a center-piece of 
their Europe-concept in the first wave of Nazi Europe-propaganda in 1939/1940 
after Hitler began his offensives in Europe.  But it appears that Wirsing developed 
these ideas much earlier with Schmitt’s help as a mentor.  As illustrated above, 
Wirsing had already begun to use the terminology of Grossraum in his 
dissertation, and the evidence suggests a high likelihood that this was a product of 
his mentorship with Carl Schmitt developed during his graduate studies.  While 
Wirsing was pursuing his graduate degree in the late 1920s and early 1930s, he 
spent some time studying in Berlin where Carl Schmitt lectured, and it was there 
that he very likely initiated a friendship with Schmitt which would extend into the 
1970s.23  The first documented correspondence between Wirsing and Schmitt was 
in 1932, when Wirsing wrote Schmitt a letter apologizing for not having visited 
him in Berlin recently and updating him on his most recent arguments in Die 
 
23 United States Department of State, “Biographic Data Form – Wirsing, Giselher,” 
November, 1951, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
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Tat.24  In a letter to Schmitt in December, 1937, Wirsing expressed frustration 
about intellectual developments in the Anglo-Saxon world “about which we, if 
I’m not mistaken, have been much too silent.”  “I have the feeling,” Wirsing 
explained, “that there are currently attempts underway there, which move beyond 
the League of Nations ideology into new international-political arguments that are 
better shaped to fit into modern developments….”  He then argued that more of 
an effort should be made from the German side to respond, and that such a 
response should follow from Schmitt’s arguments about a new Monroe-Doctrine: 
“I often ponder various topics from your earlier writings which have now become 
so important again, for example the study among your Königsberg works about 
the Monroe-Doctrine.”25  Schmitt’s Grossraum concept, then, preceded his Kiel 
speech in 1939.  Wirsing would not journalistically flesh out his renewed interest 
in his earlier dissertation topic and Schmitt’s ideas until 1939, but the evidence 
above suggests that sometime in the mid-1930s he was returning to these topics 
intellectually with the mentorship of Carl Schmitt.  In fact, as subsequent 
paragraphs will illustrate, Wirsing and his Conservative Revolutionary colleagues 
were embryonically engaged with the concept of “continental-space” (Raum) as 
early as 1930.  This was in the context of their activities in the Tat-Kreis. 
 
24 Giselher Wirsing to Carl Schmitt, March 3, 1932, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Duisburg, Germany, RW 265/18488. 
25 Giselher Wirsing to Carl Schmitt, December 22, 1937, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Duisburg, Germany, RW 265/18325. 
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 After receiving his Ph.D. in 1932 Wirsing moved to Berlin working as a 
full-time journalist in a Conservative Revolutionary intellectual circle led by one 
of the most influential interwar conservative intellectuals named Hans Zehrer.  
The Berlin-based network, which called itself the Tat-Kreis, or “Action-Circle,” 
was an intellectual clique of self-identified “new conservatives” dissatisfied with 
both the Weimar Republic as well as any return to what they considered the 
“bourgeois” Wilhelminian Monarchy.  In the late 1920s Hans Zehrer, a right-wing 
veteran of the First World War who had participated in the Kapp Putsch and then 
later served as foreign affairs editor of the Berlin-based Vossische Zeitung, took a 
previously obscure intellectual magazine, Die Tat, and re-fashioned it into what 
some historians consider the leading organ of the Conservative Revolution.26  
According to one 1933 literature review it was the “most significant political 
monthly of the last three years.”  The same publisher described its core aim: “to 
buttress the awakening new nationalism and form it spiritually.”27  When Zehrer 
took over the magazine it had a circulation of somewhere around 1,000-3,000.  
Within a few years, Zehrer had injected the magazine with political edge by hiring 
radical conservative thinkers such as Giselher Wirsing, Ferdinand Fried, and Ernst 
 
26 Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God that Failed: Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of 
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27 Niels Diederichs, “Der Verlag Eugen Diederichs und die Gegenwart, 1933,“ in “Der neue 
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Wilhelm Eschmann, and the circulation had reached almost 20,000 (Die Tat was 
particularly well-read by the political elite).28  As the American Consul in 
Stuttgart put it in 1965: “Zehrer transformed the Tat almost overnight from a 
sleepy publication with a small circulation to an influential periodical appealing to 
young intellectuals.”29   
Zehrer drew heavily from Carl Schmitt and Hans Freyer, arguing that 
modern Germany required an authoritarian “total” state, which could more 
effectively organize competing social claims by subjecting them to the unity and 
the larger will of the racial nation.  Defining and outlining this new nationalism 
and its concomitant “national revolution” was a primary task of two men: Ernst 
Wilhelm Eschmann, a young Berlin academic, and Giselher Wirsing.  Wirsing 
was additionally tasked with exploring the consequences of this national 
revolution for foreign policy and international relations.  Within the sprawling 
web of Conservative Revolutionary networks in Weimar Germany, the Tat-Kreis 
stood out for its vehement critique of capitalism and its explicit advocacy for a 
state-sponsored re-structuring of the economy, or what they called a “social 
 
28 Rüdiger Graf, Die Zukunft der Weimarer Republik: Krisen und Zukunftsaneignungen in 
Deutschland, 1918-1933 (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2008), 44. 
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revolution.”30  The primary economist in Die Tat was Ferdinand Fried, another 
young Berlin academic who had worked with Hans Zehrer at the Vossische 
Zeitung during the 1920s and who developed ideas for an anti-capitalist 
“nationalist socialism.”31 
Despite terminological overlap with National Socialism, the Tat-Kreis was 
actually hesitantly opposed to the Nazis, who they argued were crude, 
unsophisticated opportunists not worthy of leading radical right-wing opposition 
to the established order.  The Tat-Kreis envisioned itself as a conservative elite 
destined to lead the national revolution, but as the National Socialists increasingly 
garnered support they found themselves unable to rely on a dismissal of Nazi 
bullishness, and instead turned to arguing that the National Socialists were 
insufficiently dedicated to overthrowing bourgeois liberalism.  Key to the Tat-
Kreis’s self-identity was the notion that they were advocates for a “third front” 
(dritte Front), by which they meant an elitist alternative to both the Nazi and 
Communist parties capable of successfully capturing and directing the healthy 
impulse behind those movements. In one of Zehrer’s articles from 1931, titled 
“Right or Left?” Zehrer argued: 
The opposition against liberalism in Germany can be summarized in the 
following way: its right wing [the National Socialists], which due to a 
natural public reservoir of sentiment for nationalist ideas with socialist 
tendencies should have had the advantage, has wasted this advantage by 
refusing to emphasize socialism.  The left wing [the Communist Party] is 
rapidly overcoming its disadvantage by breaking into the right-wing 
 
30 Stefan Breuer, Anatomie der Konservativen Revolution (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
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bastion and guaranteeing nationalist sentiment.  There are, thus, two poles 
within the opposition [to liberalism], one nationalist and one socialist.  
Each of these wings claims that it satisfies the opposing pole – but this 
claim is not justified.  The National Socialists cannot yet be identified as 
socialist, the Communists not yet as nationalist.32 
 
Die Tat, however, struggled to balance its opposition to the Nazi movement with 
the reality that its readership was a natural bastion of support for Nazi radicalism.  
And in order to negotiate this challenge, the Tat-Kreis attempted to move the Nazi 
movement in the correct direction, which meant that in their editorials the Tat 
writers frequently opined in favor of dissidents within the Nazi movement such as 
the left-leaning Nazi Otto Strasser (who left the Nazi Party in 1930).33  In fact, 
Die Tat’s publishing house, the Jena-based Eugen Diederichs Verlag, wrote to 
Zehrer in October, 1931 instructing him to work harder to avoid the appearance of 
an alliance with Otto Strasser.  The seeming association with Strasser had led to a 
“sales stagnation.”  If this appearance were not countered, it was explained, “Die 
Tat would, due to the nationalist position and sympathies of many retailers, 
immediately disappear from relevance.”34  Die Tat continued to stubbornly, albeit 
carefully, oppose the National Socialists up until the Machtergreifung in 1933, 
after which most of the Tat-Kreis reconciled with and even propagated National 
 
32 Quoted in Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland, 69. 
33 Enthusiasm for socialism within the Tat-Kreis even led to calls for rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union, nearly mirroring the concepts of National-Bolshevism.  See Giselher Wirsing, 
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Socialism.35  In the last years of the Weimar Republic the Tat-Kreis became the 
de-facto media advocate for the authoritarian Kurt von Schleicher, Germany’s last 
Chancellor before Hitler, whom the Tat-Kreis saw as the best possible surrogate 
for their national revolution.  After Hitler assumed the chancellorship and began 
to initiate the Machtergreifung, Hans Zehrer was quickly forced down from his 
position as editor of Die Tat, after which Zehrer went into exile on the small 
island Sylt in the North Sea.36 
 But to present the Tat-Kreis as anti-Nazi, as some apologists and even Tat-
Kreis members themselves did after the Second World War, is disingenuous.37 
The Tat-Kreis can better by typified as anti-anti-Nazi, in the sense that their 
criticisms of National Socialism were comparatively infrequent, measured, and 
subtle, whereas the brunt of their criticism was aimed at communism and, even 
 
35 To be sure, already in the months before the Nazi takeover in 1933 the Tat-Kreis began to 
resolve its differences with the Nazi movement.  As Stefan Breuer has shown, Zehrer began 
distinguishing between the Nazi “party” and the Nazi “movement” as a way to identify the 
increasingly popular National Socialism as a legitimate proponent of the national revolution.  See 
Breuer, Anatomie der Konservativen Revolution, 143-145.   Mommsen, “Government without 
Parties: Conservative Plans for Constitutional Revision at the End of the Weimar Republic,” 347-
374. 
36 Ebbo Demant, Von Schleicher zu Springer: Hans Zehrer als Politischer Publizist (Mainz: 
Hase und Koehler Verlag, 1972). 
37 This was, for example, one of Armin Mohler’s arguments in his postwar attempts to salvage 
a revolutionary conservative tradition from the German past.  See Mohler, Die Konservative 
Revolution in Deutschland. 
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more so, Weimar democracy.  Furthermore, there existed an evident ideological 
overlap between the Tat-Kreis and the Nazi movement.  From antisemitism to 
anti-Bolshevism to anti-parliamentarism, the Tat-Kreis shared with the Nazis the 
fundamental animosities of the 1920s and early 1930s.  Most importantly, the Tat-
Kreis, like the Nazis, anchored their conception of politics in their vision for a 
radical nationalist revolution against the status quo.  As Rüdiger Graf has argued, 
a key characteristic of the Tat-Kreis (and of German conservatism as such in the 
years preceding the Nazi take-over) was a jubilant confidence that they were 
living through a period of water-shed transformation, or what he calls: 
“consciousness of a turning-point” (Wendebewusstssein).38 And, in fact, Wirsing 
himself used very similar terminology when he frequently called for a 
“liquidation of the pre-First World War world.”39  Ultimately, this translated into 
a readiness to welcome the Nazi-caused breakdown of the Weimar system in the 
early 1930s.  In September, 1930 Wirsing was made assistant editor of Die Tat.40  
In his first article as assistant editor, Wirsing euphorically covered what he called 
a “Turn against parliamentarism” (Wandlung gegen Parlamentarismus) sweeping 
across Eastern and Southeastern Europe and preparing the ground for a common 
 
38 Rüdiger Graf, Die Zukunft der Weimarer Republik: Krisen und Zukunftsaneignungen in 
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39 See, for example, Giselher Wirsing, “Die Siegfriedstellung der deutschen Aussenpolitik,” 
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“destiny” and even future federation with Germany.41  In other articles, Wirsing 
praised Italian fascism as a successful national revolution and evidence that the 
“struggle against Versailles” was part of a broader European “process of 
evolution.”42  And in the lead up to the Nazi break-through election in July, 1932, 
Wirsing wrote an article urging Germans to take heed of Moeller van den Bruck’s 
call for an uncompromising rejection of Weimar and its replacement with a 
vaguely-defined “new system.”43  In the early 1930s, such enthusiasm for liberal 
disintegration were difficult to distinguish from advocacy for the very agents of 
that disintegration throughout Europe; namely, fascists.  In the end, the ideology 
of the Tat-Kreis is best described a kind of National Socialism without the street 
violence.  This knowledge was not lost on postwar U.S. intelligence services.  
According to the American Consul in Stuttgart, quoting a German Professor close 
to the embassy, Die Tat was “‘the most interesting, the most active, and the most 
influential periodical in the fight against Versailles and Weimar, and it was at the 
same time the organ which stood closest to the ideology of the National Socialist 
Movement.’”44  Or, as Wirsing’s first American interrogators put it in a report 
 
41 Giselher Wirsing, “Richtung Ost-Südost: das Raumbild des neuen Deutschland,” Die Tat, 
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from July, 1945: The Tat-Kreis propagated “a kind of nationalsocialism[sic] 
before the Nazis came to power.”45 
 This proto-Nazi ideology was also central in Wirsing and his colleagues’ 
budding ideas about Europe.  As illustrated above, Wirsing’s In-between Europe 
concept argued in favor of a vague, post-liberal “new form of political, economic 
and social life” in Europe, but that this “mutual reciprocity of the ‘National’ and 
the ‘Supranational’” was not possible until Europeans moved beyond 
parliamentary democracy.46  In a similar vein, Wirsing frequently contrasted his 
ideas for a new In-between Europe with the Pan-European movement led by 
Richard von Coudenhove Kalergie, which Wirsing dismissed as a mere extension 
of French or British “High Capitalism,” underpinned by the disingenuous 
internationalism of the League of Nations. The Western Allies of the First World 
War, Wirsing argued, masked their intentions to prey upon and subjugate the 
agrarian regions Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe with the Pan-
European movement.  Such, for example, were the true intentions behind French 
Prime Minister Aristide Briand’s calls for Pan-European economic integration.  
His In-between Europe, in contrast, sought to integrate their agricultural 
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economies with industrial Germany in a mutually beneficial relationship (the 
precise economic details of which Ferdinand Fried was asked to outline in his 
articles suggesting the mutual dependence of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern 
European resources).47  Wirsing repeatedly warned Germans of the Pan-European 
enticements of the French and British.  It would be “the great disappointment of 
all Europeans,” Wirsing argued, should they fall victim to Western lies only to be 
abandoned when market vicissitudes produced an immediate retreat by the 
Westerners, leaving behind dysfunctional capitalist democracies in their wake.48  
Wirsing’s first flirtations with the Schmitt-influenced idea of “continental space” 
(Raum) originated in these arguments against Western Pan-Europeanism.  Take, 
for example, his discussion of Briand’s suggestions for a European custom’s 
union: 
The biggest difference [between the French and Germans] has to do with 
continental spaces [Räume].  The French sphere of control [Machtbereich] 
is obviously and manifestly distinct from the rest of Europe.  Perhaps this 
is a difference in the spiritual life of the respective peoples.  In any case, 
there is no reason to sentimentally mourn this process of separation.  It is 
simply one of the basic elements of fact in this natural division of Europe. 
 
He continued: “There remains for the moment the sober fact of a self-
concentration and beginning isolation of Greater French continental space 
[grossfranzösische Raumeinheit], which is finding it increasingly difficult to 
reconcile notions of a hegemonic rule over Europe.”  In fact, Wirsing argued, 
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1931, 81-126. 
48 Giselher Wirsing, “Vorstoss Zollunion,” Die Tat, June issue 1931, 212-231. 
79 
 
Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europeans need to begin forming a 
“Revisionist block” in order to speed up this process: 
The idea of a regional integration of the constricted central European 
states is now emerging.  The [French] customs union was the first attack 
[on that idea]…. The people in Geneva [the League of Nations] have tried 
to hide these facts and preserve the French front in Eastern Europe.  
Nevertheless, there are three great blocks already emerging from this 
development: Greater France, inner-Europe [Innereuropa], and Russia.49 
 
From there, Wirsing proceeded to argue that the French proposal for a customs 
union, taken alone, was “economically justified” and carried the germ for a truly 
revolutionary economics which transcended nation-states.  Unlike other radical 
nationalists, Wirsing and Fried decried the idea of national autarchy as a response 
to global capitalism.  Autarchy, by which they meant enclosed and self-sufficient 
economies structured to the benefit of national groups, was correct as a moral 
principle but unfit to meet the demands of modern economies.  Perhaps Fried’s 
most significant argument in the Weimar Tat-Kreis was his attempt to square this 
paradox by simply expanding the autarchic unit into larger continental spaces or 
“economic blocks” as he called them.  In other words, instead of enclosed 
national economies Fried proposed enclosed continental economies so that the 
German nation would have access to all necessary resources within continental 
Europe while at the same time preserving its independence from the vagaries of 
global capitalism.50  Such arguments obviously insinuated German political 
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hegemony in Europe – after all, a continental autarchy would have to be 
controlled and administered.  Consequently, Wirsing complimented Fried’s 
postulation of continental autarchy by attaching it to his In-between Europe 
concept.  Europe, he argued, must establish an economic union by implementing a 
new concept of political federalism: 
The impossibility to even slightly construct autarchic national economies 
in either the old or even our contemporary borders forces us to abandon 
nation-state silliness.  It demands an entirely new way of thinking which 
may contradict the forces of state-centralization. Every large-continental 
[räumliche] federation of states will have to be modelled after a federally-
constructed Reich elastic enough to include Eastern Europe, and thereby 
simultaneously resolve the minority-question there.51 
 
In order to make such a federation a real possibility, Wirsing argued in a separate 
article, Germans would need to recognize that foreign policy and domestic policy 
were intertwined, that an internal “liquidation” of Weimar could not take place 
without establishing a lasting “connection to the young forces in Europe” by 
which he meant radical conservatives and fascists throughout the continent.52  
Wirsing and the Tat-Kreis, then, had already been working towards the 
Grossraum-concept nearly a decade before Carl Schmitt initiated the conversation 
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in 1939, and these subtle justifications for German political dominance in Europe 
were important pre-cursors to their eventual alignment with Nazi propaganda. 
 It is important to note that Wirsing was not only opposed to competing 
Pan-European concepts of Europe.  He also situated his In-between Europe in 
contrast to what could have been a more natural ally: the interwar conservative 
Catholic Occident movement (das Abendland).  The problem with the Occident-
concept, he argued, was that it was committed to a restoration of a non-existent 
past.  Even more damning for Wirsing, however, was that the Occident movement 
advocated closer relationships and integration with Catholic Western powers.  
This, he argued, was just a call for “watered-down imperialism” (verhinderten 
Imperialismus): 
Without a doubt there is a not inconsiderable portion of the old forces in 
Germany who advocate a foreign policy which can be categorized as 
watered-down imperialism.  This cuts across the various parties and 
attaches itself to those groups which, either consciously or unconsciously, 
feel spiritually connected to the Western victors.  For all those groups, the 
Occident is still a unifying cultural concept even after Versailles, and is 
the desired blueprint for political concepts. …we are dealing in no small 
measure with more than Pan-European fantasies from ‘the left’, but rather 
also from the old Right which has unexpectedly been taken over by the 
Occident-path.53  
 
Wirsing’s earliest Europeanism, then, was adversarial towards the Occident 
movement, and as such is the first piece of evidence for this dissertation’s claim 
that his postwar movement, despite tactical alliance with the postwar Christian 
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Democratic Occident-advocates, was from the very beginning a different kind of 
conservative supranationalism. 
 Key to what this dissertation calls “Europeanism” is an explicit 
engagement with national identity.  And here, too, Wirsing and the Tat-Kreis 
began to cautiously experiment with revision.  To be sure, most of the above 
nascent Europeanism was geopolitical.  But a close reading of Die Tat reveals that 
the Tat-Kreis understood the revolutionary implications of the In-between Europe 
paradigm for national identity.  Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, future co-editor with 
Giselher Wirsing of Die Tat’s successor magazine Das XX Jahrhundert, was 
tasked by Wirsing and Zehrer after 1930 to explore this topic.  In one particularly 
audacious article, titled “The Transformation of Nationalism,” Eschmann set out 
to problematize how German conservatives approach nationalism.  It is not quite 
fair, he argued, to suggest that “one is either nationalist or not.”  After all, a 
careful reading of German history would suggest that there are many different 
kinds of “national consciousness” and that this changes over time.  Eschmann 
pointed out, for example, that German national identity came much later (late 
nineteenth century) than in other countries.  But this need not be a cause for 
insecurity, he argued.  Indeed, while other national patriots before the late 
nineteenth century were defining their nations, German patriots were defined by 
their “character as a European people of the Reich” (europäisches Reichsvolk) 
with a “supranational Reich-consciousness” (übernationales Reichsbewusstsein).  
This allegedly meant that, in practice, contemporary Germans were uniquely 
conditioned to be leaders in Europe because they were historically imbued with a 
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“Reich-conditioned feeling of responsibility” (reichsmässiges 
Verantwortungsgefühl) towards the other peoples in Europe.  This “feeling of 
responsibility,” unmatched by any other European Volk, supposedly molded with 
the German nationalist movement of the late nineteenth century, thus making the 
Germans into a special brand of nationalists prepared by history for reconciliation 
with other European nationalists.  Unlike the anti-nationalist Pan-European and 
Social Democratic movements, Eschmann argued, German nationalism was both 
“nationalist” and “supranational”:  
Our historical development and that of other peoples in comparison shows 
us that a nation can live and prosper in a supranational feeling of 
responsibility or in a self-confident state of being which is undeterred by 
the problems of nationalism. … Regardless of whether an accelerated 
overcoming of nationalism in favor of a new supranational feeling of 
responsibility should be recommended or whether nationalism should 
return to a static patriotism anchored perhaps even in class – either way: 
nationalism has a not yet fully defined role in our destiny.54 
 
These convoluted ruminations, however eccentric, were nevertheless audacious in 
their calling into question the national categories otherwise held sacred and 
absolute in the politics of radical German nationalism.  Under Wirsing’s 
leadership, then, the Tat-Kreis was dabbling in Nazi Europeanism before the 
Nazis even took over power in Germany. However, this came to an abrupt pause 
in 1933. 
Reconciliation with National Socialism 
 




 After Hitler came to power in 1933, Die Tat fell victim to Nazification 
(Gleichschaltung).  The Nazis had good reason to settle scores with the Die Tat, 
as it had been one of the largest obstacles in their quest to seize the complete 
support of radical German nationalists. Within a few short months Zehrer was 
forced to step down from his position as editor of the magazine, and Wirsing, at 
the age of twenty-six, was made his replacement in September.55  During the next 
six years Wirsing opportunistically reconciled with the Nazi regime, ended any 
and all criticisms of the Nazi movement, and, in fact, energetically propagated the 
Nazi revolution.  For the first few months after Hitler’s rise to power, Die Tat 
remained awkwardly silent vis-à-vis the new regime, but in April Wirsing 
signaled a complete reversal of his hitherto tepid anti-anti-Nazism.  The first 
sentence of Wirsing’s April article read: “The national and social Revolution in 
Germany is leading to a two-front war against the internationalism of class 
struggle and the internationalism of capital.”  “The theory of the Conservative 
Revolution,” he continued, “is finding a foundation in a new reality [Nazi rule].  
We in this magazine have always tried to make possible this new reality by 
struggling against the remaining pieces of the old Right and the old Left.”  
Wirsing also swiftly distanced himself from his previous supranational 
sentiments: “Just like the notion of a Marxist World Revolution is mere talk with 
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no foundation in reality, so too is there no such thing as a ‘Fascist 
International’.”56  By the end of the year, Wirsing’s idiosyncratic commenter on 
nationalism, Ernst Wilehlm Eschmann, had published a book about the Nazi 
revolution called The Purpose of the Revolution, advertised in Die Tat as a work 
which explored the “unity of state, Volk, and nation” – a far cry from his earlier 
explorations of European identity.57  To be sure, the new magazine occasionally 
attempted to re-engage with the idea of a new, federal formation in Europe, but 
masked it with appeals to nationalism.  Eschmann, for example, wrote about 
Herder’s revolutionary Volk-concept and the rise of a new German nationalism 
based in organic culture rather than Enlightenment “universalism.”  But tucked 
into the back of this article about romantic German nationalism was a section 
entitled “The Principle of Federation,” in which he argued: “Just like the Volk 
revolts against society [Gesellschaft], so too stands its supranational version, the 
Reich, against the empire of civilization.”  “The supranational significance of 
National Socialism,” he explained, was to export the Reich concept outside of its 
borders so as to provide Europe with a “New Order” capable of replacing the 
universalism of the decadent, rootless nation-state system.58   
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Wirsing likewise flirted with a return to Europeanism a year later in an 
article titled “Europe in Fever,” in which he argued that the Versailles system had 
been broken by Hitler and a “Revolution of Europe’s center” was underway.59  
This revolution, Eschmann explained in the same issue, was turning all of Europe 
fascist and opening the door to an unknown world beyond liberalism and 
Marxism.  But, careful to not step on the toes of German nationalists, Eschmann 
finished with:  
We would like to state very clearly that European peoples are 
overthrowing their own respective decays; we are not speaking about 
European personhood, which is an invention of the era after the Great 
War.  Europe lives inside of each of its peoples.  There is no European 
‘personhood’, which can be drawn out from these peoples.60 
 
In October, 1933 Wirsing defended the Nazi book burnings as a spiritual act 
against illegitimate intellectualism.61  By the end of the year, Die Tat began 
signaling an estrangement with Spengler, typifying his pessimism as the right-
wing equivalent of left-wing “dangerous intellectualism,“ thus combining their 
Spengler-revisionism with Nazi anti-intellectualism.62  Having established itself 
as an echo-chamber running sophisticated flak for the Nazis, Die Tat proceeded to 
define itself throughout the 1930s as an expert commentator on foreign affairs, 
 
59 Giselher Wirsing, “Europa im Fieber,” Die Tat, March issue 1934, 913-923, 32-33. 
60 Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, “Wird Europa faschistisch?” Die Tat, May issue 1934, 81-101. 
61 Giselher Wirsing, “Volk und Geist: Die Gegenkirche der Intellektuellen,” Die Tat, October 
issue 1933, 513-520. 




which meant trumpeting each of Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy maneuvers as a 
path-breaking success.  Wirsing’s first postwar interrogator summed up best the 
post-1933 influence of Wirsing and his Tat-Kreis: “[Wirsing] carries an 
inordinately large share in laying the ideological foundations upon which the 
conservative elements of Germany could submerge their dislike of the many 
repugnant aspects of the Nazi regime.”63  Wirsing, explained another U.S. 
interrogator, “persuaded the Conservative element [in Germany] to underwrite 
Nazism, arguing that the more repugnant aspects were mere teething troubles of a 
young revolutionary party.”64  In short, Wirsing became a key apologist for the 
Nazi revolution by helping German conservatives overcome any remaining 
trepidations.  
 Wirsing was rewarded for his new-found loyalty to National Socialism.  
At the end of 1933 he was made chief editor of the Münchner Neueste 
Nachrichten (MNN), the forerunner to the postwar Süddeutsche Zeitung and at the 
time the largest paper in Southern Germany (it was read daily by Hitler).65  
Wirsing kept this position through 1942, and used the position to broaden his 
 
63 “Draft Reports from MFIU No.3 (Third Army Interrogation Center),” July 30, 1945, United 
States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
64 United States Counter Intelligence Center, Interrogation Section, “Final Report on Stubaf,” 
October 25, 1946, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
65 Leon Poliakov and Josef Wulf, Das Dritte Reich und seine Denker (Munich: K.G. Saur 
Verlag: 1978), 477. 
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public voice by frequently penning front-page articles himself, which he signed 
“GW.”66  Wirsing also brought with him Ferdinand Fried and Ernst Wilhelm 
Eschmann to the paper as leading editorialists, where, as we will see, the reformed 
Tat-Kreis returned to their Europe-concept in 1939.   
In 1938, Wirsing made a fateful decision: he joined the SS and received 
the rank of Hauptsturmführer. American secret intelligence documents were 
extremely consternated about the motivations and consequences of this decision, 
and ultimately unable to decipher the mystery.  Wirsing, of course, was highly 
reticent about the issue throughout his postwar life, only ever arguing that it was 
an opportunistic decision made in the hope of better positioning himself to change 
the Nazi regime from within.  According to one historian, his primary 
responsibility with the SS-membership was to serve as an informant, and he was 
supposedly cherished by the SS as a “willing, diligent, and extraordinary valuable 
colleague.”67  As will be discussed in chapter six of this dissertation, the only 
other documented task completed by Wirsing in his SS capacity was a series of 
insubordinate intelligence reports written for the Reichssicherheitshauptamt 
 
66 Paul R. Sweet (American Consul General in Stuttgart) to the United States Department of 
State, “Dr. Giselher Wirsing and Christ und Welt: A Profile,” November 23, 1965 United States 
National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
67 Mattias Weiss, “Journalisten: Worte als Taten,“ in ed. Norbert Frei, Hitlers Eliten nach 
1945 (Munich: Dtv Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), 265. 
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(RSHA) in the attempt to convince Himmler of the war’s futility and the 
subsequent need to overthrow Hitler. 
Otherwise, it can be credibly conjectured that his membership in the SS 
was a means for advancing his career as an antisemite.  In 1937 Wirsing went on 
a long trip to Palestine and subsequently wrote one of the most read antisemitic 
tracts in Nazi Germany during the late 1930s titled Engländer, Juden, Araber in 
Palästina.68  Wirsing’s time in Palestine convinced him that Zionism was among 
the most dangerous components in the Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world.  
Perhaps in part due to his SS-membership, Wirsing was able to increase his 
profile as an antisemitic thinker during the late 1930s and early 1940s, even 
participating with Alfred Rosenberg in a three-day conference from March 26-28, 
1941 to inaugurate the “Institute for the Research of the Jewish Question” (Institut 
zur Erforschung der Judenfrage) in Frankfurt am Main.69  
Giselher Wirsing’s Early-war Europeanism, 1939-1943 
 At the outbreak of war in September, 1939, Wirsing was hired by the 
Information Department of the Foreign Office in a part-time advisory capacity on 
international affairs, which he would fulfill alongside his editorial position at the 
MNN, moving back and forth between Berlin and Munich each week until he 
 
68 Giselher Wirsing, Engländer, Juden, Araber in Palästina (Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 
1939). 
69 Wirsing’s speech, titled “Die Judenfrage im Vorderen Orient,“ was given on March 27, 
1941 and presented his arguments about the danger of Zionism.  For the conference program see 
Leon Poliakov and Josef Wulf, Das Dritte Reich und seine Denker, 140-144. 
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ceased working for the Foreign Office at the end of 1941.70  According to his 
postwar interrogations by U.S. intelligence services, Wirsing’s contacts in the 
Foreign Office stretched as far back as 1928; in fact, throughout the 1930s 
Wirsing used his contacts in the Foreign Office to become “the first German 
editor to organize air-mail deliveries of his paper to foreign countries; from 1935 
onwards the MNN was distributed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, Italy, 
France Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal before any other German paper, and had 
a foreign circulation three times as high as that of the ‘Frankfurter Zeitung’, its 
nearest competitor.”  This influence abroad reinforced the desire of the Foreign 
Office to secure a close relationship with Wirsing, who increasingly used his 
standing in the Foreign Office to travel abroad and establish friendships with a 
large number of German diplomats.  Wirsing’s work for the Foreign Office 
 
70 “Wirsing, Giselher, Prosa, Bericht über meine Beziehungen zu Dr. Adam von Trott zu 
Solz,“ in “Briefwechsel Müller-Plantenberg, Clarita, Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1969,“ 
A:Diederichs/ Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.  This can 
also be corroborated by documents from the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes outlined in 
a subsequent chapter of this dissertation.  Wirsing was offered this position at a conference of 
journalists organized by the Foreign Office.  Other journalists turned down the offer, such as Ernst 
Jünger, but Wirsing was not the only journalist to accept the offer.  Hans Georg von Studnitz, 
future assistant to Paul Karl Schmidt in the Press Department of the Foreign Office, also accepted 
the position.  So, too, did Karl Megerle, the originator of Nazi Europeanism in the Foreign Office 
who later became “Propaganda Commissioner” over the Foreign Office. See “Draft Reports from 
MFIU No.3 (Third Army Interrogation Center),” July 30, 1945, United States National Archives 
and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.”  
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revolved around “disseminat[ing] German propaganda in neutral countries.”  
Additionally, Wirsing participated in various closed-room conferences organized 
by Ribbentrop to coordinate foreign propaganda.71  As will be discussed in a 
separate chapter of this dissertation, the Foreign Office became one of the most 
important centers of Nazi Europeanism, and it is important therefore to highlight 
the connection between Wirsing and the Foreign Office.  Unfortunately, Wirsing 
left very few documentary tracks in the records of the Foreign Office, and it is 
difficult to trace the precise flow of Europeanist ideas from Wirsing to the 
Foreign Office, or vice-versa.  One document, however, does reveal the 
importance of this network and its intellectual interactions.  In a memo to the head 
of the Foreign Office Information Department in February, 1942, it was 
announced that the Foreign Office had assisted the Eugen Diederichs publishing 
house in publishing first Wirsing’s influential Europeanist book published during 
the war: Der Masslose Kontinent.  Furthermore, the department announced 
intentions to circulate the book through their foreign propaganda channels “in 
every possible way,” including “press directives and reviews,” “radio 
commentary,” and “access to foreign publishing houses.”  This memo illustrates 
two important points: 1) although Wirsing claimed to have completely ceased 
working for the Foreign Office at the end of 1941, it is clear that the relationship 
 
71 United States Counter Intelligence Center, Interrogation Section, “Final Report on Stubaf,” 
October 25, 1946, Appendix B, “The Information Section of the Auswärtige Amt,” United States 
National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
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continued in some capacity afterwards;72 2) the Foreign Office not only knew of 
his Europe ideas, but actively broadcasted them within their propaganda system.73  
Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail below, Wirsing continued to work 
indirectly for the Foreign Office from 1943 to the end of the war in his capacity as 
editor of Nazi Germany’s largest foreign-propaganda magazine, Signal, which 
was co-published by the Foreign Office and the German Army.  According to 
Wirsing, at the end of 1940 he was offered by Ribbentrop a high-ranking position 
in the Foreign Office: the head of the Information Department.  But ostensibly 
due to his distaste for the Foreign Office’s rivalry with Joseph Goebbels’s 
Ministry of Propaganda, he declined.74  During his time at the Foreign Office 
from 1939-1941 Wirsing continued his work as editor and contributing editorialist 
of both the MNN and the Die Tat.  Beginning in 1939, Die Tat was renamed to 
Das XX Jahrhundert (“The XX Century”) in order to suggest the ushering in of a 
new era.75  By the end of 1939 the XX Jahrhundert had become a leading 
 
72 Ibid. 
73 “Generalkonsul Wuester,” to “Luther, Woermann, Schmidt, Ruehle” in the Information 
Department of the Foreign Office, February 11, 1942, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes 
in Berlin, Germany, RZ 211/R105119. 
74 United States Department of State, “Biographic Data Form – Wirsing, Giselher,” 
November, 1951, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
75 This was a deliberate play off of the British intellectual magazine “The Nineteenth 
Century,” in which Wirsing was suggesting that his magazine was a superior modern update 
compared to the outdated intellectualism of the British.  The advertising slogan for the renamed 
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periodical in Germany; in fact, the largest weekly in Nazi Germany, Das Reich, 
felt threatened enough by XX Jahrhundert that it offered a position to Wirsing in 
September, 1939 in an attempt to weaken the growing magazine.76 Already in 
October, 1938, Wirsing began returning to the theme of Europe in his writings.  In 
an article celebrating Hitler’s maneuvers at the Munich Conference in September, 
1938, Wirsing described the diplomatic victory as the triumph of “European 
justice as represented by Germany.”  The article, titled “The New Europe,” 
declared that Hitler had secured peace but, more importantly, had shattered the 
350-year old “classical balance of powers theory” of the British, which had 
always been a mere excuse to intervene in European affairs.  Although unwilling 
to articulate what it meant, Wirsing proclaimed a new age of European politics 
without British interference.77  Carl Schmitt’s Monroe-Doctrine speech in April, 
1939 at the University of Kiel, however, appears to have truly spurred Wirsing 
towards re-engaging with the Europe-concept.  Shortly after the speech, Schmitt 
 
XX Jahrhundert was “The Monthly For Our Times.”  See “Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Dokumente, 
Plakat zu der Zeitschrift ‘Das XX Jahrhundert‘,“ A:Diederichs/ Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 
Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
76 In a letter to Wirsing on September 8, 1939, the Eugen Diederichs Verlag pleaded with 
Wirsing to decline the offer and not abandon their most profitable venture.  It appears that Wirsing 
was able to leverage the offer to obtain, as a condition for remaining, complete editorial 
independence as chief editor.  See Unnamed author at Eugen Diederichs publishing house to 
Giselher Wirsing, September 8, 1939, A:Diederichs/ Eugen Diederichs Verlag, “Eugen Diederichs 
Verlag an Wirsing, Giselher, 1939-1948,“ Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
77 Giselher Wirsing, “Das Neue Europa,“ Die Tat, October issue 1938, 433-444 
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sent a copy of the speech to Wirsing.  In a response-letter to Schmitt on June 1, 
1939, Wirsing thanked Schmitt for the copy, saying:  
As you know, I have always considered your Monroe-studies from your 
Königsberg research to be a supreme work in foreign-policy literature.  In 
this most recent work of yours [the Kiel speech], the most important point 
seems to me that we finally find a way to escape negative differentiation, 
and instead find the strength to give our own theory of law in international 
relations. … All of my editorial work in the last few years has been 
circling around this same problem. 
 
Wirsing attached in his letter his most recent article in MNN, in which he 
reviewed Schmitt’s Kiel speech to his readers, as well as an article from XX 
Jahrhundert.78  Schmitt responded within a few weeks, expressed appreciation for 
the articles, declared XX Jahrhundert to be “excellent,” and expressed that “as far 
as I can remember, [I have] never had this level of happiness finding a necessary 
accompaniment [to my research] as with your lectures about my essays.”  
Apparently Wirsing had criticized Schmitt’s arguments about how Europe must 
make greater use of the sea in order to expand its hemisphere.  Schmitt 
acknowledged this criticism, admitting he had “been too quick to emphasize” the 
importance of the sea, and that he agreed with Wirsing that the central division in 
international relation theories of the future would be between “universalism and 
Grossraum.”  He promised Wirsing that he would view Wirsing’s future 
“lectures” in the MNN as a “continuing conversation.”79 Thus, before the war had 
 
78 Giselher Wirsing to Carl Schmitt, June 1, 1939, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Duisburg, Germany, RW 265/18376. 
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begun Wirsing had injected the Grossraum theory into his journalism at the MNN 
and Das XX Jahrhundert. 
 This process was accelerated by German victory over France in the spring 
of 1940.  Wirsing subsequently filled pages of MNN with calls for a “New Order 
of Europe.”  Wirsing regularly published, for example, Reich Chief of Press Otto 
Dietrich’s pronouncements and speeches about a New Order of Europe, often 
even on the front-page.80  He supplemented these with economic commentary on 
the European Grossraum economy by Ferdinand Fried,81 as well theoretical 
explorations of the Grossraum-concept by Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann.82  In 
October, 1940, Wirsing published himself on the front-page in an article titled 
 
80 See, for example, Otto Dietrich, “Die Europäische Revolution,“ Münchner Neueste 
Nachrichten, October 28, 1940, 1.  “Eingehende Ansprache Führer-Duce, Appell Otto Dietrichs an 
das geistige Europa; Überwindung des entarteten Individualismus,“ Münchner Neueste 
Nachrichten, January 21, 1941, 1-2.   
81 See, for example, Ferdinand Fried, “Grosswirtschaftsraum Europa wird gescmiedet: Seine 
Kraftelinien streben zur Mitte/ Englands Sprengungsversuche völlig vermieden,“ Münchner 
Neueste Nachrichten, October 20, 1940, 3.   
82 See, for example, a front-page article from January, 1941 in which he begins to break down 
the national idea by suggesting that Europe envelop the “autarky-concept“ of nationalism: “One 
can’t understand the Grossraum-concept until one recognizes it as the continuation of the Autarky-
concept.  Autarky seeks the security and existence of a Volk in a limited space; the Grossraum-
concept expands this idea to the common pursuit of a shared special destiny of connected nations.  
The Grossraum-concept therefore prioritizes unifying principles over dividing principles.”  See 
Ernst Willhelm Eschmann, “Neue Räume auf dem Erdball,“ Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 
January 12, 1941, 1-2. 
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“Foundations of the New Europe.”  In this article Wirsing first published a series 
of themes which would become standard mantra in his war-time Europeanism: 
England committing “treason against Europe”; Europe becoming an “enclosed 
and self-contained unit”; a “new European continent emerging via the voluntary 
and in certain respects federal cooperation of the various constituents”; a “diverse 
family of European peoples”; and a “revolutionary war in which the forces of the 
future are fighting against the forces of the past.”83 After the invasion of the 
USSR the dam broke entirely: “Today,” Wirsing explained on the front-page in 
August, 1941, “we have a Europe-rallying cry, a European program, and the 
beginning of a new European reality.  This is the result of two victorious years of 
war.”  He continued:  
[This war] is going much farther than our original goals, which were 
limited in 1939 to the recognition of our own German right to living space 
[Lebensraum].  At the time, the conditions did not seem ripe for a greater 
European solution.  What England wanted to hinder, the establishment of 
a continental-European unit, has been accelerated forward by many years, 





After the outbreak of this war the criteria began to change.  Responsibility 
expanded.  After both the Poland-campaign and France-campaign, the 
Führer proclaimed there was no necessity of continuing the war if the 
opposing side would only agree to the limited German right to craft its 
own living space without intervention. … But meanwhile, via German 
military victory, a new set of facts have been created in Europe: without it 
being consciously intended, the responsibility for the entire continent was 
forced into the hands of the Axis.  The struggle for Germany expanded 
into a struggle for the entire European continent, in which all people found 
themselves working together to secure their right to existence if they were 
 
83 Giselher Wirsing, “Fundamente des neuen Europas,“ Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 
October 27, 1940, 1-2. 
97 
 
not to be destroyed.  This is the German-led European Revolution against 
the forces of the past, who intend to deny the entire continent its political 
independence and economic freedom.84 
 
 As has been shown, unlike many Nazi propagandists, Giselher Wirsing’s 
turn to the Europe-concept was not caused by war on the Eastern Front with the 
Soviet Union.  In fact, if his intellectual thought was catalyzed by anxiety about a 
great-power opponent, then it was not primarily the Soviet Union, but rather the 
United States.  Before the Second World War began, in a letter to Carl Schmitt, 
Wirsing explained: “To summarize - in my view the most decisive factor [in 
international relations] is the potentiality of American intervention.  Everything 
else that happens is just a function of that potentiality.”85  In the spring and 
summer of 1938 Wirsing travelled the United States for six months on a trip 
financed by MNN, and based on which he wrote a sixteen-article series.  Wirsing, 
via his friendship with German ambassador to the United States, Hans-Heinrich 
Diekhoff, was able to visit many high-ranking American personalities including 
senators, members of the state department, and even Franklin D. Roosevelt.  
According to postwar American intelligence reports, it was during this trip that 
Wirsing became convinced of the supposed out-sized control of East Coast Jewry 
over Roosevelt and the subsequent threat which the United States posed for 
 
84 For his post-Operation Barbarossa writings see Giselher Wirsing, “Der Aufbruch Europas,“ 
Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, June 29, 1941, 1-2.  Giselher Wirsing, “Vom Sinn dieses 
Krieges,“ Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, August 31, 1941, 1.  
85 Giselher Wirsing to Carl Schmitt, June 1, 1939, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
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Germany and Europe.  At the various stops in his trip, Wirsing “expounded on the 
beneficial and rational influence of Nazi Germany on Europe.”  Ironically, 
although back in Germany Wirsing was still suppressing his Europe-concept, it 
appears that he allowed himself to expand upon them while in the United States.  
For example, while in Chicago he was invited by Northwestern University to give 
a lecture titled “Pan-European Federation,” after which he was ostensibly 
criticized by the President of the university.86   
Based on his experiences during this trip to the United States, Wirsing 
wrote his most popular book published during the war, Der Masslose Kontinent 
(“The Excessive Continent”), which was published at the end of 1941, sold over 
140,000 copies, and was, according to postwar American intelligence services, 
among the most influential anti-American tracts in war-time German literature.  
His main argument in Der Masslose Kontinent, published at the height of the war 
on the Eastern Front and right after the United States joined the conflict, was that 
the United States was actually chiefly to blame for the current war.87  The United 
States, he posited, had outpaced its British competitor in recent decades and 
developed a new, Jewish-based, materialistic civilization: “Americanism.”  
Unlike any other civilization, even Sovietism, Americanism threatened Europe 
because it was the only “continent-transcending power” (überkontinentale 
 
86 “Draft Reports from MFIU No.3 (Third Army Interrogation Center),” July 30, 1945, United 
States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
87 Giselher Wirsing, Der Masslose Kontinent (Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1941). 
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Macht), by which he meant a civilization expanding beyond its historically and 
geographically assigned continental sphere.  In fact, Wirsing put forward an 
argument which he would return to in his later propaganda; namely, that the 
Americans were fighting two wars: one explicit war against Europe and Japan-led 
East Asia, and one implicit war, or “underground war,” against the British, whom 
the Americans intended to consume.88  This new Americanism proudly 
proclaimed a doctrine of  ”universalism,” or “world-integration” based on its 
liberal ideals, but this was nothing more than a new, more powerful version of 
British imperialism:  “Behind the vail of a resurgent ‘internationalism’ from the 
Wilson-Era emerges a new world-conquering American imperialism.  The attempt 
to erect a gruesome monopoly of the world’s resources.  This would lead to the 
enslavement of more than half of mankind.”89  The only way to resist the “dream 
for world domination” at the core of Americanism, Wirsing argued, is for 
Europeans to recognize the need to defend, “not only what is in our own country, 
 
88 Giselher Wirsing, “Der unterirdische Krieg,” Signal, 1st February issue 1943, 2-3. 
89 Giselher Wirsing, Der Masslose Kontinent, 347.  The theme of “imperialism“ is one 
Wirsing returned to in his Europe-propaganda throughout the war in an attempt to harangue the 
Western Allies as hypocrites.  The Atlantic Charta, he often argued, was impossible to square with 
the British Empire.  In fact, the front-page lead-article in the 2nd April issue of 1943 was a special 
investigation into the history of India and Gandhi’s movement, which was presented as a 
continental liberation from British rule not unlike Europe’s liberation movement against the 
Western Allies and Soviets.  Wirsing remained interested and supportive of anti-colonial liberation 
movements in the postwar period, thus illustrating a unique bridge in his ideas to the postwar 
period.  See Giselher Wirsing, “Der Siegreiche Mahatma,” Signal, 2nd April issue 1943. 
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but rather everything that is precious and valuable in our entire continent.”90  In 
his concluding chapter titled “Destiny’s War of Continents,” Wirsing elaborated 
on what he meant.  Europeans, he explained, must oppose the philosophy of 
“universalism” and “world-integration” not with outdated models of “small space 
[kleinäumig] nationalism” but with a new world-ordering principle which he 
called Völkergemeinschaften (“communities of peoples”).  In doing so, he 
introduced for the first time a theme he would advocate throughout his war-time 
Europe-propaganda; namely, an identitarian transition from the 
Volksgemeinschaft (“German national community”) to the Völkergemeinschaft 
(“European national community”).  As Wirsing explained: “The goal, therefore, is 
a Völkergemeinschaft on our continent, much like earlier the goal in the German 
lands was a Volksgemeinschaft.”91 
 In early, 1942, having turned down Ribbentrop’s offer to lead the 
Information Department of the Foreign Office, Wirsing also put down his work as 
editor of MNN and joined the army as a war correspondent in a propaganda-
company on the Eastern Front.92  As will be discussed in a later chapter of this 
dissertation, it was during this time on the Eastern Front that Wirsing wrote the 
Foreign Office a long report criticizing German war-time politics towards Eastern 
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European peoples.  In December, 1942 he returned from the front and began his 
most influential Nazi position: lead editorialist and later editor of the largest 
foreign-language propaganda magazine in the Nazi propaganda regime called 
Signal.93  
Giselher Wirsing and Signal, 1943-1944 
 
Signal was a periodical administered jointly by the foreign office and the 
Wehrmacht.  In an effort to reach millions of Germans and non-Germans 
throughout Nazi-occupied Europe, they published this bi-weekly color magazine 
in twenty-five languages, and very early in the war reached an enormous 
circulation of 2.4 million (a figure which was maintained into the last year of the 
war), thus making it the second-most published weekly or monthly periodical in 
the entire Nazi propaganda apparatus.94  Perhaps because it functioned outside of 
 
93 United States Counter Intelligence Center, Interrogation Section, “Final Report on Stubaf,” 
October 25, 1946, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
94 The Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung was the only periodical with a higher circulation. Joseph 
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domestic audiences. See Rainer Rutz, Signal: Eine Deutsche Auslandsillustrierte Als 
Propagandainstrument Im Zweiten Weltkrieg, (Essen: Klartext, 2007), 19, 59. For Signal’s 
circulation numbers see Rutz, Signal, 10, 73, 95, 97. 
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Goebbels’s Propaganda ministry, Signal unfortunately receives short shrift in the 
literature despite being one of the largest Nazi propaganda projects in the Second 
World War.  The Press Department of the Foreign Office had principal control 
over the political content in Signal.95  As we will see in a subsequent chapter of 
this dissertation, the Foreign Office was another key institution in which, as early 
as 1940, Europeanism came to organize Nazi propaganda narratives.  It is difficult 
to identify the extent to which Wirsing’s work in the Foreign Office between 
1939 and 1942 informed the early development of Signal, because he did not 
become explicitly involved in the periodical until 1943.  Nevertheless, from 
nearly the very beginning of the publication in early 1940, Signal was cognizant 
of its role as a facilitator of Nazi ideas to both German and non-German 
audiences.  In fact, in February, 1940, as the Foreign Office was planning the 
future periodical, the intended propaganda narrative was summarized in a Press 
Department memo: “Politically, ’Signal’ will pursue a general narrative organized 
behind the term ‘For Europe’.  This narrative should be recognizable in all forms 
of material: pictures, articles, article-series, and also cartoons.”  This narrative 
was subsequently broken down into seven tentative components, among them: the 
 
95 According to a Press Department memo in the Foreign Office dated February 15, 1940, the 
Foreign Office and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht agreed that: “The foreign-propaganda 
coordination and planning of the periodical, as well as the censoring of political content, will be 
exercised by the Press Department of the Foreign Office; the coordination and censoring of 
military content will be exercised by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.” Günther Lohse (Press 
Department), memo, February 15, 1940, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, 
Germany, RZ 701/R123717. 
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“new economic unity of Europe”; “Grossraum Europe”; and Europe presented as 
a “utopia.”96  By the end of 1941 Signal had turned heads across the Atlantic with 
its audacious Europe-messaging.  According to the Foreign Office, the British 
newspaper, The Daily Mail, complained on November 19th, 1941: 
Signal is very successful because it has color and pictures, and masks its 
propaganda in good stories … its articles are written such that it is 
assumed that all European countries already accept and share their 
proposition of Europe and are partners in the ‘New Order’. The European 
continent is presented as a great economic unity.  ‘Europe united’ is the 
Leitmotif of this unique paper.  Rarely is there any talk of German rule.97  
 
Indeed, Europe quickly became the concept around which the entire 
publication revolved: war updates, cultural and entertainment articles, comics and 
advertisements, and, most importantly, lead-articles in political and philosophical 
commentary - everything was dressed with an overtly European messaging.  
Unlike most Nazi propaganda, Signal’s targeted audience was never the German 
Volksgemeinschaft; instead, the audience addressed throughout the periodical was 
the europäische Völkergemeinschaft (“European community of peoples”) or the 
europäische Schicksalsgemeinschaft (“European community of destiny”).  These 
striking mutations of turn-of-the-century German nationalist terminology speak to 
the unique ideological discourse which underpinned the publication.  Signal came 
to function as a theoretical space for articulating an explicit romantic pan-
 
96 Unsigned and undated memo, based on surrounding documents most likely January or 
otherwise early 1940, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 
701/R123717. 
97 “Auszung aus der ‘Daily Mail’,” November 19, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 
Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 701/R123717. 
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Europeanism which defined Europe as an organic, cultural-historical entity that 
transcended race and, eventually, even national identity.  Although initially shoe-
horning its European pseudo-egalitarianism into race categories by describing 
European peoples as equal yet different biological entities, eventually, under 
Wirsing’s later leadership, Signal abandoned the concept of race, instead defining 
Europe through cultural inheritance and a shared past.  In making this step, 
Signal’s Europeanism eventually propagated a European nation to compete with 
German nationhood. 
The first two years of Signal, before Wirsing took over the publication, 
were a mixed bag – the publication, although outwardly European in its 
intentions, struggled to find a coherent and consistent narrative.  The first few 
months consisted of various braggadocious proclamations of German military, 
economic, and political superiority which overwhelmed an elusive appeal for a 
“New Europe.”  But by the autumn of 1941, the magazine had developed its 
Raison d’Être: namely, to facilitate a “new self-conscious Europe.”98  Hitler and 
Mussolini were increasingly presented as original European ideologues, who 
“with a rock-solid conviction of European reform” set out to end “European Civil 
War” by leading Europe towards a “community of fate” under German 
leadership.99  Other supranational themes which would later receive more 
audacious articulation in Signal were irregularly introduced over the course of 
1941, especially after the invasion of the Soviet Union.  Examples include: the 
 
98 “Europas Verkehr ohne Grenzen,“ Signal, 2nd October issue 1941, 41-45. 
99  Max Clauss, “Europäische Entscheidung,“ Signal, 1st November issue 1940, 4-5. 
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notion of a new “continental” age in the history of European civilization;100 the 
idea that nationalism was a “narrow” particularism which would be overcome in 
this new age of “European unity”;101 and the advocacy of a unified, autarchic 
European “continental economy.”102  Yet right alongside this initial 
experimentation with Europeanism in the publication’s early years, Signal writers 
simultaneously reinforced Germany’s claim to imperial dominance.  This was 
accomplished through the euphemism of “German leadership” which was 
symbolized as the “heart of Europe,” and discussed by the writers as the only state 
therefore capable of protecting Europe militarily and coordinating Europe 
economically with its “organizational strength.”103  To those fearful of German 
exploitation, the only recompense offered was that Germany, due to its 
geographical situation at the center of Europe, had interests “inherently tied to the 
interests of all European states.” Germany, an intrinsically “continental” state 
unlike England, was ostensibly unable to compromise the interests of other states 
without compromising its own.104  This, they argued, was not unlike the great 
 
100 F.W. von Oertzen, “Völkerbund? – Völkergemeinschaft! Was Genf unmöglich war, und 
was in Zukunft möglich sein wird,“ Signal, 1st July issue 1941, 8-11. 
101 “Endlich Soll Europa Erstehen,“ Signal, 2nd June issue 1941, 16, 27. 
102 “Europas Verkehr Ohne Grenzen,“ Signal, 2nd October issue 1941, 41-45.   
103 “Europas Verkehr ohne Grenzen,“ Signal, 2nd October issue 1941, 41-45.   
104 Rudoph Fischer, “Wer kann Europa führen?“ Signal, 1st June issue 1941, 22-27. , “Der 
Frieden der nicht Leben Konnte: warum 1939 auf 1919 Folgen Musste,“ Signal, 1st April issue 
1941, 4-6, 8. 
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Napoleon.105  Germany was portrayed as geographically positioned and 
historically destined to “lead” what they called “Mitteleuropa,” a term for 
“Central Europe” which built upon justifications for German imperialism in 
“Central Europe” and had circulated in conservative German thought since the 
First World War.106  
 By mid-1942, Signal publishers began the process of replacing 
disorganized references to German “leadership” in a New Order of Europe with a 
much more far-reaching and theoretically thorough Europe-concept.  This 
coincided with Wirsing’s arrival to the magazine.  In early 1943 Wirsing was 
made main editorialist (Schriftleiter) of Signal, and this enabled him to direct the 
ideological messaging and further increase print space for his own ideas. Wirsing 
had each bi-weekly issue open with two main editorial columns (“The War as a 
World Struggle” and “The New Worldview – the Future of Europe”), in which he 
always penned the lead-articles, using them to situate the ongoing war into 
European and world historical context, as well as expound upon the “new” 
 
105 One interesting way Signal writers justified the need for “German leadership” was to make 
frequent reference to Napoleon as the “precursor” of the New Order, who, unfortunately ahead of 
his time, nevertheless correctly recognized the need for a “strong will” to enforce the “thrust 
towards [European] integration.” See Max Clauss, “Europäische Entscheidung,“ Signal, 1st 
November issue 1940, 4-5.  Rudoph Fischer, “Wer kann Europa führen?“ Signal, 1st June issue 
1941, 22-27.  “Wohin Geht Europa?” Signal, 2nd June issue 1943, 23-26.   
106 Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967).  
Jürgen Elvert, Mitteleuropa!: Deutsche Pläne Zur Europäischen Neuordnung, 1918-1945 
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999). 
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European ideology of Nazi Germany.  Between 1943-1945, Wirsing wrote at least 
sixty-six articles in Signal, and this does not take into account his editorial 
direction to articles penned by other authors. The ascension of Wirsing to main 
editorialist, and by the end of the war chief editor over the entire magazine, 
enabled a concerted effort to codify the hitherto uncoordinated Europe-concept of 
Signal and more audaciously distance the magazine from many orthodox National 
Socialist principles. 
 One of the first Nazi ideas to come under revision in Wirsing’s Signal was 
German supremacy.  Signal’s initial bewildering method for accomplishing this 
was to deny that various central Nazi concepts had anything to do with 
supremacism.  For example, in an article from late 1943 entitled “Herrenvolk” 
Wirsing attempted to roll-back the central doctrine of the “master race.”  In an 
astonishing projection of National Socialism upon England, Wirsing argued that 
in reality the British were the actual Herrenvolk.  In their pretentious, exploitative 
posture towards Europe, it was the British, not the Germans, who had failed to 
understand that “a New Order is only possible if it is not founded upon the rule of 
a Herrenvolk, but instead upon free partnership between free nations.” He 
implored the Europeans to not be deceived by British attempts to slander German 
intentions by twisting the German doctrine of Herrenvolk from its original 
meaning (which was left undiscussed).  The Herrenvolk doctrine, he dismissively 
explained, was not the “important point” when it comes to the European New 
Order.  Rather, “[w]hen Germany professes its belief in the idea of a greater 
Europe, in the long run this can never happen upon any foundation other than the 
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voluntary cooperation of all European peoples. There is no other foundation that 
would be sustainable.”107 
Another example of Signal’s revisionism is the way Lebensraum (“living 
space”) was reformulated in a mid-1942 article. “The concept of Lebensraum is 
too often misconstrued,” an unnamed author explained; in fact, Germany’s 
enemies falsely claim that “the German-coined concept of ‘Lebensraum’ implies 
imperialistic tendencies.” Instead, the author insisted that the term Lebensraum 
did not mean expansionism, and nor did it have anything to do with the unilateral 
strivings of any single Volk; instead, it was actually an inherently supranational 
concept: 
First of all, it must be established that it [Lebensraum] does not mean the 
space needed by a people to survive, space which therefore must be 
conquered and controlled.  To the contrary, it refers to a circle of 
relationships, consequences, and reciprocal impacts between nations…. 
 
Lebensraum, the author continued, was never more than the pursuit of collective 
European autonomy and creating new historical entities, for which the author used 
Wirsing’s term “communities of peoples” (Völkergemeinschaften).  Lebensraum, 
the author argued, simply referred to the space “inhabited by nations with the 
same needs, by nations that are dependent of one another, and determined to give 
their social and economic life a steadiness and security based on organizational 
similarity.”108 
 
107 See Giselher Wirsing, “Herrenvolk,” Signal, 2nd October issue 1943, 2-8.  
108 From an article entitled “Lebensraum – Buzzword and Reality.” See “Lebensraum – 
Schlagwort und Wirklichkeit,“ Signal, 2nd May issue 1942, 2. 
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Arguably the most important revelation in Signal concerns what it did not 
contain: Rassenkunde (“racial doctrine”).  Indeed, from the very beginning of the 
publication, the core Nazi concept of race was comparatively absent from the 
periodicals. That said, race was sporadically present via vague terminology such 
as “blood,” imprecise deployment of racial synonyms such as race/nation, and, of 
course, dichotomies which opposed “barbaric” Asia against “civilized” Europe.  
Yet even when race was present (mostly in Signal’s early years of publication) it 
was explained through absurdly revisionist categories such as, for example, a 
“European race.”  One article from early 1942, for example, advocated for the 
historical consciousness and solidarity of a “European race” or “Occidental race” 
(used interchangeably). This race was simply defined as “white” in opposition to 
“blacks” and “Asians.”  As such, the article rebuked English practices of hiring 
black soldiers in the First World War, and thereby betraying the “solidarity of the 
European race.”  Germany, in contrast, was supposedly unifying the European 
race in the current war.109 
Early editions of Signal often skirted the issue of race by handling the 
various Axis nations in separate articles.  But by the time Wirsing was in charge 
Signal stressed the commonality of Europe’s nations as much as, if not more than, 
their differences, often employing a unique term which expressed European 
togetherness: Europäische Völkerfamilie (“European family of peoples”).  
Curiously, such messaging openly incorporated Eastern European nations 
otherwise understood in orthodox National Socialism as “sub-humans,” and this 
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took place in Signal articles even in 1941 at the height of German euphoria on the 
Eastern Front.  In November, 1941, well before future worsened war prospects 
would have necessitated it, Signal ran an article praising various Eastern 
European ethnicities and deploring the way Bolshevism had withheld from them 
the spiritually humanizing power of European civilization. Now, it was argued, 
they could look to their European captors for re-humanization.110  The idea of re-
humanization was a peculiar maneuver, because it enabled Wirsing to circumvent 
the doctrine of Eastern “sub-humans” by suggesting that Eastern Europeans had 
been temporarily made sub-human by an artificial communist regime.  Take, for 
example, Wirsing’s front-page lead-article from the last issue in 1943 titled “Dead 
and Living.”  In this article Wirsing contrasted for his readers the materialistic and 
heartless practice of Bolshevist military burials with the beautiful practice by 
which Russian soldiers allied to Germany bury their dead.  How is it, Wirsing 
asks, that the two practices, performed by people from the same country, are so 
different?  The answer, he suggests, is that the Bolshevists are not actually 
Russians; rather, they have numbed and suppressed the “unchangeable substance” 
of Russians: 
It is thus clear that the Soviet burial methods correspond neither to the 
Russian tradition nor to the Russian character; rather, that we are dealing 
with a lamination of the Russian [character] … which now needs to be 
awakened in order to break through powerfully to its original form. 
 
 
110 Willy Beer, “So Sieht der Sowjetsoldat Die Welt: ‘Signal‘ besucht ein Gefangenlager für 
Sowjetsoldaten,“ Signal,  2nd November issue 1941, 8, 16.   “Nach 2 Jahren Sowjetherrschaft 
wieder der erste Gottesdienst,“ Signal, December Heft 1941, 16.  “Für die Rechte ihrer Völker,“ 
Signal, December issue 1943, 12-13.   
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He continued:  “Not until these recent years of war in the Eastern territories have 
the German soldiers been able to understand that the unchangeable substance [of 
Eastern peoples] has preserved itself much more intact that we could have 
known.”  “It is a matter of survival for Europe,” he asserted, that the Eastern 
peoples are assisted in the quest to re-find this “unchangeable substance.”111 
By the end of the war, Eastern Europeans were portrayed as equal, even 
exemplary, members of European civilization.  Take, for example, an article by 
Wirsing titled “We, the Europeans” which was purportedly written based on his 
experiences in the propaganda company on the Eastern Front.  In this article 
Wirsing narrated an inspirational story about a young man named Vladimir, a 
Russian student turned soldier, who at the beginning of the war decided to defect 
from his Red Army unit and travel many miles to the German lines. It was a long, 
arduous journey, Wirsing explained, and only one thought kept him going: “[t]his 
way leads me to Europe.”  In this way, Vladimir was like many other Eastern 
Europeans: “he expressed precisely what tens of thousands, indeed hundreds of 
thousands, of Ukrainians, Russians, and Byelorussians hazily felt.” Wirsing did 
not censor his admiration for Vladimir: “Only rarely have I so vividly felt that 
special thing that defines Europe as I felt in conversation with this lanky, pale, 
lively young Russian, who possessed deep in his heart such a firm image of what 
it is that makes Europe.”  For Wirsing, the experience with this young Russian 
was evidence that Europe could not be defined geographically, but rather 
spiritually:  
 
111 See Giselher Wirsing, “Tote und Lebende,“ Signal, 2nd December issue 1943, 2. 
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For all the geographers of the entire world Europe will never be definable. 
It is more than a continent, Europe is a spiritual concept.  Who a European 
is - who belongs in our unique and peculiar cultural community - can only 
be identified by whether or not he professes himself to her, whether or not 
he exists for her, whether or not he has planted his roots in her [in ihr 
seine Wurzeln geschlagen hat]. 
 
The last sentence in that quotation is essential. Here, Wirsing took head-on an 
established Nazi metaphor (racial roots) and rewrote it to counter its original 
meaning.  One’s roots were not inherited; instead, they were consciously 
“planted” by the individual according to their free agency.  Even for Russians, 
Wirsing explained, Europe was a choice:  “Vladimir was a European. He wanted 
to think and feel as we do. He wanted to profess himself to us.  Naturally, he did 
not want to become a German; rather, he wanted to remain that what he is by 
blood. But he wanted to do that as a European.112  The above articles were not 
exceptions to the rule. Indeed, Signal periodicals were strewn with a constant flow 
of articles praising the various Eastern nations of Europe for their participation as 
Europeans in the war against Bolshevism.  In fact, the last magazine for the year 
of 1943 was a special edition devoted entirely to praising the Eastern European 
contribution to the war effort and intended to bolster Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht 
recruitment drives throughout Europe.113  
There was, however, one ethnic group for whom Europe could not be a 
choice: the Jews.  Despite Nazi Europeanists’ persistent revisionism, the one Nazi 
concept which they never rejected was the Jewish conspiracy.  Indeed, Jews were 
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never incorporated into the European “family” by Signal.  Furthermore, Signal’s 
peculiar form of cultural racism actually serviced a unique representation of Jews 
in Signal: namely, the Jews as the primordial enemy of a unified Europe.  It is in 
this vein that Giselher Wirsing, who had already made a name for himself as an 
antisemitic writer in the 1930s, refashioned the Jews into the “elite troops of the 
Anti-Europeans.”  Rather than the historical enemy of the German race, the 
pernicious Jews were expanded by Wirsing into an adversary of both “nations and 
continents,” a devious enemy which had impeded Europe’s self-fulfillment at all 
the important historical crossroads which otherwise could have led to European 
unity.114 
Wirsing brought with him to Signal the concept at the core of his 
Europeanism, the Grossraum-concept; in fact, while at Signal he even expanded 
it.  In particular, he added the notion of historical inevitability.  The Grossraum 
became more than a geographic space uniquely suited for economic and political 
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cooperation; rather, the Grossraum became a cultural community endowed with a 
collective past and therefore future as well.  Just as if the Grossraum had replaced 
class in Marxism, history became a struggle of Grossraum[s].  Under Wirsing’s 
leadership, Signal integrated the Nazi slogan of a “New European Order” into 
historical narratives which presented the Second World War as the culmination of 
a world historical development: namely, the integration of nations and states into 
Grossraum[s].  The New Order of Europe was interpreted as the birth of the 
European Grossraum.  A Grossraum, then, was an updated version of the racial 
community in orthodox National Socialism, a revolutionary political, economic, 
and cultural collective historically armed with the capacity to defend themselves 
from inorganic, foreign influence.  For Signal’s writers, history had, in a reverse 
Spenglerian sense, reached a wonderful new civilizational epoch which 
“calculated politically and economically with Grossraum[s]” and would leave 
behind the era of the nation-state.115 As Wirsing explained in a mid-1943 article: 
“The unfolding of our century reveals that the most important phenomenon of our 
age is the development of great continental units which have displaced all other 
problems that have consisted between individual peoples and states.”116  
Consequently the Second World War was never presented as a conflict of nations 
or races; rather, Signal declared, “the struggle of continents has begun.”117  
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Similarly, the National Socialist revolution was sometimes reformulated as a 
Raumrevolution (“continental revolution”).118  
Signal writers were so committed to this new spatial paradigm that they 
discussed it not only as a European phenomenon, but as the “natural” telos for all 
continents across the globe. In this way, they could imbue their message with an 
ethos of global inevitability.  One method Signal employed in this respect was to 
repeatedly map the Tripartite pact with Japan onto this continental outlook: “The 
three powers do not view it their responsibility to replace the English imperial 
system with a new one of similar form, but rather to organize spheres of influence 
which are determined geographically, politically, and economically according to 
nature.”119  A common refrain, surely taken from Foreign Office propaganda, was 
“Leave Europe to the Europeans” and “Leave Asia to the Asians.”  As one article 
explained: “We are fighting together with Japan so that every continent of the 
earth can determine its path according to his own will: the European according to 
his, the East-Asian according to his, also the American, the Indian and that of the 
Middle-East.”120   
Economically, the Grossraum doctrine was situated into the interwar 
debates as the perfect compromise between international free-trade and national 
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autarky.  Grossraumwirtschaft, or “Grossraum economics,” as they called it, 
taught that all Grossraum[s] were geographically capable of providing for 
themselves and therefore did not require dependence on the inconsistency of 
international free trade where a “crisis in some corner of the world” could cause 
chaos at home.121  At the same time, they were large enough to overcome the 
short-sighted isolationism of national autarchy.  Thus, national protectionism in 
the form of tariffs or otherwise was equally a threat to European living standards 
and therefore heavily criticized.122  The actual proposed policies presented in 
conjunction with this Grossraum-economics ultimately represented a wide-
ranging list of demands for economic integration, including: de-regulation of 
interstate transportation within Europe; de-regulation of the interstate passport 
entity thereby creating a “constant traveling populace across our continent”; 
“…determining, via accepted trade contracts, the specific quantity of goods while 
guaranteeing pre-determined established prices”; and “an economically united, no 
longer divided by tariffs, independent market…”123  This economic package was 
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presented as a genuinely socialist project.  To be sure, the National Socialists had 
always presented the Nazi Party as the genuinely socialist party, but Signal 
writers felt that with Grossraumwirtschaft they had discovered the anticipated 
solution to the social crisis of the early twentieth century: “Between Bolshevism 
and Capitalism stands Europe, which sees in socialism the necessary care of the 
state for the welfare of its people.”124  Under Wirsing’s leadership, Signal 
associated this future European socialism with various historical predecessor 
movements with which the Nazis never would have associated: for example the 
Social Democrats of Bismarck’s era as well as the turn-of-the-century 
Kathedersozialisten.125  “A laborer,” one article explained, “cannot consider 
himself honored until he has obtained guaranteed employment, security for his 
retirement, assistance for sickness, unemployment and maternity, and assurance 
that wife and child will be taken care of in the case of death.”126  Grossraum 
economics, then, replaced the salvific national community of Nazi propaganda 
with a new redeemer from liberal capitalism: the self-sustaining, integrated 
European Grossraum economy. 
Perhaps Signal’s most blatant revision of National Socialism was its 
alteration of Social Darwinism. Take, for example, and article written by an 
author named Hans Baehr, which attempted to fuse the European “continental 
ideology” with social Darwinism, but in doing so he turned Social Darwinism on 
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its head.  Essentially replacing race with European culture, Baehr argued that the 
earth’s Darwinian struggle for existence was a cultural phenomenon, even 
describing Europe as an organic Kulturgemeinschaft (“community of culture”) 
which was inevitably transformed over time into a Lebenskampfgemeinschaft in 
order to survive extinction (Lebenskampfgemeinschaft translates roughly to 
“community struggling for existence”).  History was therefore not presented as a 
struggle of competing races, but of competing cultural communities. In spite of 
the frequent occurrence of conflict between European nations in past and present - 
in reality, Baehr argued, European nations were actually unconsciously “unified 
in essence.”  “[O]ur peoples,” Baehr explained, were part of a “united historical 
process and, in spite of their differences, all cooperative stones in the European 
match.”  Thus, in total contradiction to Nazi ideology, the European races were 
subliminally “cooperative” and “united” in a historical metanarrative of European 
cultural struggle against the East and West. According to Baehr, it was not the 
racial Volksgemeinschaft but the European Lebenskampfgemeinschaft that would 
organically evolve towards “her rights and responsibilities.”  The ultimate victory 
of this new community could not be stopped.  It was, he explained, “nature’s 
natural selection.”127 
It would be a mistake to conclude that this continental concept was a 
repudiation of National Socialism.  The calculus in Signal was to replace the Volk 
with the continental community (“the European Völkergemeinschaft”), a new and 
 




more inclusive foundational myth from which to derive all political theory. This 
was an attempt to make National Socialism accessible, palatable, and more 
modern by mutating key characters and concepts.  Signal writers, like Nazi 
ideologues, consistently portrayed the Second World War as Europe’s continental 
struggle against the inorganic Weltanschauungen (“world ideologies”) of the 
Eastern Bolshevism and the Western liberalism.  Against the mechanistic 
collectivism of the former, and against the spiritually defunct individualism of the 
latter, Signal writers promoted a discussion of nature’s “laws,” Europe’s 
“naturally-derived organic origins,” and the idea of cultural-historical 
“organisms.”128 Such rhetoric appears to mirror the neo-Herderian ideas of 
National Socialism, but the absurdity of such a völkisch ideology in Signal, of 
course, was that Europe was not by any stretch a Volk.  Hence, nature’s laws 
could not be formulated as racial; they were, instead, rather awkwardly and 
vaguely reformulated as cultural. This incongruity was exposed, for example, in 
an article by Wirsing from early 1944.  In it, Wirsing denounced both Western 
liberalism and Eastern Bolshevism because neither ideology was “völkisch.” The 
solution he went on to advocate, though, was not the German Volk; instead, “[t]he 
European solution must be the solution,” he explained, “the middle between both 
extremes.”129 In this way, Wirsing subtly disassociated the concept of völkisch 
from the concept of race and attached it to the concept of culture. 
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August issue 1942, 8.  Giselher Wirsing, “Wofür wir Kämpfen,” Signal, 2nd issue 1944, 8. 
129 Giselher Wirsing, “Wofür wir Kämpfen,“ Signal, 2nd issue 1944, 8. 
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Signal at the End of the War 
By 1944, Signal writers were consistently arguing that the European 
continental epoch was the inevitable culmination of history.  On a theoretical 
plane this is comparable to Nazi historicism, which placed the Nazis at the end of 
a historical struggle of races. However, unlike the Nazis, the historical actor (the 
organic community driving European historical development) was not the 
German Volk; instead, it was the European continent and its civilizational spirit 
(for which the term “Europäertum” was used).  Signal frequently published 
articles on European history, beginning usually with Greco-Roman classical 
antiquity. Tracing the path of Europe rather than nations, the articles explored 
Europe’s dialectical rise to the present, a time when political and economic 
unification had finally become ripe and necessary.130  In complete contrast to Nazi 
historicism, Signal often bemoaned the age of nationalism and the rise of nation-
states, describing such historical processes as unfortunate steps backward in the 
evolution of European unity.  Too often, Signal argued, Europeans blindly 
followed “the archaic nationalism of yesterday” (altüberkommener 
Nationalismus) into disastrous “European Civil Wars.”  Unlike Nazi reverence for 
the emergence of exclusive nations in Early Modern European history, Signal 
mourned these new nationalisms for the way in which they fostered “false 
strivings for power, a culture of ‘elect peoples’, geopolitical aggression, and wars 
 
130 “Wohin Geht Europa?“ Signal, 2nd June issue 1943, 23-26.  
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of robbery.”131  Wirsing and his writers frequently drew upon a long-term 
perspective of European history, in which the Greeks overcame their inter-state 
European civil wars by defeating the Persians and in doing so created a “unifying 
community of culture” based on a “unified European consciousness” that was 
passed down to the Europe of the Middle Ages.  Unfortunately, however, this 
metaphysical cultural unity was destroyed from within during the Early Modern 
era which inaugurated a period of European Civil Wars.  This kept Europeans 
from acknowledging their intrinsic unity and blinded them to the incursions of 
“foreign continents” such as, eventually, the United States under Woodrow 
Wilson.  In this way, Wirsing conceptualized the Second World War as the long-
awaited, restorative “war of European unification” against the incursions and 
remaining influence of “non-European powers.”132  The war then, despite all of its 
horrors, contained a dramatic silver lining - it was, as Wirsing explained, 
“birthing the self-consciousness of the European continent.”133 
 
131“Europäische Kirchturmspolitik,“ Signal, 17th issue 1944, 10-13.  Walther Kiaulehn, “Das 
Bist Du, Europa,“ Signal, 13th issue 1944, 23-26, 30, 34.  To be sure, many early war articles on 
European history attempted to have it both ways, arguing that nationalism, although unfortunate 
for European unity, was a necessary stepping stone in Europe’s historical path: “The idea of 
[European] unity had to give way to the narrowest of interests. It may well be that this detour was 
necessary.”  See “Endlich Soll Europa Erstehen,” Signal, 2nd June issue 1941, 16, 27.  By the end 
of the war, under Wirsing, Signal rarely made such concessions to nationalism. 
132 Giselher Wirsing, “Wir, Die Europäer,” Signal, 2nd March issue 1943, 11, 23, 38. 
133 Giselher Wirsing, “Die Geburtstunde des Europäischen Soldatens,“ Signal, 2nd June issue 
1943, 8-13.   
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In the final years of the war Signal responded to impending Nazi defeat 
with an increasingly radical Europeanism, culminating ultimately in a 
reevaluation of German national identity.  Indeed, Wirsing and his writers became 
increasingly obsessed with the notion of “identity” (for which they used the 
German term Bewusstsein), arguing that the European revolution necessarily 
altered identity.  In short, the seriousness with which Signal writers handled their 
new European Weltanschauung eventually necessitated the creation of a new 
European identity.  For if Europe was truly the essential paradigm for viewing the 
world, past and future, then Europeans would therefore need to think and feel 
European. Anything short of this would delegitimize the integrity of their 
elaborate European conceptualization.  Signal, in its earliest periodicals, made 
little or no attempt to develop a supranational European identity.  Instead, the 
various nationalisms of the continent (including German nationalism) were 
praised with sympathetic articles.  However, as the European ideology was 
increasingly cemented into the narrative, the inconsistency between nationalism 
and Europeanism became too pressing.  Signal’s response was to position 
nationalism and Europeanism in a kind of symbiotic relationship, purporting that 
the two were mutually reinforcing.  Originally, this European identity was 
presented as a compliment to national identity.  As one article explained, “[t]he 
German spirit has never refused to assimilate the realization of other European 
spirits; indeed, from the depths of the Hellenistic spirit, he [the German spirit] 
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views himself European.”134  By 1943 Signal had coined the term for this 
European identity: Europäische Idee (“European idea“) or Europa-Gedanke (“the 
Europe-concept”).  In the first stages of this identity discussion, Signal writers 
routinely stressed the compatibility of this Europe-concept with national identity 
even when the logic was completely nonsensical. 
In 1944 a new tone established itself.  By this point, the “German 
leadership” narrative had long since given way to a burgeoning discussion of 
transnational equality and the sovereignty of European member states in a 
politically integrated “continental unit” (kontinentale Einheit).  In late 1943 
Signal was running an article series titled “Europe on the Way Towards a New 
Weltanschauung” – a not too subtle reformulation of yet another Nazi concept, 
Weltanschauung, or “world ideology.”  By 1944 the war was consistently 
portrayed as the necessarily violent endpoint of a historical teleology towards 
“European unification,” a process which would replace the nation-state 
provincialism of old.135 Wirsing frequently described the future Europe in terms 
of a “federation of all peoples on the continent” (Bund aller Völker des 
Kontinents).  Europe, he explained, would be a 
federation that grants every people, large and small, the same right to 
existence and the same potential for development. A federation that is 
founded upon the recognition, which we Europeans have made, that this 
 
134 “Das Geheimnis: Die Seele des Menschen, nicht die Machine siegt in der Schlacht,“ 
Signal, 1st May issue 1942, 7-12. 
135 Giselher Wirsing, “Kann Man die Uhr Zurückstellen?“ Signal, 16th issue 1944, 8-11, 23.  
Giselher Wirsing, “Vom Weg der europäischen Jugend,“ Signal, 1st May issue 1943, 8.  Giselher 
Wirsing, “Wird Europa arm sein?“ Signal, 1st August issue 1943, 8. 
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war is not about a mere coalition-war, such as earlier alliances, but rather 
the recognition that we are a family.136 
 
As a consequence of these developments, nationalism was increasingly 
diluted and a common European national identity was proposed.  The most 
unashamed advocacy of a new European identity eventually came in articles 
penned in the very last months of the war.  At this late date there was no longer 
any need for Europeanism – the war was clearly lost and the Reich no longer 
extended over any non-German territories.  Indeed, the last editions of Signal 
subtly hint that Wirsing and his writers were losing hope in the war.  In fact, as 
will be discussed in chapter six of this dissertation, American CIA records reveal 
that in late 1944 and early 1945 Wirsing worked on a covert project to author a 
series of defeatist SS-reports in an ultimately failed attempt to convince Himmler 
to oust Hitler in a coup and approach the Western Allies with diplomatic 
reconciliation.  Yet, as late as April, 1945, Wirsing was still opining on behalf of 
Nazi propaganda in Signal and energetically espousing a fanatical European 
resistance.  One article, after describing nationalism as “excessive” and 
“chauvinist,” proceeded to argue that a new-age European identity necessitated a 
disavowal of nationalism.  It is worth quoting at length: 
[European nations] will not be justified degenerating into the mistake of a 
stubborn and archaic Chauvinism.  From this point of view, today’s 
national hero will be tomorrow’s European traitor.  It will therefore be 
necessary to design all educative programs of the European states upon the 
foundation of a new collective identity [Gemeinschaftsgefühl]. The 
accustomed historical consciousness of many nations will therefore have 
to be displaced.  The youth of tomorrow should consider itself, above all 
 
136 Giselher Wirsing, “Die Geburtstunde des Europäischen Soldatens,“ Signal, 2nd June issue 
1943, 8-13.   
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else, a European youth.  Everything that is undertaken towards this goal 
should be placed in the service of this new consciousness, including 
school, literature, music, travel, radio, and film. Tomorrow’s Europeans 
must consider themselves Europeans when visiting other continents unless 
they want to be ridiculed, and eventually subjugated, by other 
conscientiously unified continents as a result of their being Swiss, 
Germans or Frenchmen.137 
 
Few quotations could better reveal Signal’s internal paradox. A propaganda 
periodical in the service of the Nazi regime had come to repudiate, by name, 
German national identity. 
 Signal challenges the frequent claim the Nazi Europeanism was merely 
opportunistic and/or mostly limited to eccentric academics. First, circulation 
numbers illustrate that millions of readers were exposed to this periodical, and the 
fact that Signal was a commodity (sold for consumption on the private market 
rather than enforced as propaganda training) further reinforces its claim to 
influence. Second, the length to which these authors went to codify their 
Europeanism with historical teleology and map this revisionist vision onto Nazi 
ideas suggests that they took their Europeanism seriously.  Unlike some 
disingenuous Nazi propaganda elsewhere, the idea of Europe in Signal was not 
merely an empty and sporadic supplement; rather, Wirsing made his Europe-
concept the central theme around which the entire publication revolved.  To be 
sure, the increasingly desperate situation on the Eastern Front certainly provided 
an impetus for a more focused and fanatic anti-Bolshevism, and the circulation of 
Signal reached its zenith after Stalingrad.  However, as we have seen, Wirsing’s 
 
137 “Was wird aus der Jugend?“ Signal, 5th issue 1945, 4.   “Was sind deine Aufgaben nach 
dem Kriege?“ Signal, 5th issue 1945, 26-30.   
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network was trafficking in Europe-propaganda well before the Nazi invasion of 
the Soviet Union in 1941 as well as before the war irreversibly turned against the 
Nazis in 1943.  Furthermore, Signal continued its Europe-propaganda until the 
very end of the war, even when Germany no longer occupied non-German 
countries.  Signal was never merely a response to Germany’s evolving war 
prospects; rather, the evidence suggests that Signal was a real attempt to come to 
terms with the globally expanding scope of the conflict and, importantly, the 
genocidal nature of totalitarian conflict.  Signal writers never acknowledged the 
mass murders taking place in Nazi-occupied Europe.  But by situating the Second 
World War at the end of an inevitable “continental” narrative of Europe’s 
historical journey, the unprecedented crimes and violence of National Socialism 
could be rationalized as the mere historical collateral damage in Europe’s 
inevitable and salvific birth into a new, modern era. A passage by Wirsing from 
late 1944 illustrates this point: 
In the last few years of this war Signal has unceasingly championed the 
thesis that this war … is nothing more and nothing less than the 
preparation for a genuine unification of the European nations, a unification 
which alone can guarantee the survival of Europe as a meaningful world 
factor. That such a process could only take place with the greatest of 
difficulties, blood, and tears is something we never denied.  But we have 
said that these sacrifices are small in proportion to the destiny into which 
the continent is progressing.138 
 
Conclusion: Das Zeitalter des Ikaros 
After the war, American intelligence services were surprisingly unaware 
of, or at least uninterested in, Wirsing’s role in one of Nazi Germany’s most 
 
138 Giselher Wirsing, “Am Abgrund des Hasses,” Signal, 19th issue 1944, 10-11. 
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influential propaganda organs.139  Much of this had to do with a prioritized focus 
on Wirsing’s insubordinate SS-reports prepared secretly in the RSHA in the last 
months of the war.  But another reason is that they failed to take his Europeanism 
seriously, dismissing his Europe-propaganda as “deceptive verbiage.”140  Despite 
uncovering a good deal of evidence vis-à-vis Wirsing’s complicity in National 
Socialism, American intelligence services initially believed a story Wirsing 
himself was fond of telling: namely, that looking beyond his prewar and early war 
association with Nazi politics, Wirsing ultimately came to oppose the Nazi regime 
and attempted to revise it from the inside.  “Wirsing,” one of his original 
interrogators argued, “is undoubtedly a courageous man if compared to the 
common run of Germany’s scribes.”141  A subsequent interrogator took at face 
value Wirsing’s claim “to have disapproved of the Nazi concept of a ‘New Order’ 
 
139 Most interrogations, collected reports, and prepared biographies either omitted his work at 
Signal or merely glossed over it.  A few documents noted his work for Signal in passing but failed 
to understand the significance of either his role or the periodical as such.  This was because 
Wirsing, for good reason, was less than forthcoming about his work for Signal, which continued to 
the very end of the war and compromised his self-presentation as a kind of quasi-resistance 
operative. 
140 United States Counter Intelligence Center, Interrogation Section, “Final Report on Stubaf,” 
October 25, 1946, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
141 “Draft Reports from MFIU No.3 (Third Army Interrogation Center),” July 30, 1945, 
United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, 
Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
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in Europe.”  As a result of Wirsing’s successful obfuscations with initial 
interrogators, he was seen as a potential ally in postwar reconstruction, evaded 
postwar justice measures (denazification) with a mere “fellow-traveler” status and 
small fine, and was even briefly employed by American intelligence services as a 
research assistant.  The contradictory path of Wirsing as an ardent propagandist 
yet covert defeatist with a record of oddly revisionist ideas and even opposition to 
Nazi race policies resulted in a truly amorphous subject for American intelligence 
operatives.  His earliest interrogators, then, were misled into a false representation 
of his war-time behaviors.  But the Americans kept an on-going record and 
investigation into Wirsing for decades after the war.  Already by the end of 1946, 
one American intelligence operative was beginning to re-assess and criticize the 
earlier leniency towards him:   
Prisoner’s role and importance in Nazi Germany are hard to assess.  There 
is no convenient category into which he falls easily: his SS rank was of no 
significance, and even during his most influential period he was a mere Lt. 
in the German Army.  Yet Prisoner’s political influence has been of 
significance…. Prisoner’s claim that he was not a Nazi is not well 
founded.  He was not, it is true, a believer in the Nordic blood myth.  He 
can point to his frequent clashes with the Propaganda ministry, with 
Bormann, Dietrich, Goebbels, and Ribbentrop, to his cautious public and 
private criticism during the final stages of the Third Reich (“The war is 
lost – let us save Germany”), and finally to his timid intrigues to have the, 
so he believed, more malleable Himmler replace Hitler.  But in 1940, 
when German domination over Europe was almost complete, Prisoner 
could still talk of moral value, reasoning post factum as he had done 
before, that external force was an unimportant trapping of a transitional 
stage which would weld Europe into the political and cultural unity of a 
pan-German Commonwealth, thus proving once more to the intellectual 
and doubting minority that Nazi methods were historically inevitable and, 
therefore, excusable and in the long run unimportant.  The record of the 
Nazi regime is a grim historical fact, for which Prisoner must accept some 
responsibility.  His share in the war guilt was that he shored up a vicious 
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and cowardly dictatorship by giving it moral values and a historical 
perspective which he knew to be false.142 
 
This agent’s ill-fated attempt to hold Wirsing accountable displayed an admittedly 
shallow understanding of Wirsing’s Europeanism, but he very correctly identified 
Wirsing’s complicity justifying and supporting the Nazi empire.  What he and all 
other interrogators missed, however, was the fact that Wirsing energetically 
continued to propagate his Nazi Europe-concept until the end of the war despite 
his simultaneous defeatism. 
Indeed, although Wirsing told American interrogators that he recognized 
the war’s futility in August, 1944 and consequently began his insubordinate SS-
reports, in reality his passionate calls for supporting the Nazi war effort continued 
until the very end of the war, and not just in Signal.143  In addition to his work for 
Signal, Wirsing continued throughout the entire war to publish his Europeanism 
to explicitly German audiences as well.  His pre-war intellectual magazine, Das 
XX Jahrhundert, continued to be published during the war, and he used it as a 
platform for exposing Germans to his arguments in Signal.  In the early 1940s 
Wirsing hired his former Tat-Kreis colleague, Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, to co-
 
142 United States Counter Intelligence Center, Interrogation Section, “Final Report on Stubaf,” 
October 25, 1946, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, 
MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
143 For Wirsing’s August, 1944 claim, see “Draft Reports from MFIU No.3 (Third Army 
Interrogation Center),” July 30, 1945, United States National Archives and Records 
Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, 
folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
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edit the periodical and incorporate his audacious calls for a revision of German 
nationalism.144  The periodical frequently published other former members of the 
Tat-Kreis, Waffen-SS propagandists, and Foreign Office propagandists, 
including: Ferdinand Fried, Wolfgang Höpker, and Karl Heinz Pfeffer.  
Additionally, Wirsing published his final war-time book in 1944 titled Das 
Zeitalter des Ikaros: Von Gesetz und Grenzen unseres Jahrhunderts (The Age of 
Ikaros: A Study of the Laws and Limits of our Century).145   
The purpose in Ikaros was to doctrinally codify his “European idea” into a 
political philosophy on par with Marxism and liberalism and thereby justify 
uncompromising commitment to the beleaguered Nazi regime.  Wirsing explained 
in a correspondence to Carl Schmitt while writing the book that he hoped to 
anchor the European idea as a “spiritual concept as opposed to its geopolitical or 
otherwise vague myths.”146  Wirsing began his book arguing that the world was 
experiencing a “crisis of cultures” in which modern technology, politics, and 
 
144 In March, 1943, Das XX Jahrhundert began publishing only once every two months.  
According to his correspondences with Carl Schmitt, Wirsing likely had Schmitt publish in Das 
XX Jahrhundert (with pseudonym) and the magazine was apparently sold in large quantities to the 
German military.  Wirsing mentions, for example, that the German navy received 10,000 copies 
per issue.  See Giselher Wirsing to Carl Schmitt, October 26, 1943, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Duisburg, Germany, RW 265/18327. 
145 Giselher Wirsing, Das Zeitalter des Ikaros: Von Gesetz und Grenzen unseres Jahrhunderts 
(Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1944). 
146 Giselher Wirsing to Carl Schmitt, October 26, 1943, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Duisburg, Germany, RW 265/18327. 
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economics were breaking down centuries of religious and social association; in 
short, the traditional way of life was “collapsing,” and this had been foreseen by 
various anti-modern philosophers.  The world, as evidenced by the current war, 
was reaching the critical stage of this “collapse.” But those, such as Spengler, who 
correctly diagnosed European decline failed to escape their “fearful” predilections 
for “Occidental cultural pessimism.”147 Their mistake, and that of other “pathetic” 
reactionary conservatives, was a failure to realize that the proper prescription was 
a partial re-birth rather than an unrealistic roll-back of history.  As such, the laws 
of nature would find a new, modern expression.148  Specifically, this new 
expression was the Grossraum, and it was finally bursting onto the scene of world 
history as a consequence of the current war.149  Wirsing parceled the world into 
four emerging Grossraum[s]: “the European, East Asian, Soviet, and Anglo-
American.”  The rest of the world, he argued, was either not yet transitioning into 
a Grossraum or their fate (such as China and India) was undecided between 
various Grossraum[s].   
The notion that the current war was about “nationalism,” Wirsing argued, 
was merely a “shadow” or “superficial appearance” left over from the early stages 
 
147 See Wirsing, Zeitalter des Ikaros, 69-70. 
148 Ibid., chapter 1. 
149 Wirsing took his readers through a history lesson of Europe in order to illustrate that the 
past can be read into the current European “attempt at unification.”  There had been three previous 
“attempts at unification” in the nineteenth century, all of which failed for their insufficient 
commitment to overcoming the French Revolution: Napoleon, the Holy Alliance between Russia, 
Austria, and Prussia, and the Pan-European movement. Ibid., 57-61.   
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of the conflict.150  Quite similarly to Karl Marx, Wirsing argued that nationalism 
and liberalism were a specific stage of history inaugurated by the French 
Revolution.  They were not necessarily bad; in fact, economically speaking “[t]he 
idea of our age,” he argued, “could not emerge until man had become Lord of his 
own creations, the machines.”  But the ideal of equality ultimately enslaved 
human beings to capitalism, while the ideals of nationalism and popular 
sovereignty degenerated into chauvinism and European Civil Wars.  The 
“Grossraum era,” however, would reclaim the valuable aspects of both liberal 
capitalism and nationalism.  As for liberal capitalism, the economically stable 
Grossraum-units would preserve local “natural hierarchies” and institutions while 
also facilitating modern levels of economic production.  Second, unlike 
democracies which fail to see that politics is based on the Schmittian friend-
enemy distinction, Grossraum[s] would be politically organized such that 
“natural” forms of European governance would be allowed to emerge, in other 
words: dictatorship.  As such, Grossraum[s] offer the last line of defense against 
the twin universalistic imperialisms of the United States and the Soviet Union, 
both of which desire to export unnatural, “foreign” forms of governance to 
Europe.  As for retaining the valuable aspects of nationalism, he explained: 
Nationalism is receiving a new purpose.  As a Völkergemeinschaft 
[community of peoples], it is definitively moving beyond chauvinism and 
the pent-up prejudices of our ‘traditional enmities’.  Nationalism is losing 
its exclusive character, which through the increasingly small size of 
Europe had become an unbearable anachronism.  However, it is retaining 
its original capacity to integrate historically developed groups of people. 
 
 
150 Ibid., 26-27. 
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Nationalism, then, was transforming into a something larger, the 
Völkergemeinschaft  ̧which, he explained, was a “higher unit that transcends the 
national unit, and which is historically pre-determined as we see in Europe and 
East Asia, and needs only to be completed.”151  But, he warned, Europeans should 
take heed: Europe, although an organic “higher unit,” would lose yet another 
chance to complete its historically destined unification if Europeans did not have 
the strength and courage to fight back against the “universalistic civilizations” of 
“Americanism” and “Sovietism” in the present war.  In other words, the age of the 
Grossraum could only redeem Europe alongside some form of Nazi victory in the 
Second World War. 
 Michael Geyer has argued that the fanatical resistance of the German 
population in the late stages of the Second World War were undergirded by a 
concept he calls Endkampf, or “final struggle.”  In contrast to Nazi propaganda 
promising a miraculous Endsieg, or “final victory,” many Germans, he argued, 
were actually not delusional about the war’s prospects.  However, because they 
perceived the First World War to have been a national surrender, German 
nationalists, he argues, came to believe that some kind of final victory could still 
be achieved in defeat.  By zealously devoting themselves to the struggle, even in 
the thrall of defeat, they believed they could plant the seeds for a rebirth of the 
 
151 Ibid., 29.  
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national revolution after the war.152  Nazi Europeanists such as Wirsing developed 
a discourse of Endkampf for their Europe-concept.  Although increasingly 
disillusioned with Nazi leadership and resigned to the hopelessness of the war, 
they maintained a fervent belief in the postwar viability of the Europe-concept.  
Yet, despite eventually detaching the Europe-concept from Nazi ideology, Nazi-
Europeanists such as Wirsing continued to place their talents in the service of the 
war-effort until the very end.  Wirsing’s late-war Europe-propaganda in Signal 
and other publications such as Ikaros suggest that his disillusionment with 
National Socialism and his insubordinate SS-reports were not, as U.S. intelligence 
officers believed, born of a genuine change of heart and an opposition to the Nazi 
regime.  To the contrary, Wirsing propagated Nazi Europe-propaganda until the 
conclusion of the war and only chose to oppose the regime because he believed 
that its current leadership was failing his European revolution.  Wirsing’s 
disillusionment with National Socialism at the end of the war, then, had more to 
do with the priority he placed on his Europe-concept.  Wirsing was no anti-Nazi, 
but his prioritization of the Europe-concept over National Socialism would prove 
to be an important foundation for his postwar migration away from political 
radicalism.  As his encounter with U.S. intelligence agents after the war 
illustrates, Wirsing was uniquely positioned to distance himself from National 
Socialism in the postwar period.  This is a pattern displayed in the lives and work 
 
152 Michael Geyer, “Endkampf 1918 and 1945: German Nationalism, Annihilation, and Self-
Destruction“ in ed.s Alf Lüdtke and Bernd Weisbrod, No Man’s Land of Violence: Extreme 
Wars in the 20th Century (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2006), 35-68. 
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of other Nazi Europeanists as well, such as, for example, Europe-propagandists in 




















Chapter 3: “Europe to the Europeans!” – Nazi Europeanism 
in the Foreign Office 
Introduction 
 
 Despite their revisionist and increasingly unorthodox European ideology, 
Giselher Wirsing and his writers were able to avoid censure in large part because 
Signal operated in a nebulous realm couched between the Wehrmacht and the 
Foreign Office which was outside of Reich Propaganda Minster Goebbels’s 
authority.  Signal, a joint venture between the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht, 
was initially edited and censored by the Foreign Office.  But as the war 
progressed the Foreign Office was gradually pushed out of its role directing the 
largest propaganda organ outside of the Reich, the responsibilities for which the 
Wehrmacht subsequently delegated to Wirsing’s editorial direction.1  However, 
the Foreign Office oversaw a plethora of propaganda projects of its own.  In the 
late 1930s and at the beginning of the Second World War, Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, successfully amalgamated under his command 
the chief authority for propaganda outside of the Reich’s borders.  Consequently, 
the Foreign Office became one of the most important networks for secondary-
level propaganda and subsequently for conservative advocates of the Europe-
concept, many of whom used their propaganda positions in the Foreign Office to 
expand the reach of their Europeanism.  After the war, many of these figures - 
including Paul Karl Schmidt (head of the Foreign Office Press Department) and 
 
1 Rainer Rutz, Signal: Eine Deutsche Auslandsillustrierte als Propagandainstrument im 
Zweiten Weltkrieg, (Essen: Klartext, 2007). 
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his assistant Hans-Georg von Studnitz, Axel Seeberg (coordinator of the Foreign 
Office’s Berlin-based academic think-tank), and Klaus Mehnert (director of 
Foreign Office propaganda in the Far East) - took their ideas about Europe with 
them the into their new journalistic callings in postwar West Germany.   
The most important academic research project into the propaganda of the 
Foreign Office was completed by Peter Longerich, whose primary argument is 
that the Foreign Office successfully exploited the limits of Joseph Goebbels’s 
Propaganda Ministry and established itself as the largest propaganda apparatus 
independent of Goebbels.2   He argues that the “polycratic” web of competing 
Nazi bureaucracies with undefined lines of authority allowed Ribbentrop and his 
subordinate Foreign Office administrators to establish themselves as the highest 
authority over Nazi propaganda in occupied territories outside of the borders of 
the Reich.3  They even made inroads into Goebbels’s sphere of domestic 
propaganda by printing their propagandists in local papers, publishing a foreign 
policy monthly in Germany called Berlin-Rom-Tokio, and placing many 
institutions of academia in Berlin under their authority.  Naturally, this produced a 
fierce competition and animosity with Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry, and 
Longerich’s book is a political history of the power struggle between these 
bureaucracies. As such, Longerich devotes very limited attention to propaganda 
 
2 Peter Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg. Die Presseabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes 
unter Ribbentrop (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1987). 
3 Longerich envisioned his argument as a contribution to the “functionalist” model for 
understanding the administration of the Third Reich. 
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content, suggesting that there was little difference between the propaganda 
content of the Foreign Office and Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry.4  To be sure, 
Longerich acknowledges that Foreign Office propaganda revolved around the 
term “Europe,” but his methodological decision to focus on political rivalry at the 
expense of propaganda material led him to the conclude, like so much of the 
literature on Nazi Europe-propaganda, that it was largely an empty falsehood 
because its practitioners were unwilling or unable to concretely formulate a 
postwar political entity.5 
The following two chapters, based primarily on a collection of documents 
from the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin as well as 
documents from the Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, will review Nazi 
Europeanism in the Foreign Office and illustrate that the Foreign Office was one 
of the institutions in the Third Reich where Nazi-Europeanists found space to 
articulate their wide-ranging re-conceptualization of National Socialism and 
broadcast it to millions of Germans and non-Germans alike.  This chapter 
specifically will examine how the Europe-concept was developed, organized, and 
disseminated in the higher levels of the Foreign Office, and how it became the 
center of Foreign Office propaganda narratives under the leadership of Karl 
Megerle, the propaganda commissioner of the Foreign Office and close assistant 
of Ribbentrop, as well as Paul Karl Schmidt, the director of the Press Department.  
A subsequent chapter will introduce a few smaller and lesser known appendages 
 
4 Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg, 106-108. 
5 Ibid., 89, 105. 
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of the propaganda apparatus of the Foreign Office and examine them as case-
studies for the dissemination of Nazi Europeanism.  Importantly, both chapters 
deal with Foreign Office Europe-propagandists who will re-appear in part II of 
this dissertation in their roles as high-ranking journalists in West Germany.  As 
such, these two chapters build upon the recent historical research into continuities 
between the Foreign Office and the political culture of West Germany.6  This 
chapter will begin by first examining how Nazi Europeanism came to find a home 
in the Foreign Office and then outlining the unique shape and form that it took. 
Karl Megerle and the Origins of Nazi Europeanism in the Foreign Office 
The Foreign Office propaganda apparatus was a collection of various 
departments, the most important of which were: the Press Department, the 
Information Department, the Radio Department, and the Cultural-Politics 
Department.  These departments’ primarily responsibilities and accompanying 
figures pertinent to this chapter are outlined in Appendix A below.  These 
departments directed the various propaganda projects undertaken by the Foreign 
Office outside Reich borders.  However, the substance of their propaganda was 
not arbitrarily determined by each respective department; instead, propaganda in 
the Foreign Office was organized and disseminated primarily by two individuals 
who, at different times during the war, obtained the title of Beauftragter für 
Propaganda (“Propaganda Commissioner”), an office in close proximity to 
 
6 See, most notably, Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, and Moshe Zimmermann, Das 
Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik 
(Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 2010). 
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Ribbentrop and, in fact, administered within his “Main Office” (Ministerbüro).  
The Propaganda Commissioner worked closely with Ribbentrop and was tasked 
with organizing propaganda narratives which were subsequently distributed to the 
various departments for the purpose of simultaneous and unified propaganda 
messaging.  The first Propaganda Commissioner was Martin Luther, the former 
diplomat to the United Kingdom, who was appointed after the Nazi victories in 
the summer, 1940, and who used the position to both expand the scope of Foreign 
Office propaganda as well as complete what Longerich calls the “Nazification of 
the Foreign Office” by increasing the share of Nazi party members in key 
propaganda positions and cementing the Foreign Office’s role in the Holocaust.7  
A key step in the centralization of propaganda narratives in the Foreign Office 
came with the invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer, 1941 when Ribbentrop 
authorized under Luther’s leadership the creation of a “Propaganda Committee” 
(Propagandaausschuss) designed to “intensify foreign propaganda” and subject it 
to “constant monitoring and examination.”8  The Propaganda Committee 
proceeded to remake the propaganda narrative of the Foreign Office in light of the 
European crusade against Bolshevism.  The key figure in this transition was Karl 
Megerle, a propagandist appointed to serve as one of Luther’s chairs in the 
Propaganda Committee, who later replaced Luther and secured the title of 
“Propaganda Commissioner” for himself.   
 




Karl Megerle, born 1894 in Southwest Germany, was a high school 
teacher (Volksschullehrer) at the outbreak of the First World War but volunteered 
for enlistment at the beginning of the war, was heavily wounded, and received the 
Iron Cross, second class.  Like many conservative nationalists he completed 
university training (in German History and Philosophy at the University of 
Tübingen) in the early 1920s and ultimately received his Ph.D.  In the mid-1920s 
he worked briefly as a teacher, but according to a Foreign Office biographical 
sketch he departed because of “differences with the socialist and democratic 
teachers and administration.”  Instead, he pursued a career in conservative 
journalism, starting at the München Augsburger Abendzeitung and later the 
Hamburger Nachrichten.  While it is not clear whether or not Megerle joined the 
Nazi Party during these years, by 1931 he had begun working for various papers 
known as fronts for the party: the Berliner Börsenzeitung, the Völkischer 
Beobachter, the Westfälische Landeszeitung, and the NSZ-Rheinfront.  In 1934 he 
was hired as an aid in Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry working on propaganda 
concerning Austria.  Rewarded for his service, in 1938 he was given the 
ceremonial position of a representative in the Reichstag.9 At the beginning of 
1939 Megerle began doing some scholarly work for the “German Institute for 
Foreign Policy Research” (Deutsches Institut für Aussenpolitische Forschung), a 
subsidiary academic organization of the Cultural-Politics Department of the 
Foreign Office formerly of the Berlin University and under the direction of 
 
9 “Lebenslauf – Dr. Karl Megerle,” October 19, 1938, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 
Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27667. 
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Friedrich Berber, which coordinated academic research on questions supplied by 
the Foreign Office.10  In August, 1939 Megerle began working directly for the 
Foreign Office when he was invited to the same journalist conference to which 
Giselher Wirsing was invited, and which was discussed in the previous chapter of 
this dissertation.  There, both he and Wirsing accepted the invitation to work for 
the Information Department as researchers and advisers on international affairs.11  
Together with Wirsing and a few other journalists, Megerle worked for over a 
year in this advisory capacity to the Information Department of the Foreign 
Office.  It is difficult to ascertain the whether or not this is where Megerle was 
first acquainted with Nazi Europeanism.  But the close proximity and cooperative 
work with Wirsing strongly suggest that this was the case. 
 Charting the emergence of Nazi Europeanism in the Foreign Office is a 
challenging task, because the incomplete records of the Foreign Office during the 
Second World War do not contain a separate folder for the Propaganda 
Commissioner or for the Propaganda Committee.  However, they do contain a 
separate folder for Megerle’s personal collection, which, albeit scattered and 
incomplete, contain hundreds of articles and writings by Megerle.  Additionally, 
 
10 Megerle to Aschmann, January 18, 1939, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27676.   Megerle to Kleinlein, May 5, 1939, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27676. 
11 “Lebenslauf – Dr. Karl Megerle,” October 19, 1938, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 
Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27667.   Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg, 51.  See 
additionally, chapter two of this dissertation. 
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the folders for the various propaganda departments within the Foreign Office 
include amongst their collected memos the various orders from the Propaganda 
Commissioner and the Propaganda Committee.  When pieced together these 
sources illustrate that Megerle was the inspiration and impetus for Nazi 
Europeanism in the Foreign Office, having advocated as a journalist for the 
Information Department in favor of the Europe-concept as early as June, 1940 
under a slogan which he later made a center-piece of Foreign Office propaganda: 
“Leave Europe to the Europeans!” 
Megerle’s Adoption of Nazi Europeanism, 1940 
 Before the Nazis came to power in the early 1930s Megerle had begun 
working as a foreign policy editorialist in the Berliner Börsenzeitung (BBZ), a 
paper with a circulation at one point as high as 40,000 under the editorial 
direction of Walter Funk, future Minister of Economics in the Third Reich.12  
Megerle continued to write regularly in the BBZ even after beginning 
employment at the Foreign Office.13  In early 1940 the brunt of his argumentation 
was that the British Empire was deceiving Europeans and Americans into 
servicing British imperial interests.  Germany, Japan, and Italy, however, 
represented a “Community of Destiny” (Schicksalgemeinschaft) opposing British 
 
12 Peter de Mendelssohn, Zeitungsstadt Berlin: Menschen und Mächte in der Geschichte der 
deutschen Presse (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1982), 457-458. 
13 The records of the Foreign Office in Berlin suggest that he wrote regularly for the BBZ 
through at least 1942. 
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domination of Europe and imperialism as such.14  Megerle’s willingness to bend 
the ideological rules of National Socialism was already evident in February, 1940 
when he wrote an article defending and softening the doctrine of Lebensraum as 
“a planned economy within a closed territory composed of several states.  The 
economy of these states would have to be constructed in such a way that these 
states complement one another.”  His article attracted significant and even 
sympathetic foreign attention, especially in the Swedish press: “In this way his 
[Lebensraum] program proves to be a significant upgrade on the originally 
National Socialist idea of an exclusively German program of self-sufficiency.”  
Already in this article from early 1940 Megerle was criticizing nationalism, 
which, when excessive, he described as a “unique barrier in the realization of the 
entire idea [of Lebensraum].”15   
 In the summer of 1940 Megerle began to develop ideas about a future 
Europe in the BBZ.  On June 16th, 1940 he developed for the first time what 
would become a central propaganda slogan in Foreign Office Europe-propaganda: 
“Leave Europe to the Europeans!”  Displaying what would become a key pattern 
in Foreign Office propaganda, Megerle pursued his early Europeanism by 
 
14 Karl Megerle, “Bekenntnis zur Schicksalgemeinschaft,“ Berliner Börsenzeitung, January 3, 
1940 in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27734.   Karl 
Megerle, “Blauer Dunst,“ Berliner Börsenzeitung, January 2, 1940 in Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27734. 
15 From a summary written in the Swedish radio transmitter “Radio Stockholm,“ March 2, 
1940,  in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27737. 
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highlighting under-reported quotations by Adolf Hitler.  In an interview with an 
American reporter, Karl von Wiegand, Hitler turned the legacy of American 
isolationism against his prying interviewer:  
I do not believe that a doctrine such as the Monroe doctrine can be 
understood as a one-sided claim; because the purpose of the Monroe 
doctrine was not to hinder European states from engagement in American 
affairs…but rather that America, too, should not get involved in European 
affairs. The fact that George Washington himself put forward such a 
similar warning is evidence of the logic and reason behind this 
interpretation.  Therefore, I say: ‘Leave America to the Americans, leave 
Europe to the Europeans!’16  
 
Less than a month later, on July 13th and July 14th, Megerle published a special 
article series in the BBZ titled “Foundations of a New Europe by Karl Megerle.”  
This article, which was reviewed by dozens of newspapers in at least twelve 
different countries,17 illustrated Megerle’s quick conversion to various crucial 
themes which we have thus far identified with Nazi Europeanism.  “The current 
collapse and rupture in the realm of military and power-politics,” the article 
began, “has already overlapped onto social and economic territory. …Europe has 
found in the victory of Germany and his allies a power-political weight in the 
middle of the continent and feels that something developing for many centuries is 
 
16 Karl Megerle, “‘Europa den Europäern‘, Unterredung des Führers mit einem USA-
Journalisten,“ Berliner Börsenzeitung, June 16, 1940 in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 
Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27734. 
17 Megerle’s personal document collection contains reviews from the Netherlands, Romania, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Norway, Italy, France, Hungary, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.  
See “Pressestimmen: Grundlagen des Neuen Europas,” Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes 
in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27765. 
146 
 
occurring; a new era has begun.”  Europe, he argued, was “objectively” headed 
towards “a new European solidarity and Community of Destiny” 
(Schicksalgemeinschaft).   Europeans were beginning to sense the necessity of a 
“Grossraum,” he continued, because Europe is “too small to remain divided up 
into countless units unworthy of life [lebensunfähig].”  The new era would bring 
previously unthinkable changes, Megerle warned, and this included the 
“breakdown of excessive nationalism and the unfounded power-political 
individualism of small nations.”  Megerle argued that it was the responsibility of 
every European to “acknowledge the untenable nature of previous social, 
economic, and political systems” and to “participate loyally in the New Order of 
Europe.”  This would not be easy, Megerle warned, because it portended a 
“foundational, often painful, and sacrifice-demanding commitment to the New 
and simultaneous rejection of the Old.”  His arguments repeatedly employed a 
reactionary modernist repudiation of tradition in favor of a new, forward-looking 
modernity which was paradoxically grounded in the pre-ordained destiny of the 
“Old World.”  Megerle’s terminology, the reader will likely notice, mirrored the 
terminology employed by Wirsing and his writers in Signal.  Another is the 
relaying of Volksgemeinschaft through the European lens: “European Community 
of Peoples” (Europäische Völkergemeinschaft).  Importantly, already in the 
summer of 1940 Megerle understood the “New Europe” as a human-transforming 
process.  Economic, political, and social transformation were ultimately 
incomplete in Megerle’s eyes without the concomitant rise of what he called a 
“new model-human [neuer Menschentypus]”: 
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…a conception of the human being which replaces the alienated, over-
bred, and life-suffocating intellectual as well as the proletarian mass-
human [Massenmenschen] with a healthy, happy, brave, and live-gushing 
human being founded in the harmony of body, soul, and spirit and based 
on a unification of nature, reverence, discipline, devotion, and community 
as well as an appreciation of creative personality.18 
 
On July 16th Megerle received a note from the Press Department that the article 
series was receiving “strong attention everywhere in the world,” and that his 
arguments portended a positive, new direction for Foreign Office propaganda.19  
In the fall, Megerle briefly dabbled in what this dissertation calls “Germanic 
Europeanism,” which, as a subsequent chapter of this dissertation will illustrate, 
was particularly strong in the Waffen-SS.  In an article from October, 1940 titled 
“Germanic Particularism,” printed in the BBZ (but also in various publications in 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden) Megerle argued that the 
Germanic peoples had been deceived into a sense of “exaggerated individuality” 
such that they lamentably had chosen to “remain outside of their tribal 
community.”  The “European New Order,” then, would include a special “place 
for a Germanic community” within it.20  By the end of the year Megerle had 
 
18 Karl Megerle, “Sonderdruck aus der Berliner Börsenzeitung: Grundlagen des neuen 
Europas von Karl Megerle,“ Berliner Börsenzeitung, July 13 and 14, 1940 in Politisches Archiv 
des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27765. 
19 Note from “P XII (Presseabteilung) Eigendienst Ungarn,” July 16, 1940, Politisches Archiv 
des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27737. 
20 Drawn from reports collected by the German embassy in Copenhagen and sent to the 
Foreign Office, October 10, 1940 and November 11, 1940, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 
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adopted the Grossraum argument, publishing articles in the Foreign Office’s 
political magazine, Berlin-Rom-Tokio, about the intrusion of powers “alien to our 
space” (raumfremd)  into Grossraum(s) throughout the world, including American 
and British encroachment onto the Japanese-led Grossraum of East Asia.21  
 While it is tempting to dismiss Megerle’s Europeanism as Foreign Office 
manipulation, the documentary record suggests that Megerle took his new-found 
Europeanism very seriously and genuinely.  In one article, intended for a German 
and Italian audience, Megerle argued that while Germany and Italy had received 
the “historical assignment” of “European leadership,” it behooved them to 
carefully consider the appropriate “European-occidental” [europäisch-
abendländisch]” approach to fulfilling this task.  Indeed, if Germany and Italy 
were to inaugurate a true “European community,” he argued, then, unlike 
nationalist “particularists” they must “never work against, but rather only for 
Europe.”  This necessitated that “the European leaders [Führungsmächte] win 
over the loyalty of every single member of the New Order.”  In practice, this 
meant advocating the highest possible amount of freedom and participation in the 
emerging Europe: “The more definite and voluntary the integration of the 
individual parts [of Europe] and the more free and elastic the forms of unification 
can be, the less contentious will be the questions of military security and 
 
Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27737.  According to Megerle’s own accompanying notes 
this argument was received poorly in the non-German press. 




implementation of the New Order.”  This, he declared, was the European 
“community-task” (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe) of Germany and Italy.22  
Megerle’s sincerely held vision for Europe can be confirmed by a series of 
correspondence he had with Ribbentrop’s secretary, Ernst von Weizsäcker, in late 
1942 in which Megerle wrote a memo suggesting that the Foreign Office back an 
ambitious plan to establish local self-administrative governments throughout 
Russia as well as a “central committee for the creation of a New Russia.”  This, 
Megerle hoped, would win over the population, subdue partisans, and counter 
Soviet propaganda.  Weizsäcker responded that Megerle’s “special concern for 
the topic of the treatment of the Russian population” was well known.  However, 
the opportunity for such a measure was long past, Weizsäcker explained, and in 
any case was impossible to reconcile with Hitler’s “colonial intentions” and the 
need to keep open the possibility of a separate peace with Stalin.23  Additionally, 
in early 1943 Megerle received a rebuke from Paul Karl Schmidt, head of the 
Press Department, for too forcefully pressing for a more explanatory excavation 
 
22 Karl Megerle, “Europäische Führung und Gemeinschaft,“ Berlin-Rom-Tokio, November 
issue, 1940, 16-17. 
23 Karl Megerle to Ernst von Weizsäcker, November 14, 1942 and Ernst von Weizsäcker to 
Karl Megerle, November 16, 1942, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, 
Germany, RZ 102/R 29849.  It is also interesting to note that Megerle often criticized Bolshevism 
for its treatment of the Russian people, for the way it destroyed ”all that is of beauty and worth in 
their humanity.” See Karl Megerle, “Der Atem der Geschichte,” Berliner Börsenzeitung, October 
7, 1941 in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 236/R 27735.  
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of future roles and functions of member states in the New Order.24  Megerle, then, 
despite his collaboration in the conquest and exploitation of Nazi-occupied 
Europe had genuine, even if fantastical and naive, hopes for the Nazi-led New 
Europe. 
By 1941 Megerle’s Europeanism was increasingly coming up against 
orthodox National Socialist principles.  In fact, in one article in the BBZ Megerle 
asked Germans to dismiss any enemy propaganda claiming “that the German 
master-race desires slave-races for manual labor.”25  Ironically, however, it was in 
1941 that Megerle received his promotion into the highest ranks for propaganda 
coordination in the Foreign Office.  In early 1941, the records indicate that 
Megerle had struck up a personal relationship with Ribbentrop, to whom he had 
begun writing personal correspondences with suggestions for propaganda.26  On 
May 28, 1941 he wrote Ribbentrop suggesting that 
in addition to the concept of the New Order the signed nations of the 
Tripartite Pact should establish the following peace-slogan: ‘Freedom of 
the seas in war and peace, for all peoples, small and large and without any 




24 Karl Megerle to Paul Karl Schmidt, January 19, 1943, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 
Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 102/R 29850. 
25 Karl Megerle, “Neuordnung und Lebenshaltung,” Berliner Börsenzeitung, January 5, 1941 
in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany RZ 236/R 27735. 
26 As early as May, 1940 Megerle’s suggestions for the Grossraum concept and a European 
Monroe-doctrine were forwarded by the head of the Press Department, Paul Karl Schmidt, to 
Ribbentrop personally.  See Paul Karl Schmidt to Joachim von Ribbentrop, May 20, 1940, 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany RZ 247/R  27876. 
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This theme has the advantage of being a supranational [übernational] goal 
and can be attractive to all peoples with the exception of the Anglo-
Saxons.  It justifies the partners of the Tripartie Pact presenting themselves 
as forerunners of a supranational task, and it would represent progress for 
the notion of positive propaganda which I have repeatedly stressed, and it 
would be a workable compliment to the concept of the New Order. 
 
Not afraid of addressing the dissonance of his ideas with orthodox National 
Socialism, Megerle added that while some will suggest this narrative contradicts 
their “hitherto economic approach of Lebensraum and Autarky” – “I think it 
possible to harmonize both of these political narratives.”27  There is no evidence 
that Ribbentrop immediately acted on this suggestion, but in June, 1941 Nazi 
Germany invaded the Soviet Union.  By the end of the year, and likely in part due 
to the renewed intensity of Europe-propaganda following the opening of the 
Eastern Front, Ribbentrop hired Megerle as his personal assistant and 
“Propaganda Commissioner” over all Foreign Office propaganda. 
The Propaganda Committee, 1941 
 On July 22nd, 1941 Ribbentrop sent a memo to all departments of the 
Foreign Office calling into creation a “Propaganda Committee“ tasked with 
meeting daily to review and coordinate Foreign Office propaganda.  Along with 
half a dozen directors of the various propaganda-related departments (including 
Paul Karl Schmidt of the Press Department) Megerle was named as one of the 
 
27 Karl Megerle to Joachim von Ribbentrop, May 28, 1941, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany RZ 703/R 97626, frame 423568. 
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participating members.28  Megerle’s presence on the Propaganda Committee 
despite not being a ranking department director in the Foreign Office makes more 
sense in light of a subsequent memo sent by Ribbentrop two days later tasking 
Megerle with providing him, Ribbentrop, with a weekly summary of propaganda 
initiatives in the Foreign Office.  As such, he ordered the Press Department and 
Political Office to “work closely” with him.  Megerle, then, already one month 
into the campaign on the Eastern Front was made into a kind of personal 
propaganda assistant for Ribbentrop.  Although Martin Luther was initially made 
the chair member of the Propaganda Committee, by the end of the year Megerle 
had used his close position to Ribbentrop to assume the primary position in the 
Propaganda Committee, and he was subsequently made “Propaganda 
Commissioner” on December 12th, 1941.29 
 The first propaganda initiative put into place by the “Propaganda 
Committee” was a response to the Atlantic Charter.  Megerle was tasked with 
writing up the “prescribed terminology” (Sprachregelung) for the various 
departments of the Foreign Office vis-à-vis putting forward the Axis response.  
The Atlantic Charter, he explained, was a “betrayal of Europe” (Verrat an 
Europa): 
Europe wants to be the Lord of its own house.  It rejects any return to an 
Anglo-Saxon meddling which is alien to our space [raumfremd], and it 
rejects any return to European disharmony.  It will not allow the hands of 
the world-clock to be turned back twenty-three years….  It is determined 
 
28 Memo by Joachim von Ribbentrop to all Foreign Office departments, July 22, 1941, 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany RZ 703/R 97625, frame 423551.  
29 Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg, 61-65. 
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to claim the leadership of the cultural world and not allow said leadership 
to be abdicated to powers alien to our space.  With great sacrifice it has 
fought its way through to the realization that the Old Order was a failure, 
and a new one, based in European solidarity, must be found.30  
 
The next project was the creation of a “guiding idea for propaganda in light of the 
second anniversary of the war’s outbreak.”  Megerle likely wrote up the ensuing 
manuscript.31  Like the Propaganda Committee’s response to the Atlantic Charter, 
this manuscript also emphasized the slogan “betrayal of Europe,” but it also added 
new inflections.  The war, it was explained, was thrust onto Germany by the 
British when they realized that Germany was in the process of replacing the 
“Versailles system” with the New Order of Europe.  Roosevelt and Stalin, 
described as “enemies of Europe” (Europafeinde), realized that the disappearing 
British claims to continental hegemony likewise threatened their intentions for the 
continent.  Led by Adolf Hitler, Germany recognized these malicious plans for 
what they were: a threat to the newly “consolidating Europe.”  Now, the 
Propaganda Committee argued, the war was being fought in order to “create an 
organically integrated Lebensraum for the benefit of the entire continent.”  
Europeans, therefore, were tasked with three responsibilities: a) a “clear 
recognition” of the economic unity of the Axis; b) a “clear recognition” of 
 
30 Karl Megerle, Propaganda Committee memo, “Sprachregelung für Propaganda gegen 
Roosevelt-Churchill-Erklärung,“ August 15, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, Germany RZ 703/R 97625, frame 423615. 
31 Although the manuscript was not signed by Megerle, an additional manuscript signed by 




Germany and Italy’s leadership roles in the war against Bolshevism; and c) 
“demonstrations of an awake, political consciousness of unity” 
(Einheitsbewusstsein).  They concluded the manuscript with the proclamation: 
“Long live the powerful, new Europe!”32  On August 27th, 1941 Ribbentrop gave 
complete approval for the manuscript.33  
 In September, 1941 Karl Megerle and Paul Karl Schmidt of the Press 
Department were each assigned the task of visiting different parts of occupied 
Europe in order to propagate and examine the reception of Europe-propaganda.  
When they had returned, they had come to believe that a more “positive German 
foreign propaganda,” was needed, by which they meant a more descriptive and 
clear elaboration on the political, social, and economic composition of the New 
Europe.34  Or, as Megerle put it: “It is urgently necessary that we air out the veil 
over the ‘New Order of Europe’.  Above all else we need to make clear that the 
small states will be able to administer themselves as they please as long as they 
 
32 Karl Megerle, Propaganda Committee memo, “Leitgedanken für die Propaganda anlässlich 
des 2. Jahrestages des Kriegsausbruchs,“ undated but based on surrounding documents most likely 
late August, 1941,  Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany RZ 703/R 
97625. 
33 Secretary Krümmer (on behalf of Joachim von Ribbentrop), “Notiz für die Mitglieder des 
Propagandaausschusses,” August 27, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, 
Germany RZ 703/R 97625, frame 423634. 
34 Unsigned memo of the Propaganda Committee, September 24, 1941, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany RZ 703/R 97625. 
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accept our foreign policy line.”35  On September 27th, Megerle wrote a memo for 
the Propaganda Committee called “Positive Press and Propaganda Theses,” which 
outlined his arguments in more detail.  He began his appeal by arguing that “it is 
necessary to complement our aggressive, debilitating, and polemic propaganda 
with a positive propaganda, above else vis-a-vis the future of Europe.”  He then 
proceeded to outline ten specific points which must be made in their Europe-
Propaganda: 1) the “overcoming of European particularism” through a “European 
federation”; 2) a Europe-wide partially planned economy, or Grossraum; 3) 
establishing a permanent peace; 4) guarantees against arbitrary use of German 
power except for as it pertains to foreign policy; 5) “Leave Europe to the 
Europeans!” – the elimination of “influence in Europe which is alien to our space 
[raumfremd]”; 6) state-guided elimination of unemployment; 7) Europe-wide 
social welfare; 8) replacement of liberal individualism and Bolshevist 
collectivism with a new (unnamed) philosophy capable of respecting both 
personality and community; 9) promises to foster cultural development in all 
European peoples, large and small; 10) elimination of Bolshevism from Europe, 
 
35 Secretary Krümmer (on behalf of Joachim von Ribbentrop), “Notiz für Herrn U.St.S. 




including the “re-conquering for Europe of vast spaces which had been abused 
economically, culturally, and with respects to their völkisch organization.”36  
 Despite Megerle’s protestations, however, the Foreign Office was not 
willing to adopt most of his suggestions.  This was because they deviated from the 
key compromise of Nazi Europeanism: Nazi leaders allowed lower-level figures 
like Megerle to advance Europeanism only in as much as it disingenuously served 
their imperial and genocidal ambitions for Europe.   
On November 11th, 1941, the Propaganda Committee released to all diplomatic 
missions a “Europe-Program” with various propaganda terms and messages.  
Only the vaguest of Megerle’s suggestions made the cut.  To be sure, a few 
messages were surprisingly revisionist - such as: “After German victory, towards 
which all Europeans are working, there will be a securing of Lebensraum, not just 
for Germany, but also all of Europe.”  However, most of the proposed themes 
were extremely equivocal: “Our fight is not just a fight for Germany, but all of 
Europe”; “Europe is the fountain of all cultural existence”; “Massive program to 
improve social conditions which extend well beyond the borders of the German 
Reich.”37 
 
36 Karl Megerle, Propaganda Committee memo, “Positive Presse- und Propagandathesen,“ 
September 27, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany RZ 703/R 
97629, frame 425791. 
37 Ernst von Weizsäcker to “all foreign diplomatic missions and authorities of the Reich in 
occupied territories,“ November 11, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, 
Germany RZ 703/R 97629, frame 425832. 
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Standard Theses and Megerle’s Role in 1942 
After the Propaganda Committee was disbanded in a bureaucratic re-
structuring, Megerle was promoted to “Propaganda Commissioner” of the Foreign 
Office and given authority to direct a new agency in Ribbentrop’s Main Office 
called “Bureau Megerle,” authorized with the same responsibilities as the 
Propaganda Committee: organizing and distributing propaganda narratives to the 
other propaganda departments of the Foreign Office.38  Cross-department memos 
(most of which were destroyed at the end of the war but many of which were 
retained by the Political Office of the Foreign Office) reveal that Megerle and his 
assistant by the name of von Schmieden used Megerle’s new agency to ensure the 
continued presence of the Europe-concept in Foreign Office propaganda.  This 
continued through at least early 1943, after which the documentary evidence in 
the Foreign Office records become very fragmentary.   
The primary means through which they accomplished this was the issuing 
of “Standard Theses,” point-by-point manuscripts with propaganda themes and 
 
38 “Standardthesen,“ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 
211/R105119 and R105120.  See in particular Secretary Krümmer (on behalf of Joachim von 
Ribbentrop) to all directors of all Foreign Office departments, marked “secret,” February 9, 1943, 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 211/R105120, frame 360858.  
Megerle’s new position was not uncontested.  Martin Luther was given a new agency as well, the 
Auslandspropagandaleitstelle, which was likewise tasked with coordinating Foreign Propaganda.  
The compromise, which appears to have been informally made over time, is that Megerle was 
given authority over Europe-propaganda while Luther and his new agency were given authority 
over other propaganda messaging.  See Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg, 61-65. 
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messages to be emphasized in all Foreign Office departments and diplomatic 
missions.39  A Standard Theses manuscript was drafted by Megerle’s agency for 
each country to which the Foreign Office directed propaganda.  Each manuscript 
tailored Nazi Europeanism to the specific circumstances and contexts of the 
respective countries in question.  Although many Standard Theses manuscripts 
were destroyed, the following list gives a sample of country-specific Europe-
messaging: Spain was told that their status as a “nation of European culture” 
would be secured by victory against the Atlantic forces which sought to tear 
Spain’s identity from Europe;40 Turkey was declared a genealogically “European 
power” and was promised a future role as a “natural economic partner” in Europe 
which would liberate Turkey from Russian influence;41 Propaganda about the 
English was organized around their “betrayal of Europe” at the hands of 
Bolshevists and Americans;42 the French were told that their fight against the 
Nazis in 1940 had been a “Anglo-Judaic” manipulation and that pending their 
 
39 Secretary von Schmieden (on behalf of Joachim von Ribbentrop), memo in the Political 
Office, February 1, 1942, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 
211/R105119, frame 360182. 
40 Memo by von Schmieden archived in the documents of the Political Office, February 1, 
1942, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 211/R 105119, frame 360182. 
41 Memo by von Schmieden archived in the documents of the Political Office, February 5, 
1942, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 211/R 105119, frame 360189. 
42 Memo archived in the documents of the Political Office, titled “Nr. 20, Weisungen für die 
Propaganda nach England,“ February 12, 1942, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, RZ 211/R 105119, frame 360203. 
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loyalty in this war they, too, had a place in the European New Order (in fact, even 
their colonies, which were a European “life-necessity,” would be returned);43 
Romanians were told that their participation in the war was but a mere 
continuation of their historical legacy as the first line of defense against Asiatic 
invasions of Europe.44  Even ostensibly racially inferior Balkan and slavic nations 
were appealed to in European terms.  Nazi-led Europe would “hold open” the 
possibility of, for example, Serbian and Slovakian membership in the New 
Europe pending their commitment to the war effort.  Aware that such extensions 
of European solidarity to Serbia would not be received well up the Nazi hierarchy, 
Serbia’s Standard Theses manuscript came with a note that it should be spread by 
“mouth” rather than written documents lest it come across as an “official German 
position.”45 
Megerle’s agency also distributed “all-purpose” Standard Theses, or 
propaganda themes for all Foreign Office propaganda regardless of targeted 
country.  The first such “general” Standard Theses manuscript was written at the 
 
43 Memo archived in the documents of the Political Office, titled “Nr. 26, Weisungen für die 
Propaganda nach Frankreich,“ January 8, 1943, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, RZ 211/R 105120. 
44 Political Office memo titled “Nur. 271,“ January 8, 1943, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 211/R 105120, frame 360908. 
45 Von Schmieden to Wüster, October 27, 1942, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, RZ 211/R 105119.  See additionally a memo to the directors of all Foreign Office 
departments, titled “Nur. 271,” February 15, 1943, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, RZ 211/R105120, frame 360849. 
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very end of 1941.  The manuscript contained eighteen points for general 
propaganda, of which eight explicitly handled the New Order of Europe and/or 
the concept of Grossraum.46  These all-purpose Standard Theses were regularly 
updated, oftentimes with new instructions given the changing face of the war.  In 
July, 1942, for example, Megerle’s agency sent out an update for propaganda on 
the Eastern Front. It asked propagandists to stress the territorial advance of 
Europe into Russia.  “Emphasize daily,” it added “that Europe is consolidating 
itself.”  It continued: “In this manner we should awaken and permanently 
maintain in the public opinion of our enemies that Germany and Europe together 
are becoming absolutely impervious to blockade as a result of the territorial gains 
in the East.”47  On January 28th, 1943 Megerle wrote a memo as a result of 
German transition to “Total War.”  Many of the points resembled themes similar 
to Goebbels’s famous speech at the Berliner Sportpalast in early February: a call 
for absolute sacrifice and full exploitation of all resources in Europe.  One point 
in particular connected the call for Total War to Europeanism: 
With the mobilization of our entire workforce and the adaptation of 
civilian life to Total War the German Volk (which has already carried the 
primary burden of the battle against Bolshevism) is now entirely 
 
46 Memo archived in the documents of the Political Office, titled “Zusammenfassung der von 
Herrn RAM angeordneten Standarthesen für die deutsche Auslandspropaganda,” Deember 29, 
1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 211/R 105119, frame 360196. 
47 Memo by von Schmieden archived in the documents of the Political Office, July 23, 1942, 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 211/R 105119, frame 360297. 
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committed to the salvation of Europe from downfall and Bolshevist 
chaos.48  
 
Shortly after this memo was written, the Standard Theses were updated on 
February 9th.  The updated Standard Theses were sent to all departments in the 
Foreign Office and all diplomatic missions with an explicit note from Ribbentrop 
himself demanding that the updated narratives permeate “in constant repetition 
the radio, press, and any other medium at our disposal.”  The manuscript, code-
named “directive 27,” declared four primary themes for Foreign Office 
propaganda.  The fourth and final theme was to increase Europe’s realization of 
what the “Bolshevization of Europe” would entail.  Later in the manuscript, this 
fourth theme was fleshed out into five points: 1) “The Europe of today has only 
one choice – that between Bolshevist chaos and a New European Order for all 
peoples”; 2) If the present war were lost to the “imperialists” of East and West, 
then Europe would become a “battleground” for “permanent” wars between them; 
3) Bolshevist victory means the final destruction of the “Occident” and its cultural 
heritage; 4) The only thing standing between Europe and the “Bolshevist flood” 
are the European armies; 5) Axis victory would create lasting peace, an “unheard-
of blossoming of culture and well-being,” a New Order in which all European 
 
48 Karl Megerle to “all [diplomatic] missions,” January 28, 1943, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 211/R 105120. 
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peoples, big and small, would be guaranteed “sovereignty and the freedom of self-
determination.”49  
 Megerle continued to butt heads with other propagandists in the Foreign 
Office who, unlike Megerle, saw appeals to Europe in strictly opportunistic terms.  
A memo from August, 1942 reveals that this rivalry continued into Megerle’s 
tenure as Propaganda Commissioner.  This memo, a report on a conference for 
non-German “cultural agents” assigned to diplomatic missions throughout 
Europe, outlines a dispute between Megerle and Martin Luther’s assistant by the 
name of Krümmer.  Megerle had presented his argument for a more fully-defined, 
“positive” answer to the “Europe question,” to which Krümmer replied in strong 
disagreement that “any official specifications should be avoided” including any 
“official prescribed terminology.”50  The evidence suggests that officials like 
Krümmer more often than not won these internal debates.  To be sure, it is 
possible that many of the Standard Theses were in fact victories for Megerle.  
Nevertheless, the contrast between Megerle’s explicit Europeanism and the more 
vague, reserved Europeanism of the Standard Theses suggests that Megerle was 
 
49 Memo by “Krümmer” sent to the directors of all Foreign Office departments with attached 
Standard Theses titled “Neue Richtlinien für die Auslandspropaganda,“ February 9, 1943, marked 
“secret,” Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 211/R 105120, frame 360858. 
50 Memo by Heinz Julius Hugo Trützschler von Falkenstein, archived in the documents of the 
Political Office, marked “secret,” August 13, 1942, with an attached report concerning the 
“Tagung der nach Berlin berufenen Kulturreferenten der meisten europäischen Missionen,” which 




frustrated in his efforts, at least until 1943 when the documentary evidence thins 
out.  
Importantly, despite his persistent struggles to advocate a more audacious 
Europeanism, throughout 1942 Megerle continued to regularly propagate his more 
“positive vision“ for the New Order of Europe in the BBZ and other 
publications.51  In fact, Megerle expanded his journalistic voice as well, using his 
position in the Foreign Office to have his arguments increasingly published in the 
foreign press.52  By the end of 1942 Megerle, like other Nazi Europeanists, had 
begun to formulate his Europe-concept as an explicit revision of nationalism and 
as the harbinger for a new supranational identity.  In an August, 1942 article in 
BBZ titled “For or Against Europe,” Megerle argued that all Europeans are 
historically integrated with an age-old “occidental feeling of unity” 
 
51 Take, for example, the following list of articles written in the BBZ and the Südostdeutsche 
Rundschau over the course of 1941 and 1942: “Europa im Aufbruch: Kreuzzug des Kontinents 
gegen den Bolschewismus,” June 27, 1941; “Gesamteuropäische Solidarität,” July 29, 1941; “Der 
Atem der Geschichte,” October 7, 1941; “Europas Freiheitskampf,“ November 30, 1941; 
“Totengräber Roosevelt: Der USA-Imperialismus und Europas Freiheitskampf,“ December 3, 
1941; “Die Wiedergeburt Europas,“ March, 1942; “Ein Stück Europa,“ March 22, 1942; 
“England, Europa, und Moskau,“ March 29, 1942; “Europa soll bolschewisiert werden: Anglo-
amerikanischer Verrat,“ May 6, 1942; “Mit oder gegen Europa,“ August 3, 1942; “Wall gegen 
Bolschewismus: Zum Jahrestag des Antikominternpaktes,“ November 25, 1942.  Politisches 
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 236/R 27735; RZ 236/R 27736; RZ 701/R 123536. 
52 Lohse to Karl Megerle, August 8, 1941 and Lohse to Karl Megerle, February 12, 1942, 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 701/R 123698. 
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(abendländisches Einheitsgefühl) which had been suppressed for centuries.  But 
the speed of recent history was scraping away the superficial surface of nationally 
divided countries.  The return of this “feeling of unity,” however, would not take 
the religious form it had in the pre-modern era, because secularism was too 
advanced.  Instead, it would be a “cultural feeling of unity”: 
The fusion of cultural elements from the Greek, Roman, and Germanic 
eras into a European collective consciousness [europäisches 
Gesamtbewusstsein] has created shared commonalities which each 
European senses.  Europe is, just as the Führer says, everywhere where 




What Europe is can be felt in every village.  What Europe is not can be 
felt by anybody who has interacted with milieus of a foreign continent and 
suddenly realized that he is missing the cultural, human, and spiritual 
climate which is natural to him.  This is especially true with respect to 
North America.53 
 
Although Foreign Office records become scarce after 1942, there is plenty 
of evidence that Nazi Europeanism continued to have a central role in foreign 
propaganda in 1943 and afterwards.  For example, in 1943 the Foreign Office 
used the German Institute for Foreign Policy Research to publish a book which 
would serve as a blueprint for the propaganda of the Foreign Office after 1943: 
the so-called “Europe Handbook” (Europa: Handbuch der politischen, 
 
53 Karl Megerle, “Mit oder gegen Europa,“ Berliner Börsenzeitung, August 3, 1942 in 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 236/R 27736. 
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wirtschaftlichen, und kulturellen Entwicklung Europas).54  The Europe Handbook 
was a large project with entries from leading figures such as Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, Roland Friesler, Walter Funk, and Paul Karl Schmidt, and was 
intended as a war-time diplomatic and propaganda guideline about the future 
Europe for Germans and non-Germans alike.  The Europe Handbook even began 
by listing and briefly describing all thirty member countries of the future 
Europe.55  Nine chapters focused on specific countries’ unique historical 
contributions to Europe, current achievements in the war for Europe, and future 
importance to the New Order.56  Of the remaining eleven chapters, many echoed 
the Standard Theses for Nazi Europeanism, with titles such as: “Europe as 
Inheritance and Assignment,” “The Axis is the Foundation of the New Europe,” 
“European Consciousness,” “Germany and Europe in Course of History,” 
“Lebensraum or Imperialism,” “The Theory of Law in the Young Europe,” 
 
54 Deutsches Institut für Aussenpolitische Forschung, Europa: Handbuch der politischen, 
wirtschaftlichen, und kulturellen Entwicklung Europas, (Leipzig: Helingsche Verlagsanstalt, 
1943).  See additionally Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 211/R105120a. 
55 The last edition of the book listed thirty total countries.  The following lists them in the 
original German: “Albanien, Andorra, Belgien, Bulgarien, Dänemark, Deutsches Reich, Finnland, 
Frankreich, Griechenland, Grossbritannien, Irland, Island, Italien, Kroatien, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Niederlande, Norwegen, Portugal, Rumaenien, San Marino, Schweden , 
Schweiz, Serbien, Slowakei, Spanien, Türkei, Ungarn, Vatikan.“ 
56 The nine country-specific contributions were for: Italy, France, Spain, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Finland, Africa, Southeastern Europe, and Germany (which was described as “the heart of 
Europe”).    
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“Europe as Cultural Community.”57  Other chapters investigated the common 
cultural inheritances and practices of Europe, with titles such as “Music in 
Europe” (Musik in Europa) and “European Sports” (Europäischer Sport).  The 
Europe Handbook was published in the tens of thousands and was distributed 
abroad to all the diplomatic missions of the Foreign Office.  A second edition was 
published near the end of the war with updated appendices chronicling the 
historical steps towards the “New Europe” since the rise of fascism (including a 
list of Hitler’s speeches pertaining to the New Order of Europe). 
The Standard Theses, Megerle’s many publications, and the “Europe 
Handbook” collectively represent the best glimpse into the backroom 
coordination of propaganda narratives in the Foreign Office after 1941, but they 
are, like much of the records of the Foreign Office, an incomplete source 
collection.  To be sure, there is evidence that the Europe-concept was 
enthusiastically picked up by Ribbentrop himself.  As early as November, 1941 
Ribbentrop gave a long, 90-page speech in Berlin to various invited statesmen of 
the Tripartite Pact.58  The speech, broken down into nine different sections, 
presented all the different ways Europe was presently finding unity.  Ribbentrop 
 
57 The titles in the original German: “Europa als Erbe und Aufgabe,” “Die Achse ist die 
Grundlage des Neuen Europas,“ “Europäisches Bewusstsein,“ “Deutschland und Europa im 
Laufe der Geschichte,“ “Lebensraum oder Imperialismus,“ “Das Rechtsdenken des jungen 
Europa,“ and “Europa als Kulturgemeinschaft.“ 
58 Report by the “Deutscher Nachrichtendienst,” including speech text, November 26, 1941 in 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27882. 
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returned frequently to the Europe-concept in his speeches throughout the war, 
and, as has been noted, made Megerle his personal assistant and “Propaganda 
Commissioner” in the Foreign Office.  But the other direction – namely, the 
dissemination and execution of Europe-propaganda down the ladders of Foreign 
Office bureaucracy – is more difficult to trace.  For this, one must study 
individual Foreign Office departments, such as the largest among them: the Press 
Department. 
Paul Karl Schmidt and the Press Department 
 The second most relevant figure for Foreign Office Nazi Europeanism was 
Paul Karl Schmidt (also known by his postwar pen name “Paul Carell”).  
Schmidt, born West of Berlin in 1911, joined the Nazi Party as a twenty-year-old 
student nationalist in 1931, after which he campaigned for the party in the critical 
elections of the early 1930s as a speaker.  According to an autobiography of his 
written in 1938 upon joining the Foreign Office, during the years of Nazi take-
over Schmidt was a leader in his student nationalist organization which fought 
against “Jewish Intellectualism.”  He was, according to a Foreign Office 
biographical sketch, the founder of “the first large ‘comrade-committee’ of the 
National Socialist Student Association in Kiel.”  In his own words, Schmidt’s 
youth passion had been “fighting the un-German spirit.”  In the early 1930s 
Schmidt continued his education at the graduate level and received a Ph.D. in 
Psychology from the University of Kiel in 1936.  There, Schmidt became 
acquainted with Franz Alfred Six, his future colleague in the Foreign Office.  Six, 
at the time a member of the SS, had connections to the Foreign Office and helped 
Schmidt enter the Foreign Office as a press-analyst.  By 1938 Schmidt had joined 
168 
 
the SS.  Within a year, at the age of twenty-eight, he had become the director of 
the Press Department, and by the end of the war he expanded it into Ribbentrop’s 
largest propaganda department in the Foreign Office.59  The primary 
responsibilities of Schmidt’s Press Department were: first, gather information 
from and about foreign press; second, influence the foreign press by daily press 
conferences with accompanying instructions for Foreign Office publications, 
associated publications, and journalist operatives assigned to diplomatic missions; 
third, endeavor to spread Foreign Office messages to a German audience by 
working with important figures in the domestic German press such as, for 
example, Giselher Wirsing. 
Like Megerle, it can be credibly surmised that Schmidt’s Europeanism can 
be traced back to Giselher Wirsing.  First, Schmidt worked closely with Megerle 
in the Propaganda Committee of 1941 as well as the Standard Theses afterwards, 
and, as will be shown, quickly aligned himself with Megerle’s European 
approach.  But the connection goes back further still.  Schmidt’s personal assistant 
Hans Georg Studnitz worked from 1939-1940 in the small journalists’ office of 
the Information Department in which Wirsing and Megerle also worked during 
 
59 For biographical details see Press Department correspondences, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 701/R 123697.   “Lebensskizze,“ Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27904.   Wigbert Benz, Paul Carell: Ribbentrops 




the same time period.60  In fact, already in the fall, 1939 Schmidt and Studnitz 
were integrating the Europe-Concept into the primary propaganda periodical of 
the Foreign Office, Berlin-Rom-Tokio, which they edited together (and at the 
same time they began publishing guest articles by Karl Megerle).61  Finally, as 
director of the Press Department Schmidt was administratively in charge of the 
Foreign Office’s leading propaganda organ, Signal, which was edited by Wirsing 
after 1943.  Schmidt, then, not only became acquainted with Wirsing’s Europe-
concept early in the war, but even hired Wirsing as a Europe-propagandist to 
direct his largest propaganda project.  As Schmidt’s biographer Wigbert Benz has 
argued, Schmidt had a quite active interest and hands-on role in the Signal 
undertaking.62  In fact, Schmidt’s first documented deployment of Europe-
propaganda was in connection with Signal.  Schmidt’s correspondences in the 
 
60 “Draft Reports from MFIU No.3 (Third Army Interrogation Center),” July 30, 1945, United 
States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.”  
61 Paul Karl Schmidt, “War 1939,” Berlin-Rom-Tokio, October issue, 1939.   Editors, 
“Neuordnung Osteuropas,” Berlin-Rom-Tokio, October issue, 1939.   Karl Megerle, “Eine Bessere 
Weltordnung,” Berlin-Rom-Tokio, November issue, 1939.   Editors, „Um die Freiheit Europas,“ 
Berlin-Rom-Tokio, December issue, 1939. 
62 This can also be confirmed in Schmidt’s memos and correspondences in the Press 
Department from 1940 and 1941.  Among other things, the records show that Schmidt pushed 
through the Signal project despite push-back, that he ensured a pro-Europe narrative, and that he 
emphasized publishing leading non-German political figures aligned with the foreign policy of the 
Reich.  See Benz, Paul Carell, 26-27.  See additionally Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes 
in Berlin, RZ 701/R 123696; R 123697; R 123698; R 123699; and R 123717. 
170 
 
Press Department reveal that he was a leading voice advocating for the 
undertaking of this unique foreign propaganda periodical, even against the advice 
of co-workers who felt that “the necessity for the creation of a periodical with this 
new political direction is not pressing.”63  Nevertheless, Schmidt was able to press 
forward with the Signal project, and in a memo distributed throughout the Press 
Department even before the Nazi invasion of France in the spring, 1940, the main 
themes for the periodical were outlined, including the advocacy of a new 
“European utopia,” a new “European economic unit,” and the historical reality of 
a European “Grossraum” - all accompanied with “a general narrative organized 
around the term ‘for Europe’.”64  Not long thereafter, roughly a week following 
the Nazi invasion of France, Schmidt wrote Ribbentrop a personal letter 
recommending an adoption of Megerle’s suggestion for propaganda against the 
United States based on a European Monroe Doctrine.  Schmidt had Megerle, at 
the time still a lower-end journalist in the Information Department, draft his 
 
63 Lohse to Schmidt, August 27, 1940, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, 
RZ 701/R 123697.  It should be noted that Schmidt, as early as May, 1939, prepared a draft for 
Ribbentrop’s press release vis-à-vis the signing of the “Pact of Steel” between Nazi Germany and 
fascist Italy.  In it, Schmidt ended the comments with: “This pact establishes a solid, unbreakable 
foundation for the New Order of Europe and the cooperation of the two nations.”  But other than 
the use of the term “New Order of Europe” there is no other nod to the Europe-concept.  Thus, the 
present author feels justified claiming that Schmidt’s first articulated Nazi Europeanism can be 
dated to his work preparing the Signal project. 
64 Unsigned Press Department memo, undated but most likely early spring, 1940, Politisches 
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 701/R 123717. 
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suggestion in an essay, which Schmidt sent in his letter to Ribbentrop.  Schmidt 
even asked Ribbentrop if, should Ribbentrop be uncomfortable with Megerle’s 
suggested propaganda narrative, he could have permission to implement the 
suggestion covertly.65 
By the end of 1940, Schmidt had been fully converted to Nazi 
Europeanism.  The first recorded instance of Schmidt’s Europe-propaganda in 
public print came from November, 1940 when he wrote a forward to a history of 
fascism titled “Revolution in the Mediterranean.”  In the forward he argued that 
the fascist revolution was too often understood for its domestic impact.  But 
fascism, he argued, also had a revolutionary assignment in foreign policy: 
The Axis must re-structure Europe anew; because in the future only the 
fascist and National Socialist forms of life will be capable of survival after 
the Western-liberal principles have lost their capacity to overcome the 
emergencies of European life. 
 
For Schmidt, this foreign policy mission was a natural outgrowth of fascism’s 
domestic message: 
 
It is one of our primary ideologies that a Volk and a community 
[Gemeinschaft] can only survive as long as each and every link has the 
strength for healthy life and thus the community can band together 
organically at every moment.  Whenever this law has been broken Europe 
has begun a spiritual and political decline. 
 
Schmidt, then, was articulating an early example of criticizing nationalism by 
employing the doctrine of national communities (Volkgemeinschaft) to European 
unity.  This “law” of European history was evident in Europe’s troubling history 
of “nationalism,” “liberalism,” the “Middle Ages,” the “reformation,” the 
 
65 Paul Karl Schmidt to Joachim von Ribbentrop, May 20, 1940, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27876. 
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“Enlightenment,” and even the ostensibly disingenuous “pan-Europe” movement 
– all examples of European community breakdown.  In each case, he argued, 
Europe’s “constituent members [Glieder] forgot the larger whole [das Ganze] and 
in their short-sighted self-assuredness they only saw themselves.”  But no longer: 
Germany and Italy were leading the surgical removal of the inorganic, “Western” 
influence from Great Britain and the United States.  The “organic alliance” of 
Germany and Italy, he declared, was turning European hearts and minds back to 
the laws of European history.66  
 Schmidt, therefore, was a natural ally of Megerle’s short-lived Propaganda 
Committee of 1941.  The evidence suggests that the two figures together were the 
driving force behind the rise of Nazi Europeanism in Foreign Office propaganda.  
In September, 1941, around the same time Megerle submitted his essay calling for 
a more “positive” Europe-propaganda, Schmidt submitted to the Propaganda 
Committee a 19-page essay of his own similarly advocating for a more audacious 
Europe-narrative.  The essay, titled “Working Plan for an Aggressive News and 
Press Initiative,” opened with two “theses” which should guide Europe-
propaganda.  First, he agreed with Megerle that Foreign Office Propaganda 
should be organized around the slogan “Leave Europe to the Europeans!” and 
added the slogan “Defeat the Enemies of Europe!”  Second, he added an emphasis 
on newer and more equitable social relations in Europe, which he organized under 
a third slogan “Social Europe,” and which included various calls for Europe-wide 
 
66 Paul Karl Schmidt, “Vorwort,“ Revolution im Mittelmeer, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27902. 
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welfare guarantees.  Then, anticipating the country-specific Standard Theses of 
1942, Schmidt offered a series of opening thoughts on how to calibrate Nazi 
Europeanism to different countries ranging from France, to the Scandinavian 
countries, to the Balkans, and even to the Arab world (which he suggested could 
be brought into an alliance with Europe because both share an opposition to 
Zionism).  Schmidt even ended his essay with the argument that Europe-
propaganda should also be advocated in the German press.67  It is important to 
note that Schmidt, like Megerle, advocated extending Nazi Europeanism to a 
German audience at such early and optimistic stages of the German war effort, 
because this bolsters the claim in this dissertation that their Nazi-Europeanism 
was not, in fact, blatant opportunism but rather something in which they sincerely 
believed.  After the disbanding of the Propaganda Committee at the end of 1941, 
Schmidt continued to support Megerle’s Europeanism by approving and ordering 
the use of Standard Theses in the Press Department.  In February, 1942 Schmidt 
distributed a memo in the Press Department in which he explained: “the theses 
approved by Reich Foreign Minister [Ribbentrop] are to be used unceasingly.”  
“Not until a thesis has been explicitly withdrawn,” he continued, “is one free from 
the responsibility to consistently use them.”68  
 
67 Paul Karl Schmidt, “Arbeitsplan für eine offensive Nachrichten- und Pressearbeit,” undated 
but based on context and surrounding documents most likely late September/early October, 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 703/R 97629. 
68 Memo by Paul Karl Schmidt titled “Initiative 10,” February 21, 1942, Politisches Archiv 
des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 701/R 123558.  On the other hand, there is also evidence 
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Nazi Europeanism in the Press Department 
 Indeed, Schmidt implemented Nazi Europeanism in the duties and 
functions of the Press Department, and in his press activities throughout the entire 
war continuously reinforced what he called “our general program for the New 
Europe.”69  Schmidt accomplished this through a variety of means.  One way was 
to coordinate initiatives and events with other institutions and organizations 
outside of the Foreign Office.  As early as July, 1941 Schmidt worked with the 
Waffen-SS to place non-German journalists in the unique, multi-national 
divisions of the Waffen-SS as war-reporters who could attest to the European 
solidarity on the Eastern Front.70  In the spring of 1942 Schmidt worked with 
Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry to bring together students and soldiers from 
across Europe at a conference in Dresden called the “Conference for European 
 
that Schmidt was less willing than Megerle to pursue “positive” Europeanism in official 
propaganda.  For example, in early 1943, as explained above, Megerle was criticized by Schmidt 
for having demanded that the Foreign Office be more transparent about the future composition and 
rules of the European New Order.  See Karl Megerle to Paul Karl Schmidt, January 19, 1943, 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 102/R 29850. 
69 Paul Karl Schmidt, memo titled “Notiz für Herrn Gesandten von Rintelen über Herrn 
Schlottmann,“ October 27, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 
27893. 
70 Paul Karl Schmidt to Joachim von Ribbentrop, July 15, 1941, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27877. 
175 
 
Students and Front Soldiers.“71  From 1940-1942 Schmidt organized through the 
Press Department “informal evenings” at the Foreign Office in Berlin to which 
hundreds of German and non-German journalists, as well as foreign diplomats 
and their guests, were regularly invited.  In the second half of 1942, seventy-seven 
“informal meetings” took place, many of them led by Schmidt himself.  The 
evenings provided cultural entertainment (films, music, orchestras, and theatre) 
provided by the Propaganda Ministry, but were also a backdoor for Foreign 
Office propaganda.  As one inner-departmental report at the end of 1942 put it:  
The informal evenings led by Dr. Schmidt have become a center-piece of 
club-life and the resulting political discussions have greatly enabled us in 
our work to spread many proposals and guidelines amongst the active 
foreign journalists and diplomatic press-attachments of Axis nations.72  
 
Each Tuesday a special evening was led by Schmidt called the “political 
evening.”  Another report from early 1942 explained that “[Schmidt’s] intimate 
political discussions have definitely strengthened belief in, and understanding for, 
the increasingly emerging concept of a New Europe.”73 
 
71 Memo by Paul Karl Schmidt addressed to “Abteilung Pers,” April 16, 1942, Politisches 
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27908. 
72 In 1940 the “informal evenings” only took place once per week and only a few dozen 
people attended, but by the end of 1942 they supposedly took place multiple times a week with 
many dozen attendees.  See Foreign Office correspondences with the “Auslands- Presseclub,” 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27892. 
73 Report by “Herr Schneiditz,” undated but most likely early 1942, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27892. 
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Schmidt jealously guarded his Press Department’s authority over 
influencing non-German journalists and dignitaries.  In the spring of 1942 
Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry attempted to cut into Schmidt’s market by 
establishing the so-called “Union of National Journalists’ Associations,” an 
organization which brought together over 400 leading journalists from across 
Europe via occasional conferences and publications.74  Schmidt viewed this 
organization as a threat to his authority, and quickly moved to ensure that the 
Press Department review all speeches presented by the roughly one hundred 
German participants at the first conference in Venice in April, 1942.75  After 
unsuccessfully trying to have the Press Department fully take over the 
organization, Schmidt maneuvered himself onto the “Presiding Committee” in 
mid-1943 in order to ensure that the Foreign Office would not lose its influence 
on the substance of Union conferences and publications.76  Schmidt was not afraid 
to butt heads with the President of the Presiding Committee, Helmut Sündermann, 
whom he sent an angry letter, accusing him of allowing Hungarians to send Jews, 
the “number one enemy of our continent,” to the upcoming conference in Vienna.  
Schmidt was particularly critical of a failure on Sündermann’s part to use the 
 
74 Benjamin George Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 266. 
75 “Material zur Tagung in Venedig, 1942,” Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, RZ 247/R 27886. 
76 Paul Karl Schmidt to Joachim von Ribbentrop, June 16, 1943, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27894. 
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Union as a “banner of hope for all faithful and fighting peoples in the European 
crusade.”  He asked Sündermann to make Europe-propaganda a more central 
pillar of the upcoming conference.  “Let’s be honest, Mr. Sündermann,” he 
exclaimed, “if Europe is born on a crooked foundation, then this Europe will self-
destruct the next day.”77  Perhaps as a result of his protestations, Schmidt was 
allowed to give the concluding speech at the conference in which he presented the 
Second World War as a struggle for the preservation of Europe’s cultural 
heritage.  The “European cultural community,” he insisted, would only survive 
this war if a “European journalism” arose to support it.78 
 Schmidt’s speech at the Union of National Journalists’ Association in 
Vienna was only one example of his lectures outside of Germany.  Indeed, the 
records indicate that he was quite the travelling lecturer, frequently speaking at 
many venues both in and outside of Germany, where he was invited to expound 
upon the European mission of Nazi Germany.79  Schmidt was even invited to 
speak in front of administers of the domestic press in Germany on January 17th, 
 
77 Paul Karl Schmidt to Sündermann, August 2, 1943, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 
Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27894.  
78 Paul Karl Schmidt, “Anschlussrede,” Vienna Conference for the Union of National 
Journalists‘ Association, June 25, 1943, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 
247/R 27894. 
79 Schmidt’s scattered personal document collection include evidence that just in the months 
of May, 1941 to May, 1942 he accepted nearly a dozen invitations in Scandinavia and the Balkans, 
as well as Hamburg, Bremen, Dresden, and, of course, Berlin.  See “Vorträge des Herrn 
Gesandten Dr. Schmidt,“ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27893. 
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1943, where he was asked to give an account of foreign propaganda.  He 
explained to his audience of German press administrators that, unlike domestic 
propaganda, his work had to more carefully navigate “the greatest doctrine of the 
National Socialist movement,” namely: race.  This meant finding a propaganda 
narrative which reconciled race with the Reich’s foreign policy goals.  The 
answer, Schmidt argued, was the “great idea of the New Order of Europe.”  This 
“great idea” made it possible to marry together the most important principles of 
the European war: “the Occident, Europe, the Nordic-man, and Germania with its 
racial and cultural values.”  This new “motto,” the “New Order of Europe,” 
Schmidt explained, had been painstakingly and conscientiously developed by the 
Foreign Office.  It had allegedly already forced the Western Allies onto the 
defensive, leading them to articulate a postwar vision of their own: the Atlantic 
Charter.  Schmidt regarded the Atlantic Charter as a great victory for Nazi 
Europe-propaganda, because it ostensibly exposed the contradictions behind 
Western Alliance of imperialists and democrats.  Of course, Schmidt also 
acknowledged the criticism that the new “motto” was silent on the “future 
composition of the New Order,” but he implored the domestic press to 
nonetheless assist the New Order narrative, promising that “we will find 
possibilities in the near future to say more about this, and even illustrate a more 
specific division of roles.”  Yet, Schmidt also explained that this promise would 
nevertheless not break with a so-called “iron principle”: namely, that only after 
the war would crucial political decisions about the future be decided.  Still, he 
proceeded to expound for his listeners on the doctrine of Grossraum, which he 
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argued was a quite explicit economic vision for the postwar New Order.80  
Schmidt’s appeals to the domestic press were important for a few reasons.  First, 
it is yet another example of the Foreign Office’s attempts to infiltrate domestic 
propaganda with Nazi-Europeanism.  And the fact that he felt compelled to 
defend Nazi Europeanism from its lack of specifics suggests there existed a feed-
back loop between German audiences and Nazi Europeanism.  Finally, speaking 
to a German audience Schmitt could be more candid about the racial components 
of his Nazi Europeanism, something Schmidt likewise illustrated in a speech to 
Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS veterans in Dresden on April 19th, 1942.  Roosevelt, 
he explained, had recently presented the war as a struggle for the survival of 
democracy; in reality, Schmidt argued, it was a struggle for the survival of 
something much older: the “racial unity” of “old Europe.”  He explained: 
Above the differences of our nations there stands a geographical, racial, 
and historical unity which separates us from those around us and which - 
despite centuries of conflicts, errors, wars, and hatreds – pushed us 
towards an ever closer community of destiny [Schicksalsgemeinschaft]. 
 
In making this argument, Schmidt was eschewing the distinctiveness of the 
Germanic race.  To be sure, underneath the racial unity of Europe Schmidt saw 
different “peoples” (Völker), and in the nineteenth century the natural evolution of 
government corresponded to these different “peoples” (Germany was simply a 
late development in this process).  But for Schmidt, unlike for orthodox National 
Socialists, the fusion of nation and state was not the final stage of history; in fact, 
 
80 Paul Karl Schmidt, “Vor der deutschen Presse,” January, 17, 1943, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27893.  
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the nation-state era was overtaken by a conspiracy of British and American Jews 
who created “the Jewish-plutocratic Europe” during the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century.  The emergence of Bolshevism was only the “most 
radical form of the Jewish-capitalist undertaking,” and thus an extremist effort to 
withhold history from further development.  The rise of fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany, he continued, each initially prioritized only their respective Volk, but 
together quickly developed into the “Berlin-Rom Axis,” a collective effort to 
replace the Jewish nation-state system with “the New Racial Europe,” defined as 
a “racial federation” armed to defeat “the Jewish conspiracy in all of its forms.”  
Or, as he put it:  
Opposed to the world revolution of the so-called proletariats and opposed 
to the world reaction of the plutocrats (both of which are mere Jewish 
phrases) – against both of these there stands an organic Order, a racially 
determined Grossraum within which there are politically independent and 
enclosed communities. 
 
Subtly, then, Schmidt surgically removed the concept of “race” from “Volk” 
while alleging the importance of both: “Volk and Race are the basis of this new 
form of politics.”81  As seen in the above quotations, Schmidt was able to hide his 
unorthodoxy in Nazi racial doctrine by doubling-down and amalgamating an 
equally foundational pillar of National Socialism: antisemitism.  This can be 
further illustrated by taking a closer look at Schmidt’s most aggressively pursued 
 
81 Paul Karl Schmidt, speech titled “Der Kampf um das völkische Europa,” at the 
“Europäisches Studenten- und Frontkämpfertreffen,“ April 19, 1942, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27893. 
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policy for disseminating Europe-propaganda in the Press Department: namely, the 
printed word.  
Antisemitism and Illiberalism in Schmidt’s Europe-Concept 
Schmidt’s personal document collection in the archives of the German 
Foreign Office in Berlin reveal that he regularly propagated the Foreign Office’s 
Europe-propaganda by publishing hundreds of articles in dozens of publications 
throughout Nazi-occupied Europe as well as German publications in the Reich.82  
Additionally, Schmidt and his assistant Hans Georg von Studnitz edited and 
published a monthly periodical directly from the Foreign Office called Berlin-
Rom-Tokio (hereafter “BRT”), which was published in German and Italian and 
distributed largely in Berlin, Rome, and in the German diplomatic embassies 
throughout Occupied Europe.  Unlike other periodicals in which the Foreign 
Office was involved, such as Signal, BRT was published directly by Schmidt, 
who regularly penned lead-articles and therefore used the periodical as the 
primary organ for articulating Foreign Office Europeanism; in fact, Schmidt 
himself called BRT the “authoritative periodical of the New Order.”83  Schmidt’s 
war-time editorial work, in BRT and elsewhere, is important not just because it is 
 
82 See Paul Karl Schmidt’s personal documents, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, RZ 247/R 27893 and R 27899. 
83 Paul Karl Schmidt to “Kleinlein,” May 5, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes 
in Berlin, RZ 247/R 27881.  BRT regularly published propagandists who also wrote in Signal, the 




evidence of the proliferation of Foreign Office Nazi-Europeanism such as the 
“Standard Theses.”  It also gives insight into the unique form that Nazi 
Europeanism took in Schmidt’s Press Office; in particular, the antisemitism and 
illiberalism.   
Jews performed a unique and important role in Schmidt’s Europe-
propaganda.  One of the most important developments in the historical literature 
on Nazi antisemitism is a shift from an emphasis on the biological doctrines to the 
political and conspiratorial nature of Nazi antisemitism.84  Schmidt, whose racism 
as illustrated above did not amount to more than vague notions of shared 
European racial superiority, likewise deplored the Jews most vehemently because 
of their supposed world-conspiratorial influence.  At the core of this obsession 
was the notion that the Jews had maneuvered their way into the hallways of power 
in the United States.  The Jews, Schmidt explained to Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS 
soldiers in April, 1942, had successfully harnessed the chaos of the First World 
War to infiltrate Woodrow Wilson’s White House with their Wall Street puppet-
masters.  The result was Wilson’s “Versailles system,” or the “Jewish-Plutocratic 
Europe” of the inter-war period.85  Franklin D. Roosevelt, subsequently, 
represented the extension and ascension of “world Jewry“ to its highest reach of 
 
84 Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2006). 
85 Paul Karl Schmidt, speech titled “Der Kampf um das völkische Europa,” at the 
“Europäisches Studenten- und Frontkämpfertreffen,“ April 19, 1942, Politisches Archiv des 
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power.  In fact, Roosevelt, Schmidt regularly argued, was a captain-like figure in 
a world-wide Jewish grasp for dominance of the entire earth.  As he explained in 
BRT in January, 1942: “Roosevelt is the ultimate initiator of this World War.  He 
acts on behalf of World Jewry.”  He continued: 
…everywhere you can not only feel but even see with clear evidence the 
seal of David’s star underneath the plans, slogans, lies, and atrocities….  
You can see everywhere and always the Jewish origins underneath the 
commands of those organizations which are leading and directing this war.  
The Jewish bankers in Paris and the Jewish profiteers in Warsaw have 
forced the world into war using their money received from Roosevelt and 
his commissioners.86  
 
British imperialism, too, was linked into the conspiracy.  In fact, Schmidt and his 
assistant Hans Georg von Studnitz frequently argued that Zionism was among the 
most dangerous weapons of the Jewish world-conspiracy, and was supported by 
the British because of strong Jewish political control there as well.87  Finally, 
Bolshevism, too, of course, was yet another weapon in the Jewish crusade to 
dominate the globe. 
 But Schmidt’s antisemitism made sense of, and ultimately sought redress 
for, the vast Jewish world-conspiracy with the help of Nazi Europeanism.  How 
could one make sense of Jewish presence behind both liberal capitalism and 
 
86 Paul Karl Schmidt, “Europa den Europäern, Ostasien den Ostasiaten,“ Berlin-Rom-Tokio, 
January issue, 1942, 2-5.   Paul Karl Schmidt, “Quartiermacher des Bolschewismus,“ Berlin-Rom-
Tokio, December issue, 1942, 2-5.   Paul Karl Schmidt, “Todesstoss für die Atlantik-Charta,“ 
Berlin-Rom-Tokio, March issue, 1943, 2-5. 
87 Paul Karl Schmidt, “Leichtfertige Politiker – leichtfertige Strategen,“ Berlin-Rom-Tokio, 
May issue, 1942, 2-5.   Hans Georg von Studnitz, “Das Davidsbanner – nicht entrollt,“ Berlin-
Rom-Tokio, January issue, 1944, 2-5.   
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Marxist Bolshevism was a question Schmidt often asked.  The answer: lurking 
beneath both seemingly contradictory ideologies was a repudiation of the 
principle of organic differences in the world.  Both the “world revolution” of 
Bolshevism and the “dollar-imperialism” of liberalism, he explained in a BRT 
article in October, 1941, were camouflaged tools of “universalism,” the doctrine 
that the entire world should be shaped similarly – politically, culturally, socially, 
and economically.88  But the past was no cure to Jewish ascendency, Schmidt 
claimed, because the political forms of governance in Europe’s past - imperialism 
and the nation-state - had likewise been overtaken by the Jewish conspiracy and, 
in fact, had been used to prevent European unity.89  In contrast, the New Order of 
Europe, described as “an organic federation,” was the only possibility in the 
modern world to prevent the “Jewish collective in all of its forms.”90  
Schmidt’s antisemitism was not merely a propaganda tool.  As Schmidt’s 
biographer Wigbert Benz has illustrated, Schmidt may even have participated in 
the Holocaust.  During the years of his postwar literary fame Schmidt was able to 
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hide from public view a series of legal proceedings during the 1960s which 
credibly implicated him in the mass murder of Jews in Hungary.  Although 
ultimately pronounced innocent by postwar West German courts of assisting the 
mass murder of Hungarian Jews in 1944, one document from the trials at the very 
least exposes his likely knowledge and support for the massacre of Jews.  It was a 
note written by Schmidt on May 27th, 1944, after the deportation of Hungarian 
Jews had already begun, to the German diplomat in Budapest Edmund 
Veesenmeyer: 
Having surveyed a very thorough review of the current and planned Jew-
actions in Hungary I have surmised that in June a large-action is planned 
for Jews in Budapest.  This planned action will, due to its magnitude, 
produce quite a bit of attention abroad and will certainly be cause for a 
hefty reaction.  The enemy will scream of human hunts etc. and will 
attempt to radicalize their own public opinion and that of neutral nations 
through the use of atrocity-reports.  I would like to therefore suggest that 
one avoid these things by creating external reasons and justifications for 
the action: for example, uncovering explosive material in Jewish 
organizations’ buildings and synagogues, conspiratorial plans, assaults on 
police officers, and the use of foreign currencies with the goal of 
undermining Hungary currency.  The final component of such a move 
would have to be a particularly extreme example such as to justify the 
round-up.91 
 
 When analyzing Schmidt’s antisemitism it becomes clear that he was 
intensely preoccupied with the United States.  In fact, like most Nazi Europeanists 
in this dissertation, and unlike most other Nazi propagandists, the greatest threat 
in the world was and always had been the United States and its accompanying 
political and economic liberalism.  Communism was even frequently depicted by 
Schmidt’s Press Department as a function of American liberalism, a “variety” of 
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American Jewry.92  This primacy of anti-Western over anti-Eastern sentiment 
meant that much of Schmidt’s Europeanism was an attempt to appropriate the 
claims of the liberal tradition in order to expose the Jews hiding behind the façade 
of democracy.  Take for example the following arguments of Schmidt’s written to 
a German audience on the front-page of the Frankfurter Anzeiger on May 4th, 
1943: 
We are not against democracy, but we are against the kind of democracy 




And in the end we are also not against humanism; because in Central 
Europe (especially in Germany and Italy) humanism was born, spiritually 
and culturally anchored, and also realized in practice.  However, we are 
against the Jewish kind of humanism, which our peoples have gotten to 
know all too well. … This humanism was on display in the history of 
English concentration camps.  This humanism was revealed to the world 
in the social hell-hole of New York, Washington, and London, as well as 
on Stalin’s Kolkhoz farms.  It is demonstrated in the English methods of 
domination in their colonies, as well as in the proclamation of a bombing 




We have taken a stand against the reaction of the West and her child born 
in the East.  The European peoples are marching with Hitler.93 
 
 
92 Paul Karl Schmidt, speech titled “Der Kampf um das völkische Europa,” at the 
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Schmidt also shared this message with non-German audiences.  His concluding 
speech at the “Union of National Journalists’ Associations” in Vienna on June 
25th, 1943 was a historical lecture on Europe’s real humanist tradition, something 
he called “Occidental cultural humanity” (abendländische Kulturmenschheit).  
This tradition, protected over centuries by Europeans against Oriental barbarians, 
had ostensibly now been reinvigorated by the New Order of Europe and 
simultaneously rejected by the enemies of Europe in the present war, such as 
during the Katyn massacre and the murderous bombing raids of the Western 
Allies.  Furthermore, the real “flag of freedom” and “banner of progress” was not 
found in the liberal tradition, but in the voluntary sacrifice and unification of 
Europeans in the present war.94 
Conclusion 
Europe-propaganda in Schmidt’s Press Department, then, was articulated 
and implemented in the Foreign Office to both foreign and domestic German 
audiences.  The Press Department’s Europe-propaganda is an example of how 
Megerle’s mission to situate the Europe-concept in the highest echelons of the 
Foreign Office ultimately succeeded.  In early 1942 the Foreign Office 
commissioned a study into the reception of Europe-propaganda abroad and stated 
that, although most Europeans were frustrated with the lack of specificity, “it is 
doubtlessly true and can be thoroughly confirmed that the proclaimed war-time 
 
94 Paul Karl Schmidt, “Anschlussrede,” Vienna Conference for the Union of National 




goal of the Axis powers for a restructured Europe has engaged the populations of 
all European countries in the most spirited way….”  The report, based on 
interviews with diplomatic missions across Europe, collected dozens of 
proclamations of support from social elites in the various countries of Nazi-
occupied Europe.95  The Foreign Office, therefore, was at the very least convinced 
of the success and importance of Nazi Europeanism in their propaganda efforts.  It 
is difficult to ascertain how effective Foreign Office propaganda was, but the 
subsequent chapter of this dissertation takes a closer look at a few operations, 
handling them as case studies for Europe-propaganda in the Foreign Office.  As 
will be shown, many non-Germans enthusiastically collaborated intellectually 
with the Europe-propaganda projects of the Foreign Office.  But just as important, 
it will show that the Germans who administered these projects, and who after the 
war would enjoy illustrious careers as leading West German journalists, found 
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Chapter 4: Foreign Office Europe-Projects in Berlin and 
Abroad 
Introduction 
The following chapter continues the investigation of Europe-propaganda 
in the Foreign Office by investigating a few case studies of propaganda projects 
led by three less-prominent Europe-propagandists in the Foreign Office: Frans 
Alfred Six, Axel Seeberg, and Klaus Mehnert.  Six organized and directed a large 
academic think-tank affiliated with Foreign Office called the “German Foreign 
Studies Institute.”  One of this institute’s most prestigious projects was a yearly 
conference retreat organized and administered by Axel Seeberg called the 
“Foreigner Course,” to which hundreds of non-German social elites from across 
occupied Europe were invited for propaganda instruction on the Europe-concept.  
Each of these operations will be discussed in the first half of this chapter.  A final 
section of this chapter will introduce Klaus Mehnert who directed Foreign Office 
Europe-propaganda operations on the other side of the globe in China and the 
Pacific.  Although their war-time profiles were not as large as Megerle’s and 
Schmidt’s, after the Second World War Seeberg and Mehnert became two of the 
most influential conservative editorialists in West Germany, and Six worked 
briefly with United States secret services in a propaganda project funded by the 
CIA. They are therefore of supreme importance for understanding the transwar 
influence of Foreign Office Europe-propaganda.  The postwar continuities and 
ruptures in their Europe-concept are the subject of a subsequent chapter.  Instead, 
this chapter will present their work as Europe-propagandists and grapple with the 
way in which their ideological commitment to the Europe-concept informed their 
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transition from collaborators in National Socialism to self-proclaimed critics of 
National Socialism. 
Franz Alfred Six and the German Foreign Studies Institute (DAWI) 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Foreign Office had a close 
relationship with various academic institutions in Berlin which were integrated 
into the Foreign Office in order to conduct research on countries and populations 
throughout the world as well as disseminate Europe-propaganda in intellectual 
milieus.  Such was the case with Friedrich Berber’s “German Institute for Foreign 
Policy Research” (Duetsches Institut für Aussenpolitische Forschung), which 
published the Europe Handbook.  As historian Birgit Kletzlin has illustrated, 
Berber’s German Institute for Foreign Policy Research and its subsidiary 
academic journals were a key gathering ground for German scholars who 
developed the Europe-concept in the academy during the Second World War.1  In 
addition to Berber’s institute, there was a second, separate academic organization 
which was likewise incorporated into the Foreign Office: the German Foreign 
Studies Institute, or “Deutsches Auslandswissenschafltiches Institut.”  The 
German Foreign Studies Institute (hereafter DAWI) was originally the 
Hochschule für Politik, a liberal, pro-Weimar academy in Berlin founded by 
Friedrich Naumann and Theodor Heuss after the First World War.2  In 1933 the 
 
1 Birgit Kletzlin, Europa aus Rasse und Raum: die Nationalsozialistische Idee der Neuen 
Ordnung (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2002). 
2 The surviving documents for DAWI in the Federal Archives of Germany in Berlin-
Lichterfelde contain an essay by historian/archivist Ulrich Roeske, who traced the construction of 
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Hochschule für Politik was taken over by Joseph Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry 
after most of its employees had either emigrated or were forced to step down.  On 
January 1st, 1940 the Hochschule für Politik was combined with the Department 
of Foreign Languages and Culture at the University of Berlin, the predecessor of 
Humboldt University.  The resulting department, called the “Foreign Studies 
Department” (Auslandswissenschaftliche Fakultät), was led by SS-functionary, 
and future Einsatzgruppen member, Franz Alfred Six, who immediately upon the 
creation of the Foreign Studies Department created DAWI as a special institute 
within the department for educating the upcoming administrative generation of 
the Nazi state on foreign affairs within a more controlled ideological 
environment.3  Throughout the war Six held various positions in the SS and the 
Foreign Office, and in his absence DAWI was led by sociologist Karl Heinz 
Pfeffer, a former Conservative Revolutionary who had published frequently in 
Wirsing’s publications during the Weimar period and continued to publish for 
Wirsing through the end of the war.  Between 1940 and 1943 DAWI matriculated 
over 4000 students who were supposed to supply the Reich with the highest 
quality “specialists on foreign peoples” (Kenner fremder Völker).  Additionally, 
 
DAWI and submitted his research to the on-site finding aid.  This is the most useful resource for 
DAWI’s background history.  See Ulrich Roeske, ”Einleitung,” 1992, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-
Lichterfelde, Band I, Findbuch, R 4902, Deutsches Auslandswissenschaftliches Institut. 
3 In fact, Six compared DAWI’s purpose to that of Chatham House in London and the École 
libre des sciences politiques in Paris. See Franz Alfred Six to Hans Heinrich Lammers, March 16, 
1942, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frame 100. 
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DAWI funded and published a plethora of foreign studies research projects, many 
of which were conducted through the prism of the Europe-concept; in fact, the 
stated purpose of DAWI was to research “the German mission in Europe and 
European mission in the world.”4  According to financial records of the Reich 
Chancellery, DAWI had a yearly budget of 50,000 Reichsmark.5  The Foreign 
Office, always jealously guarding its authority on foreign policy, successfully 
appointed Franz Alfred Six to be director of the Cultural-Politics Department of 
the Foreign Office in 1943 thus using the tool of promotion to make DAWI and 
the entire Foreign Studies Department an official branch of the Foreign Office.6  
As such, DAWI in particular became an important vessel for Foreign Office 
Europe-propaganda. 
 Like much of the rest of the Foreign Office documentary record, most of 
the documents for the Cultural-Politics Department were also destroyed or lost at 
the end of the war.  However, the federal archive in Berlin-Lichterfelde has an 
admittedly partial but nevertheless substantial collection of remaining documents 
from DAWI.  Most of the documents are composed of essays, history reports, and 
primary sources for research projects conducted by DAWI on the various 
countries and territories under examination.  But there are also several folders 
which reveal an important propaganda function fulfilled by DAWI on behalf of 
 
4 Kletzlin, Europa aus Rasse und Raum, 49-53. 
5 Records of the Reichskanzlei concerning DAWI funding, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-
Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a. 
6 Roeske, “Einleitung.” 
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the Foreign Office from 1943-1945.  This section will examine Nazi-Europeanism 
within Foreign Office-aligned academia by drawing from these documents as well 
as correspondences between DAWI and the Reich Chancellery concerning 
finances (the documents for which are also available at the federal archive in 
Berlin-Lichterfelde).  Finally, this section will also make use of a few folders 
containing DAWI records which found their way to the Political Archive of the 
Foreign Office in Berlin.    
 In its first few years of existence DAWI appears to have been primarily 
focused on providing its students with detailed knowledge of the outside world 
through the prism of Nazi racial ideology.  An early assistant of Six’s, Dr. Bruno 
Kiesewetter, explained in 1940: DAWI was supposed to provide an environment 
where Nazi academics and administrators-in-training could acquire a 
comprehensive “view of the world” so that they could more efficiently execute 
the needs of the Nazi-state.7  Nevertheless, even before DAWI was incorporated 
into the Foreign Office, Franz Alfred Six appears to have been drawn to Nazi 
Europeanism and incorporated it into the research activities at DAWI.  As early as 
the summer of 1940 one of DAWI’s first academic workshops was titled “The 
New Order of Europe.”8  In fact, its self-described purpose in its early requests for 
Nazi Party funding in early 1941 was to improve the image of the Reich among 
 
7 Roeske, “Einleitung.“ 
8 Hans Heinrich Lammers to Franz Alfred Six, July 5, 1940, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-
Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frames 56-58. 
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foreigners by academically pursuing sensitive topics in political, economic, and 
culture as it relates to the “creation of the New Europe.”9  
 The documentary evidence for DAWI reveals that Franz Alfred Six was 
an early adherent to Nazi Europeanism.  Before taking over DAWI, Six had been 
converted from the student nationalist milieu into the SS in 1935 as a “foreign 
enemy specialist” (Gegner-Forscher).10   He was eventually promoted to press 
director of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst), where he oversaw research on ideological 
enemies of the Reich and coordinated press campaigns against them.  In 1939 he 
was transferred to the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) and took over control 
of DAWI.  Even after assuming leadership of DAWI in 1940 Six continued to 
work in the RSHA; in fact, in 1941 he was made a “commando leader” in 
Einsatzgruppe B and, despite his postwar denials, in all likelihood participated in 
mass executions of Jews.11  Remarkably, while he was stationed in his murderous 
capacity on the Eastern Front Six continued to direct DAWI from abroad and 
contribute intellectual material on the New Order of Europe.  This he did by 
editing and contributing to DAWI’s primary intellectual journal, Zeitschrift für 
Politik (ZfP), a monthly periodical published by Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.12  
 
9 Dr. Achenbach[sic] to Hans Heinrich Lammers and Ulrich Müller, May 19, 1941, 
Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frames 97-99. 
10 Lutz Hachmeister, Der Gegnerforscher. Die Karriere des SS-Führers Franz Alfred Six 
(Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 144-199. 
11 Ibid., 231-238. 
12 After April, 1943 ZfP was only published once every two months. 
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ZfP co-functioned as both a medium for DAWI’s completed academic research as 
well as a political editorial which even published famous European collaborators, 
including occupied-Norway governor Viktor Quisling and Belgian Waffen-SS 
commander Leon Degrelle.13  Six regularly penned articles in the politics section 
titled “Europe and the Reich,” where he commented on current events and 
attempted to present DAWI research on the Europe-concept as an answer to 
contemporary problems.  In November, 1941, while serving in the Einsatzgruppe, 
Six penned an article in ZfP inaugurating the editorial section.  The article, titled 
“The Reich and Europe” quoted Hitler’s October 3rd, 1941 speech wherein he 
called for a continent-wide European crusade against Bolshevism (discussed in 
the introduction of this dissertation), and declared the Eastern Front only the latest 
example of a “more encompassing development,” namely: the “powerful new 
ordering of the continent.”  He proceeded to discuss various programs for cultural 
exchange between Europeans.  Thus, while contributing significantly to the 
Holocaust Six was simultaneously embedding a European program into DAWI.14  
In comparison to other Nazi Europeanists, Six’s Europe-concept was especially 
marked by two key elements: the Germanic-concept and Hegelian historicism. 
 Unlike many Nazi Europeanists, Six was uncompromisingly loyal to the 
race-concept.  In order to square Europe with racial doctrine, therefore, Six relied 
 
13 ZfP also published Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann as well as other figures who published in 
Wirsing’s network such as Max Clauss. 




heavily on what this dissertation calls “Germanic Europeanism.”  Much like the 
Europe-concept in the Waffen-SS, for Six the New Order of Europe meant an 
integration of racially pure Germanic peoples into a unified community.  Europe 
itself, he argued in a ZfP article in March, 1942, was a weak continent torn 
between Asia (Islam) and the Mediterranean (Christianity) until the Germanic 
migrations of the Middle Ages secured its independence.  The present war, then, 
was a struggle to defend the Germanic heritage by securing a “European 
Lebensraum.”  For Six, like many Germanic Europeanists, the term “Germanic” 
was wielded with enough imprecision to leave open the question of who precisely 
belongs, but the repeated insistence on the revolutionary value of Nazi race 
concept was a clear suggestion that not all peoples presently in Europe actually 
belonged.15  
 Increasingly over the course of 1942 Six supplemented his Germanic 
Europeanism with a detailed and codified historicism.  His goal was to present 
evidence that European unity was historically inevitable, but in order to construct 
such a narrative he had to confront a historical trajectory which so often seemed 
to condemn Europeans to perpetual conflict among themselves.  Six’s answer was 
to find a hidden Hegelian-like European spirit underneath the surface of intra-
European conflict.  European history, then, was a series of “European civil wars” 
which broke up Europe’s original unity, each of which, however, ironically and 
necessarily left Europe one step closer to an even more powerful moment of 
 




unification; namely, the present war.  Six introduced this historicism in a speech 
given in November, 1942 to hundreds of politicians, journalists, and intellectuals 
throughout Nazi-occupied Europe who had been invited by DAWI to Germany 
for a two-week seminar.16 The speech, titled “The European Civil Wars and the 
Present War of Unification,” began with the Holy Roman Empire, an ostensibly 
unified Germanic kingdom which absorbed the strength of the Roman Empire it 
had defeated and subsequently weaponized its new-found  “occidental solidarity” 
(abendländische Solidarität) against the Asiatic barbarians during the eighth, 
ninth, and tenth centuries.  Unfortunately, however, during the late Middle Ages 
the “nation-state concept” conquered the Holy Roman Empire and turned 
Europeans against one another: “…in replacement of the centralized, dominant, 
fair Order as well as the occidental consciousness of community there emerged a 
diverse, decentralized world of states.  The age of European civil wars had 
begun.”  The “age of European civil wars,” Six argued, quickly became 
dominated by a few, self-interested empires, whose competition unwittingly 
sparked ideas of European unity (the Napoleonic Empire, for example, evolved 
into an “attempted unification of the European continent” in its struggle against 
the British Empire).  Nation-state competition in the Early Modern time period 
decimated the heart of Europe (Central Europe) and consequently inadvertently 
enabled the rise of two nation-states, Italy and Germany, which, unlike other 
nation-states, rebelled against the “nation-state system” and consequently set out 
to reverse the “self-immolation of Europe.”  The First World War, he continued, 
 
16 This seminar was one of the “Foreigner Courses” discussed in more detail below. 
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was caused by the English and Russians who recognized the threat to the nation-
state system represented by Germany.  And while Allied victory appeared to be a 
historical confirmation of the nation-state, it produced a justifiably resentful 
Germany.  Germany’s rebellion, although it began as a national revolution, 
underwent an inevitable “change of heart” because it, too, was a rebellion against 
the nation-state system.  The Bolshevist war waged against Nazi Germany 
produced the most important historical irony of all, “the strongest element of 
European solidarity has awakened: the consciousness of an occidental cultural 
unity which spans all European peoples.”  Hitler himself, Six explained to his 
guests, had undergone this “change of heart,” and he proceeded to quote various 
Hitler statements vis-à-vis the New Order of Europe.  His speech included a ten-
page hand-out of the dozens of “European civil wars” throughout European 
history with accompanying explanations regarding each war’s hidden “purpose” 
in the European-unity metanarrative.17  
By the end of 1942 Six regularly presented DAWI research as centered 
around the Europe-concept:  “At the center of our relevant research apparatus vis-
à-vis foreign research and the Reich,” he explained in an academic literature 
review, “is the theme: ‘The Reich and Europe’.” According to Six, this research 
theme could be broken down into three constituent parts: “1) the recognition of 
Germanic Reich concept, its historical structure, and its future greatness; 2) the 
 
17 Franz Alfred Six, “Die Bürgerkriege Europas und der Einigungskrieg der Gegenwart,” 
Ausländerkursus in Berlin, November, 1942,  Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, Germany, RZ 106. 
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spiritual, political, and economic relationship of this Reich-concept to the 
European peoples and governments and its concrete manifestation in history; 3) 
the consciousness of Europe’s unity and the New Order of the continent.”  The 
last 2 constituent parts are revealing.  By the end of 1942 Six had either changed 
his mind about the strict Germanic definition of Europe or, more likely, had seen 
fit to concede space for research and ideas on Europe outside of the Nordic race.  
Thus Six spoke of research on “the Nordic race, the core race of the Greater-
Germanic space [grossgermansichen Raum]” and “the Germanic community 
concept” (germanische Gemeinschaftsgedanke) while at the same time also 
discussing research on “Europe as a united Lebensraum,” and “European 
consciousness.”18  This paradox endured in Six’s DAWI writings throughout the 
war and remained unresolved.  In fact, as discussed below, Six intentionally and 
disingenuously upheld this paradox in order to placate other DAWI researchers 
who disagreed with his Germanic supremacism.   
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, with or without Six’s enthusiasm, 
the Europe-concept in DAWI expanded to include a non-racial Europe-concept 
which increasingly presented Europe as a new, emerging nation.  In fact, it 
appears that Six himself occasionally attempted to reframe his Germanic 
Europeanism in such a way as to incorporate his colleagues’ more sweeping 
vision.  According to reviews in several German newspapers, Six gave a speech 
 
18 Franz Alfred Six, “Das Reich und Europa als Forschungsaufgabe,“ in “Die Weltliteratur: 
Berichte, Leseproben und Werden,“ September/October, 1942 in Bundesarchiv in Berlin-
Lichterfelde, R 4902/12. 
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before DAWI in early March, 1943 titled “European Consciousness.”  According 
to the reviewers, Six argued that European consciousness was originally 
established by the Germanic “occidental ethos” of the Middle Ages and actually 
spread to the East by the “colonial achievements” of Germanic settlers.   The era 
of the nation-state, he argued, destroyed this European identity and replaced it 
with “particularism” which made Europe vulnerable to domination by “foreign 
continents” in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.  However, “the Adolf 
Hitler movement, with its irrepressible will to power, established the unity of the 
European Middle and thereby created a new European consciousness.”  “Just like 
in the age of the hitherto [Holy Roman] empire“ the reviewers continued, “so too 
today has the German historical consciousness become a European historical 
consciousness and therefore also a new form of European life.”19 
 Despite the peculiarity of Six’s Germanic concept, then, Nazi 
Europeanism in DAWI increasingly mirrored the non-racial European nationalism 
found elsewhere in the Foreign Office and Giselher Wirsing’s network.  In fact, 
the records indicate that DAWI, too, even before its official combination with the 
Foreign Office in 1943 had connections to Nazi Europeanists in the Waffen-SS, 
the Foreign Office, and Giselher Wirsing’s network.  Indeed, this connection can 
already be established in the first few months of its existence.  In the summer of 
1940 Six briefly joined the Waffen-SS, but continued to administer DAWI during 
 
19 Franz Alfred Six, speech given at DAWI titled “Europäisches Einheitsbewusstsein,“ March 
6, 1943, reviewed in several newspaper clippings from the Berliner Morgenpost and the Deutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/7190. 
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the nine months he served in this organization which, as illustrated in chapter five 
of this dissertation, was likewise seeped in Nazi Europeanism.20  Also, according 
to DAWI’s requests for Nazi Party funding, it had a cooperative relationship with 
the Foreign Office from the very beginning.21  Additionally, there is evidence that 
DAWI worked closely with and even employed important figures in Giselher 
Wirsing’s network.  For example, Wirsing’s assistant Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann 
regularly published articles and books for DAWI,22 and even directed the “France 
Division,” one of DAWI’s twenty-two research sub-departments.23  In fact, both 
Wirsing and Eschmann were invited as guest speakers to DAWI’s first ever 
 
20 Franz Alfred Six to Hans Heinrich Lammers, July 5, 1940 and Franz Alfred Six to Hans 
Heinrich Lammers, April 1, 1941, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frames 56-
58 and 64-66.  
21 “Guthoff“ to Hans Heinrich Lammers, May 31, 1941, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, 
R 43-II/947a, frames 99-100. 
22 Correspondences wtihin DAWI, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/12. 
23 Franz Alfred Six to Hans Heinrich Lammers, March 16, 1942 and “Jahresbericht des 
DAWI, 1940/1941,“  Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frames 100 and 125-173.  
It is likely that, by the end of the war, there existed more than twenty-two sub-departments.  But a 
document from 1941 listed twenty-two sub-departments at the time.  They were: Foreign Policy 
and Research; Military Science Abroad; Foreign Economics Research; Over-see History and 
Colonial Politics; Geography and Geopolitics; Racial Research and Racial Groupings; 
Foundations of Law in Foreign Policy; Great Britain; USA; France; Italy, Spain and Spanish 
America; Scandinavia; Central-Eastern Europe; Southeast Europe; Soviet Union; Turkey; Arabia; 
Iran; Japan; Southeast Asia; Africa.  See Franz Alfred Six, report on DAWI, 1941, Bundesarchiv 
in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/6028. 
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academic conference on January 31st, 1940.24 Finally, the vice President of 
DAWI, Karl Heinz Pfeffer frequently published in Wirsing’s domestic intellectual 
journal “Das XX Jahrhundert,” and several other scholars were likewise 
published both by DAWI and by Wirsing.25  Both of DAWI’s above connections 
– to the Foreign Office and to Wirsing’s network – can be further highlighted with 
a discussion of the “Foreigner Course,” one of DAWI’s most important 
propaganda arrangements. 
Axel Seeberg and the Foreigner Course 
 From 1940 until 1945 DAWI organized and conducted a yearly fourteen-
day conference in conjunction with the Foreign Office which invited hundreds of 
non-German politicians, leading journalists, and intellectuals from across Nazi-
occupied Europe and financed their travel to Germany for scheduled lectures, 
workshops, and cultural entertainment programs.  This yearly conference, called 
the “Ausländerkursus,” or “Foreigner Course,” was one of DAWI’s most 
publicized and prestigious activities; in fact, Six was regularly asked by the Reich 
Chancellery to report on the Foreigner Course in his yearly appeals for continuing 
DAWI’s budget.26  The Foreigner Course was coordinated by a young intellectual 
 
24 Franz Alfred Six to Hans Heinrich Lammers, March 16, 1942 and “Jahresbericht des 
DAWI, 1940/1941,“  Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frames 100 and 125-173. 
25 Other scholars who published – and/or gave speeches - for both DAWI and Wirsing were 
Horst Michel, Willy Beer, and Wolfgang Höpker.  See correspondences wtihin DAWI, 
Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/12, 1579, 11552, and 7190.  
26 Franz Alfred Six to Hans Heinrich Lammers, March 16, 1942 and “Jahresbericht des 
DAWI, 1940/1941,“  Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frames 100 and 125-173. 
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named Axel Seeberg.  Seeberg was born in 1904 to a wealthy nationalist, 
Protestant family and was too young to fight in the First World War but old 
enough to experience the postwar settlement as a national shame.  As a young 
man he was actively involved in youth organizations such as the Bündische 
Jugend.  There is no available information about his education background or his 
relationship to the Nazi Party, but during the 1930s he lectured at Goebbels’s 
Nazified Berliner Hochschule für Politik, the predecessor to DAWI.27  In 1939 he 
began publishing for DAWI’s academic periodical ZfP, and according to his 
postwar testimonials around the same he also began work as a “research assistant” 
in an unidentified department of the Foreign Office.28  At the end of 1940 Seeberg 
expanded his propaganda activities when the Wehrmacht awarded him the chief 
editor position of the Foreign Office’s periodical for English-speaking POWs, 
“The Camp,” a position he kept until the end of the war.29  Contrary to Seeberg’s 
 
27 Despite his large presence in postwar West German journalism, there is practically no 
scholarship on Seeberg.  The above biographical information was drawn from a 1986 obituary by 
the German journalist Günther Mack in Die Zeit.  See Günther Mack, “Ein kluger Skeptiker,” Die 
Zeit, issue 27/1986, 27 June, 1986. 
28 Seeberg’s postwar testimonials in personal document collections for Hans Lilje and Erich 
Ruppel, Seeberg’s postwar colleagues, Hannover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L 3/II, Nr. 51-55; L 
3/III, Nr. 250; and N 60/170.   “Bericht über Holiday Camps für englische Kriegsgefangene in 
Deutschland,“ September 19, 1946, Hannover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/II, Nr. 52. 
29 The Foreign Office records for “The Camp” project are extremely fragmentary, and mostly 
consist of letters to the editor (Seeberg) between 1941-1943.  See “Betreuung englischer 
Kriegsgefangener,” 1942, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 
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claims after the war, “The Camp” was, in fact very ideological and National 
Socialist.  In fact, “The Camp” appears to have essentially been an attempt by 
Seeberg to convince British POWs of the futility in fighting against the New 
Order of Europe as well as the Jewish conspiracy forcing the British into the 
inadvisable defense of the older order.30  In fact, after the war Seeberg revealed: 
“[in ‘The Camp’] I increasingly advocated the idea of more active European 
cooperation.  Accordingly, I repeatedly warned of the danger of Russian 
domination of Europe.“31  In 1943 Seeberg extended this work and enlarged his 
cooperation with the Foreign Office when Paul Karl Schmidt hired him to 
organize and administer the “Holiday Camp,” a four-week propaganda resort for 
captured British officers.32 
 
702/R 67646. However, Seeberg also discussed this work in his postwar testimonials and revealed 
that he worked this project from 1940 until the end of the war.  See Seeberg’s postwar testimonials 
in personal document collections for Hans Lilje and Erich Ruppel, Seeberg’s postwar colleagues, 
Hannover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L 3/III, Nr. 250; and N60/170.   “Bericht über Holiday 
Camps für englische Kriegsgefangene in Deutschland,“ September 19, 1946, Hannover 
Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/II, Nr. 52.  
30 “Betreuung englischer Kriegsgefangener,” 1942, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 
Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 702/R 67646.   “Chef des OKW im Auftrage v. Wedel, Oberst d.G. 
Abteilungschef“ to all POW-camps, titled “Richtlinien für die Betreuerarbeit Nr. 9,“ April 7, 1942. 
31 Seeberg’s postwar testimonials in personal document collections for Hans Lilje and Erich 
Ruppel, Seeberg’s postwar colleagues, Hannover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L 3/II, Nr. 51-55; L 
3/III, Nr. 250; and N 60/170.   “Bericht über Holiday Camps für englische Kriegsgefangene in 




In 1940 Seeberg received an additional project in DAWI; namely, 
organizing and administering six different Foreigner Courses over the years 1940-
1945 to which over 1,000 prestigious guests from across Europe were invited.  
The following table outlines the six courses.  A list of high profile speakers as 
well as some of the highlighted non-German invitees can be found in Appendices 
B and C at the conclusion of this chapter. 
Table: Foreigner Courses, 1940-194533 
 Where When Title Guest count 
Foreigner 
Course #1 
Berlin March 17-30, 1940 „Germany at 
War“ 








Berlin June 1-18, 1941 “For a New 
Europe“ 




Berlin November 5-19, 1942 „Questions for 





December 4, 1943 
“Foundations of, 











33 The above information was drawn from review articles in Zeitschrift für Politik, as well as 
Franz Alfred Six’s budget requests sent to the Party Chancellery.  See Axel Seeberg, “Fragen der 
neuen Ordnung,” Zeitschrift für Politik, December issue, 1942.  Axel Seeberg, “Grundlagen und 
Aufgaben europäischer Zusammenarbeit,” Zeitschrift für Politik, January/February issue, 1944.  
Axel Seeberg, “Europa in der Entscheidung,” Zeitschrift für Politik, January/February/March 
issue, 1945.   Franz Alfred Six to Hans Heinrich Lammers, March 16, 1942 and “Jahresbericht des 
DAWI, 1940/1941,“  Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frames 100 and 125-173. 
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In order to put together the Foreigner Courses Seeberg worked closely with the 
Foreign Office, which supplied the “foreigners” through its contacts in the 
diplomatic missions.34  Additionally, leading personalities in the Foreign Office, 
such as Paul Karl Schmidt, regularly gave presentations at the Foreigner 
Courses.35  By 1941 the Foreigner Course was a DAWI/Foreign Office joint 
project, which, according to their requests for funding, were directed with the sole 
purpose of advancing the Europe-concept in European intellectual circles.36  
Indeed, the third Foreigner Course, held just before the Nazi invasion of the 
USSR in June, 1941, was titled “For a New Europe.“  Reporting on the event in 
ZfP, Axel Seeberg described the proceedings with a blurb: 
Presentations were held about the historical preconditions for the current 
evolution of the European continent, about the nations in the New Order 
of Europe, about the concept of sovereignty, about the stages of National 
Socialist foreign policy in its struggle for the New Order of Europe, about 
the future of German trade and the new politics for European trade, about 
the issue of a planned European economy for heavy industries, about the 
Axis as a foundation for European politics, about the economic 
cooperation of nations, about the meaning of farming for European 
culture, about the way to acquaint the European nations, and about the 
 
34 Franz Alfred Six to Hans Heinrich Lammers, May 17, 1941, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-
Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frames 95-96.   Franz Alfred Six to Hans Heinrich Lammers, March 
16, 1942, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frame 100. 
35 Paul Karl Schmidt, speech at the “Reichsinstitut für Aussenpolitik“ at Strickelplatz 6, 
Berlin, titled “Der Weg der Aussenpolitik des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands zum neuen 
Europa,“ June 10, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany RZ 247/R  
27893. 
36 Franz Alfred Six to Hans Heinrich Lammers, April 1, 1941, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-
Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frames 64-66. 
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consequences of developments in modern war-technology for European 
politics. 
 
It is important to point out that, at this early stage in the war, DAWI largely 
presented the Europe-concept through the lens of nationalism.  Much like 
historian Benjamin Martin’s model of “inter-nationalism” for describing fascist 
concepts of Europe, the early Foreigner Courses presented the new Europe as a 
collection of different, segregated nations rather than a new, united nation.37  
Take, for example, Seeberg’s final point in the above article: “We will present the 
national histories of each individual nation next to one another; by learning about 
other nations through the study of their respective histories and through repeated 
travel abroad one will be able to strengthen, not weaken, his own patriotism.”38 
 Already by the time of the Foreigner Course in 1942, however, DAWI had 
integrated the direction of the Foreign Office.  The entire conference, for 
example, revolved around the Grossraum-concept, which presenters argued was 
geological and historical evidence of not only inherently connected economies but 
also evidence of a common cultural heritage.  In fact, according to another review 
article by Seeberg in ZfP about the 1942 Foreigner Course, the notion of a shared 
“occidental” heritage was the key missing piece in the “Jewish” pan-European 
movement of the inter-war period.39  And by the time of the Foreigner Course in 
 
37 Benjamin George Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
38 Axel Seeberg, “Der Suppenlöffel,” Zeitschrift für Politik, August issue, 1941, 514-516. 




1943, “inter-nationalism” had given way to European nationalism.  The 
conference, titled “Foundations of, and Tasks for, European Cooperation,” 
revolved around the question of “European consciousness,” by which the 
presenters meant a shared European identity.  Seeberg’s summary of this 
conference began with a long discussion of Hegelianism.  While Hegel was 
correct to identify inexorable trends underneath the historical surface, Seeberg 
argued, he failed to see how “consciousness” can be the driver of historical 
changes.  In other words, Europeans must choose to enact the European 
revolution by committing themselves to it spiritually.  Political science, he argued, 
“will not be able to address the task of facilitating European cooperation until it 
accomplished a reconstruction of consciousness among the European peoples.”  
This meant moving beyond “diversity” (Vielfalt) and emphasizing  
commonality, the mutual influence upon one another based on their racial 
cohesion, based on their linguistic affinity, based on their common history, 
and based on their jointly interconnected Raum.  The task, then, is to 
maintain peculiarities, but also to avoid the danger that these peculiarities 
are exaggerated and hence become destructive. 
 
Seeberg even used the term “European nationalism”: 
   
A European consciousness always existed in the history of Europe when 
the European [das Europäische] was highlighted against outer-European 
formations  [das Ausseneuropäische Großgebilde].  When this contrast 
was absent, such as after the end of the wars against the Turks, then this 
consciousness withdrew behind an exaggeration of national individuality.  
In the present a European nationalism must be developed as a 
consequence of yet another conflict with outer-European formations.  This 
means acknowledging that a single Volk only exists inasmuch as others 
exist.  Each must learn to see itself as part of a larger whole.40 
 
 
40 Axel Seeberg, “Grundlagen und Aufgaben europäischer Zusammenarbeit,” Zeitschrift für 
Politik, January/February issue, 1944, 61-65. 
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At a similar pace as the transition towards European nationalism, racial doctrine 
gradually declined from the Foreigner Courses.  This was likely a result of the 
increasing European diversity invited to the conferences, itself a consequence of 
the increasingly dire war circumstances.  Despite the public image of a non-racial 
Europe no longer defined by exclusive Germanic membership, however, many 
members of DAWI remained committed to these exclusionary interpretations of 
Europe but only felt able to express them in private circumstances.  One such 
private atmosphere was the “Europe-Seminar.” 
The Europe-Seminar 
 From January 18th, 1944 to March 16th, 1945 DAWI held roughly two 
dozen secret workshops (roughly every other week) composed of leading 
academics of the Europe-concept, important figures in the Foreign Office, and 
leading figures across several different Nazi bureaucracies.  The minutes for 
roughly half of the workshops of this “Europe-Seminar” were surprisingly 
preserved despite the Europe-Seminar having taken place near the end of the war, 
and despite orders to have the documents destroyed.41  A list of Europe-Seminar 
attending personalities and their respective positions in the Third Reich can be 
 
41 Unlike much of the documentary material for the Foreign Office, a few folders of 
documents for DAWI covering the last years of the war have been preserved.  Accompanying the 
documents is an original twenty-page note written by the anonymous person who found the 
documents, and who had ostensibly heard about DAWI’s Europe-Seminar (discussed below).  The 
anonymous finder allegedly retrieved the documents from a bombed out building at Unter den 
Eichen 115 in Berlin-Lichterfelde in the final weeks of the war despite standing orders that the 
documents not be preserved. See Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1. 
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found in Appendix D below.  In 1943, DAWI was officially incorporated into the 
Foreign Office’s Cultural-Politics Department and Franz Alfred Six was made 
director of the entire department.  Consequently, Karl Heinz Pfeffer, a frequent 
contributor in Wirsing’s Das XX Jahrhundert, was made acting director of 
DAWI.  In October, 1943 he was approached by one of DAWI’s Europe-
specialists, Gerhard von Mende, with the request to convene private meetings in 
which scholars could discuss different ideas of Europe in secrecy.  Each 
workshop was composed of eight to twelve participants, some of whom attended 
regularly but most of whom attended sporadically.  In total, sixty-nine different 
academics and seven Foreign Office personnel attended the Europe-Seminar at 
one point or another.42 Pfeffer himself, acting in his function as acting director of 
DAWI, was in charge of the Europe-Seminar.  When Pfeffer was not in 
attendance, then it was Seeberg who presided over the workshop.43  The Europe-
Seminar is a valuable source for understanding the dilemma of Nazi Europeanism.  
As will be illustrated, leading intellectuals of the Nazi Europe-concept were 
unable to resolve key paradoxes at the heart of Nazi Europeanism even when they 
made genuine attempts to address them. 
 
42 Ibid. 
43 Seeberg’s heightened role in the Europe-Seminar is in large part due to the connection 
between the Europe-Seminar and the Foreigner Courses.  In the very first workshop of the Europe-
Seminar Pfeffer announced that the Foreigner Courses had increased the appetite of many for a 
more audacious explication of the New Europe.  See “Protokoll: 1. Besprechung des ‘Europa-
Ausschusses‘,“ January 18, 1944, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1. 
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 The participants in the Europe-Seminar were very open about the purpose 
of the workshop; namely, to create a space for privately discussing the 
inconsistencies and lack of specifics vis-à-vis the New Order of Europe in such a 
manner not otherwise possible in official propaganda.  This in turn, would lead to 
a codification of the Europe-concept and plans for a postwar New Order.  In the 
first workshop of the Europe-Seminar Seeberg was invited to open the meeting, 
and he took the opportunity to explain that the largest barrier hindering the 
Europe-concept was the inability of propagandists to put forward concrete 
postwar propositions and that no  “codification” had been established across the 
Reich, thus leading to contradictions.  The rest of the meeting consisted of various 
attempts to answer which specific contradictions were most pressing and needed 
addressing.  The two most agreed-upon issues were the issue of race as well as the 
future political sovereignty of non-Germans.44  As a result, subsequent workshops 
primarily revolved around these two issues. 
 Sovereignty and state-hood of non-German peoples was the first issue 
taken up by the Europe-Seminar.  On February 3rd, 1944, Professor Gerhard von 
Mende gave the key-note presentation and argued in favor of an open espousal of 
federalism.  According to the minutes, a key failure in German Eastern policy, he 
argued, was the elimination of “national administrative capacities” and the 
elimination of any self-control for Eastern populations, instead subjecting them to 
“secret administration,” a euphemism for the genocidal imperialism of Nazi 





the following: will we have representation in the New Europe?  Will there be a 
general assembly for Europe?  Will the small states and peoples be allowed, in at 
least some capacity, to participate in it?”45  It is unclear how the workshop 
responded to his arguments, but it appears that they were favorable.  Because in 
the next workshop, on February 17th, the Europe-Seminar enthusiastically 
discussed “federalism” as an answer to von Mende’s concern.  Led by Karl Heinz 
Pfeffer, the Europe-Seminar advanced various arguments about how a future 
federal Europe could be composed.  Even the smallest of peoples, they argued, 
should be guaranteed some kind of representation.  The minutes do not make clear 
how they proposed to resolve the obvious paradox of Nazi dictatorship with self-
determination for small and scattered populations throughout Europe.  They do 
suggest, however, that the participants discussed precisely these questions.  One 
of the discussions was titled “The role of small nations and the difference in the 
treatment of individual nations according to size, whether large, medium, or small 
nations.”  A few other discussions suggested that culture was an avenue for 
resolving impractical claims to political liberty.  For example, one discussion was 
titled: “The meaning and utility of cultural-politics in replacement of political 
responsibilities.”  Another discussion revolved around copying Soviet practices of 
guaranteeing language rights to minority populations.  Yet another conversation 
suggested mobilizing prejudice against Jews.  This conversation was titled “The 
 
45 “Protokoll der 2. Besprechung des Europa-Ausschusses,“ February 3, 1944, Bundesarchiv 
in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1.  
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fundamental different nature [Andersartigkeit] of the Jews (parasites, not a 
nation).”46 
 While the Europe-Seminar participants generally agreed that federalism 
was the path forward for the New Europe, there is evidence that they quickly 
came to disagreements over how to apply it.  According to the minutes for the 
May 18th, 1944 workshop, for example, the participants of the Europe-Seminar 
were unable to come to agreement on whether or not the new “social state” of the 
Nazi revolution, with its accompanying economic redistributive elements, should 
be administered at the federal level or at the constituent state level.  For some 
participants, if the New Europe was to resemble a unified economic Grossraum, 
then such economic integration must also include an integration of social policies 
as well.  The participants also sparred over whether or not constituent members 
could enter into closer relations with some members than they had with the rest of 
the members of the European federation.  Another conversation haggled over how 
to overcome religious divides, especially when some religions on the peripheries 
of the European federation would invite intermingling from large powers of a 
“foreign Raum.”47  
All of these differences came to a head in June, 1944, when the Europe-
Seminar participants unsuccessfully attempted to bring together their various 
ideas for European federalism into a book for publication.  The book was to be 
 
46 “Protokoll der 3. Besprechugn des Europa-Ausschusses,“ February 17, 1944, Bundesarchiv 
in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1. 
47 “Arbeitssitzung,“ May 18, 1944, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1. 
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separated into two parts, which were outlined in a Europe-Seminar workshop on 
June 15th, 1944.  Part one consisted of six chapters, each one illustrating a 
historical example of federalism, with a final chapter on the Holy Roman Empire 
as a kind of predecessor federalism to Europe’s emerging new-age federalism.  
Part two consisted of three chapters on the political, economic, and cultural 
composition of the upcoming postwar European federation.  But by the end of the 
workshop, according to the notes, Axel Seeberg, who presided over the workshop, 
declared: “It is unlikely that this work, in this form, will achieve its goal of 
reaching a new doctrine for federalism.”  According to the minutes, the 
participants agreed to try and publish Part one, about which there was no 
controversy, and then move beyond the attempt to come up with a “systematic” or 
“doctrinal treatment” of federalism.48  In addition to disagreements, there is a 
second reason why the participants of the Europe-Seminar chose not to publish 
their arguments; namely, fear of political retribution for having pursued 
unorthodox ideas.  Four days after the workshop which had been intended for 
outlining the book on federalism, acting DAWI director Karl Heinz Pfeffer 
received a letter from Dr. Herbert Scurla begging him to forego publishing 
material from the Europe-Seminar unless all participants were aware of the “exact 
limitations regarding who would receive” the material.  Scurla implored Pfeffer to 
remember that “suggestions or provisions concerning plans for Europe are 
unwelcome” in many circles, and many academics in the Europe-Seminar would 
 
48 “Protokoll der Arbeitssitzung des Europa-Ausschusses,“ June 15, 1944, Bundesarchiv in 
Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1. 
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prefer to avoid the perception that they are telling politicians how to structure the 
New European Order.49  As a result, at the next workshop on June 29th, 1944, 
Pfeffer opened the workshop declaring that, although federalism was the 
“solution,” it would nevertheless remain an intellectual work-in-progress.  
However, it would be tabled for the moment.  Instead, the Europe-Seminar moved 
on to an even more divisive issue: the concept of race. 
After Pfeffer’s opening remarks about tentatively moving beyond the topic 
of federalism, the floor was given to a certain Professor Frankenberg associated 
with DAWI.  Frankenberg’s presentation, titled “The Greater Germanic Concept 
and the Europe Concept” surveyed the history of the Greater Germanic Concept 
going back to Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, Ernst Moritz Arndt, and the Brothers 
Grimm.  He proceeded to trace it through the development of racial science and 
then argued that its ultimate fruition was the Waffen-SS.  For Frankenberg, the 
Germanic concept was at the core of National Socialism, but very difficult to 
square with a New Order of Europe which many thinkers extended beyond the 
Nordic lands.  He finished with three questions which were subsequently 
discussed, but for which there are unfortunately no records: “1) Can we give 
people on the outside an answer to the question about the relationship between the 
Greater Germanic concept to the Europe concept? 2) What is this answer? 3) 
 




Does the Greater Germanic Order not actually stand in conflict with Europe?”50  
The very next workshop, on July 13th, 1944, continued the discussion of these 
questions and the minutes reveal that divisions ensued.  “Mr. [Axel] Seeberg,” the 
minutes explained,  
takes the most extreme position in this ongoing discussion; namely, that 
all propaganda, publications, and official treatment should only carve out 
the objective of a homogenous [einheitlich] Europe and therefore all 
things about ‘Germanic’ or ‘Greater Germanic’ should be absolutely 
silenced. 
 
On the other side of the debate was a certain Dr. Bran from the Foreign Office 
who represented the most stringent pro-Germanic opinion, arguing that the 
Germanics were the most important people to be “activated for the New Europe” 
and because “the German claim to leadership can only be founded upon its 
belonging to the Germanic race.” Still others, such as Frankenberg, tried to take a 
middle ground, arguing that the Germanic concept could be expanded to 
incorporate more of Europe than previously considered (as illustrated in a 
separate chapter of this dissertation, this is precisely how the Germanic concept 
eventually functioned within the Waffen-SS).  Still others agreed with Bran that 
racial doctrine necessitated a strict commitment to Germanic supremacism.51 
But Seeberg’s was not a lone voice.  Some Europe-Seminar participants, 
such as Herbert Scurla, sided with Seeberg, arguing that the German claim to 
 
50 “Protokoll der Arbeitsbesprechung des Europa-Ausschusses,“ June 29, 1944, Bundesarchiv 
in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1. 
51 “Internes Protokoll der Besprechung des Europa-Ausschusses,“ July 13, 1944, 
Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1. 
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leadership could actually be justified based on the principle of disproportionate 
sacrifice (in other words, all peoples who fight on the Eastern Front would and 
should belong).52  In fact, at an earlier workshop about federalism Scurla and 
fellow DAWI Professor Wilhelm Grewe (a former colleague of Giselher 
Wirsing’s)53 had gone even further, arguing that the entire “Volk concept” needed 
revision if European federalism was to succeed.  According to the minutes, they 
argued: 
We need a new clarification of the ‘Volk concept’. In the nineteenth 
century there emerged a movement which rejected the hitherto tradition of 
political subservience [monarchical absolutism].  Under French influence 
it was called the philosophy of nationalities and under German influence it 
was called the philosophy of the independent Volk.  Both of these trends 
strengthened opposition to the [Holy Roman] empire.  Both the French 
nationality concept as well as the romantic concepts of Volk – whether or 
not they were good or bad is unimportant – now need to be overcome if 
there is going emerge a genuine Order on the continent which otherwise 
could only ever be a hierarchy.  ‘Overcoming nationalism’ - this 
overcoming can proceed only in the Hegelian sense of a fruitful synthesis.  
So Professor Scurla suggested that a new nationalism could build upon the 
Volk doctrine in German Romanticism.54 
 
It is not clear how Scurla envisioned a European nationalism which could be 
connected to the German Romantic tradition, but based on Nazi Europeanism 
elsewhere he was likely channeling the concept of a völkisch Europe.  In any 
 
52 Ibid. 
53 Grewe and Wirsing worked in the same office of the Information Department of the 
Foreign Office in 1941.  Wirsing confirms this in “Wirsing, Giselher, Prosa, Bericht über meine 
Beziehungen zu Dr. Adam von Trott zu Solz,“ in “Briefwechsel Müller-Plantenberg, Clarita, 
Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1969,“ A:Diederichs/Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Deutsches 
Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.   
54 “Arbeitssitzung,“ May 18, 1944, Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1.  
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case, here was a Foreign Office academic dismissing the entire tradition of 
nationalism.  
 The Europe-Seminar, then, collected a surprisingly diverse and even 
discordant group of thinkers who were unable to agree on the some of the most 
fundamental components of the Europe-concept.  The Europe-Seminar was a 
failure.  Originally conceived as a workshop for refining the Europe-concept into 
something more codified, already by November, 1944 it had become clear that 
this was not going to be achieved.  In fact, Franz Alfred Six began attending the 
workshops himself at the end of 1944, and used his authority as director of DAWI 
and the Cultural-Politics Department of the Foreign Office to curtail the ambitions 
of those Europe-Seminar participants, such as Seeberg and Scurla, who were still 
pushing for a “European Manifesto” to counter the Atlantic Charter.  The 
European Manifesto, Six demurred, would disable them from propagating and 
tailoring the Europe-concept to individual lands and peoples, which, of course, 
was code for hiding contradictions otherwise potentially exposed.55  Tensions 
over Six’s decision to diminish the purpose of the Europe-Seminar came to a head 
at the workshop in late December, 1944 (a rather large workshop with twenty-
nine total participants).  The workshop began with Pfeffer and Seeberg signaling 
his subservience to Six (who was present).  Pfeffer and Seeberg, the presiding 
authorities over the Europe-Seminar, explained that the seminar’s purpose should 
remain “scholarly” and avoid “politics.”  Yet a few more brave participants such 
 
55 “Protokoll: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europa-Ausschusses,“ November 23, 1944, Bundesarchiv 
in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1. 
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as Scurla and a member of the Ministry for Science, Education, and Culture, 
Albert Holfelder, were allowed to voice disagreement.  They argued that 
Germany’s plans for a New Europe suffered from lack of “trustworthiness” 
resulting from a failure to codify a program.  They agreed to discontinue the 
“European Manifesto,” but insisted that the Europe-Seminar be allowed to 
continue to pursue an “internal codification” with “clear and binding German 
positions.”  But following Scurla and Holfelder’s remarks, Six once again 
pumped the brakes, and ordered the Europe-Seminar to disband such designs and 
instead focus on how to help advance German propaganda rather than focus on 
such hopeless “theoreticals.”  Nevertheless, some participants were dissatisfied.  
In order to express their disagreement, Scurla pressed Six on the “primary 
decision which needs to be made”; namely, whether or not they could “confirm 
nationalism and the continuation of the völkisch principle as desired in National 
Socialism.”  Another DAWI academic came to Scurla’s defense, arguing that the 
völkisch principle “necessarily leads to the dissolution of Europe” and 
“emphasizes dividing lines without fostering commonality.”  “We cannot escape 
the need to develop National Socialism into a universal idea,” he continued, 
because otherwise “our cultural politics is built on sand.”  Six, clearly frustrated, 
responded that his opponents, by flirting with universalism, were placing 
themselves on the philosophical side of the enemy.  They should replace their 
desire to find the “universal” in National Socialism, he rebuked, with a 
satisfaction with the “continental.”  The “principle of the continent” (das 
Kontinentale), he explained, solved the dilemma of finding European 
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commonality without bowing to universalism.  Six then proceeded to definitively 
forbid “codification” and ended the workshop.56 
 The Europe-Seminar’s inability to accomplish its intended purpose likely 
contributed to its gradual dissolution over the course of the first few months in 
1945.  Interestingly, though, it continued to meet for scholarly discussions on a 
wide variety of topics, including: “the meaning of the French Revolution,” 
“Russia in Europe,” “the meaning of Socialism.”  They also continued to discuss 
various topics left unresolved by the discussions of the previous year, including: 
“modern nationalism,” “the relationship of the Germanic-concept to the Europe-
concept,” and the “biological commonality of the European peoples.”57  The 
Europe-concept, then, did not require “codification” in order to continue to 
capture the minds of Nazi functionaries in DAWI.  This is a metaphor for Nazi 
Europeanism as such, which continued to be propagated throughout the Second 
World War despite competing and contradictory definitions.  The final section of 
this chapter will present one of the Foreign Office’s most far-flung Europe-
propaganda projects which likewise continued to propagate the Nazi Europeanism 
 
56 “Protokoll: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europa-Ausschusses,“ December 18, 1944, Bundesarchiv 
in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1. 
57 It is not clear whether or not the Europe-Seminar ended on March 16th, 1945, the date for 
which the last workshop documents exist.  The protocols for the March 16th workshop suggest, for 
example, that the above themes and topics were discussed in subsequent workshops (for which 
there is no documentary evidence).  See “Europa-Seminar: Besprechung,“ March 16, 1945, 
Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4902/1. 
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in the last months of the war; in fact, it continued to advance the Europe-concept 
even after the war had ended. 
Klaus Mehnert and the XX Century in Shanghai 
 From 1941 to 1945 the Foreign Office funded a propaganda campaign 
based in Shanghai with a multi-faceted mission: a) instill National Socialism 
among the thousands of Germans living in the Far East; b) intensify relations with 
the Japanese; and c) reach English-speaking readers in the Western hemisphere.58  
The last of these tasks was led by Klaus Mehnert, who would become one of 
postwar West Germany’s most prolific publicists.  Despite having published 
multiple best-sellers and having edited the most highly read weekly newspaper in 
West Germany after the Second World War, hardly any scholars have closely 
investigated Klaus Mehnert’s illustrious postwar career.59  And even less explored 
is his role as a Nazi propagandist before 1945.60  Indeed, although after the war he 
became a leading advocate of close German-American relations, a staunch 
defender of NATO, and a self-described “Atlanticist” – his history before 1945 
reveals a man deeply implicated in National Socialism, antisemitism, and Nazi 
propaganda activities.  Mehnert’s life trajectory was quite remarkable, stretching 
across the entire globe: he was born in Tsarist Russia, he was raised in Weimar 
 
58 Astrid Freyeisen, Schanghai und die Politik des Dritten Reiches (Würzburg: Königshausen 
und Neumann, 2000). 
59 A notable exception is Otto Köhler who discusses Mehnert in a short chapter.  See Otto 
Köhler, Wir Schreibmaschinentäter: Journalisten unter Hitler – und danach (Cologne: Paul-
Rugenstein, 1989). 
60 A notable exception is Astrid Freyeisen’s Schanghai und die Politik des Dritten Reiches. 
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Germany, he corresponded for Nazi newspapers in the Soviet Union, he lectured 
at American Universities before the war (and married an American), and he 
ultimately lived in Shanghai during the war on appointment by the Foreign 
Office.  It is not without good reason that he titled his 1981 memoirs “A German 
in the World.”61  It was in Shanghai where Mehnert came to fulfil his primary 
function in the Nazi propaganda apparatus.  There, he edited the Foreign Office’s 
largest propaganda venture in Asia: a monthly periodical called “The XX 
Century.”  This section sets out to trace Mehnert’s life before 1945, substantiate 
his connections to the Nazi movement, examine his conversion to the Europe-
concept, and illustrate the far-reaching impact of Nazi Europeanist networks in 
the Second World War.  Additionally, it aims to further demonstrate the 
integration of Wirsing’s propaganda network and the Foreign Office.   
The sources employed in this section are drawn primarily from the state 
archive of Baden-Württemberg in Stuttgart, where Mehnert had his extensive 
personal document collection archived upon his death in 1984.  The thousands of 
documents in his personal document collection largely revolve around his 
illustrious postwar career.  Probably in part due to the checkered nature of his pre-
1945 history, Mehnert appears to have been less generous in terms of submitting 
pre-war and war-time documents.  Nevertheless, a good amount of 
correspondences before 1945 do exist.  Most importantly, Mehnert wrote a 115-
page autobiography in September, 1945 just months after the Second World War 
 




ended.62  This is a particularly valuable source, and not only because of the 
chronological proximity to the war.  As Mehnert sets out at the beginning of the 
document (which was accompanied with a note strictly forbidding its circulation 
or publication), the autobiography was intended as a private, personal rumination 
on National Socialism through the lens of his life biography – in short, a kind of 
extended diary entry.  The document, titled “personal declaration,” was a genuine 
attempt at coming to terms with National Socialism and his role in it.  He openly 
admitted and accepted the moral catastrophe and culpability of the Nazi 
phenomenon.  That is not to say that the document is devoid of apologia.  To the 
contrary, Mehnert repeatedly oscillates between, on the one hand acknowledging 
his seduction to National Socialism, but on the other hand denying his full 
commitment to it.  In fact, a repeated argument throughout the autobiography is 
that Mehnert, unlike most Germans, maintained intellectual and emotional 
distance to the regime and its accompanying precepts.  One of his primary 
arguments thread throughout the document, for example, is that although he was 
raised in a nationalist milieu, and although he was briefly taken in by the 
nationalist fervor of the Nazi movement - he eventually broke from nationalism in 
favor of the “Europe-concept,” a term he, like other Nazi Europeanists, explicitly 
employed.   
In the end, Mehnert was very candid in this document, even to the point of 
admitting to embarrassing and incriminating episodes from his past as if he were 
 
62 Klaus Mehnert, “Selbsterklärung (nicht zur Veröffentlichung),“ September, 1945, 
Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 288.  
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asking for forgiveness from a religious figure.  Obsessively tortured by the need 
to come clean and thereby exonerate himself, Mehnert’s writing in the 
autobiography displays a repeated pattern of contradiction wherein he would deny 
his complicity in a given evil of the Nazi regime only to immediately thereafter 
recall examples of his partial complicity which he would subsequently summarize 
and attempt to minimize.  Unwittingly, then, the autobiography exposes 
Mehnert’s relationship to National Socialism and is therefore a useful source for 
interrogating his intellectual trajectory. 
Mehnert’s Early Life and Attraction to National Socialism 
 Klaus Mehnert was born in 1906 in Moscow to a social milieu he 
described as “Moscow-Germans,” a collection of upper-middle class military and 
business families who spoke German, and the majority of which had recently 
emigrated from imperial Germany.  His father, an engineer, was a reserve officer 
in the German army, and raised Mehnert to be a patriotic German abroad.  On the 
other hand, Mehnert was always quick to point out, his mother was a 
“cosmopolitan” who transferred to him a deep interest for other languages and 
world cultures.63  “Already as a young student,” Mehnert bragged in his 1945 
autobiography, “I knew more about the world abroad and other nations than many 
Nazi leaders at the time of the take-over of power in 1933.”64  With the outbreak 
of the First World War in 1914, Mehnert and his family were forced to move back 
to Germany, where they moved close to family in Stuttgart.  His experiences as a 
 
63 Klaus Mehnert, “Selbsterklärung,“ ch.s “Familie“ and “Welt-Bürgertum.“ 
64 Klaus Mehnert, “Selbsterklärung,“ ch. “Welt-Bürgertum.“ 
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lower-middle class German student during and after the First World War turned 
him into a passionate nationalist.  According to Mehnert, this began with the 
death of his father on the Western Front in 1917.  He described in detail his 
father’s funeral and the way he coped with his father’s death by reading the 
trauma through the lens of national sacrifice and honor.65  This catalyzed an active 
involvement and investment in the war, or as he described it: “a willingness to 
sacrifice and a recognition of my responsibility.”  As a very young man, eleven 
years old, he organized a local humanitarian drive for Germans in the Balkans 
who wanted to immigrate to Stuttgart.  Germany’s defeat in 1918 was impossible 
for him to digest and he refused to do so.  He continued to hang a small picture of 
Wilhelm II. in his room well after the war and the dissolution of the German 
Empire.66  
In his 1981 memoirs Mehnert claimed that he supported the new Weimar 
Republic and its leaders in the Social Democratic Party, and that he never 
supported the Nazi Party.67  His 1945 autobiography tells a different story.  He 
opens his discussion of the 1920s with his first ever attendance at a Nazi rally in 
1925 in Hasenheide, where Hitler gave a speech.  After distancing himself from 
the “masses” who fell into naïve, spiritual ecstasy, he admits to having been 
captured by three themes which galvanized the rest of his young adulthood: 
nationalism, socialism, and the leadership-principle.  Picking up on the death of 
 
65 Klaus Mehnert, “Selbsterklärung,“ ch. “Familie.“ 
66 Klaus Mehnert, “Selbsterklärung,“ ch. “Nationalismus.“ 
67 Klaus Mehnert, Ein Deutscher in der Welt, 39-86. 
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his father, Mehnert describes the appeal of nationalism to the lower-middle class 
of Stuttgart in the 1920s.  In school he was taught that “love of Fatherland” was a 
“matter of course,” and to see an ideological conflict raging in the world between 
the “idealistic” philosophy of Germany and the “materialistic” philosophies of the 
West.  He recalled, for example, regularly wearing to school and on fieldtrips a 
black-white-red armband, the colors of imperial Germany, and in the 1920s a 
symbol of resentment against the new, Weimar democracy.68  He energetically 
participated in nationalist youth organizations such as the “Young Germany 
Federation” (Jungdeutschland-Bund), where he overcame his introverted nature 
and made his first close friends.  Together, they spent hours in extracurricular 
activities such as hiking and camping, all the while learning to “rebel against the 
spirit of the large cities, against the division of the Volk into classes, against the 
spiritual emptiness of modern civilization….” He recalled first getting into 
politics during his time in the youth organizations, where he and his friends would 
discuss the national slander of France’s occupation of the Rhine-lands.  He even 
remembered their attachment to the term “Reich.”  Most importantly, Mehnert 
admitted, his time during the youth organizations taught him the value of the 
“leadership-principle” (Führergedanke); namely, romantic associations of 
collective action with loyalty to a strong figure.  He could still remember the 
names of his group leaders: Zeller and Speidel.69 
 
68 Klaus Mehnert, “Selbsterklärung,“ ch.s “Familie“ and “Nationalismus.“ 
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At home, too, Mehnert was raised to hold German nationalism as sacred.  
Some of his family members were National Socialists, and even if his family did 
not often discuss the specifics of politics, they nevertheless regularly expressed 
anger at the sense of shame they associated with the postwar Versailles 
settlement.  One of his uncles in particular was an avid supporter of the Nazis and 
frequently shared Nazi propaganda brochures with Mehnert.  Mehnert makes no 
mention of any participation in the Social Democratic Party by himself or 
members of his family; in fact, he seems to indicate that those who did not 
support the Nazi Party supported the “German Nationalist People’s Party,” a 
right-wing party also opposed to the Weimar Republic, the majority members of 
which eventually switched allegiance to the Nazi Party.70  But the German 
Nationalist People’s Party did not attract Mehnert’s support, because their 
justified rejection of Weimar called for something equally as unappealing in 
Mehnert’s eyes: a restoration of the past.  Here, Mehnert was subtly revealing a 
transition in his nationalism.  His previous commitment to the German empire and 
Wilhelm II was being replaced by a desire for a nationalist alternative to both 
Weimar and imperial Germany.71  This was a key argument of both the 
Conservative Revolution and the Nazi Party.  Mehnert went on to discuss his 
affinity for reading historical literature, and mentioned by name his favorite 
author of the 1920s: the Conservative Revolutionary Oswald Spengler.  He even 
listed specific pages from his books which had been particularly important for 
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him.  Spengler’s arguments about a new, “Prussian” form of socialism, one 
amicable with nationalism, were especially important for Mehnert.  His family 
had left much of their belongings in Russia behind and Mehnert deeply resented 
his lower class status which was further aggravated by the Great Depression.  But 
he could not bring himself to turn to Social Democracy or any form of Marxism, 
which for him was but an empty “internationalism” and smacked too much of 
Weimar and Versailles.  He refused to abandon nationalism for the sake of 
socialism, but Spengler taught him that there was a possibility for combining the 
two.72 
Perhaps the most tortured, but also revealing, section of Mehnert’s 1945 
autobiography is his handling of antisemitism.  The fact that Mehnert wrote on 
antisemitism at great length suggests that he knew full well the centrality of 
antisemitism in National Socialism.  He began his long section on antisemitism by 
suggesting that the “Jewish problem” was neither important to him nor had it been 
present in his life.  Perhaps realizing the dishonesty in that statement, he 
immediately began to re-wind.  After discussing various uncles of his who had 
had quarrels with Jews, he proceeded to carefully expose his own prejudices and 
discriminatory behaviors towards Jews.  Some encounters were relatively 
innocuous, such as resenting a Jewish boy who stole a girlfriend of his.  Others 
were more harrowing.  In the mid-1920s, while in Berlin staying with relatives, he 
confessed to having joined his cousin on an adventure to Kurfürstendamm to 
“bother Jews,” where they proceeded to harass Jewish passer-bys with jokes and 
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small swastika emblems they had collected.  Mehnert promised that such youthful 
indiscretions did not mean an enthusiasm or even acceptance for the persecution 
of Jews.  In fact, in the late 1920s, when he moved to Berlin to complete a 
university education, he attested to good relationships with fellow Jewish students 
and even to having had a close relationship with a Jewish editor at the Neue 
Rundschau.  Yet, he then immediately followed up these assurances with an 
outburst of antisemitism: 
On the other hand, my attitude towards the large influence of Jews on the 
cultural life of Berlin was different.  I often went into the theater, or 
visited art exhibits, or read modern books and many newspapers, and I 
could not but regret the nearly monopolistic position of the Jewish element 
in these areas.  Because for me, this influence was in so many ways 
negative, destructive, and unhealthy.  And I had certain sympathy for the 
idea that the Jewish monopoly of cultural life in Berlin, and therefore of 
much of Germany in general, should be removed. 
 
Then, in a remarkable admission, Mehnert acknowledged the Holocaust: “…if 
somebody would have told me what Hitler was planning to do to the Jews, and 
what he actually did to them between the years 1933 and 1945, then I would have 
said it was not only insane but also a crime against the German people.”  But for 
Mehnert, even in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, the true crime was 
against Germans.  He continued: 
Because these methods necessarily convinced the entire, and considerable, 
power of the Jews throughout the world against Germany into revenging 
themselves.  That Hitler used antisemitism as a political tool in the years 
before 1933 is understandable given the emergency of the situation…. But 
after he had come to power in 1933 he did not need these methods 
anymore and he should have let off with the antisemitic campaign; instead, 
he should have attempted to break the Jewish power and de-tooth the 
dangerous [Jews] without making world Jewry the sworn enemy of 
Germany.  His colleague Stalin actually provided him with a masterful 
example.  He liquidated the Jewish problem in his own house during the 
great “purges” of 1936 to 1938 by having countless prominent Jews 
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disappear – including even the most prominent in the entire Soviet Union 
– without having to use the word “Jew” one single time, instead referring 
to them with completely general terms such as traitors, oppositional 
elements, saboteurs, etc…. 
 
The above lines are shocking.  Mehnert, who began his section on antisemitism 
with a denial of any prejudice, proceeded to express sympathy with Hitler’s 
conspiracy of world Jewry and faulted him for not more efficiently conducting 
genocide.  Mehnert finished his thoughts on antisemitism by suggesting that 
Western liberalism and Enlightenment were at fault for the disastrous Nazi 
policies towards the Jews, because the goal of assimilation was ultimately 
untenable.73 
Mehnert’s World Travels and Conflict with the Nazi Regime 
There is no evidence that Mehnert ever joined the Nazi Party (a fact 
Mehnert proudly repeated throughout the postwar years).  But as the above 
discussion illustrates, Mehnert was clearly, by his own strenuous admission, 
fiercely attracted to the Nazi movement while living in Weimar Germany as a 
young man.  But this was not the only side to Mehnert.  When he claimed that his 
mother instilled in him an appreciation of the world outside of Germany the 
evidence corroborates this claim.  After finishing his High-School degree (Abitur) 
in 1924, and after briefly enlisting in the German military, Mehnert decided to 
embark on an academic career in foreign studies.74  He was accepted as a graduate 
student by Otto Hoetzsch at the Hochschule für Politik (the predecessor of 
 
73 Klaus Mehnert, “Selbsterklärung,“ ch. “Welt-Bürgertum.“ 
74 Klaus Mehnert, Ein Deutscher in der Welt, 87-103. 
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DAWI) where he initially began an apologetic research project on the “German 
guilt question” and the First World War.  But he soon changed emphasis, 
ultimately defending a Ph.D. dissertation on the Russo-Japanese War in 1927.75  
Thus began Mehnert’s long career as a well-known expert on Russia and the 
Soviet Union.  But more importantly, this is when Mehnert began to spend his 
intellectual faculties on the world outside of German nationalism.  As a young 
high-school student his mother had encouraged him to accept various scholarships 
to study in different European countries, and after defending his dissertation he 
accepted his most ambitious study-abroad scholarship yet: a German Academic 
Exchange Service (DAAD) scholarship to study and teach at the University of 
California, Berkeley in 1928, where he met and married his American wife, Enid 
Keyes.76  In his 1945 autobiography Mehnert claimed that his experiences in the 
United States revealed to him the “narrowness of a patriotism which is exclusive 
and only focuses on one’s own Volk.”  He allegedly began to see his intellectual 
purpose as a “mediator between nations.”  Specifically, he claimed to have come 
to his Europe-concept in these years, saying that he came to realize that Europe, 
just like the German states of the nineteenth century, must begin to unify.  This 
was the “next necessary step” in the history of Europe.  These proclamations, of 
course, are compromised by his desire to distance himself from National 
Socialism in 1945.  But there may have also been a kernel of truth to his claim. 
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Upon returning to Germany in 1929, Mehnert claims to have become a 
member of Coudenhove-Calergi’s inter-war Pan-European movement.  In fact, he 
asserts that he briefly worked as a secretary to Christian Frederick Heerfordt, an 
influential Pan-Europeanist who wrote a book titled United States of Europe in 
1924.  Ultimately, though, Mehnert found the Pan-European movement’s 
attachment to the League of Nations and the Versailles settlement too distasteful 
and therefore discontinued his participation.77  Instead, he worked full-time for 
the DAAD in Berlin, coordinating further academic exchange between the United 
States and Germany.78 
 His intellectual conflict with nationalism can further be seen in the 
evolution of his Sovietology.  In 1932 Mehnert changed work yet again, and was 
employed by his former Ph.D. adviser as the secretary for the “German Society 
for the Study of Eastern Europe” (Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Studium 
Osteuropas), a Berlin-based academic association with connections in universities 
across Germany and with an accompanying publication called Osteuropa.  Here, 
Mehnert began his career as a Sovietologist.  Already by the end of 1932 Mehnert 
had published his first serious monograph on the Soviet Union, titled “Youth in 
Soviet Russia.”79  Mehnert developed an interpretation of the Soviet Union which 
was, for a German nationalist, noticeably sympathetic.  This put him into conflict 
with the Nazi regime after 1933, and Mehnert took great pride in his postwar 
 
77 Ibid. 
78 Klaus Mehnert, Ein Deutscher in der Welt, 175-210. 
79 Klaus Mehnert, Jugend in Sowjet-Russland (Berlin: Samuel Fischer, 1932). 
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writings for having been slandered, along with his former adviser, as a “Saloon-
Bolshevist.”  Although he was fond of describing his arguments as “neutral” and 
“objective,” there was, in fact, an ideological and political motivation behind his 
Sovietology.  As Mehnert himself admits in his 1945 autobiography, he had 
developed a disdain for capitalism in his youth and long sought after a workable 
socialism.  In line with this, his Sovietology repeatedly presented the Soviet 
Union as indeed “Jewish” and “internationalist,” but also a lesser evil than liberal 
democracy and thereby a legitimate, albeit misguided, attempt to overcome “New 
Deal capitalism.”  As he summarized in his 1945 autobiography, his arguments 
implored Germans to see Bolshevism as a “changing organism,” and therefore a 
system capable of healthy evolution.  Consequently, Mehnert often argued that 
Germans should seek better relations with the Soviet Union; after all, both states 
opposed the Western Versailles settlement.80 
When the Nazis came to power in 1933 Mehnert hoped that they would 
realize his vision for an amalgamation of nationalism and socialism.  Apparently 
disappointed in the results, Mehnert gravitated towards those affiliated with the 
Nazi movement who likewise desired a more socialist National Socialism.  This 
appears to have been the impetus for his integration into the Tat-Kreis, the 
Conservative Revolutionary intellectual circle first led by Hans Zehrer, but 
subsequently by Giselher Wirsing after the Nazi take-over of power in 1933.  As 
explained in chapter two of this dissertation, the Tat-Kreis was a gathering ground 
for more left-leaning Conservative Revolutionaries.  Mehnert, in his 1981 
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memoirs, recalled joining the Tat-Kreis roughly around the time of Hitler’s 
Machtergreifung.81  Mehnert’s first article appeared in Die Tat, the intellectual 
journal published by the Tat-Kreis, in October, 1933, in which he presented his 
interpretation of the Soviet Union.82 
 According to his 1945 autobiography, Mehnert had fostered contacts in 
the late 1920s with Reichswehr members similarly sympathetic to rapprochement 
with the Soviet Union.  This included friendships with Eugen Ott, Kurt von 
Hammerstein-Equord, and Kurt von Schleicher.  Like other members of the Tat-
Kreis, he ostensibly hoped that they would take power rather than the Nazis.  
Mehnert also claimed to have fostered a multi-year, ongoing friendship with Otto 
Strasser beginning around the year 1930 as Strasser was excommunicated from 
the Nazi Party for his left-wing activism. Mehnert found in Strasser an ally 
capable of reforming Nazism in the direction of reconciliation with the Soviets.  
Shortly after the Nazis came to power, and in the hope that he could moderate 
Nazi positions towards the Soviet Union, Mehnert alleged to have contacted Ernst 
Röhm and obtained a personal meeting in which he presented his argument that 
the Communists had actually achieved important success industrially and should 
be given a chance to modernize backwards Russia.  Already in 1934 Mehnert 
came into conflict with the regime when he was allegedly censored to some 
undisclosed extent by Alfred Rosenberg’s Foreign Policy Office.  Mehnert 
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claimed to have been saved by the intervention of Giselher Wirsing, who 
subsequently offered Mehnert a job in Moscow as a foreign correspondent for the 
paper newly under his direction, the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten (MNN).83  It 
was during this time in Moscow that Mehnert took up a close friendship with 
none other than the American diplomat and foreign policy theorist, George F. 
Kennan, who at the time was serving at the American State Department’s 
embassy in Moscow.  The two figures witnessed the process of Stalinization in 
the early and mid-1930s, a process that appears to have gradually pierced 
Mehnert’s ambivalent sympathy towards the Soviets.  Correspondences between 
the two indicate a friendship formed around a shared criticism of Soviet 
Communism.84  This was a friendship which, as we will discuss in Part II of this 
dissertation, continued well into the Cold War.   
 In 1936, Mehnert was once again censored by the Nazi regime for alleged 
Soviet sympathies, this time by Joseph Goebbels, who ordered all of Mehnert’s 
newspaper affiliates to cease publishing him.  Mehnert decided that it was not 
worth the fight and travelled East, through Asia, to the United States.  But fearing 
 
83 Mehnert also worked for the Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten and Hamburger Fremdenblatt 
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designation as an “enemy of the state” or “political emigre,” Mehnert returned to 
Germany in the same year and gave himself over to the Gestapo, where, once 
again with the assistance of Giselher Wirsing, he was able to win his case and 
have the censor removed.  Shortly thereafter, Mehnert travelled for a third time to 
the USA, but this time for a sustained period of time.  In 1937 he was offered a 
job by the University of Hawaii as a Professor of history and philosophy, a 
position he kept until 1941.85 
In his 1981 memoirs Mehnert claims that his run-in with Goebbels’s 
propaganda administration solidified his opposition to National Socialism and 
convinced to him to cease publishing in the domestic German press, but the 
evidence suggests otherwise.86  Mehnert continued to work with the Tat-Kreis and 
intensify his friendship and work relationship with Giselher Wirsing during these 
years, who, as discussed in a separate chapter of this dissertation, was trending 
sharply in the direction of reconciliation with National Socialism.  For example, 
Mehnert continued to publish in Wirsing’s MNN after 1938.87  Furthermore, in 
his 1945 autobiography, Mehnert approached his later relationship to National 
Socialism with more candor.  After describing his decision to move to Hawaii, 
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Mehnert attempted to answer the question why he did not become an American 
citizen and fully distance himself from National Socialism: 
National Socialism seemed to me, just like Bolshevism and the New Deal, 
to be an answer to the problems of our time.  It was an answer which, in 
many different ways, did not please me, but which – at least how I saw 
things then and without the knowledge of it leading to a new World War – 
seemed to me better than the Bolshevist answer or that of the New Deal. 
… National Socialism inherited so much from the spirit of post war 
youthfulness, and I had so much trust in this spirit that I hoped it would 
gradually improve and expand National Socialism with its idealism. 
 
Mehnert continued by putting forward an argument which he and other former 
Nazi Europeanists repeatedly made throughout their postwar careers: 
“Furthermore, National Socialism was never a finished product – it was 
constantly evolving, and I had the hope that its evolution would follow a direction 
that I could support.”  Mehnert hoped that he himself could help affect such an 
evolution and claimed that he only shared this secret intention with Giselher 
Wirsing, who likewise ostensibly shared these intentions.88  
Mehnert’s Employment in the Foreign Office 
 Mehnert’s relationship with National Socialism endured through his four-
year professorship at the University of Hawaii.  In 1941, as we will see, Mehnert 
accepted a Foreign Office order to move to Shanghai and conduct foreign 
propaganda.  In both his 1981 memoirs and his 1945 autobiography Mehnert 
presents this decision as a begrudging concession to an order from his homeland 
as well as a necessary decision due to increasing hostility towards Germans in the 
United States.  There is evidence, however, that Mehnert had a much earlier and 
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enthusiastic relationship with the Foreign Office.  Astrid Freyeisen, a historian of 
Nazi-Chinese relations, points out that he briefly moved from Hawaii to 
California in 1940 and that this move was directed by the Foreign Office so as to 
escape suspicions in Hawaii of Mehnert’s Nazi connections.89  Freyeisen believes, 
therefore, that Mehnert was a spy as early as 1940.90  The documentary evidence 
from Mehnert’s personal document collection complicates this picture.  As early 
as late-1937 Mehnert was in contact with the Foreign Office and had a unique 
relationship with Berlin.  Although apparently not an official spy, Mehnert 
certainly understood himself as a semi-official operative.  By cross-referencing 
his 1930s correspondences to the Foreign Office with his 1945 autobiography, it 
becomes clear that Mehnert himself solicited cooperation with the Foreign Office.  
In November, 1938, Mehnert wrote to the Cultural Department (later Cultural-
Politics Department) and sent a kind of resume and summary of his life in 
Hawaii.91  A few months later Mehnert sent the same department a detailed 
propaganda proposition for an “art exhibit” in the United States with the purpose 
of placating anti-German sentiments in the United States.  The letter suggested 
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that he himself would direct the project from California.  He concluded the 
proposition with the assurance that he had recently had his press censor lifted and 
was therefore a reliable partner.92  The Foreign Office replied that the idea was 
good, but that the resources were not currently available.  A subsequent 
correspondence with the Foreign Office reveals that Mehnert even pitched this 
idea in person to the German embassy in San Francisco.93 
In November, 1938, he began writing a German diplomat in Moscow, 
Gustav Hilger, suggesting that he would accept a position there if asked.  By 1940 
it appears that Mehnert had likely been told to remain in Hawaii and attempt to 
improve Germany’s image through his university work.  In January, 1940 he 
wrote to Hilger:  “I assume that you have still not seen any opportunity for me to 
discontinue my local work and move to Russia or Germany. … My work at the 
university continues to go just fine.”  Mehnert continued: “Nevertheless, I am 
sticking with what I told you shortly after the war began: I am at all times ready to 
break down my tent if you ask me to.”  Perhaps nervous that he was sounding too 
forward, Mehnert concluded saying that he fully appreciated the importance of his 
“beautiful, fully satisfying responsibility in Hawaii.”94  Hilger responded in April, 
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1940 that Mehnert would soon be contacted by Adam Trott zu Solz, a Foreign 
Office functionary in the Information Department who, Mehnert admits in his 
1945 autobiography, had an important influence on his decision to leave the 
United States for Shanghai.95  Trott zu Solz, who eventually joined the resistance 
and was murdered for his connections to the July 20th, 1944 assassination attempt, 
had been a friend of Mehnert’s ever since he had won a DAAD scholarship under 
Mehnert’s supervision in the early 1930s.  According to his 1945 autobiography, 
Mehnert was personally visited by Trott zu Solz in Hawaii shortly after the 
beginning of the war, and the two allegedly discussed their criticisms of the Nazi 
regime and their commitment to changing the regime from within.  Mehnert told 
Trott zu Solz to get into contact with Giselher Wirsing, and when he received the 
1941 telegram requesting his assistance in Foreign Office propaganda in Shanghai 
this was ostensibly a signal that his work in Shanghai would contribute to the 
collective effort to change National Socialism from the inside.96  But as the Hilger 
correspondences illustrate, his relationship with the Foreign Office began well 
before the 1941 telegram from Wirsing, which was actually just a continuation of 
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an already existing relationship, or perhaps even semi-official partnership, with 
the Foreign Office. 
Nevertheless, Mehnert did in fact receive a telegram from Wirsing in May, 
1941.  The telegram was quite vague, suggesting the “possibility” of a 
“meaningful position” publishing a periodical in the Far East which would have 
an “exceedingly large influence.”  Mehnert claimed in his 1945 autobiography 
that he interpreted this telegram as an order.97  He was not entirely wrong.  To be 
sure, in both his autobiography and memoirs Mehnert was attempting to abdicate 
responsibility for accepting a job in the Nazi propaganda apparatus.  However, as 
he explained in his 1945 autobiography, “in a totalitarian state a request is often a 
friendly euphemism for a command.” Mehnert’s correspondences with the 
Foreign Office since 1937 were often quite cryptic.  For example, after one letter 
from Gustav Hilger, Mehnert responded: “I read your letter carefully, and I think I 
understood it.”98  Of course, what Mehnert omitted, was that he had actively 
sought such a command since 1937 at the latest.  In short, despite his claims in his 
autobiography and memoires that it pained him to leave the United States in the 
summer of 1941, in reality, he more likely happily took up the opportunity to 
participate in Nazi propaganda even if the opportunity came as an “order.” 
Mehnert’s Propaganda in Shanghai 
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 It is difficult to ascertain with precision when Mehnert began advancing 
Nazi Europeanism.  As explained above, Mehnert had briefly been a member in 
the Pan-European movement in the late 1920s, and he dated his own commitment 
to the Europe-concept to the late 1920s after travelling the world and seeing the 
modern futility of nationalism.  But this was likely an example of historical 
revision.  It is more likely that he was drawn to the Europe-concept as a result of 
his connections with Giselher Wirsing’s network, with which he began to 
associate in the early 1930s.  There is some evidence to suggest that he first began 
to deliberate on Europe in the late 1930s while in Hawaii.  In a letter to Japan-
specialist Friedrich Max Trautz in September, 1938, Mehnert explained: “My 
[professorial] activities have been quite pleasing and have given me the 
opportunity to outline a broad interpretation of the term “Europe” and to 
investigate European-Pacific questions.”99  Nevertheless, throughout most of the 
1930s Mehnert appears to have spent his intellectual capital studying Sovietism.  
In any case, by the time he began working propaganda in Shanghai he had 
certainly committed himself to Nazi Europeanism. 
 The first avenue for Mehnert’s Europe-propaganda was to provide history 
lectures in English to Chinese students and English-speaking diplomats at the 
“German Medicine Academy” in Shanghai.  There he held a weekly two-hour 
lecture series titled “Europe and its History.”  According to one director of the 
academy shortly after the war, over 100 people regularly attended the lectures 
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which were transcribed and re-printed in the German-speaking newspaper Der 
Ostasiatische Lloyd: 
For us, his German listeners, “Europe and its History” [lectures] were 
more than historical surveys.  For example, the history of the crusades was 
especially impressive – they showed us the first break-through of the 
collective European concept.  We began to understand the power such a 
concept has.  Particularly the presentation of Europe as the history of a 
‘Grossraum’ was something especially arresting for us Germans at the 
time, and I believe I am able to say: the history of Europe had never been 
presented that way before….100 
 
But the by far most influential propaganda medium employed by Mehnert was a 
monthly periodical titled “The XX Century,” published in English, which 
Mehnert claimed had a circulation of 12,000, and which was financed by the 
Foreign Office.101  Although initially intended for American readers as well, the 
attack on Pearl Harbor relegated XX Century to an English-speaking readership 
mostly in Asia (including Japan).102  After the war, the United States secrete 
services attested to the periodical’s importance: “without a doubt the most 
important organ for German propaganda in the Far East.” 103   One historian of 
Nazi-China relations has called it the “most successful German propaganda 
operation in Shanghai.”104  As Mehnert explains in his 1945 autobiography, he 
was granted considerable maneuverability as editor of the project.  Due to the 
invasion of the Soviet Union shortly after the project was authorized, the Foreign 
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Office was largely distracted from Shanghai and left Mehnert control over the 
direction of the periodical.105  Mehnert, of course, intended this point as evidence 
that he refused to allow his material to be coordinated by Nazi propaganda.  But, 
as we will see, this assertion was actually quite damning, because it establishes 
his responsibility for the periodical’s very National Socialist content.  In fact, XX 
Century essentially evolved into Mehnert’s personal space for pro-Nazi editorials.  
Mehnert ultimately penned fourty-seven entire articles, more than double the next 
most published author.  Additionally, Mehnert regularly commented before other 
authors’ articles with a blurb which tied in the article to the Europe-concept.   
The periodical’s title, “The XX Century,” was intended to mirror the 
ideological purpose of Giselher Wirsing’s periodical of the same name (Das XX 
Jahrhundert).106  Sure enough, the paper reads as an extension of Wirsing’s Nazi 
Europeanist network.  Following an introductory issue, the second published issue 
in November, 1941 opened with an article by Mehnert about the danger of 
nationalism to the future peace of both Russia and Europe.107  Then, a subsequent 
 
105 Klaus Mehnert, “Selbsterklärung,“ ch. “Nach 1937.“   
106 According to historian Astrid Freyeisen, Mehnert admitted in a letter to his mother (which 
Freyeisen has in her possession) that he named his paper after Wirsing’s paper in order to Signal 
gratitude for Wirsing having helped Mehnert obtain the position.  See Freyeisen, Schanghai und 
die Politik des Dritten Reiches, 294. 
107 Klaus Mehnert, “The Nations of Russia,” The XX Century, November issue, 1941, 81-88. 
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article was supplied by none other than Carl Schmitt, who introduced Mehnert’s 
readers to the Grossraum concept.108 
In both his autobiography and memoirs Mehnert claimed that he was 
uncomfortable with the idea of pursuing propaganda and therefore made sure that 
XX Century remained largely informational and objective rather than 
propagandistic.  He even claimed that he refused to espouse Hitler, promote 
antisemitism, or slander the United States of America.  As early as 1942, Mehnert 
claimed, he had become a sort of defeatist in the periodical.109  All of these claims 
were patently false.  To be sure, XX Century repeatedly presented itself as 
“neutral,” but even the most unobservant reader could have seen through this 
falsehood.  The key argument strewn through XX Century was that the Second 
World War, unlike the First World War, was not a war between self-interested 
nations and that the propensity to view it as such was a lie perpetrated by the 
Allied powers to mask what Mehnert called a “super-national” conflict, or “a 
gigantic contest for the shaping of the next phase in human development.”110  In 
January, 1942, he argued: 
One of the chief objections of the Anglo-American nations to the Axis 
peoples is what they call their "narrow nationalism." Yet to anyone who 
has followed carefully the words and actions of Japan, Germany, and Italy 
in the past years, the trend away from this "narrow nationalism" is 
umistakable [sic]. The Japanese - this can best be seen in North China - 
are thinking more and more in terms of East Asia, the Italians and 
Germans in terms of Europe. What to many, perhaps, seemed in the 
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beginning a matter of domination over obeying inferiors, now appears 
increasingly as leadership among co-operating equals. The extended 
living, for example, of millions of German soldiers, administrators, 
railway workers, and others on foreign soil cannot but widen their horizon 
and vision and increase their appreciation for the human beings of the 
other side. 
 
The true meaning of the war, then, transcended nationalism, and only the Axis 
was pursuing this deeper purpose while the Allied powers set out to hinder it.  
Mehnert believed this was a selling message to English-speakers who had 
travelled the world and were well acquainted with other cultures.  In the same 
article, he established what would become a strikingly cosmopolitan tone 
throughout XX Century: 
The great majority of this magazine's readers have probably one thing in 
common: they have spent part of their lives outside the boundaries of their 
own countries - English-speaking Japanese, Chinese, and Europeans, or 
Americans and Englishmen living in the Orient.  They are therefore less 
likely than those of their countrymen, who have always stayed at home, to 
see everything in black and white.111 
 Paradoxically, then, the Second World War became, in the pages of XX 
Century, the Axis powers’ war against nationalism.  As Mehnert explained: “In 
the pages of this magazine we have repeatedly pointed out that in the last two 
years the former nationalistic spirit of the Axis nations has gradually given way to 
an ideology of increasing scope….”  This “ideology of increasing scope,” 
Mehnert went on to explain, was “European on the one hand, East Asiatic on the 
other.”112  This points to one of the peculiar characteristics of XX Century.  As 
 
111 Klaus Mehnert, “The World at War,” The XX Century, January issue, 1942, 1-4. 
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the primary arm for Foreign Office Europeanism in the Far East, XX Century 
reported on the “East Asian Grossraum” just as energetically as it did on Europe.  
Beginning with Carl Schmitt’s article introducing Mehnert’s readers to the 
Grossraum concept, XX Century established the central role of East Asia in the 
triumph of “super-nationalism.”  Schmitt explained that the American 
Revolutionary War was the first moment in human history when a portion of the 
world freed itself from, and established itself independently against, the Old 
World.  But while the United States established the “first modern Grossraum,” 
East Asia was not far behind.  In 1905, by defeating Russian in the Russo-
Japanese War, Japan began to establish the second non-European Grossraum.  
Europe, under Hitler’s leadership, Schmitt explained, was bringing this process 
back to the Old World.113  Many articles in XX Century attempted to situate the 
“East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (the Japanese propaganda term for their empire 
during the Second World War) as the organic outgrowth of what was called 
“Pacific history.”114  Sometimes this was done by Mehnert himself, such as an 
article in April, 1942 in which he argued that Japanese art and language were 
uniquely capable of unifying the East Asian Grossraum in ways other cultures 
could not.115  But most of the time this task was given over to specialists in Asian 
history such as a certain “IC Hiro Hara,” who wrote the lead-article in the July, 
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1942 issue titled “The Foundations of East Asia,” which presented East Asia as a 
historically, culturally, racially, and economically united community capable of 
breaking Western imperial “bondage” if properly unified.116  In another article, 
Mehnert presented various poems which could become the future national 
anthems of the European and East Asian Grossraum(s).117  The topic of race 
figured remarkably little in the pages of XX Century, and when it did, then 
usually as broad declarations of racial commonality within Grossraum(s).118  
Mehnert, then, like much of the Foreign Office’s Europe-propaganda, was out of 
step with National Socialist racial policies.  In fact, in Mehnert’s first article 
inaugurating XX Century in October, 1941, he went so far as to express fondness 
for his time in Hawaii, which he described as a peaceful “melting-pot of races” 
and therefore an example to the rest of the world for how to overcome racial 
differences.119  
Mehnert’s previous ambivalence towards Soviet Communism was erased 
after 1941.  One of the most prevalent themes in XX Century was to present the 
Eastern Front as a pan-European mission to save the nascent European New Order 
from Bolshevism.120  In fact, Mehnert went to great lengths to present the Eastern 
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Front conflict as a historical continuation of Europe’s confrontation with the East.  
Europeans must come to understand on the Eastern Front, Mehnert argued, that 
“Europe possesses not only a common cultural, but also a common political 
heritage, even though this has been overshadowed by the countless national wars 
of the European past.”  This meant revising their understanding of European 
history.  For example, in one particularly long history article Mehnert invited his 
readers to reconsider the crusades of the Middle Ages as a pan-European conflict 
with the Orient and therefore a historical predecessor for the contemporary war on 
the Eastern Front.121  A similar article re-cast the Holy Roman Empire as a pan-
European empire.122  
 The United States, too, received Mehnert’s ire in XX Century, despite his 
postwar contention that he refused to criticize the United States in the 
periodical.123  Interestingly, though, Mehnert came to view the United States as 
the lesser of two evils, a stark reversal of his earlier prioritization of capitalism 
and liberalism as the greatest problems in modernity.  It is difficult to ascertain 
when Mehnert revised his anti-Americanism.  Perhaps it was in the mid-1930s 
when he befriended George F. Kennan and witnessed Stalinization.  Or perhaps it 
was while interacting with Americans at the University of Hawaii (Mehnert 
always claimed to have had fond memories and friendships with his American 
students, for example).  In any case, his writings in XX Century reveal a more 
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complicated criticism of the United States.  Rather than a bottomless hole of 
materialism, Mehnert presented the United States as an initially wholesome 
project which only turned sour in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
Mehnert argued that the United States was, after all, founded by Europeans and 
maintained a “spiritual and cultural unity” with the Old World even as they 
separated themselves diplomatically.  Its leaders had been justifiably inspired by 
the idea of liberty, he argued, and did much to weaken the grasp of “reactionary” 
monarchs and their suppression of freedom throughout the European continent.  
Mehnert described the American Revolution and French Revolution as a 
transatlantic movement against a decrepit and outdated “absolutism.”  Together 
they were what he called the “Great Revolution,” and did much to advance human 
freedom and weaken arbitrary rule by the few over the many during the 
nineteenth century.   
But by the end of the century the Great Revolution was destroyed by the 
very nations which had conceived it.  First, Mehnert argued, industrialization 
turned liberty into anarchy and a “struggle of all against all.”  Second, Woodrow 
Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt intervened on behalf of European monarchs in 
the First World War and on behalf of nationalists in the Second World War, 
thereby making the United States into a champion of the very reactionary forces it 
had rebelled against throughout the nineteenth century.  The contemporary war, 
Mehnert then argued, symbolized a reversal of 1776, because the forces which 
had long fought for modern change were now fighting to stop it:  
Today it is Europe, under the leadership of Germany and Italy, which is 
riding the crest of the wave of the future. This Europe champions the new 
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order, while Roosevelt is the reactionary, who is fighting for the 
preservation of a state of affairs whose term of life has already expired…. 
 
In contrast, the Grossraum powers were fighting for the continuation of the Great 
Revolution’s heritage, because they were inaugurating a second great historical 
revolution: the “New Revolution.”  This New Revolution was advancing the 
cause of freedom against its modern enemies: “democracy and parliamentarism,” 
“individualism,” “capitalism,” “rationalism,” and the “unnatural emancipation of 
women.”  Instead, the New Revolution advanced the principles of “community,” 
“spiritual values,” and “family.”  Most importantly, the New Revolution was 
prepared to displace nationalism: 
The Great Revolution began with ideas which were addressed to all 
mankind, and it ended with the creation of that extreme nationalism which 
put its mark on the nineteenth century in Europe and elsewhere. The New 
Revolution started out with nationalistic slogans, yet it has led during the 
last few years to the creation of super-national Grossraums in Europe and 
East Asia. Italian and German nationalism has extended to ‘Europeanism’, 
and Japan has developed into the idea of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
Mehnert, then, discovered a historical narrative in which the fascist revolutions of 
the 1930s were a continuation and completion of the progressive-liberal 
revolutions of the nineteenth century while the Western Allies were the actual 
reactionaries.  Mehnert’s hope was that the New Revolution would, just like the 
Great Revolution, travel across the Atlantic, but this time in reverse direction: 
In this way, the war is bringing the day nearer when the European 
revolution will be victorious in America too. There was a time when one 
spoke of Europe against America. Today one speaks of America against 
Europe. We believe that tomorrow it will be Europe, Asia, and 
America.124  
 
124 The above arguments were put forward by Mehnert in two back-to-back lead-articles in the 




To be sure, this is not to argue that Mehnert’s propaganda against the 
United States was measured or subtle.  His depiction of the United States was that 
of a materialistic, individualistic threat to civilization led by a manipulative cabal 
of Jews.  Indeed, antisemitism was a recurring theme in Mehnert’s discussions of 
the United States.  According to Mehnert, the “four pillars of reaction” against the 
fascist New Revolution were the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, 
and international Jewry.  Franklin D. Roosevelt was depicted as “the New 
Metternich,” a forceful reactionary and puppet of international Jewish circles.125  
Mehnert denounced the United States as murderous “terrorists” intent on 
destroying Europe either by sacrificing it to Bolshevism or through its own carpet 
bombing.  The Allied aerial bombing campaigns, Mehnert argued, were nothing 
short of a barbaric assault on civilization.  But the silver linings, he argued, was 
that they exposed the futility of borders in the modern world.  Europeans, he 
argued, would be forced by the transnational bombing campaign into a tighter 
community.126  Mehnert was perhaps guilty of projection in these claims, because 
at other junctures it appears he was sensitive to the claim that the fascists were the 
war’s barbarians.  In one article, Mehnert defended the Axis nations as the 
defenders of freedom and justice.  But perhaps sensing the hypocrisy of such an 
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argument he continued: “To this many will object: ‘That is not true, the issue is 
clear, it is that between democracy and totalitarianism’. But totalitarianism is not 
the aim of the Axis nations, it is their method, it is a weapon in their fight….”127 
Conclusion 
In his 1945 autobiography Mehnert claimed to have foreseen the end of 
the war and even committed defeatism in the pages of XX Century.  This is not 
true.  Even in the last months of the war Mehnert was espousing the “miracle 
weapon” narrative and pleading Europeans to fight for every last inch of Europe 
and, even if defeated, to fight until the last drop of blood:  
We will either win back our military superiority and fling the intruders out 
of Europe in such a way that they will never dare to come back, or, at the 
worst, we will make them pay such a terrible price for every square mile 
of European soil that they themselves will decide to get out while there are 
still some of them left.128 
 
Remarkably, XX Century published its last issue in June, 1945 after the war had 
already come to an end in Europe.  The issue took the form of an introspection 
into the recently concluded war in Europe.  Predictably, Mehnert presented the 
war as an unfortunate conflict for which all sides bore equal responsibility and 
although he acknowledged the disproportionate wrongdoing of Hitler and Nazi 
Germany, he attempted to explain away Germany’s guilt by pointing to the 
mistakes of Versailles.  He also strongly defended the Axis vision of a “Greater 
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Europe.”129  In fact, despite defeat, Mehnert remained opposed to the two 
“global” ideologies which had secured victory: American liberalism and Soviet 
Bolshevism.  Nor did he favor a return to nationalism, something he believed was 
likewise a false conclusion to draw from the war.  Instead, he called on Europeans 
to remain committed to realizing the Europe-concept in the postwar world: 
In spite of the fact that global plans have been championed vigorously 
and, in the last few years, vociferously, we do not believe that the time has 
come for their carrying out. Hence, although we have discussed these 
plans as far as they concern their two chief exponents the USA and the 
USSR, in this magazine, we have rejected them. On the other hand, we 
have also refused to identify ourselves with the nationalism which came 
into being in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and reached its climax 
in the first World War and the ensuing years. We regard it as a 
phenomenon no longer in conformity with our age…. 
 
He continued: 
As we regard the point of view of the nation as too narrow, that of the 
whole world as too wide, this magazine has made Europe the center of its 
thought and discussed the various aspects of Europe and its problems in a 
series of articles. Nor do we intend to shift our ground because the 
realization of the European idea has once again disappeared beyond the 
horizon. Indeed, more than ever do we regard the creation of a 
harmoniously united Europe, independent of the exponents of global 
plans, as the only means of saving the continent from utter self-laceration. 
And we do not hesitate to consider the lacking preparation for the 
European idea as one of the reasons for the failure of the most recent 
attempt at realizing it. Neither the German people who, in a natural 
reaction to Versailles, went into the second World War with slogans 
mainly of a nationalistic nature, nor the other European nations, some of 
whom still labored under ideologies belonging to the nineteenth century, 
were able under the pressure of war to further the European idea to such 
an extent as would have been necessary for its realization. All the more 
urgent is it today to work in this direction and, in a time which as the 
 




result of the sufferings of the war is inclined to emphasize antagonisms 
and all that separates, to stress that which unites.130 
 
In the crucial months of transition after the Second War, then, Klaus 
Mehnert fled to the Europe-concept as a means for understanding the Second 
World War and his participation in it.  But equally importantly, he organized his 
hopes and ideas for the future around a continuation of the Europe-concept.  In 
this way, Mehnert encapsulated the trajectory of many Foreign Office 
Europeanists after the war.  Within a few years after the war Mehnert and his 
colleague Giselher Wirsing had become the chief editors of postwar West 
Germany’s most read weekly political magazine, Christ und Welt.  The second 
most read weekly political magazine, Sonntagsblatt, was edited by Axel Seeberg. 
Paul Karl Schmidt, for his part, was directing an American-financed, covert 
operation to influence public opinion in Hamburg.  All of these projects were, as 
we will discuss in Part II of this dissertation, organized around modern 
adaptations of these thinkers’ Europe-concept.  But before turning to the postwar 
lives and work of these former Nazi propagandists, we must first present one 
more important institution in the Nazi regime where the Europe-concept became a 
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Chapter 5: Germanic Europeanism in the Waffen-SS 
Introduction 
Heinrich Himmler and his paramilitary apparatus in the Nazi regime, the 
“Schutzstaffel” (SS), have justifiably been at the center of literature on Nazi 
Germany, the Holocaust, and the Second World War.  However, the largest 
contingent of that organization, the Waffen-SS, has received a considerably small 
amount of that attention.  Despite its size, its multi-national composition, its 
function as a militarized combat force, and its postwar influence, few historians 
have focused on the Waffen-SS as a unique phenomenon in its own right.1  But 
the Waffen-SS was a unique historical phenomenon, above all else because it 
 
1 To be sure, there is a remarkably large collection of non-academic writing on the Waffen-
SS.  While the amateur public has avidly explored the Waffen-SS, in particular within apologetic 
milieus, the academy has devoted considerably less attention, usually subsuming the Waffen-SS 
within discussions of the SS.  This historiographical reluctance is undoubtedly connected to 
postwar attempts by former Waffen-SS members to distinguish themselves from the SS and 
thereby separate themselves from postwar discourses of criminality in order to evade culpability 
and historical justice. Although the topic of Waffen-SS complicity in war-crimes is a complex 
one, the Waffen-SS was most definitely implicated in the Holocaust.  In this way, it is 
understandable that many historians have been hesitant to distinguish between the Waffen-SS and 
the SS.  But given the current state of research - in particular the general widening scope of 
culpability, for example the dissolution of the “Wehrmacht myth” – analyzing the Waffen-SS as a 
unique historical phenomenon does not prevaricate issues of war guilt. For more on postwar 
apologetics in the Waffen-SS, see David Clay Large, "Reckoning without the Past: The HIAG of 
the Waffen-SS and the Politics of Rehabilitation in the Bonn Republic, 1950-1961," The Journal 
of Modern History 59.1 (1987): 79-113. 
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facilitated one of the most wide-reaching and significant Nazi-Europe discourses 
in Nazi Germany’s propaganda regime.  Furthermore, the Waffen-SS practitioners 
of what this dissertation calls “Germanic Europeanism” were important 
contributors to the political activities of veterans of the Wehrmacht in West 
Germany in the early postwar decades.  The Europe-concept in the Waffen-SS 
was, of course, fiercely ironic.  The SS was the vanguard of racial chauvinism in 
the Nazi movement, the gate-keepers of a revolutionary political ideology which 
fanatically and proudly rejected all forms of political and philosophical 
internationalism.  Racial exclusion was truly the Raison d’Être of the SS.  Yet, as 
this chapter will illustrate, by the end of the war the Waffen-SS had not only 
incorporated into its ranks hitherto deemed racial “inferiors,” but had also 
undertaken a series of ideological revisions to conventional blood and soil SS-
ideology, replacing the concept of racial struggle with a narrative of racial 
exceptionalism and racial segregationism in which all European “Germanic” races 
were unique, different, and equal. 
The earliest scholarship on the Waffen-SS largely neglected ideology.  
The first authoritative monograph about the Waffen-SS written by George Stein 
in 1966 depicted the Waffen-SS as an army of a) social misfits abused by 
economic dislocation, boredom, and social alienation; and b) sadists who 
gravitated towards the criminal opportunities presented by membership.2  The 
criminal adventurism theory fit well into the early postwar literature on Nazism, 
 
2 George H. Stein, The Waffen SS: Hitler’s Elite Guard at War (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1966), 141-142. 
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where Hitler and his ideology were given less importance than was the impact of 
opportunism and Machiavellian power-politics.3  More recent scholarship on the 
Waffen-SS has echoed the historiographical turn (led by Karl Dietrich Bracher in 
the 1970s) towards taking Nazi ideology seriously.4 The most authoritative, 
modern history of the Waffen-SS is Bernd Wegner’s German-language 
monograph published in 1990. Wegner attempts to rescue the centrality of 
ideology in the Waffen-SS, arguing that the Waffen-SS had a “unique ideological 
and institutional connection” with the larger NS-regime and was, in fact, a 
“product” of traditional National Socialist ideology.5  Therein lies the significance 
of the Waffen-SS for Wegner, because unlike other military institutions in the 
“advanced stages of industrial society,” the Waffen-SS advanced a uniquely 
German assault on traditional conservative social institutions and hierarchies 
(albeit with the objective of replacing them with new racial hierarchies).  In this 
sense, the Waffen-SS was a revolutionary form of politics masked as a military 
branch of the state – they were, to use his term, “political soldiers.”6 Key to his 
argument is the Conservative Revolutionary movement. Indeed, his first chapter, 
 
3 See Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (Watford: Odhams Press Limited, 1952). 
4 See Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: the Origins, Structure, and Effects of 
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entitled “Revolutionized Conservative Value Systems,” situates the Waffen-SS 
into the Conservative Revolutionary culture of right-wing nationalists after World 
War I, especially veterans and members of the Reichswehr who had been active in 
the Free Corps movement.7  For Wegner, then, the main components of Waffen-
SS ideology were already set in place as part of the Conservative Revolutionary 
movement; in particular, he emphasizes a new nationalism which rejected the 
nation-state nationalism of the Wilhelminian monarchy. The true German nation 
for inter-war conservative militarists was, he argued, an unrealized racial ambition 
which transcended borders, a “dream of the future” (Zukunftstraum) which could 
only be realized through militarized struggle against the forces of diversity, 
discord, and individualism. This evolved nationalist restlessness among the 
conservative-military milieu in Weimar, Wegner asserts, bled over into the 
Waffen-SS program of a racial avant-garde armed with the military resources 
capable of toppling traditional militaries and states, and replacing them with a 
new racial elite.8 
 Wegner is undoubtedly correct to situate the origins of the Waffen-SS in 
inter-war German conservatism. It is no secret that the original leadership cadres 
of the Waffen-SS were drawn from former Free Corps veterans and the right-wing 
nationalist movement.9 And Wegner is able to illustrate that the social origins of 
Waffen-SS officers correspond to the social indicators of early nationalist support 
 
7 Ibid., 25-34. 
8 Ibid., 30. 
9 Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin, 2004), 228. 
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for the Nazi party (the large majority were Protestant, a majority was middle-
class, a majority came from small cities, and a strong plurality was university 
trained).10  Although Wegner successfully situates our understanding of the 
Waffen-SS in ideology, his narrative nevertheless misses a few essential aspects 
of the Waffen-SS.  First, as a social history his approach separates ideology out 
from the narrative, handling it in a separate chapter.  This means that he misses 
the extent to which ideology within the Waffen-SS was evolving and reacting to 
changes in the war and to the composition of the Waffen-SS.  Second, and more 
importantly, Wegner’s arguments are openly German-centric and neglect the later 
years of the Waffen-SS.  Wegner explicitly acknowledges that “the non-German 
volunteer movement of the Waffen-SS only finds cursory treatment” in his work 
and that he intends to focus on the social origins of the Waffen-SS in the pre-war 
and early war years.  He justifies this prioritization by arguing that the Eastern 
Europeans in the Waffen-SS, while nominally under Waffen-SS command, were 
never fully integrated into German units or treated as members of the emerging 
postwar “elite,” but instead remained largely a “help troop” to the original 
Waffen-SS, the foundations of which were established quite early on.11 In short, 
for Wegner the ideology of the Waffen-SS was a static and logical extension of 
National Socialism.  As this chapter will show, while this point may have been 
true vis-a-vis institutional discrimination, as well as Himmler’s ultimate 
intentions, it neglects consequential shifts in Waffen-SS indoctrination in the last 
 
10 Wegner, The Waffen-SS, 235-267. 
11 Ibid., 18. 
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years of the war which resulted precisely because of the multi-national make-up 
of the Waffen-SS, and which were propagated to all Waffen-SS personnel, 
including Germans (especially the German officers charged with training and 
leading non-German units).  
 More recent scholarship on the Waffen-SS has emphasized the 
transnational history of the Waffen-SS, such as, for example, the very recent 
collected volume The Waffen-SS: A European History, edited by Jochen Böhler 
and Robert Gerwarth.12  This valuable recent scholarship has rescued the 
 
12 Böhler and Gerwarth’s collection brings together the most recent scholarship by a slew of 
European historians who for the last few decades have been researching the various non-German 
Waffen-SS recruits by specific country of origin.  See Jochen Böhler and Robert Gerwarth, The 
Waffen-SS: A European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).  Other notable 
examples include: Peter Scharff Smith, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Claus Bundgård Christensen, who 
have investigated the Danish recruits.  See Peter Scharff Smith, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Claus 
Bundgård Christensen, “The Danish Volunteers in the Waffen-SS and German Warfare at the 
Eastern Front,” Contemporary European History 8.1 (1999): 73-96.  Martin Gutmann, in addition 
to the Danes, has looked at the Swedish and Swiss recruits as well.  See Martin R. Gutmann, 
Building a Nazi Europe: The SS’s Germanic Volunteers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017).  Bruno de Wever has investigated the Flemish-Belgian recruits.  See Bruno de Wever, 
“‘Rebellen‘ an der Ostfront. Die flämischen Freiwilligen der Legion ‘Flandern‘ und der Waffen-
SS,“ Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 39 (1991): 581-610.  Thomas Casagrande had looked at 
the ethnic Germans of Eastern Europe (Volksdeutsche).  See Thomas Casagrande, Die 
volksdeutsche SS-Division “Prinz Eugen” (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2003). 
 This recent literature, taken as a whole, has confirmed the centrality of ideology in the 
Waffen-SS, albeit with important new perspectives.  First, these scholars have illustrated that the 
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transnational nature of the Waffen-SS, but the brunt of the research has been done 
through separate national histories rather than integrating the non-German 
experiences into a general narrative of the Waffen-SS.  This crucially leaves out 
the question of how the changing transnational composition of the Waffen-SS 
 
Waffen-SS was a gathering ground for a transnational proto-fascist network of conservative 
nationalists radicalized by the First World War and its aftermath, including a deep anxiety about 
Bolshevism. “Non-Germans in the Waffen-SS: An introduction” in ed.s Jochen Böhler and Robert 
Gerwarth, The Waffen-SS: A European History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1-15.  
To be sure, there is still some debate about the fierceness of ideological motivation behind 
Waffen-SS volunteers.  Martin Gutmann takes the strongest stance in favor of ideology, whereas 
others, such as Peter Scharff Smith, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Claus Bundgård Christensen see more 
space for non-ideological motivations.  See Martin R. Gutmann, “Debunking the Myth of the 
Volunteers: Transnational Volunteering in the Nazi Waffen-SS Officer Corps during the Second 
World War,” Contemporary European History 22.4 (2013): 585-607.   Claus Bundgard 
Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Peter Scharff Smith, “Germanic Volunteers from Northern 
Europe” in ed.s Jochen Böhler and Robert Gerwarth, The Waffen-SS: A European History, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 42-75.  Second, these have re-centered that ideological 
discussion from a strictly German ideology to a transnational Germanic ideology which appealed 
to different Northern European national identities as common heirs of “European civilization” 
with equal national cultures and histories. As Martin Gutmann has illustrated, the volunteers in the 
Waffen-SS were not merely “anti-Bolshevist”; rather, he argues, they were actively seeking a new, 
anti-bourgeois vision of a Germanic modernity.  See Gutmann, “Debunking the Myth of the 
Volunteers.”  Finally, the recent scholarship has illustrated the integral relationship between the 
Waffen-SS and the Holocaust.  See Martin Cüppers, Wegbereiter Der Shoah: Die Waffen-SS, Der 
Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS Und Die Judenvernichtung 1939-1945, (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005). 
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affected the core German membership, because it treats the Waffen-SS as a 
collection of separate nationalities rather than a collective institution, which, as 
will be shown, actually shared a codified indoctrination program across 
nationalities.  Furthermore, Waffen-SS propaganda eventually even sought to 
breakdown national identities.  Indeed, while recent research has provided a more 
nuanced picture of a cooperative “Germanic Europe” underpinning Waffen-SS 
ideology, this chapter will illustrate that the idea of “Germanic” was constantly 
modified in Waffen-SS propaganda, and by the end of the war came to mean a 
repudiation of traditional nationalisms in favor of an integrated pan-European 
nation with a shared racial heritage in ancient Europe. 
 This chapter will emphasize the changing and ephemeral nature of this 
new nationalism, which we will call “Germanic Europeanism,” because, unlike 
other iterations of the Europe-concept, the Waffen-SS remained stubbornly 
committed to National Socialist racial doctrines.  As we will see, in order to 
reconcile racial doctrines with the increasingly multiethnic profile of the Waffen-
SS, propagandists turned to the concept of “Germanic” as a way to make racial 
doctrines more inclusive.  Drawing from under-utilized sources (officer 
indoctrination, soldiers’ propaganda periodicals, and internal documents from the 
Waffen-SS “Office of Indoctrination”) this chapter will trace the evolution of 
Germanic Europeanism through four stages: German racial exceptionalism, 
Germanic particularism, Germanic nationalism, and modified Germanic 
Europeanism. 
Gottlob Berger and the SS-Office for Indoctrination 
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The Waffen-SS (translated literally “weapon-SS”) grew out of Hitler’s 
original bodyguard in the SS.  In 1923 the SS was formed as a small bodyguard 
attachment of the larger paramilitary brown-shirt formation, the SA.  Heinrich 
Himmler joined this bodyguard movement and gradually rose to prominence in 
the organization, eventually appointed “Reichsführer-SS” by Hitler in 1929.  
Before the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, Heinrich Himmler rapidly expanded 
the unit from 280 men to 52,000.  After the “Night of Long Knives,” when the SA 
was politically emasculated, Himmler successfully established the SS as the 
infamous paramilitary force which administered Hitler’s arbitrary, terror-based, 
and ultimately genocidal rule in Nazi Germany and occupied Europe.  But the SS 
was an amorphous organization, which as early as 1934 began to be subdivided 
into various different institutions designed for specific tasks in Himmler’s shadow 
state.  This included the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), or “Security Service,” for 
administering intelligence and secret state policing; the “Death’s Head 
Formations” for administering the concentration camp system; and the “General 
SS” as a reserve unit.  Altogether, these aforementioned units numbered roughly 
150,000 by the end of the war.13  This number was dwarfed, however, by yet 
another institution within the SS: the Waffen-SS. 
The Waffen-SS, originally called SS-Verfügungstruppe, or “provisional 
force,” was formed by Himmler in 1936 as an expanded and military-equipped 
version of Hitler’s original SS-bodyguard.  In 1938 Hitler issued a decree which 
 
13 See Stein, The Waffen-SS, xxv-xxxiv.  Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head: The 
Story of Hitler’s SS (Hamburg: Spiegel, 1966). 
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established the Waffen-SS as a third standing armed force alongside the army and 
police. This was a small army directly loyal to Hitler, and did not amount to more 
than a few divisions until the outbreak of war in 1939, which Himmler used to 
expand the size of the Waffen-SS.  By war’s end, the Waffen-SS consisted of 38 
divisions and over 900,000 soldiers, most of them non-German. In one of the 
most blatant ironies of the Third Reich, Himmler’s racially superior, elitist 
“Order” eventually comprised of more non-German collaborators than Germans. 
In fact, by the end of the war it included hundreds of thousands of supposedly 
racially inferior so-called Untermenschen (“sub-humans”), in particular from the 
Ukraine and Russia.  The Waffen-SS even drew upon Baltic Muslim recruits. 
Table: Ethnic Composition of Waffen-SS14  
Germans (Reichsdeutsche) 400,000 
Western/Northern Europeans (mostly Dutch, Danish, Belgian, French, and Swedish) 125,000 
Eastern European ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) 150,000 





14 For statistic tables by nationality see Chris Bishop, SS: Hitler's Foreign Divisions: Foreign 
Volunteers in the Waffen-SS 1940-1945, (Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmount, 2005).  Stein, The Waffen 




War-time exigencies, combined with difficult recruiting competition from 
the army, provided the impetus for its exponential and international expansion 
from 1940 to 1945.  The chief architect behind this and all other Waffen-SS 
recruiting operations throughout the war was Gottlob Berger.15   After war began 
in September, 1939 Berger was able to expand the Waffen-SS from 25,000 to 
150,000 within a year.  He did so, despite the wishes of traditional military 
recruiters, by repeatedly transferring soldiers from the “General SS” and 
concentration camp units into the Waffen-SS and then re-filling those units to 
their prescribed domestic strengths.  The remarkable war-time expansion of the 
Waffen-SS is largely thanks to Berger’s Machiavellian instincts and his ability to 
balance Himmler’s scruples against foreign recruitment as well as army 
trepidation about Waffen-SS recruitment from traditional military pools.  
Following a successful recruiting campaign in late 1939, Berger himself drew up 
a proposal to create the Ergänzungsamt (Recruiting Office), which would 
separately organize all Waffen-SS recruitment under his direct command.  
Himmler agreed and gave him authority for the “total recruitment of the Waffen 
SS” (Gesamtrekrutierung der Waffen SS).  This office was created within the SS-
 
15 For a short biographical account see Tuviah Friedman, SS-Obergruppenführer und 
General der Waffen-SS Gottlob Berger: Chef des SS-Hauptamtes in Berlin und Chef der 
Gesamtrekrutierung der Waffen-SS: Dokumentensammlung ( Haifa, Israel: Institute of 
Documentation in Israel for the Investigation of Nazi War Crimes, 1996).  Ronald Smelser and 




Hauptamt (“SS Main Office”), which Berger also subsumed under his 
command.16   
But Berger’s ambition went beyond recruitment.  After the Western 
campaigns resulted in the defeat of France, he brought ideological indoctrination 
under his supervision as well by taking advantage of a unique institutional 
restructuring.  On August 15th, 1940, in a bureaucratic rearrangement of SS 
departments, a new department was created to oversee and administer the growing 
Waffen-SS: the SS Leadership Main Office.  Berger was appointed head of the 
older SS-Main Office, now stripped of most of its authority other than recruiting.  
But in order to keep his now threatened department from disintegrating or 
becoming insignificant in the opaque line of SS authority, Berger cunningly 
reorganized the department, and successfully lobbied to have all ideological 
indoctrination for the Waffen-SS placed under his direct authority in a sub-
department called the Schulungsamt (“Office for Indoctrination”).17 Thus, even 
though after 1940 it was no longer the central administering department for the 
Waffen-SS, the SS-Main Office secured continued existence because both 
indoctrination and recruitment were brought under its umbrella.  As such, Gottlob 
Berger and his propagandists in the SS Office for Indoctrination were, throughout 
 
16 Stein, The Waffen SS, 36.  
17 See Stein, The Waffen-SS, 27-59.  The SS-Main Office and the SS-Leadership Main Office 
continued to exist side by side throughout the duration of the war (not without mutual animosity). 
See Stein, The Waffen SS, 105. See Smelser and Seyring, Die SS: Elite Unter Dem Totenkopf, 49. 
See Martin Cüppers, Wegbereiter Der Shoah, 99. 
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the war, the primary source for changes to the ethnic composition as well as the 
ideology of the Waffen-SS. 
Lehrpläne 
We can see this propaganda transformation by surveying the ideological 
instruction of Waffen-SS officers.  Waffen-SS unit commanders were, beginning 
in 1937, given primary responsibility for the subsequent indoctrination of the 
troops throughout the war. They were a Nazi version of the Soviet commissar – 
separately trained ideological fundamentalists who were inserted into units in 
order to ensure a steady diet of ideological program and guarantee that the 
Waffen-SS retained its ideological tenacity and loyalty (the Waffen-SS motto, in 
fact, was “my honor is my loyalty”).18 In other words, Waffen-SS officers were 
not only trained in ideological fanaticism, they were made into ideological 
instructors.  An analysis, therefore, of the material for officer indoctrination is a 
valuable prism into the ideological narratives which underpinned the Waffen-SS 
over time.  These German officers were trained at special SS academies called 
“Junkerschulen,” where they were indoctrinated according to a curriculum 
sketched out in so-called Lehrpläne (“Instructional outlines”) published by 
Berger’s SS-Main Office.  Essentially ideology textbooks, the Lehrpläne outlined 
a 6-month instructional plan for the indoctrination of the Waffen-SS officer corps 
 
18 Other than a limited amount of indoctrination at basic training, Waffen-SS soldiers 
received the majority of their ideological training from unit commanders and periodicals. Cüppers 
illustrates that Berger was particularly passionate about cementing this system of ideological 
training. See Cüppers, Wegbereiter Der Shoah, 99.  Bernd Wegner, The Waffen-SS, 202. 
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at the SS academies.  These sources offer a glimpse into the indoctrination 
process of the Waffen-SS.  Since all Lehrpläne followed the same 6-month war-
time training program, they are particularly useful in comparison with one 
another. By comparing an early Lehrplan dated to 1941 with a later Lehrplan 
from 1944 one can identify the overall shift that took place in Waffen-SS 
propaganda from its infancy in 1941 to its peak in 1944.19   
The most important difference between the Waffen-SS of 1941 and the 
Waffen-SS of 1944 was its ethnic composition.  By 1944, the Waffen-SS had 
completed its war-time evolution into a unit comprising soldiers as far West as 
France and as far East as Russia.  In fact, the 1944 officer manual begins by 
stating it was published with the knowledge that volunteers from all over Europe 
were serving in the Waffen-SS, and that “ideological indoctrination should be 
adjusted accordingly.”20 This “adjustment” ended up being quite radical.  As will 
be shown, key tenets of National Socialism were repeatedly altered or even 
 
19 The Lehrpläne appear to also have been used to a certain extent for training in the General-
SS and the police. See Lehrplan für die sechsmonatige Schulung, erarbeitet und herausgegeben 
vom SS –Hauptamt (1941), United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, 
German Nationalism Series. See Lehrplan für Die Weltanschauliche Erziehung in der SS und 
Polizei, erarbeitet und herausgegeben vom SS –Hauptamt (1944), United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, Nazi Propaganda Literature Series. Although neither 
Lehrplan is dated in the original documents, a thorough analysis of the texts with special 
consideration to discussed political events and the history of the Waffen-SS reveals with near 
certainty that the first Lehrplan can be dated to mid-1941 and the second Lehrplan to 1944. 
20 Lehrplan (1944), preface. 
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replaced throughout the entire six-month program.  This can be illustrated by first 
analyzing a summary of the terminological changes between the two instruction 
outlines.  Then, it can be further illustrated in a more concentrated investigation of 
three pivotal themes in conventional National Socialism: racial doctrine, Reich 
ideology, and Nazi historicism. 
Terminology 
The Lehrpläne were broken down into four overarching chapters (each 
intended to last six to eight weeks of indoctrination). Each chapter was then 
broken down even further into hourly sub-sections (specific topics for hourly 
lectures).  Already here, in a comparison of the section and sub-section titles, a re-
structuring of the narrative reveals itself.  Two of the four original six to eight 
week instructional sections were re-titled: “The Struggle for the Reich” to 
“Europe and the Reich”; and “The Life of the Führer and the History of the 
Movement” to “The Führer, his Life, and his Meaning for Europe.” Not a single 
section or hourly lecture in the 1941 Lehrplan even mentioned Europe.  In the 
1944 Lehrplan, on the other hand, twenty-six of the thirty-four hourly lectures 
were re-created as lectures revolving entirely around the Europe-concept, with the 
term “Europe” even specifically in the title as a replacement for “Germany.”  
However, the transformation of National Socialist vocabulary extended beyond 
titles – indeed, the entire 1944 Lehrplan, down to hourly lectures, was revised to 
replace standard German-centric terminology with European terminology.  
Because each Lehrplan follows the same overall structure, the two Lehrpläne, 
compared side by side expose which terms were changed and what they were 
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replaced with.  First, there was a clear transition in audience: from “we Germans” 
or “German nation” to “Europeans” or “European union”; from “the German 
Volk,” “the Greater German Reich,” or “German People’s Community” to 
“Europe,” “European Peoples,” “European Community,” or “European 
Community of Destiny.”21 Sentences originally in bold such as “our Volk is the 
Community of Destiny” were completely taken out of the second Lehrplan 
because of their inability to fit into the new ideological curriculum.22  
Racial doctrine (Rassenkunde) 
The doctrine of a racially superior Germanic/Nordic race – “racial theory” 
(Rassenkunde) as Nazi theoreticians called it - was a key component to the Nazi 
Weltanschauung.  As a pseudo-science, Nazi racial doctrine oscillated liberally 
between terms such as “German,” “Germanic,” “Aryan,” and “Nordic” without 
codifying differences or demarcations between racialist categories. As will be 
discussed in more detail below, this imprecision was essential for subsequent 
ideological transformations in Waffen-SS propaganda. But as it pertains to officer 
indoctrination, it is important to point out that the German-centric narrative of the 
1941 Lehrplan likewise oscillated between racialist categories.  For example, 
while it sometimes made use of “Germanic” terminology, the 1941 Lehrplan also 
 
21 For the German translations: “wir Deutsche,“ “deutsche Nation,“  “das deutsche Volk,“ 
“das großdeutsche Reich,““deutsche Volksgemeinschaft“ vs. “Europäer,“ “europäische 
Verbundenheit,“ “Europa,“ “europäische Völker,“ “europäische Gemeinschaft,“ and  
“europäische Schicksalsgemeinschaft.“ 
22 Lehrplan (1941), 47. 
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occasionally accentuated the superiority of Germans and Germany without the 
“Germanic” qualifier (e.g. “Deutsche” and “Deutschland”).  The twenty-five 
points of the Nazi party’s first mass party rally, which contained numerous 
overtones against “non-Germans” (nichtdeutsche) and were blatantly German-
centric, were listed and proclaimed to “still be the program of the movement.”23  
The 1944 Lehrplan, in contrast, removed the twenty-five points completely out of 
the training.  Other times, the 1941 Lehrplan allowed for a more expansive 
supremacism, subtly including “Nordics” into the family of racial superiors.  The 
1941 Lehrplan attacked any notions of racial equality, tied such sentiments to 
both Marxism and liberalism, and dismissed the idea that 
the destiny of all peoples can be improved.  For [Marxists and liberals], all 
men are equal…. But we know: racially and in other ways dissimilar 
people, even if they are in the same living space and no matter how long 
the time periods, can never be completely equal.  They remain what they 
are: foreign blood that has to be kept distant from our people 
[Volkskörper].24 
 
A vitriolic disdain for East European and Slavic races was repeatedly articulated, 
and traditional Lebensraum theory as well as the expulsion of racial inferiors were 
propagated as measures to protect Germanics from the harmful races in the East: 
The great colonization [of the East] through settlement of Nordic farmers 
will build a wall against the penetration of the Eastern peoples of Slavic 
language…. Our strength and our spirit will determine and assort a new 
racial composition of Europe comprising of Germanic peoples.25 
 
23 Ibid., 11-15. 
24 Ibid., 57. 
25 Ibid., 58. 
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The 1944 Lehrplan, in contrast, remained surprisingly silent on the topic of 
Lebensraum. Instead, all European peoples (europäische Völker) were presented 
as equal heirs to the European heritage and landmass.  “[T]he racial organization 
of people,” it proclaimed, “will be based on their biological equality 
[Gleichwertigkeit].”26 And while the Nordics had provided Europe with many 
historical gifts, “the other [non-Nordic] races of Europe,” it continued, “have also 
delivered very valuable contributions [in European history], especially regarding 
the formation of distinctive peoples and cultures [Volksgruppen und 
Volkskulturen].”27 
In its discussion of the fight against Bolshevist Russia, the 1944 Lehrplan 
mentioned all the “heroic” peoples that had joined with the Germans in the fight 
against Bolshevism, including a slew of peoples traditionally viewed by the Nazis 
as racial inferiors, but who were now fighting in the Waffen-SS: Slovaks, 
Croatians, Spanish, French, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians.  All were 
mentioned by name.  Then, astonishingly, far Eastern Europeans likewise 
received their inclusion into the community of racially “healthy” peoples.  Clearly 
making reference to the Ukrainians and Russians who began entering the Waffen-
SS in late 1943, the Lehrplan continued:  
Yes, even members of peoples in the farthest Eastern portion of Europe, 
which belonged to the earliest struggles against Bolshevism, are turning 
against their brutal oppressors under our leadership.  Truly, all healthy 
 
26 Ibid., 74. 
27 Ibid., 75. 
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racial powers of Europe are breaking out against the world of destruction 
and annihilation [italics in original].28 
 
To be even more blunt about its newfound, paradoxical racial egalitarianism, the 
Lehrplan then commented on some of the achievements of non-European peoples 
as well, including the Chinese, Incan, and Aztec cultures, which, although 
different, were nonetheless to be considered “high cultures.”29 
“Theory of the Reich” (Reichsidee) 
 The so-called Reichsidee, or “theory of the Reich,” so central to National 
Socialist doctrine, also witnessed a dramatic shift in the Waffen-SS ideological 
narrative.  In the 1941 Lehrplan, following traditional National Socialist rhetoric, 
the term “Reich” was generally used exclusively for the German nation. Thus, the 
term “Reich” was used synonymously with “Germany,” hence the use of 
wordings such as das deutsche Reich (“the German Reich”) and das großdeutsche 
Reich (“the greater German Reich”).30  In fact, an entire chapter in the 1941 
Lehrplan was devoted to presenting National Socialism as the historic salvation of 
the German Volk, culminating with a final sub-section entitled “The Historical 
Responsibility of National Socialism,” in which “the German Volk in the Greater 
 
28 Ibid., 66. 
29 Ibid., 76. 
30 “Reich” was also used synonymously with “deutsches Volk” and “Volksgemeinschaft” 
(“German Volk” and “Volk’s community,” respectively). While it is true that the term 
“großdeutsches Reich” plays off of pre-National Socialism, irredentist ideas for the unification of 
all Germans into one state (“großdeutsche Lösung”), even this conception of a Reich is clearly 
confined to an exclusively German-speaking state, albeit an enlarged one. 
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German Reich” was presented as the movement’s ultimate victor.  Written at the 
bottom of the last page in bold print stood a statement certainly intended to 
remind the instructors of the symbiotic relationship between Reich and Germany: 
“One Volk, One Reich, One Führer.”31 
 In the 1944 Lehrplan, at a time when the Reich employed soldiers from 
quite a few more than “one Volk,” the reciprocal association between Reich and 
Germany was severed; the concept of Reich lost its strict national character and 
became the historical vehicle for international European cooperation.  
Terminologically, the word “Reich” was replaced with either “Europe,” 
“European Community,” “European Peoples’ Community,” and “Occidental 
Community of Destiny,”32 or, when it remained, it became synonymous with the 
infamous propaganda slogan Neuordnung Europas (“New Order of Europe”), the 
vague political entity which would supposedly administer postwar Europe.  
Consider the following intermingling of the terms “Reich” and “New Order of 
Europe”: 
Adolf Hitler’s New Order of Europe goes well beyond the sphere of the 
state, for it is the consequence of a revolution in the entire European way 
of thinking.  The visible expression of the transformed European Peoples’ 
Community is THE REICH [uppercase in original].33 
 
 
31 Lehrplan (1941), 47. 
32 For the German translations: “Europa,“ “europäische Gemeinschaft,“ “europäische 
Völkergemeinschaft“ and “abendländische Schicksalsgemeinschaft.“  
33 Lehrplan (1944), 48. 
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Even the very term “National Socialism” underwent reconstruction, often 
replaced in the 1944 manual with “Revolutionary Socialism” or “European 
Socialism”: 
In the Second World War, in which we see the continuation of a now 
nearly thirty year struggle, it’s proven more clearly than ever that this is 
not about Germany alone, but rather all of Europe.  Once again, as so 
often in history, the Reich is standing for the entire Occident against the 




The Reich represents the outward concerns of the continent, 
guarantees an equitable reconciliation of the multifold internal 
national claims, and ensures the autonomous life of every single 
European nation [bold in original]. The arrangement of the inner-folkish 
[innervölkisch] circumstances of each individual state stands, just as the 
coexistence of all nations in the continent, under the law of revolutionary 
European Socialism.  According to their proportion of achievement for the 
whole, every Volk will be guaranteed its due position in the continental 
community.  Amidst the emergencies and pains of a bloody struggle, 
Europe reaches unity.34 
 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of these passages was the use of federalism when 
referring to intra-European relations in “European Socialism.”  “Nations” were 
promised an “autonomous life,” “individual states” were assured of “their due 
position in the continental community,” and “national claims” were guaranteed 
“equitable reconciliation.” This “European Socialism” was presented as the only 
philosophy capable of providing “a controlled adjustment of relationships 
between European peoples.”35  These excerpts from the section on the historical 
background of the Reich present a Nazi political ideology not only in 
 
34 Ibid., 47,48. 
35 Ibid., 21. 
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contradiction with the earlier Lehrplan, but also diametrically opposed to central 
principles in the National Socialist commitment to Social Darwinism.   
This new, supranational character of Nazism was even proclaimed to have 
been existent since the inception of the Nazi party. The history of the 1933 
Machtergreifung (the Nazi party’s rise to power) was portrayed by the 1944 
Lehrplan as a European ideological revolution which, paradoxically similar to 
Marx’s proletariat revolution, implied, desired, and expected exportation to its 
neighbors. Take, for example, the following quotation about the rise of Hitler 
from a sub-chapter entitled “Adolf Hitler: the Führer of Europe and the Fighter 
for a Genuine European Socialism”: “One knew very well,” it explained “that 
such a basic, life-giving movement would not stop at geographic or political 
borders.”36 
Nazi Historicism 
 Nazi propaganda relied heavily on the use of history to buttress the 
legitimacy of ideology. This was particularly true in the SS. In fact, three of the 
four sections in both the 1941 and 1944 Lehrpläne (twenty-eight of thirty-six total 
hours of instruction) were literally ideological indoctrination masked as history 
lessons.37 An analysis of the use of history in the two Lehrpläne provides further 
 
36 Ibid., 69. 
37 Each Lehrplan contained one section which was especially historical, tracing the history of 
the Reich concept into the Early Middle Ages or even into classical antiquity. In the earlier 
Lehrplan this section is entitled “The Struggle for the Reich,” and in the later Lehrplan the title is 
“Europe and the Reich.” 
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evidence of the dilution of the ideological message, because in order to remain 
consistent with the new European message traditional Social Darwinist 
historicism had to be Europeanized in the 1944 Lehrplan.  In the 1941 Lehrplan, 
the history of the Reich was nothing more than the struggle of the superior 
German or Nordic race, which “carried the torch of creativity into the ahistorical 
darkness of antiquity.”38   Once again, the Nordic race was not clearly delineated 
from “German,” and in fact described as the “fountain of blood for the German 
Volk”; indeed, the term “Nordic” was often employed interchangeably with 
“German.”39  In the 1944 Lehrplan, however, the history of the Reich was not 
specifically “German,” but rather a history of the Entstehung Europas 
(“emergence of Europe”).  “Europe and the Reich,” it was explained “are fatefully 
connected together – the one is not historically comprehensible without the 
other.”40  Moreover, the agent for this historical phenomenon was not the Nordic 
race, but the “Indo-Germanic race,” drawn throughout the narrative as the racial 
origin of all European peoples.  The 1941 Lehrplan, in contrast, only mentioned 
the term “Indo-Germanic” once, but not to praise it.  Quite to the contrary, it 
lamented the term as “quite empty” and “scientifically objectionable.”41   
 
38 Lehrplan (1941), 28. 
39 The second hourly lecture in this history section was titled “The Nordic Race – the 
Fountain of Blood for the German [deutsch] Volk.” See Lehrplan (1941), 25. 
40 Lehrplan (1944), 24. 
41 Lehrplan (1941), 26. 
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 In the 1941 Lehrplan, the primary means by which the Reich was 
historicized was through the story of the Nordic race and its mission to retain its 
racial purity by avoiding contact with other European races and simultaneously 
conquer Lebensraum from Eastern peoples (especially the Slavs).  This 
Darwinistic supremacism underwent the most drastic reversal in the historicism of 
the 1944 Lehrplan. Charlemagne in the 1941 Lehrplan, for example, was depicted 
as ultimately a failure for having mixed with too many Eastern peoples that were 
not “Nordic Germanics and Anglo-Saxons,” and hence allowing his kingdom to 
become “interracial” (übervölkish).42 Charlemagne was then contrasted with the 
Germanic leader of the Saxons, Widukind, who rightly opposed the integration of 
his people with others. 43  In the 1944 Lehrplan, however, Charlemagne was 
celebrated for having “given continental form to the developing European 
Community of Peoples [europäische Völkergemeinschaft].”  After specifically 
mentioning the beneficial incorporation of Slavic peoples into the developing 
Reich, the Lehrplan declared that “his kingdom created the masterly connected 
system of European order.”44   
A similar ambivalence can be seen in the history of Heinrich I. of Saxony, 
who in the 1941 Lehrplan was exalted for having secured the Germanic Reich 
Lebensraum by “reconquering” the East from the Slavs.45  In fact, Lebensraum 
 
42 Ibid., 34. 
43 Ibid., 35. 
44 Lehrplan (1944), 27. 
45 Lehrplan (1941), 37. 
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was constantly portrayed as the overriding phenomenon of history.  For example, 
evidence for the “inner strength of the German [deutsch] Volk” was their ability 
to win back much of the East from the Slavs while simultaneously fighting the 
Catholic church.46  Interestingly, the term “Lebensraum” was not employed at all 
in the 1944 Lehrplan.  Instead, the history of Lebensraum was replaced with a 
benevolent gathering mission in which the peoples of the East were brought “law 
and order,”47 and then subsequently given those elements of civilization that 
ultimately made them European.  Thus, in the 1944 Lehrplan, Heinrich I. was 
praised for having “gradually given the Slavs those elements of civilization that 
enabled them to subsequently be…added among those who have given Europe its 
lasting elements.”48 The alteration of the Slavs’ role in the history of the Reich 
represents a complete about-face in the two Lehrpläne.  Initially insidious, racial 
inferiors, they suddenly became the latest fruitful additions to the European 
community: “[i]t was Europe itself that went forth with the German [deutsch] 
emigrants towards the East and gathered the Slavic peoples from the Baltic See to 
the Adriatic See into the continental community.”49 
European Racial Exceptionalism 
 
46 This comes from a sub-section entitled Die Rückgewinnung des Ostens (“The 
Reconquering of the East”).  See Lehrplan (1941), 39. 
47 Lehrplan (1944), 32. 
48 Ibid., 29. 
49 Ibid., 34. 
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 At first glance, one might mistakenly conclude that the 1944 Lehrplan had 
discontinued the concept of race.  In fact, at times the text seems to offer the idea 
of a post-race and post-nation Europe: 
For many centuries the peoples of Europe were unable to 
acknowledge their commonality due to feelings of national 
uniqueness.  In the nineteenth century the last remains of a 
conscientious continental identity sank in the blood of European 
Civil Wars while the exaggerations of the national principle and 
irrational disassociation from one another were nurtured.  The 
consequences of this blindness was endless suffering.50 
 
While the 1944 Lehrplan was certainly post-nation (advocating for a new 
“European continental identity” to replace nationalism) it was not, however, post-
racial. In fact, the Waffen-SS propagandists were clearly sensitive to such 
accusations and attempted to preemptively dismiss them: 
Whoever thinks that the SS is therefore forfeiting its original 
character or repudiating the strict principles of race does not 





The history of Germanic migration and the once-upon-a-time 
Germanic settlement between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea and 
from the Atlantic Ocean to North Africa founded the blood-based 
relatedness [blutsmässige Verwandtschaft] of Europe, and 
established what we call European culture.  The New Order of 




No person in Europe today believes – no matter how this war 
might end – that there will be a return of small and large states 




50 Ibid., 23. 
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Lastly, it argued, Europeans everywhere were witnessing “the common Germanic 
roots of the European Family of Peoples taking root once again.”51 The way to 
square a post-nation ideology with a pro-racial ideology, then, was to expand the 
historical definition of “Germanic” to include all of continental Europe (somehow 
even including Russia).  In fact, the 1944 Lehrplan went even further, suggesting 
that all Europeans are racial comrades who share origins in the “Indo-Germanics” 
who migrated into Europe many thousands of years before and “in this manner 
created long ago the blood-based foundation for the European continent upon 
which a later spiritual unification could take place.”52 The various tribes which 
emerged throughout the continent, although they occasionally and unfortunately 
fought against one another, were actually united with an “Occidental identity” and 
unconsciously engaged in a meta-historical mission to protect the Indo-Germanic 
heritage from Jews and “Asians.”53 Near the end of the 1944 Lehrplan there 
appeared a section devoted to codifying this new racialism, in which each modern 
European nationality was the product of one of six “successor races” 
(Erbanlagengemeinschaft) to the “Indo-Germanic” race: namely, Nordisch, 
Fälisch, Dinarisch, Westisch, Ostisch, or Ostbaltisch.54 
 
51 Ibid., 20-24. 
52 Ibid., 25. 
53 Ibid., 26-27. 
54 Here and elsewhere Waffen-SS propagandists made use of the racial categorization put 
forward by Nazi academic Hans F.K Günther at the University of Berlin.  Waffen-SS 
propagandists began to sporadically deploy these categories as early as 1942 when the SS-
Hauptamt published a short seventy-two page book based on Günther’s categorization.  See 
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In other words, racial theory remained in the 1944 Lehrplan, but was re-
developed into a paradoxical pseudo-egalitarian racial exceptionalism. Each 
modern European race, it was explained, was its own special combination of 
“biological” and “cultural-historical” “inheritance,” and should therefore be 
preserved because of its inherent “biological equality” (biologische 
Gleichwertigkeit) with all other European races, and because of its “distinct” and 
“unique” contribution to the whole, and because of its origins in the “Indo-
Germanics.” Yet despite the alleged commonalities and equalities, racial mixing 
was nevertheless condemned: “Every racial mixing changes this harmonious 
racial picture… [and causes] damage to racial peculiarity.”  This was an idea 
peddled by the Jews, the one race which did not belong to the European fold.55  
Awkwardly overcautious, the 1944 Lehrplan struggled to avoid racial 
supremacism while still attempting to present the important historical role of the 
modern Nordic race.  The Nordic race was presented as having had an 
“unmistakable influence” for the historical development of Europe; it was the 
“center of European humanity and the connection to all other [races].” Yet even 
these cautious attempts to retain some element of Nazi superiority were 
accompanied with a double-down on the new-found racially egalitarian 
exceptionalism: 
Here we must emphasize yet again that it is not appropriate in the statutory 
philosophy of racial and racial-historical observations to procure 
 
Rassenpolitik, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, Nazi Propaganda 
Literature Series. 
55 Lehrplan (1944), 71-77. 
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definitions of comparative value. Every form of life and achievement of a 
race, as a biological and cultural community, will be acknowledged, 
because we see in it a natural demonstration of life. When we emphasize in 
particular the commitment of the Nordic race for Europe, that’s not from 
a standpoint of biological evaluation; rather, it’s a result of a real 
political realization that this race contains historically, as well as 
currently, the capacity to unite the whole and thereby integrate Europe 
into a powerful living community [italics in original].56 
 
Leithefte 
 Having witnessed the stark contrast between 1941 and 1944 officer 
instruction, the rest of this chapter will switch focus to an examination of this 
ideological shift over the course of the war in relation to the changing ethnic 
make-up of the Waffen-SS and subsequent alterations to propaganda narratives in 
Berger’s SS Office for Indoctrination.  The above passages hint at the first 
significant ideological reformulation in Waffen-SS propaganda which this chapter 
is categorizing “Germanic Europeanism.”  By June of 1940, Hitler’s Blitzkrieg 
campaigns had resulted in the sudden occupation of Europe. With most of 
Western and Northern Europe under Nazi rule, Gottlob Berger moved quickly to 
take advantage of the untapped recruitment pool, and the first wave of a few 
thousand non-German, Western and Northern European volunteers entered the 
Waffen-SS.  This resulted in the first non-German Waffen-SS formations 
(Westland and Nordland), comprised of Dutch, Danes, Belgian “Walloons,” and 
Norwegians.57 These regiments were soon after combined with a German 
 
56 Ibid., 75. 
57 Berger also began adding Eastern European ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) around the 
same time. See Stein, The Waffen-SS, 97, 143-144, 169. 
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regiment of veterans from the Western campaign to form a transnational 
Germanic division, the SS-Panzerdivision Wiking.  The name of the division, 
“Viking,” speaks to the ideological novelty which the division was intended to 
pioneer.  Under the leadership of German nationalist and former WW1/Freikorps 
veteran Felix Steiner, SS-Panzerdivision Wiking was intended as the vanguard of 
a new “Greater Germanic” identity for the Waffen-SS now imbued with a mission 
to unify Europe, and Steiner was proudly aware of this role.58  As a result, by the 
end of 1940 this new narrative dominated Waffen-SS propaganda.  A new set of 
sources illustrate both this transition as well as the essence of this new doctrine. 
While the 1941 and 1944 Lehrpläne reveal an acute shift in the ideological 
message for the Waffen-SS between 1941 and 1944, a second set of sources offers 
insight into the gradual transition towards Germanic Europeanism over those 
same years. In addition to propaganda instruction from their officers, Waffen-SS 
soldiers at the front were indoctrinated via an additional medium: monthly 
periodicals called “Leithefte,” or “guide magazines.”  These propaganda and 
entertainment magazines were, alongside officer indoctrination, the next most 
important source for propaganda in the Waffen-SS.  Published monthly by the SS-
Main Office and distributed to the various divisions and SS bureaus throughout 
occupied Europe, the Leitheft magazines were designed for continuous 
indoctrination and entertainment of the soldiers.  Like officer instruction, the 
Leitheft magazines were an essential tool for Waffen-SS indoctrination: in fact, at 
 
58 Steiner, as will be discussed in more detail below, fully embraced this ideology both during 
and after the war, and carried it with him into the postwar years as a leader in veterans’ circles. 
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the Nürnberg Trials Berger claimed that they were the main means of instruction 
within the SS.59  Heinrich Himmler himself, in a speech to SS bureaucrats in 
January of 1944, acknowledged that the Leitheft magazines were a primary means 
of indoctrination second only to direct instruction from troop commanders.60  
Moreover, war-time documents reveal the popularity of the magazines among the 
soldiers.  In a report to Himmler in April, 1943, Berger expressed that the 
popularity of the Leitheft magazines among the soldiers had resulted in extremely 
high demand (400,000 total copies had been printed, and this was supposedly not 
fulfilling the demand for even more).61  It is surprising, therefore, that the Leitheft 
magazines have not received their due attention in the historiography, especially 
because they attest to the penetration of Europeanism beyond the officer corps 
and into the standard ranks of the Waffen-SS.62  In June, 1942 the SS-Main Office 
 
59 Wegner, The Waffen-SS, 199. 
60 “Rede des Reichsführer-SS auf der Tagung der RPA-Leiter am 28 Januar 1944,” United 
States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, College Park MD, T175, 
Roll 94, Frame 2614803. 
61 Gottlob Berger to Heinrich Himmler, April 21st, 1943, United States National Archives 
and Records Administration at College Park, College Park MD, T 175, Roll 38, Frame 38/7943. 
62 George Stein only mentions the Leitheft magazines once.  See Stein, The Waffen-SS.  
Bernd Wegner discusses them primarily in the context of the pre-war years before the Waffen-SS 
expanded exponentially and internationalized, and even then mostly just on the topic of 
antisemitism.  See Wegner, The Waffen-SS.  Martin Cüppers similarly uses them only briefly to 
underscore the extreme levels of antisemitism among the soldiers of a specific unit called the 
Kommandostab RFSS (an auxiliary force under Himmler’s control from 1941-1942).  See 
Cüppers, Wegbereiter Der Shoah.  Josef Ackermann is one of the few historians to give the 
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circulated a memo from Heinrich Himmler describing the Leitheft magazines as a 
“timeless and permanently relevant ideological source for all-encompassing and 
scientific instruction.”63 
The first publication year for the Leitheft magazines was 1935, at which 
point they fulfilled a much different function than they would later during the war.  
Similar to the eventual officers’ Lehrpläne, the Leitheft magazines were originally 
published for SS officers as instructional guidelines for the further indoctrination 
of the troops.64  Also, it is important to note that at this point they were published 
for the “General-SS,” rather than primarily for the Waffen-SS.  Later, however, 
the Leitheft magazines would become a tool of instruction mainly for the Waffen-
SS.  Initially they were not yet published by Berger’s SS-Main Office; instead, 
 
Leitheft magazines substantial discussion, but he also employs them primarily in the pre-war 
context.  His use of the Leitheft magazines, though, are for a biography of Heinrich Himmler, in 
which he sees them as a source that speak mostly to the core of Himmler’s ideological beliefs.  He 
likewise does not use them for studying the Waffen-SS after 1940 and Berger’s take-over of 
indoctrination for the Waffen-SS.  See Josef Ackermann, Heinrich Himmler Als Ideologe, 
(Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1970).  Finally, Martin Gutmann has given the Leitheft magazines 
significant attention with respect to Danish, Swedish, and Swiss volunteers and their participation 
in the “Germanic Recruitment Offices.”  In particular, he utilizes the Germanic Leitheft magazines 
discussed below.  See Gutmann, Building a Nazi Europe. 
63 “Erlass des RFSS vom 1. Juni, 1942,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Licherfelde, NS 31/415.  
64 Issues in the first two years of publication, for example, usually began with a preface 
entitled Zur Beachtung (“Take notice”) instructing “SS-Führer [SS-leaders]” and “Schulungsleiter 
[Instruction leaders]” regarding which themes to emphasize and how to present the material.  See, 
for example, “Zur Beachtung,” SS-Leithefte 1/6 (1935-1936). 
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they were published by the SS Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt (the SS Race and 
Settlement Main Office), Himmler’s department in the SS responsible for policing 
racial purity.65  It was not until 1938 that the Leitheft magazines were published 
by the SS-Main Office.66  And it was not until after the outbreak of war in late 
1939, as part of Berger’s restructuring of the SS-Main Office, that the soldiers of 
the Waffen-SS became the primary audience.  Around this time, they began to be 
published in much greater quantity and not just for Waffen-SS leadership cadres, 
but for all the troops.67  Himmler emphasized that they focus primarily on 
doctrine rather than day-to-day politics such that they could be read by future or 
 
65 See “Zur Beachtung,” SS-Leithefte 2/8 (1936-1937). This is why some historians, like 
Josef Ackermann, have justifiably used the pre-war Leitheft magazines as sources for investigating 
Himmler’s idiosyncratic Nazi ideology. See Ackermann, Heinrich Himmler Als Ideologe. 
66 SS-Leithefte 4/4 (1938-1939). 
67 For example, the preface to an issue in 1937 instructs SS-leaders to cease prohibiting the 
production of further copies of the Leitheft magazines.  The Leitheft magazines, it was explained, 
should reach all men in the SS, not just the leadership.  See “Zur Beachtung,” SS-Leithefte 2/8 
(1936-1937). Additionally, a new war-time edition of the Leitheft magazines called 
“Kriegsausgabe,” which corresponded to the beginning of the war in 1939, reveals the extent to 
which the audience had changed.  In these war-time editions, the combat troops of the Waffen-SS 
were addressed directly and ideological articles begin to be interspersed with various articles for 
entertainment (stories, jokes, illustrations). See, for example, SS-Leithefte 5/5 (1939-1940). It 
should not be assumed, however, that at this point only the Waffen-SS received the Leitheft 
magazines.  An issue after the outbreak of war in late 1939, for example, mentioned that some SD 




past generations seamlessly.  In particular, he ordered, they should teach the 
“manly, heroic virtues”; namely: “honor, loyalty, obedience, courage, and 
comradeship.”68 According to another internal SS-Main Office memo, by mid-
1942 the SS-Main Office had printed over 250,000 Leitheft magazines, with more 
than half of those going to the Waffen-SS soldiers at the front and the rest to the 
“General SS” and associated “departments.”69 By this time, the Leitheft 
magazines had become the primary vehicle for Germanic Europeanism in the 
Waffen-SS.  The rise of Germanic Europeanism in the Leitheft magazines can be 
divided into four stages: German Racial Supremacism, Germanic particularism, 
Germanic nationalism, and modified Germanic Europeanism 
German Racial Supremacism, 1935-1939 
The pre-war and early-war Leitheft magazines, which the SS Race and 
Settlement Main Office began publishing in early 1935, were anchored in the 
unashamed racial supremacism typically associated with conventional National 
Socialism. The SS was presented as an exclusively German (deutsch) “Order” 
called to preserve the German race.  “I believe in Germany, and that’s what I’m 
fighting for today, tomorrow, and forever – as long as I live,” declared one of the 
earliest editions from 1935, “[t]he Volk alone is our Lord, and we serve this Volk 
 
68 “Erlass des RFSS vom 1. Juni, 1942,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Licherfelde, NS 31/415. 
69 SS-Hauptsturmführer Guhiverk, “Gedanken zur Gestaltung der Leithefte in Ausführung 




to the best of our knowledge and conscience.”70 To be sure, even already in the 
mid-1930s the Leitheft magazines were liberal with their use of the term 
“German,” often exchanging it interchangeably with “Nordic,” “Germanic,” 
“Germanic-German,” or “Germanic-Nordic.”  For example, the first edition of 
1936 was dedicated to expounding upon the political doctrine of “the blood 
concept” (Blutsgedanken) as an alternative political ideology to liberalism, 
Marxism, Christianity, and Judaism.  It declared that the Nuremberg Laws of 
1935 were an essential victory in this ideological competition, because it 
redefined citizenship via blood in contrast to the unrooted ideologies of its 
competitors. But Reich-citizenship was not only preserved for the German Volk, 
but also people of “related blood” (artverwandten Blutes).71  The ambiguity in the 
regularly employed term artverwandt enabled SS propagandists to elide 
specificity in the blood concept throughout the 1930s as well as the war years, 
because it fudged the demarcations between concepts such as “Volk,” “race,” 
“blood,” “Nordic,”  “Aryan,” “Germanic,” and “German.”  The lack of 
codification resulted in a repeated terminological incongruity in SS propaganda.  
Indeed, in the very same edition, the term “Nordic,” for example, was used 
inconsistently across different articles.  One article discussed the Nordics as the 
 
70 “Leitworte,“ SS-Leithefte 1/6 (1935-1936). 
71 “Blut und Boden,” SS-Leithefte 2/1 (1936-1937), 10-11. Another article from mid-1937 
entitled “National Socialism and Law” explained that proper legal theory in Nazism emulates 
traditional Germanic tribal law, governing all aspects of society according to race and blood. See 
“Nationalsozialismus und Recht,” SS-Leithefte 3/1 (1937-1938), 39. 
291 
 
historical “predecessors” of the modern Germanics; another article, by Alfred 
Rosenberg (a frequent guest author in SS propaganda)  used “Nordic” 
synonymously with modern Germanics, declaring the Nordics to be the world’s 
“strongest state-building and culture-creating power“ and therefore worthy of 
conquering Eastern Europe.72  This ambiguity supplied the origins of Germanic 
Europeanism, because it left open the possibility of re-anchoring SS ideology in 
the less German-centric narrative of a brotherhood of Germanic peoples. 
Nevertheless, despite the terminological flirtation with Germanic 
Europeanism, most of the Leitheft magazines propaganda of the 1930s remained 
quite German-centric.  The “blood concept” was often used interchangeably with 
the term “German socialism,” which suggested that German history contained a 
unique tradition capable of overcoming Marxism and liberalism, and under the 
leadership of Adolf Hitler was just now breaking out of its historical embryo.73 
Similarly, the Reich concept was definitively exclusive in these earlier Leitheft 
magazines, reserving the Reich for the German Volk alone: “…our understanding 
of the state is different than before. The state is only a means for the purpose of 
preserving a Volk and to protect it in its fight for life.” Notions of a European 
Reich, or even a Reich of separate-but-equal Germanic peoples, were absent.   
The first references to a European mission of the Waffen-SS were 
scattered throughout the early SS propaganda of the mid-1930s, often by Alfred 
 
72 “Grundsätze Nationalsozialistischer Geschichtsauffassung,” SS-Leithefte 2/5 (1936-1937), 
54-55. 
73 “Deutscher Sozialismus,” SS-Leithefte 5/5 (1939-1940), 5. 
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Rosenberg.  The first propaganda piece to engage with the Europe-concept was an 
article by Alfred Rosenberg in the sixth ever edition of the Leitheft magazines in 
late 1935.  While referring to “new research” in archaeology, Rosenberg claimed 
that European culture was the product of Germanic expansion and cultural 
dominance in the Middle Ages, ultimately leading surrounding races to adopt 
Germanic culture:  
Contemporary research has rescued the often misused name of ‘Europe’, 
and so if we are to proudly call ourselves Europeans, then we must do so 
from a deeper consciousness than earlier, rootless cosmopolitans have.  
Europe was once the spring-board for the great cultures of the world!  
Europe has been the carrier of all truly great research and discoveries in 
world history and today it is a concept of a larger, all-encompassing home.  
The reinforcement of the unity in European life is a fundamental 
contribution of the National Socialist movement for the renewal of an 
ideologically and socially polarized continent. 
 
He continued: “cultures do not create mankind, rather, specific racial groups 
create their specific cultures, which then naturally force other peoples under their 
spiritual dominance.”74  
 Such early probing of a racial concept for Europe, although scattered 
throughout early SS propaganda, were the exception to the rule.  Nonetheless, by 
the late 1930s such arguments were more frequent.75 By early 1939, this argument 
increasingly extended into Eastern Europe.  SS propagandists presented the 
history of Eastern Europe as a back and forth racial struggle between Germanics 
and Slavs, which began with an initial cultural flourishing under the Germanic 
Teutonic Knights but which was overwhelmed by successive waves of Slavic 
 
74 “Germanische Ur-und Frühgeschichte,” SS-Leithefte 1/6 (1935-1936). 
75 “Die Neuordnung Europas durch die Germanen,“ SS-Leithefte 3/3 (1937-1938), 10-15. 
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invasion.  Hence, the SS increasingly used the historical-cultural narrative of a 
Germanic Europe to justify Lebensraum expansionism.76 
Germanic Particularism, 1939-1941 
 The “Germanic Europe” narrative, as it first emerged in the Leitheft 
magazines in the summer and fall of 1940, was tailored to specific Germanic 
nations.  Europe was the historical inheritance of Germans, Dutchmen, Belgian 
“Walloons,” Swedes, Norwegians, and Flemish.  Each Germanic nationality was 
handled separately and, importantly, differences and peculiarities were repeatedly 
accentuated.  In other words, Germanic Europeanism, initially, was a kind of 
“particularism,” as SS propagandists called it, which separated the Germanic 
nations as historically, culturally, and even racially distinct.  Although all of these 
non-German nationalities were racially “healthy,” they were nonetheless trained 
to accept German military and political superiority and dominance.  One of the 
first lead-articles which anticipated the Germanic-European mission of the 
Waffen-SS was written at the end of 1939.  The article, titled “Germany’s 
Struggle for Europe!” spoke passionately about a “European Community,” but 
repudiated any notions of a common European, or even Germanic, identity, even 
insinuating that each nation passively submit itself to German rule: “Germany! 
That is the inner decision that we have spoken about, and that each Volk in 
Europe must make.”77  Or, as an edition from early 1940 put it: Germany was 
called to “liberate” the Nordic countries, “but not by forcing its idiosyncrasies 
 
76 “Germanen gestalten den Ostraum,” SS-Leithefte 4/10 (1938-1939), 54-60. 
77 “Deutschlands Kampf um Europa!” SS-Leithefte 5/10a (1939-1940). 
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onto the foreign peoples; rather, by pointing each people to itself and its own 
history.”78 As such, each Germanic nationality was treated independently in 
Waffen-SS propaganda.  Even traditional Nazi ideas such as “Lebensraum” were 
fitted onto Germanic particularism.  In mid-1942, a series of articles were 
published under the motto “Battles for Germanic Lebensraum in the East.” The 
articles attempted to substantiate each respective Germanic Volk’s historical 
claim to Lebensraum in the Germanic “Destiny Land” in the East by summarizing 
said Volk’s historical victories and defeats in the history of the Eastern struggle 
against Slavs.79  Following is a small selection of article titles: “Norwegians in the 
East,” “Danes in the East,” “Dutchman in the Breadbasket of Europe,” and “The 
Danish Sword Secures Earth for the Danish Plow.”80 
Germanic Nationalism, 1941-1944 
At the end of 1940, a new narrative began to compete with Germanic 
Particularism in the Leitheft magazines. The concept “Reich,” began to lose its 
strict nationalist treatment and quite literally began referring to a pan-Germanic 
Reich of a racially pure Germanic nation stretching across Northern Europe.  
Propagandists began to subtly suggest that all Germanic people (hitherto referred 
to as separate races, or Völker) were in reality just one racial Volk.  Thus, one 
edition from late 1940 declared, the coming Germanic Reich would be based on 
 
78 “Wir und der Norden,” SS-Leithefte 6/3b (1940-1941). 
79 “Weltmacht Germaniens,” SS-Germanische Leithefte 2/3&4 (1942). 




the “eternal law that a Reich and a nation are ultimately created in the observance 
that only the Volk of the same or similar blood can belong to a Reich and a 
nation….”81  Other articles from late 1940 began speaking about “our race” as a 
“Germanic race.”82 Throughout the year of 1941, and accelerated by the invasion 
of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, this new message increasingly pushed aside 
Germanic particularism.  In short, Waffen-SS propaganda began proposing a 
Germanic nation to subsume traditional nationalism. 
Internal SS-Main Office documents suggest that the impetus for this shift 
came from Felix Steiner and Gottlob Berger, and was most likely once again tied 
to the international transformation of the Waffen-SS.  Although a considerable 
amount of European volunteers joined the Waffen-SS between the summer of 
1940 and early 1941, they pale in comparison to the influx of those who joined 
following the German attack on the Soviet Union in June, 1941.  Before the 
invasion, Berger had received permission to open various “Germanic Recruitment 
Offices” (germanische Leitstellen) in order to coordinate a more intensive 
recruitment campaign for Germanic volunteers.83  By the beginning of 1942 a 
total of 20,000 Northern Europeans had joined ranks with the Waffen-SS in what 
 
81 “Das neue Gemeinschaftsgesetz in Europa,“ SS-Leithefte 6/5b (1940-1941).  
82 “Für die Ewigkeit unserer Rasse,” SS-Leithefte 6/6a (1940-1941). 
83 “Ausbau der Germanischen Freiwilligen-Leitstelle zur Zentralstelle für die germanische 
Arbeit der Parteigliederungen,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 19/1564. 
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Hitler called a “European crusade” against Bolshevism.84  Indeed, Hitler himself 
recognized the non-German volunteers in his first public speech after the invasion 
of the U.S.S.R. on October 3rd, 1941.  He continued to praise them throughout 
1941 in his public speeches, which Leitheft magazines energetically referenced 
and quoted in full.  Many of the new Germanic recruits joined an enlarged SS-
Panzerdivision Wiking, but the large number of volunteer recruits necessitated a 
new format.  Shortly after the invasion, Hitler agreed to have “National Legions” 
established for each Western and European nationality. 
This recruitment drive was an important victory for Berger, but it also 
presented him with a unique challenge.  Many Germanic volunteers understood 
their involvement in the Waffen-SS in traditional nationalist terms.  Although 
allied with Nazi Germany, they were fighting first and foremost for their country.  
Take, for example, a booklet published by the SS-Main Office in April, 1942 
called “The Rise of Germanic Volunteers in Letters.” In this short book, likely 
designed for recruiting subsequent Germanic volunteers, the SS-Main Office 
propagandists attempted to substantiate the notion of a Germanic awakening by 
publishing quotations from various Germanic volunteers.  But the quotations 
reveal a resistance to Germanic nationalism and an attachment to traditional 
nationalism.  Take, for example, the following collection of quotations: 
I want to appeal to all Norwegian boys who have preserved at least some 
sense of love for their Fatherland: join the Norwegian Legion!; We want 
 
84 Gottlob Berger, “Statistische Aufstellung zur Waffen-SS und Legion eingestellte, 
entlassene und gefallene germanische Freiwillige; Stand: 30.10.42,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-
Lichterfelde, NS 31/455. 
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to preserve the future potentialities of Flanders regarding its cultural, 
economic and general racial renaissance...; It’s interesting that, although I 
feel in my heart that I am and will remain a Dutchman, I nevertheless 
honor [Hitler] as my highest leader; After the War Finland will become 
great and strong, but only if the Finnish people remains steadfast…; May 
God protect Sweden, I often think silently; We fight with the conviction 
that our blood will flow so that our beloved Netherlands can become 
free.85  
 
But for Berger, the purpose of Germanic recruitment in the Waffen-SS was more 
revolutionary than a mere reinvigoration of traditional nationalism.  In August, 
1941 Berger wrote a letter to the Wehrmacht administrator of occupied Belgium 
and Northern France, Eggert Reeder, and made his feelings clear about traditional 
nationalism.  Reeder had written him about a “tension” between “Flemish 
nationalism” and “Greater Germanic identity.”  Berger proceeded to explain that 
these issues were not new, and had been a focus of his in the Waffen-SS for a 
long time.  The solution, he explained, was a “New Order of the Greater 
Germanic territories, aka Europe, on the basis of a Greater Germanic way of 
thinking [grossgermanisches Denken] as well as the defeating of nationalist 
movements in the periphery states.”  He explained that political difficulties made 
it impossible to make this position clear at the moment, but that it was 
nevertheless the official line of the Waffen-SS.  Future policy, he explained, 
would necessitate that  
in the New Europe the Germanic states will be tied into a uniquely close 
relationship to us, that means that the New Europe will be composed of a 
Greater Germanic Reich of peoples newly positioned facing the East as an 
enlarged continent.  This conceptualization is the necessary conclusion of 
the main idea of National Socialism, the blood and race concept. 
 
85 Aufbruch: Briefe germanischer Freiwillige, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 




While the majority of Germanics in Northern and Western Europe may not yet 
have been prepared to accept such a revolutionary idea, it was nevertheless the 
path forward, Berger explained, and the policy of the Reich must be to convert 
Germanics from their “local patriotism” to “Greater Germanic way of thinking.”86 
Thus, already by mid-1941 Berger had become an enthusiastic Germanic 
Europeanist.  This vision of a new Germanic nationalism is something he 
remained committed to throughout the war.87 Himmler, too, had become a 
proponent of a Germanic Waffen-SS, most likely already before the war began.88  
In his mid-1942 memo on the Leitheft magazines, he ordered: “I want to 
emphasize that through the Leitheft magazines our men should 
receive…instruction as to the history of the Indo-Germanic peoples, especially the 
Germanic-German Volk and a knowledge of its enemies.”89 And in a speech to 
 
86 Gottlob Berger to Eggert Reeder, „Militärverwaltungschef beim Militärbefehlshaber in 
Belgien und Nordfrankreich,“ October 7, 1941, Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 19/1548. 
87 In 1944 Berger even published a book of his own titled “On the Path Towards a Germanic 
Reich.”  See Gottlob Berger, Auf dem Weg zum Germanischen Reich (SS-Hauptamt, 1944), 
Library of Congress. 
88 In a speech to Waffen-SS troops on November 8th, 1938, Himmler said: “I really do have 
the intention to gather Germanic blood from the whole world, to rob it, to steal it wherever I can.” 
See Peter Black and Martin Gutmann, “Racial Theory and Realities of Conquest in the Occupied 
East: The Nazi Leadership and Non-German Nationals in the SS and Police” in ed.s Jochen Böhler 
and Robert Gerwarth, The Waffen-SS: A European History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 16-41, 20.  Christensen, Poulsen, and Smith, “Germanic volunteers from northern Europe.” 
89 “Erlass des RFSS vom 1. Juni, 1942,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 31/415. 
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leaders of the SS-Main Office on June 9th, 1942 he explained that this was an 
eternal task: “To this question of extracting Germanic people [Germanen], to 
which we now - in a war where history is written in blood and foundations are 
constructed - already devote a very great deal of our attention, we will have to 
devote ourselves for all time.”90 
Berger’s preferred model for a Germanic Waffen-SS was Felix Steiner’s 
SS-Panzerdivision Wiking, with Germanic and German soldiers intermingled in 
the same units, as opposed to separate national legions.  By 1942 Berger was 
convinced that Germanic Europeanism had successfully pierced the hearts of 
Germanics in the Waffen-SS.  In a report on the Germanic national legions, he 
explained that “the purpose of the Germanic legions is the indoctrination of the 
volunteers to the “Germanic way of thinking, and leading them to the idea of the 
Reich.”  He continued: 
How successful we’ve been in this is confirmed by the many letters from 
the front that have gone through our hands.  It is becoming increasingly 
clear that a knowledge is growing in the men, that Adolf Hitler is their 
Führer; that there is only one future for their homes – a return to the 
Reich; that they are of one blood with their German comrades, that there is 
nothing which separates the Germanic peoples. 
He continued: 
The legions stepped forward to protect their homes from the flood of 
Bolshevism, they fought for a free Norway, Denmark, Holland, Flanders.  
However, soon there emerged a recognition that there is something higher 
which is worth fighting for: the great National Socialist Germanic Reich.  
 
90 Peter Black and Martin Gutmann, “Racial theory and realities of conquest in the occupied 
east: The Nazi leadership and non-German nationals in the SS and police,” 16, in ed.s Jochen 
Böhler and Robert Gerwarth, The Waffen-SS: A European History, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 16-41 
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From contact with the National Socialist idea, and from living together 
with German comrades…grew the idea of the Reich and the knowledge of 
the Germanic community. 
As such, he argued, the separate national legions only hindered the goals of the 
Waffen-SS by giving aid to “local patriotism” and were therefore going to be 
discontinued.91 Indeed, they were: in early 1943 Germanic volunteers in the 
Waffen-SS were integrated into standard Waffen-SS divisions based on the model 
of Felix Steiner’s SS-Panzerdivision Wiking and upon the suggestion of Felix 
Steiner himself.92 
When analyzing the shift to Germanic nationalism in the Leitheft 
magazines, it becomes clear that Germanic nationalism did not require a radical 
alteration of fundamental Nazi doctrine. Instead, it can be read as a subtle 
modification, in which Nazi racialism was refined by mapping historical 
categories of the German race (“Aryan,” “Nordic,” “Germanic”) onto the 
contemporary “Volk.”  This was facilitated by a rather subtle shift in semantics.  
The term “Reich” was re-defined from großdeutsches Reich (“Greater German 
 
91 Gottlob Berger, “Statistische Aufstellung zur Waffen-SS und Legion eingestellte, 
entlassene und gefallene germanische Freiwillige; Stand: 30.10.42,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-
Lichterfelde, NS 31/455. 
92 Berger was likely influenced in this decision by Felix Steiner, who wrote to him in 
September, 1942 with the recommendation of collapsing the National Legions into Viking and 
other German divisions so as to further the “Germanic idea” and confront the way local nationalist 
parties had made the legions into “pets,” i.e. manifestations and vehicles of their nationalist 




Reich“) to großgermanisches Reich (“Greater Germanic Reich”).  Similarly, the 
term “Europe“ obtained a meaning synonymous with “Germanic Europe.” One 
article, for example, invited the soldiers to examine the etymology of the word 
“Europe,” explaining that the words “Germanics” and “Europe” were allegedly 
“fused together” in linguistic history: “The one is not possible without the 
other.”93 Furthermore, despite the protestation of Jewish-influenced 
cosmopolitans, the idea of Europe itself was originally supposedly a racial 
concept.  “Europe,” Waffen-SS propagandists explained, was nothing more than a 
historical term for “Germanic Reich.”  And both terms, moreover, were just 
expressions of racial essence.  “[T]he Reich concept is not an organizational 
concept,” one article from early 1942 explained, “its origin is to be found in 
blood.”94   
Precisely because the concept of “Europe” had such unifying potential, 
then, it was used in Waffen-SS propaganda as a vehicle for facilitating Germanic 
racial nationalism.  This can be seen in the re-constructed history of the Reich. 
European culture was argued to have begun when the Romans and Germanics 
joined together to defend classical Greek culture against the Huns, thus creating a 
“Germanic Occident” (Germanisches Abendland);95 the history of Europe was 
referred to as a coordinated “Germanic creation of Europe” (Germanische 
 
93 “Der Europäische Befreiungskrieg,“ SS-Germanische Leithefte 1/1 (1941), 11.  
94 “Die Germanische Sendung des Reiches,“ SS-Germanische Leithefte 2/1 (1942), 34. 
95 “Der Führer über das Schicksal Europas,“ SS-Germanische Leithefte 2/1 (1942), 3. 
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Europaschöpfung);96 Charlemagne and Heinrich I. suddenly became Germanic 
characters who fought hand in hand with other Germanic tribes against the Slavs 
from the East.97  Contrasting this history to the racial mixing in the history of the 
United States of America, one article argued that Europe should take note of 
American mistakes: “If Europe wants to avoid losing its peculiarity, then the rule 
of Nordic blood must be maintained….” The lesson was clear: to preserve the 
racial tradition of Europe, then the Nordic race must always “represent the ruling 
class.”98 
To be sure, the shift to Germanic nationalism did not take place 
seamlessly in the Leitheft magazines. Internal documents from the SS-Main 
Office suggest that Waffen-SS propagandists were often frustrated in their efforts 
to convert non-German Germanics from traditional nationalism to Germanic 
nationalism.99 As such, Germanic particularism had a scattered, persistent 
resonance in Waffen-SS propaganda.100 But in 1941, the SS-Main Office 
 
96 “Schönheit und segen des Reiches,” SS-Germanische Leithefte 2/1 (1942), 8. 
97 “Die Germanische Sendung des Reiches,“ SS-Germanische Leithefte 2/1 (1942), 35. 
98 “Europa wird Wiedergefunden,” SS-Germanische Leithefte 1/1 (1941), 22-24. 
99 Gottlob Berger, “Statistische Aufstellung zur Waffen-SS und Legion eingestellte, 
entlassene und gefallene germanische Freiwillige; Stand: 30.10.42,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-
Lichterfelde, NS 31/455. 
100 One article from the end of 1944, written by a self-described Flemish volunteer, admitted 
that among his fellow patriotic Flemish comrades “there exists in the hearts of many an impulse 
for clear border apportionment and clear finalized conditions.”  See “Flandern und der Weg zum 
Reich,” SS-Leithefte 10/9 (1944), 20-22.  See additionally a discussion of internal ethnic discord 
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published a new, separate Leitheft series called the Germanische Leithefte 
(“Germanic guide magazines”), which were published simultaneously with the 
regular Leitheft magazines in various Northern European languages, and 
distributed to divisions with non-German personnel. These did not differ in 
substance or theme from the regular Leitheft magazines – like the regular Leitheft 
magazines, the Germanic Leitheft magazines attempted to move beyond Germanic 
particularism.  In fact, as evidenced by correspondence with the Foreign Office, 
the Germanic Leitheft magazines were explicitly designed to win over non-
Germans to Berger’s vision of Germanic nationalism by appealing to them in their 
own languages.101 Interestingly, though, both Leitheft series occasionally ran 
 
within the Waffen-SS in Christensen, Poulsen, and Smith, “Germanic volunteers from northern 
Europe.” George Stein likewise documented evidence of considerable conflict between Germanic 
soldiers and German soldiers in the Waffen-SS, much of it revolving around perceptions of 
German chauvinism. See Stein, The Waffen-SS, 158-162.   de Wever, “‘Rebellen‘ an der Ostfront.“ 
101 In April, 1942, Berger corresponded with Martin Luther, Ribbentrop’s secretary in the 
Foreign Office, about the Germanic Leitheft magazines and Waffen-SS recruitment conferences in 
Germanic countries.  The Foreign Office felt that the magazines were an intrusion into their sphere 
of authority vis-à-vis foreign propaganda.  But Berger explained to Luther in a response letter 
(which he subsequently sent to Himmler) that they had authorization from the Führer to 
“undertake with a special intensity the National Socialist and Greater Germanic indoctrination of 
these units.” See „Tagung des Förderkreises der ‘Germanischen Leithefte‘ (Kulturtagung des SS-
Hauptamtes) in Magdeburg, 27-30 April, 1942; mit Teilnehmern aus Finnland, Flandern, den 
Niederlanden und Norwegen. Anspruch des Auswärtigen Amtes auf Unterrichtung über Ziel, 
Teilnehmerkreis und Wortlaut der Vorträge vor Genehmigung (Schriftwechsel zwischen Berger 
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articles espousing particularism.  It is not clear whether this was an attempt to 
coddle the pride of traditional non-German nationalists, or whether this suggests a 
divide within the SS Office for Indoctrination.  Nevertheless, a certain 
ambivalence pervaded until 1944.  The term “Greater Germanic Community,” for 
example, was sometimes replaced with “Community of Destiny for the Germanic 
Peoples” (Schicksalsgememeinschaft der germanischen Völker) which subtly 
emphasized a difference between the various Germanics in the Waffen-SS.102  
Nevertheless, by mid-1943, Germanic particularism had mostly given way to 
Germanic nationalism in both Leitheft series.  The lead-article from mid-1943 
declared that the coming postwar Reich was going to replace the nation-state idea 
with a New Order of Europe founded in “Germanic thought” and “Germanic 
solidarity.”  The liberal concept of nation-state, it declared, was being supplanted 
by the “birth of a Reich of race” anchored in the concept of “Germanic blood.”  A 
“German Revolution,” it declared, “has become a Germanic Revolution.”103 
Modified Germanic Europeanism, 1944-1945 
 Germanic nationalism remained the narrative in Waffen-SS propaganda 
throughout 1943 and into 1944.  In May, 1943, Gottlob Berger and Heinrich 
Himmler sat down to discuss an outline for the coming year’s Leitheft magazines.  
Himmler ordered that the next year’s editions resemble a “collection of works on 
 
und Unterstaatssekretär Luther vom Auswärtigen Amt),“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 
19/1878. 
102 SS-Germanische Leithefte 1/1 (1941), 3-4. 
103 “Idee und Gestalt des Reiches,“ SS-Germanische Leithefte 3/7 (1943), 1-4. 
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the Germanic-German faith, which literally can be read in coming decades just as 
it could have been read in the past.”  He further commanded that the magazines 
initiate various new topics, among them: the “Indo-Germanic canon.”104 
 But in the summer of 1944 the composition of the Waffen-SS was 
radically different than it had been a year before.  Mid-1943, as a result of the 
progressively ominous military situation, Berger convinced Himmler to begin 
extending Waffen-SS recruitment to his last remaining source of manpower: the 
East. At first, Estonians and Latvians were targeted for recruitment, a move which 
could conceivably fit into the Germanic paradigm.  Then, also in 1943, Balkan 
Muslims were recruited.105  And by the spring of 1944, entire Waffen-SS 
divisions of Ukrainians (and a few months later even Russians) had been trained, 
equipped and sent to the front.106 It is perhaps the deepest irony in the history of 
 
104 “Niederschrift über die Unterredung beim Reichsführer-SS in Gegenwart von SS-
Gruppenführer Berger am 23.5.43,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 31/415. 
105 David Motadel, Islam and Nazi Germany’s War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2014). 
106 Eastern European additions to the Waffen-SS were drawn from already existing SS units.  
During the transition to extermination on the Eastern Front in 1941-1942, Holocaust functionaries 
had increasingly employed local Eastern Europeans in auxiliary police forces attached to the SD 
which they called “Schutzmannschaften.” These units assisted the Einsatzgruppen in the 
rounding-up, deportation, and mass-shootings of Jews. In 1944 Himmler reluctantly allowed these 
units to be converted into Waffen-SS divisions. For a more detailed break-down of the 
bureaucratic decisions involved in this transition see Peter Black and Martin Gutmann, “Racial 
theory and realities of conquest in the occupied east: The Nazi leadership and non-German 
nationals in the SS and police” in ed.s Jochen Böhler and Robert Gerwarth, The Waffen-SS: A 
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the SS that Himmler’s supremacist order had come to rely on hundreds of 
thousands of allegedly racial inferiors.  There is no evidence that Himmler or 
Berger ever genuinely moved beyond Germanic nationalism.  In fact, there is 
plenty of evidence that this was a reluctant and deceitful decision.107  
Nevertheless, as a consequence of Eastern European recruitment, they began to 
disingenuously modify Germanic Europeanism so as to bridge the obvious 
hypocrisies now at the core of the Waffen-SS. 
 The first signs of this modification came in the Leitheft magazines in mid-
1943.  The impetus for the shift appears to have originated in a secret memo 
written by Joseph Goebbels on February 16th, 1943 following the disaster at 
Stalingrad.  The memo was addressed to all propagandists and administrative 
leaders in the Reich, and a copy circulated throughout the SS with Himmler’s 
signature and note: “I find it precisely at our current moment in the war to be very 
important. It is to be followed in the strictest sense by all our positions.”  In the 
memo, Goebbels highlighted the phrase “not only Germany but all Europe” and 
listed the various times Hitler had employed it. Based on these quotations he 
subsequently provided a list of seven propaganda principles for messaging 
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Europe-propaganda, including the repudiation that Germany’s foreign policy 
intended to pursue any kind of “subjugation relationship,” “colonial politics,” or 
“displacement of populations.” Specifically discussing Eastern Europe, he 
explained that German intentions must be presented as philanthropic: to 
modernize the lands for the inhabitants’ own economic and political benefit.108 
 Already in mid-1943 the Leitheft magazines began to tentatively traffic in 
this more expansive Europeanism, which they called the “European Concept of 
Unity” (europäische Einheitsidee).  The first sign was a gradual silence vis-a-vis 
Lebensraum rhetoric.  Second, articles dropped the racial superiority of the 
Nordic Germanic race and re-constructed the term “Europe” and “Germanic” to 
insinuate – and often desperately solicit – the inclusion of Eastern Europeans 
(even Slavs) into the “European Community.” Increasingly, articles about the 
Germanic idea were accompanied with exhortations to withhold judgement about 
the precise definition and function of the postwar “European Peoples 
Community,” and instead accept assurance that the “individual Germanic entities” 
would be rewarded according to their achievement on the battlefield.109  Other 
articles from mid-1943 subtly dropped the Germanic adjective to Europe.  Take, 
for example, an article titled “Us and Europe,” which was (unlike most Leitheft 
articles) given a named author, Norwegian Waffen-SS volunteer Arild Jadar.  
 
108 “Heinrich Himmler an alle Hauptämter, Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer, SS- und 
Polizeiführer, Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei, Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei,“ February, 
1943, Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Licherfelde, NS 19/279. 
109 “Idee und Gestalt des Reiches,“ SS-Leithefte 9/7 (1943), 1-4. 
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Europe, he argued, was defined by a historical struggle to defend itself against 
incursions from Asia, and in this way could best be described as a “closed cultural 
area.”  He continued with an appeal to diversity: 
Today Europe is fighting with a strong belief in the National Socialist 
concept and in the understanding that the new Europe will preserve the 
national and cultural independence of each Volk, because National 
Socialism recognizes the utility of diversity…. On this basis, every nation 
will find its way to its own National Socialist form of being. 
Napoleon’s great historical mistake, he argued, was to try to fuse Europe into one 
homogenous state (revolutionary France). In contrast, “today we’re seeing a new 
Europe rise. That does not means one-sided domination from one single power; 
rather, the responsibility of all states to the community.” Jadar continued: 
This community means a deep-reaching economic solidarity…that will not 
be determined unilaterally. Could our century strive for anything higher 
than a synthesis of the peculiarities of the nations, which, as the centuries 
have gone by, have brought forth such a rich and fruitful European spirit? 
European unity does not mean centralization, rather a leadership that will 
be found and led in all parts of this entity. 
The Germanics’ role in the future Europe, he briefly suggested at the end of the 
article, was merely one of leadership because it was the “racial group” which had 
sacrificed the most in the current conflict.110 
 In early 1944, race began to lose some of its presence in the Leitheft 
magazines, and found itself increasingly pushed into the background by a 
narrative of a future pan-European “federation” (Bund) of different peoples, 
including guarantees of cultural and political independence.  Some articles, such 
 
110 “Europa und Wir,“ SS-Leithefte 9/8 (1943), 25-26. 
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as this article from early 1944 entitled “Europe and Us,” went so far as to 
proclaim the German army to be the true defender of “unalienable human rights”:   
The enemy in the West is not ready to die for a higher world, because he 
does not know such. The enemy in the East until now has only brought 
people oppression and defamation. If there are unalienable human rights, 
then they are being defended at the front by the German army. 
 
The same article, much like the 1944 officers’ instruction manual, felt compelled 
to deny a departure from racial theory, and briefly attempted to re-define 
“Germanic” as the collection of all European nations between the Baltic Sea and 
Black Sea, including Eastern Europeans: “The SS knows that everything has to be 
done, so that they are fused together with European comrades form the East into 
battle-companionship just as it is with those from the West.”111  Another article 
from early 1944, titled “European Community,” implored the Slavs to look west 
to Germany rather than to Russia – just like the Baltic peoples were doing – and 
in doing so “find their way out of a society of fighting peoples to a peaceful 
community of a family of peoples.” In this way, the Slavs would “increasingly 
consider it their great historical fortune that they find themselves…neighbors with 
Germany. Pan-Slavism, designed to expand Russia, would have degraded the 
dignified Slavs. A Europe-led Reich will exalt them.”112    
Modified Germanic Europeanism was not simply an off-script 
idiosyncrasy.  It received signaled legitimacy from the top by Berger and 
Himmler.  In the spring of 1944, Berger gave a speech at an unidentified 
 
111 “Europäische Aufgabe der SS,“ SS-Leithefte 10/2 (1944), 21. 
112 “Europäische Gemeinschaft,“ SS-Leithefte 10/3 (1944), 29. 
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conference entitled “On the Path Towards a Germanic Reich.”  His speech was an 
overview of the history of the Waffen-SS and its evolution towards a Germanic 
ideology.  National Socialism, he argued, always contained within it the seeds of a 
larger Germanic vision, but most party members were unconscious of this.  
However, the surprisingly swift victories of 1940 changed that by enabling 
Germany to “begin re-ordering Europe, unifying the Germanic peoples of our 
continent under its leadership, and creating a Germanic Reich.”  Employing the 
Grossraum-concept, Berger argued that Japan and America had both begun to 
consolidate their continental spaces while Europe lagged behind, unable to 
overcome rivalrous power-complexes, in particular those of England.  The Jewish 
conspirators behind the American Grossraum and the Jewish conspirators behind 
the Communist world revolution, he alleged, quickly realized the threat of a 
European Grossraum to their plans and initiated the Second World War.  The 
Waffen-SS and its miraculous story of non-German recruitment, however, was the 
forefront of Germany’s response.  On the one hand, Berger continued to describe 
the Waffen-SS and its history in the regular terms Germanic nationalism: “It was 
quickly proven that blood is stronger than all other factors of life.  The men of 
Germanic blood fought just as bravely at the front as the Germans.”  Furthermore 
he summarized the history of Western and Northern European recruitment while 
conspicuously leaving out Eastern European recruitment, and argued that these 
men recruited through the Northern and Western European Germanic Recruitment 
Offices would be the nucleus for the leadership in the postwar Germanic Reich.  
On the other hand, it quickly became clear that he was modifying the definition of 
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“Germanic.” For example, the recently added French volunteers to the Waffen-SS 
were described as a new “Celtic” addition to the Waffen-SS and a valuable 
contributor to the community of “Germanic blood.”  He also included the 
Estonians and Latvians into the Germanic fold.  He concluded arguing that the 
only way to avoid “Jewish rule” of the world was to initiate a transition from 
“Greater German thinking to Greater German{ic} thinking.”  This meant that 
“particularism” would have to be overcome in both the Germanic lands as well as 
in Germany, where too many citizens are beholden to the idea of a “smaller circle 
of German people.”113 
 Berger further authorized the shift to a modified Germanic Europeanism in 
the summer of 1944, when he intervened in a dispute in the SS Office of 
Indoctrination.  SS propagandists had apparently disagreed about how to 
formulate the European message in a series of upcoming recruitment brochures.  
The brochures, formatted as a series of questions answered with “yes” or no” and 
accompanying explanations, included a section on the question: “Is National 
Socialism a German affair?”  Originally, the supplied answer was “no,” and this 
appears to have caused some controversy.  Berger intervened with a memo to the 
SS Office of Indoctrination on June 16th, 1944.  Exposing the extent to which 
Berger was conscientiously aware of Waffen-SS revisionism, he explained that 
such a formulation would have to be altered, “because we can’t place ourselves 
into a contradiction with the Führer.”  However, he continued, “it can be shown 
 
113 Gottlob Berger, “Auf dem Weg zum Germanischen Reich,” speech at the “VI Tagung“ at 
Plassenburg, February 28 – March 5, 1944, Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 19/3987. 
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that every European Volk, as long as it is Nordic, can construct its own racial 
socialism based on the same ideological principles.  The National Socialist 
movements in the non-German lands, therefore, are the harbingers of a New 
Order.”  Then, he suggested that National Socialism will primarily take root in 
just the Germanic lands, but that this revelation should be avoided due to 
“political reasons,” i.e. because it would upset non-Germanic recruits.  In 
response to this direction, the SS Office of Indoctrination re-wrote the brochures 
and sent a collection of them to Berger on September 1st, 1944.  The brochures 
illustrate how Berger’s interventions signaled and legitimized the transition 
toward modified Europeanism.  The first brochure, titled “National Socialism 
redeems the Nordic-Germanic inheritance of Europe,” defined Europe as a 
continent-wide collection of “Nordic-Germanics,” who for centuries had been 
embroiled in a historical struggle against Jews and Asians (the only races defined 
outside of the newly enlarged “Nordic-Germanic” racial category).  The question, 
“Is National Socialism a German affair?” was reformulated to “Is National 
Socialism only a German affair?” with the answer that it was a “form of life” for 
all states of “Nordic-Germanic” heritage.  Another brochure, entitled “Europe 
Constructs Itself and Defends Itself” argued that Europe cannot be defined by 
borders, but by culture.  Specifically, a culture born 4000 years B.C. by the 
“Nordic-Aryan-Indo-Germanics,” now mortally threatened by Jewish controlled 
incursions from Asia and America.  Directly referencing the “300 million” 
Europeans between Asia and America, the brochure argued that only the creation 
of a “collective European sense of responsibility” could prevent this decline, and 
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that this internal unification must include a rejection of “exaggerated and arrogant 
nationalism.”  The future Europe, it was explained, would overcome nation-states 
with the concept of the Reich, which was nothing more than family with a father 
(Hitler) at the top.  Each family member would be respected and admired for its 
unique “ethnic foundation” (Volkstum).  Race, then, had merely become in these 
brochures a stand-in for a vaguely defined area between Asia and America, with 
new, spacious signifiers such as “white” and “Indo-Germanic.”114 
 Himmler, too, took part in this opportunism and likewise signaled a 
watered-down modification of Germanic Europeanism. In October, 1944 
Himmler gave a speech to an unknown audience titled “The German Volk and 
National Socialism in the European Discussion.” The speech was recorded and 
collected among manuscripts to be printed in Leitheft magazines at the end of 
1944 and beginning of 1945.115  National Socialism, he explained, was born with 
a very specifically German mission: to redeem Germany from its postwar 
Versailles mistreatment.  But the British refusal to accept peace after the summer 
of 1940 altered the nature of the war and thereby the meaning of National 
Socialism. Nazi Germany became for the rest of the world an alternative model to 
capitalism and Bolshevism. But each of these two “Jewish Internationalisms” 
 
114 “Herausgabe und Drucklegung von Broschüren zwecks Erstellung eines ‘Handbuchs für 
den weltanschaulichen Unterricht‘ (z.T. mit Manuskripten in verschiedenen Fassungen),“ 
Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 31/418.  
115 Due to the sparsity of Leitheft magazines in the final months of publication, the present 
author was unable to locate the issue in which this speech was published. 
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recognized this, and mobilized against it.  National Socialism, he explained, has 
since come to have multiple components: a) a “nationalist-one” - Germany’s 
redemption; b) “a European-one and (in historical perspective) Reich-one, whose 
purpose and completion will be the Order of Europe.”; c) a “world-political one,” 
by which he meant a new form of socialism; and d) a “world-historical one,” by 
which he meant the rescuing of the racial idea for all peoples of the world.  On 
this last point, Himmler proudly proclaimed the ground-breaking novelty of the 
racial concept, but neglected to define it or limit it to “Germans” or “Germanics.” 
In fact, he even suggested that the racial concept’s renaissance thus far in the war 
had touched “the deepest instincts of all non-Jewish-Aryan people of the earth.” 
Surprisingly confident that in the last few years most Europeans had come to see 
that National Socialism was no longer just about Germany, he then proudly 
discussed the allegedly cooperative occupations and even the millions of (slave) 
workers in Germany from all around Europe. 116  Interestingly, based on near-
identical essay structure and terminology, it appears this same speech was re-
printed in the Leitheft magazines near the end of the war, but this time identified 
as a “proclamation” from Hitler himself, addressed to “the German people, the 
peoples of Europe and the entire non-Jewish-Aryan world.”  Clearly, the essay 
was just a re-printing of Himmler’s speech, and most likely without Hitler’s 
approval despite his printed signature. It ended with an appeal which further 
 
116 “Das deutsche Volk und der Nationalsozialismus in der europäischen Diskussion: 
Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler am 18. Oktober, 1944 beim Aufruf des deutschen 
Volksturms,” Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 31-424. 
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signaled the legitimacy of modified Germanic Europeanism: “I call to the best and 
most valuable Aryan peoples of the Earth to join the common struggle….”117 
By the end of 1944, Waffen-SS officers were being explicitly trained to 
move beyond Germanic nationalism so as to incorporate Eastern Europeans into 
the Waffen-SS.  Take for example a memo sent to multi-national divisions and 
titled “The Political Task of the German commissioned and non-commissioned 
officer in multi-national units of the Waffen-SS.”  In it, the Waffen-SS was 
proclaimed the “harbinger of a political New Order of Europe.”  Therefore, 
Waffen-SS officers must “familiarize themselves with the foundational concept of 
European Union and Order, and thereby recognize the European purpose of the 
Reich.”  “This war,” it continued “began as a war for Germany.  Today, it has 
become a war for Europe.”  Like most late-stage Waffen-SS propaganda, the 
memo relied on the myth of an ancient “Indo-Germanic” race which founded and 
unified Europe thousands of years B.C.  But this time, the racial history of the 
“Indo-Germanics” explicitly incorporated Eastern Europeans by racial group.  
Over the course of ancient European history, the memo explained, the original 
“Indo-Germanic race” successfully “incorporated itself” into the people of 
“different blood” such that “Nordic blood” was able to “penetrate” these peoples.  
 
117 The manuscript is not dated, but based on textual references as well as surrounding 
manuscripts, it is clear that the manuscript was written and published near the end of the war. See 
“Proklamation der Kriegsziele des nationalsozialistischen Grossdeutschen Reiches: an das 
Deutsche Volk! An die Völker Europas! An die gesamte nichtjüdische-arische Menschheit!” 
Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 31/420.  
316 
 
Over time, Nordic blood came to dominate the racial makeup of all European 
peoples, which the memo then listed: “Germanic,” “Romanic,” “Baltic,” “Slavic.”  
Even more audaciously, the memo suggested that all of Europe between the 
Atlantic and the Russian steppes was a common European “Lebensraum,” which 
had to be defended from Jewish internationalists.  For the first time in Waffen-SS 
propaganda, modern racial differences between European peoples were explicitly 
presented as exaggerated, largely ahistorical, and secondary to the creation of a 
common “European Community of Peoples (Europäische Völkergemeinschaft).”  
“The European Family of Peoples needs to be a brotherhood [Genossenschaft], 
whose separate parts draw nearer to each other like comrades in the Community 
of Peoples in the Reich.”  It continued: “This Brotherhood of Peoples 
[Völkergenossenschaft] will be based on the principle: European common good 
prioritized over racial self-interest [Europäischer Gemeinnutz geht vor völkischen 
Eigennutz].”118 
 The documentary evidence for Waffen-SS propaganda in the last months 
of the war is scattered and incomplete.  Although publication continued until the 
end of the war, Leitheft magazines for the year 1945 are generally not included in 
modern-day archival holdings.  But the files for the SS-Main Office include 
various folders containing manuscripts of articles which were written and 
 
118 The document is not dated, but based on textual references as well as surrounding 
manuscripts, it is clear that the document was written at the end of the year 1944 or the beginning 
of 1945. See “Entwurf: Die politische Aufgabe des deutschen Führers und Unterführers in den 
fremdvölkischen Einheiten der Waffen-SS,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 31/41. 
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subsequently published in the 1945 Leitheft issues.  The manuscripts confirm that 
in the final months of the war, the remaining barriers to a modified Germanic 
Europeanism gradually gave way.  The evidence suggests that the Waffen-SS 
increasingly shed its exclusive claim to Europeanism and adopted many of the 
Europe-propaganda narratives by other Nazi institutions (as discussed elsewhere 
in this dissertation).  In fact, they even began publishing Nazi Europeanists from 
outside the SS.  For example, Karl Heinz Pfeffer, the administrator of the German 
International Science Institute (DAWI) in Berlin and editorialist in Giselher 
Wirsing’s journal the XX Jahrhundert, was hired to write articles in the last copies 
of the 1945 Leitheft issues.  His manuscripts in the SS Main Office’s Leitheft files 
represent the final shift in Waffen-SS propaganda towards modified Germanic 
Europeanism.  Like elsewhere in Nazi propaganda, they were silent on racial 
theory.  In an article titled “European Consciousness,” he argued that Europe was 
a new cultural nation currently mid-birth in a larger transition which he called the 
“crisis of nationalism”:  
Europe has a common defensive system, a common transportation system, 
a common source of natural resources and workforce, a centrally 
connected system of currencies; it shares a common danger, it has a 





The united Europe cannot destroy the nationalism of the European 
peoples, but it needs to transcend it [es muss ihn aufheben] in the Hegelian 
meaning of the word – allow it to continue and introduce it as a living 
element into a larger entity.  The enemies of Europe aggravate the 
nationalism of many nations to the point of suicidal insanity and allow 




Pfeffer was frank that, although the war began well, the recent years of the war 
had been a set-back in this nation-transcending project.  But the climax in the 
crisis was only more evidence of the emerging watershed in European history: 
It all depends on conceptualizing our current moment in European history 
not as an end, but rather as a blossoming.  The first onslaught [the German 
victories] opened up a realm of possibilities which was not able to 
immediately ripen.  So they are now being plowed and thereby protected 
from rot and destruction.  After the experiences of the stormy spring, the 
coming harvest will be better planned.  The current set-back is not one of 
desperation, but rather a pause for contemplating a better beginning.  He 
who hasn’t been ruined by the set-backs of this last year has only been 
made stronger. 
 
For Pfeffer, the transition from “nationalism” to “European nationalism” was a 
natural by-product of social, economic, and technological changes in the twentieth 
century.  The tragedy of European history was not that Versailles shackled 
Germany, but that it “preserved each nation a state of their own and allowed a 
return of irredentism” precisely at a world-historical moment when such 
prescriptions were becoming outdated.  The consequence was an “Era of wild 
nationalism-struggles.”  This led some thinkers in Europe to the mistaken belief 
that nationalism itself must be destroyed, hence the League of Nations and Pan-
European movements.  The problem was not nationalism; rather, it was the 
“French national concept” or “liberal nationalism,” which exalted the masses and 
individual at the expense of unique cultural communities and necessarily led to 
the “anarchism” of Versailles-Era nationalism.  “Völkisch nationalism,” the 
contrasting German model, has, on the other hand, found its ultimate expression 
in European nationalism.  In other words, Pfeffer was arguing that Völkisch 
nationalism was not inherently German, but only began as a German movement in 
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the nineteenth century.  The moment German troops entered Prague in March, 
1939, he argued, Nationalism realized its historical purpose: restoring the only 
real cultural community; namely, the “Living European Community” 
(europäische Lebensgemeinschaft).119 
 One final point merits discussion.  antisemitism was always a defining 
aspect of Waffen-SS propaganda; in particular, the notion of political conspiracy 
and apocalyptic redemption from Jews.  The Holocaust, of course, was 
implemented by the SS, and the secondary literature has illustrated the particular 
culpability of the Waffen-SS as a contributor and assistant to the murderous 
operations of the Einsatzgruppen, among other things.120 As such, antisemitism 
had a constant presence in Waffen-SS propaganda (as many of the above 
examples illustrate).  It is important to emphasize though, that antisemitism in 
Waffen-SS propaganda actually increased in quantity and fervor as the war 
reached its end.  As various racial enemies in Waffen-SS narratives were 
incorporated into the Waffen-SS, the centrality of Jews was entrenched.  Waffen-
SS propaganda relied on Social Darwinistic narratives of historical racial struggle, 
but as “Europe” increasingly replaced “Germany” as the aggrieved racial group, 
so too were the aggrieved protagonists expanded: “Germans” became 
“Germanics” became “Indo-Germanic Europeans.”  This enlargement process left 
only the Jews to fulfill the role of the ever-present enemy within.  Take, for 
 
119 Karl Heinz Pfeffer, “Die europäische Besinnung,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 
31/442. 
120 See Cüppers, Wegbereiter Der Shoah.   
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example, a manuscript by a French-speaking volunteer, Fernand de Ponthiere, 
most likely published in an early 1945 Leitheft magazine.  “The voice,” he argued 
“of common blood, of an inheritance of similar Nordic-Germanic culture has 
allowed SS volunteers from Northern, Western, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe 
stand together against the Jewish-Bolshevist and Jewish-plutocratic enemy.”  One 
way to make Jews the enemy of Germanic Europe was to expose what separated 
Jews from the rest of Europe: namely, their “internationalism.”  Much like Jews 
had always been portrayed as an unmoored parasite on national traditions, so too 
could Jews be presented as an unrooted enemy of European “civilization and 
culture,” to use Ponthiere’s words.  Jews, he argued, were a threat to the “blood-
determined aspects of European life” because they fostered “foreign racial 
thinking.”  In contrast, “our unification in the New Europe is based on the blood-
determined relationship of all Nordic-Germanic men, such as we have integrated 
them into the SS-community.”  Almost as if Europe had become a singular race, 
Ponthiere concluded his article arguing: “We have no right to betray our race.  We 
will make ourselves worthy of the sacrifice by all those who have fought and died 
for Europe throughout the centuries.”121 
Conclusion: Felix Steiner’s Revisionist History 
 As illustrated above, Himmler and Berger were convinced that the Leitheft 
magazines were popular and essential tools, along with officer training, in their 
endeavors to indoctrinate the Waffen-SS with Germanic Europeanism.  Moreover, 
 
121 Fernand de Ponthiere, “Die SS und Europa: von einem Wallonen,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-
Lichterfelde, NS 31/420. 
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they believed that these efforts were successful, and that they had molded the 
Waffen-SS into a brotherhood of Germanic ideologues devoted to the mission of a 
new, Germanic Europe.  Part of the reason for their optimism was very likely a 
collection of documentary evidence gathered by the SS-Main Office to prove the 
popularity of the Leitheft magazines.  These hundreds of documents were 
collected separately by the SS-Main Office, and are currently archived in the 
German federal archives.122  Ranging from 1941 to 1944, most of the documents 
are letters addressed to the Germanic Recruitment Offices from Waffen-SS 
soldiers, their family members, SS functionaries in occupied Europe, and even 
non-SS affiliated Reich-citizens - all requesting more Leitheft magazines.  The 
dozens of letters written by Waffen-SS soldiers expressing enthusiasm about the 
Leitheft magazines and pleading for more editions suggest that Himmler and 
Berger were not incorrect in their self-evaluation of their propaganda efforts.  
Even some wives and mothers of Waffen-SS soldiers, having received copies in 
the mail from their husbands and sons, wrote asking for additional special 
deliveries to their home.  One wife of a Volksdeutsch recruit, Mrs. Maria Steiner, 
wrote on August 29th, 1942 that while reading the Leitheft magazines she had 
deeply appreciated learning “about the correct history of the “Germanen,” 
because as we grew up we didn’t have any idea what Germany was (despite the 
fact that we’re German and have German blood).  But now we understand….”  
Several division commanders, as well, wrote asking for more editions, for 
 
122 “Schriftwechsel, überwiegend Zuschriften von Beziehern und betr. Bezug der 
Germanischen und SS-Leithefte, 1941-1944,“ Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 31/75.  
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example SS-Sturmbannführer Erwin Reichel of SS-Panzerdivision Wiking (Felix 
Steiner’s division which pioneered integrating German and non-German units) 
wrote on December 13th, 1941 that the Germanic Leithefte, in particular, had 
helped advance unity between non-Germans and Germans in his unit and were 
very enthusiastically received.123  He even suggested allowing soldiers to 
contribute articles from the front.  Many letters from the low-ranking soldiers of 
Wiking poured in to the Germanic Recruitment Offices from 1942-1944.  
Domestic publishers from the Reich repeatedly asked permission to re-print 
Leitheft magazines in Germany.  Even SS functionaries in occupied territories 
reported that the Leitheft magazines were helping local Germanic populations 
understand their future belonging to the Reich.  One such bureaucrat, R. Thiel, 
stationed in Nordbrabant, Netherlands, wrote: “The concept of the Reich cannot 
be emphasized enough.  More and more, the Dutch people here are connecting 
with it.  Small-state [kleinstaatlich] solutions based in separatist ideas are losing 
interest.”  To be sure, some of these sources from unit-commanders and SS 
administrators are colored by biases towards overly optimistic appraisals of 
indoctrination efforts.  In the end, the best evidence for the penetration of 
Germanic Europeanism in the Waffen-SS is its persistence in the Waffen-SS 
milieus of the postwar period. 
 The key figure in the transition of the Waffen-SS community to the 
postwar period is Felix Steiner, the divisional commander of SS-Panzerdivision 
 
123 The commander of the Prinz Eugen Division likewise requested 500 more copies for his 
division on May 3, 1942. 
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Wiking, one of the earliest and most important divisions within the Waffen-SS.  
Although his postwar history will be handled in more detail in chapter nine of this 
dissertation, it is worth briefly discussing his role in Germanic Europeanism.  
After the war, Steiner, along with fellow Waffen-SS commander Paul Hausser, 
became the foremost apologist for the Waffen-SS as a leading member of postwar 
veterans’ associations and a highly-sold publicist.  Steiner’s primary argument in 
the postwar years was that the Waffen-SS had been slandered by association with 
the “criminals” of the regular SS; in reality, he argued, the Waffen-SS had been 
the path-breaking reformers who began a European revolution against nationalism 
– a revolution which was only just reaching fruition in the 1950s of postwar 
Western Europe.  In his first postwar book titled The Military Idea of the 
Occident, written in 1951, he wrote: “Therefore, all concepts of a nationalist-kind, 
which plagued the last century and the first half of the twentieth century, are now 
automatically collapsing.”124  The masses across Europe, he argued, were ready 
for the “Europe-concept” and in fact already “thought and felt European.”125  This 
was the result of many millions of Europeans from across the continent joining 
with the Germans to fight against Bolshevism for the “preservation of occidental 
freedom.” The only missing piece was the malicious collection of modern 
political “elites” too timid to implement this European revolution.126  Steiner 
audaciously designated the Waffen-SS as the primary harbingers of this European 
 
124 Felix Steiner, Die Wehridee des Abendlandes (Parma-Edition, 1951), chapter 8. 
125 Ibid., chapter 6. 
126 Ibid., chapter 12. 
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transformation.  This was the core idea behind his attempt to resuscitate the honor 
of Waffen-SS veterans in his 1958 book The Volunteers: Idea and Self-Sacrifice. 
Not shy about attributing himself a chief role in the Europeanization of the 
Waffen-SS, Steiner argued that although the war began and was administered by 
Hitler as a war of nationalist aggression, most German soldiers (especially the 
Waffen-SS) increasingly experienced the conflict differently: “Eventually, during 
the common struggle there awakened in the hearts of the volunteers a 
consciousness of European solidarity and a conviction of the necessity of 
unification….”127  Indeed, Waffen-SS soldiers, and specifically those in his SS-
Panzerdivision Wiking, were ostensibly the earliest proponent of this transition, 
and worked under his leadership against the will of Hitler and Himmler to become 
a European brotherhood. 
 In order to substantiate his revisionist account of history, Steiner included 
in his appendix various war-time documents which indeed suggest the extent of 
Europeanism in both himself and his division, but casually omit any notions of 
Germanic supremacism.  Take, for example, his New Year’s proclamation from 
December 31st, 1941: 
Vikings!  The New Year approaches.  It will be another year of struggle.  
We volunteers of the Division ‘Viking’ will continue this fight against the 
forces of darkness.  Our goal is a just Order in a free Europe, the 
preservation of our values and culture, and the victory of a free and 
honorable spirit against all destructive forces in the world.  In this war we 
will truly protect our families and our homes from both internal and 
external destruction; we will fight for the safety of our social way of life; 
we will fight for the development of the creative, healthy, and noteworthy 
forces of our peoples without consideration of origin, class, or tribe; we 
will fight for a strong and culture-oriented Community of Destiny 
 
127 Felix Steiner, Die Freiwilligen: Idee und Opfergang (Göttingen: Plesse Verlag, 1958), 57. 
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[Schicksalsgemeinschaft]. I welcome you into the New Year acknowledge 
with complete trust my battle-tested, glorious Viking-Division.  Hail to 
you, Vikings!128 
 
Using another memo to unit-commanders from June 22nd, 1942, in which Steiner 
instructs his soldiers to treat all soldiers completely equally regardless of their 
country of origin, Steiner suggested that the Waffen-SS was nothing but anti-
racial and egalitarian.129 
Yet, as Mark Gingerich has shown in his short biography of the Waffen-
SS General, Steiner edited these documents to omit a few crucial adjectives.  The 
original text reads: “Our goal is a just Order in a free Europe, the preservation of 
our Germanic values and culture, and the victory of a Nordic-Germanic, free, and 
honorable spirit against all the corporate [händlerisch – read: Jewish] and 
destructive forces in the world.”  Steiner’s sleight of hand in these apparent 
declarations of egalitarianism, then, is to withhold from the audience distinctions 
between “Germanic” and “non-Germanic,” something he unwittingly exposed in a 
subsequent document, a speech to Waffen-SS soldiers on September 15th, 1941: 
“This division has, through the stalwart unity of all of its members, become a 
symbol.  Whether of the German, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, or Finnish 
nationality – for all of us the division “Viking” is a symbol of our togetherness 
and destined communion.”130  These documents, all written in the first few years 
of the Eastern Front, originate from a moment in the Waffen-SS in which 
 
128 Ibid., 68. 
129 Ibid., 64-65. 
130 Ibid., 104-105. 
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declarations of European solidarity were anything but post-racial; to the contrary, 
“Europe” at this moment meant a genocidal “Germanic” community united in a 
war of blood and soil expansion against racial inferiors in Eastern Europe.  Steiner 
was not unaware of this potential criticism; indeed he tried to confront it in a 
rather long passage about an alleged divide between Himmler and most Waffen-
SS soldiers: 
The war-time experiences of two campaigns [France and the Soviet 
Union] deepened this divide.  The chasm between front-averse 
bureaucracies and front-troops entwined in constant, fierce battle was 
never greater than it was in the Waffen-SS.  Consequently, from the very 
beginning, [the Waffen-SS] accepted the Berlin-based ideology of a 
unifying Germanic concept only hesitantly.  Because historically and 
politically it was the purest of romanticism, but as a connective cultural 
tissue it could be accepted, but only so long as it remained limited to that 
and did not deteriorate into a convoluted, mythical, or even racial form.  
However, this concern was unnecessary, because such a degenerate idea 
ran contrary to the healthy purpose of this fresh, young front-troop.  And 
when imperialistic tendencies later emerged [in the occupied territories], 
the Waffen-SS was the first, and perhaps the only, institution which loudly 
protested.  The concept of a Germanic Kingdom in the East was met with 
sharp rejection. … As the process of adding voluntary units from the 
Eastern European peoples gathered momentum in the year 1942 and 1943, 
the Germanic concept was long buried.  As such, in the matter of just a 
few months and in ever-increasing manner there emerged in the thinking 
and language of the front-troops a historically and politically benevolent 
idea of a European Community of Destiny [europäische 
Schicksalsgemeinschaft], which encompassed all European volunteers and 
connected them spiritually with one another.131 
 
 Steiner’s postwar reconstruction of the past was not a complete 
fabrication.  Indeed, the documents he presented, combined with some of the 
documents in the above chapter, confirm that Steiner was an early convert to 
Europeanism in the Waffen-SS and that he perceived his division as a 
 
131 Ibid., 67-68 
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revolutionary pioneer in Nazi concepts of Europe.132  But he concealed a crucial 
and unique aspect of Waffen-SS Europeanism.  Unlike the Europe-concept 
developed by the Foreign Office, the Wehrmacht, and conservative intellectuals 
explored elsewhere in this dissertation, Europeanism in the Waffen-SS remained 
deeply committed to doctrines of race even if it meant, near the end of the war, 
discharging some of the edge behind racial concepts. The evidence suggests that, 
during the war, Steiner was among the fiercest advocates of Germanic 
Europeanism.133  On September 16th, 1942, for example, Steiner wrote to Berger 
with suggestions vis-à-vis strengthening the concept of a “Greater Germanic 
Reich” and weakening the nationalism of non-German members of the Waffen-
SS.  One of the suggestions was to disband the National Legions and fold them 
into division such as his Viking division.134 
 After the war, despite his war-time commitment to the Germanic concept, 
Steiner was able to quickly strip the Germanic concept as well as any other racial 
 
132 Mark Gingerich, in his short biography of the Waffen-SS General, has documented 
Steiner’s passion for the Germanic idea by examining his divisional commands in the last years of 
the war.  See Mark P. Gingerich, “Felix Steiner: Himler’s ‘all-time favorite child‘“ in ed.s Ronald 
Smelser and Enrico Syring, Die SS: Elite unter dem Totenkopf: 30 Lebensläufe (Paderborn: 
Ferdinand Schöningh, 2003), 431-440. 
133 In fact, according to Mark Gingerich, Steiner secured his reputation in the Waffen-SS 
precisely by pioneering the Germanic concept.  His initiative in this regard even won him the 
nickname “Himmler’s all-time favorite child.”  Ibid. 
134 Berger, as discussed earlier, ultimately implemented this suggestion a few months later.  
See de Wever, “‘Rebellen‘ an der Ostfront,“ 601. 
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doctrines from his Europeanism and re-cast the Waffen-SS as an innocuous (even 
anti-Nazi) innovator in European integration, and therefore an ally to the politics 
of European integration.  A few years after the war ended, he founded a veterans’ 
organization.  Remarkably, it turns out that this organization was covertly 
controlled by the American CIA, which had convinced Steiner to cooperate in a 
project to influence postwar veterans’ opinions.  How this came about, and the 
role Steiner played in postwar veteran milieus, will be handled in a later chapter 
of this dissertation.  In any case, by the early 1950s Steiner was the leading 
intellectual voice in the Waffen-SS and had a powerful presence in the most 
influential veteran organizations outside of the Waffen-SS as well, and this was to 
large extent because of American intervention.  Like other former Nazi 
Europeanists in this dissertation, Steiner and his followers in the postwar Waffen-
SS veteran community traversed an especially long path towards accepting the 
postwar democratic settlement.  This was certainly possible in large part due to 
the continued existence of the Soviet Union after 1945.  But it was also a product 
of the modified Germanic Europeanism which emerged in the last stages of the 
war, and which embedded the potential for a disassociation with nationalism 
which need not delegitimize their perceived war-time righteousness.135 In 1945 
there was a very real chance that the construction of postwar German democracy 
 
135 There is also legitimate evidence that Steiner increasingly butt heads with Himmler during 
the last years of the war, thus providing Steiner another postwar justification for disassociation 




would be unable to overcome illiberal opposition, and most reasonable analysts of 
German political culture would have identified the Waffen-SS as a group of men 
most naturally susceptible to radical right-wing politics and the destabilization of 
postwar West German democracy.  That this ultimately did not happen is to 
significant extent a consequence of the unique history of Germanic Europeanism 
in the Waffen-SS.  This is a story which we will pick up and continue in the final 
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Chapter 6: Transitions across 1945 
Introduction 
 In May, 1948, Peter Diederichs, the owner of the nationalist Eugen 
Diederichs Verlag through which Wirsing had published his books as well as his 
war-time magazine Das XX Jahrhundert, submitted to a Munich denazification 
hearing an apologetic account of Wirsing’s participation in the Nazi propaganda 
apparatus.  Wirsing, he argued, had been a kind of fifth columnist, a resistance 
warrior even: 
Back then he expressed to me the position that a truly effective fight 
against the dangerous tendencies of National Socialism would only be 
possible from the inside, that one must establish counter-weights capable 
of eventually transforming the Nazi movement and booting out Hitler and 
his party clique. 
 
Diederichs continued, arguing that Wirsing’s SS-membership was merely a step 
to “cover his position” and avoid designation as a “dangerous outsider.”  Against 
all the evidence of Wirsing’s war-time propaganda material, Diederichs claimed 
that Wirsing had always used his position as a propagandist to carefully criticize 
Hitler’s aggressive and irredentist foreign policy, to protest Hitler’s launching of 
the Second World War, and to philosophically defend the “spiritual virtues of the 
individual” against the collectivist racial doctrines of National Socialism.1 
A common thread throughout postwar apologias by former Nazi 
Europeanists was that they had ostensibly endured a long-standing discomfort 
 
1 Peter Diederichs to Staatskommisar Phillip Auerbach, May 13, 1947, in “Diederichs, Peter; 
Prosa, Gutachten für Giselher Wirsing, Entnazifizierung,“ A:Diederichs/Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 
Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
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with National Socialism and had seen their war-time association with the regime 
as an effort to restructure the New Order of Europe from within.  By embracing 
that which was allegedly good in National Socialism and by working to obtain as 
much influence as possible for their ideas – and because gaining influence in a 
totalitarian regime is only possible as a propagandist - they were actually 
attempting to change National Socialism.  More specifically, they alleged an 
intention to improve National Socialism by helping it undergo what they called an 
“internal evolution” (innere Wandlung).   
Such a claim should deservedly be met with skepticism; and, in fact, much 
of this dissertation has illustrated that Nazi Europeanists were fiercely ideological, 
avowedly Nazi in their convictions, and energetically supportive of Hitler’s war 
effort.  Nevertheless, the first half of this chapter will illustrate that such claims 
were not entirely baseless.  There is substantial evidence that many Nazi 
Europeanists envisioned their Europe-concept certainly not as a fifth column 
resistance weapon, as Diederichs would have had us believe, but rather as a 
fruitful corrective to the perceived ills and exaggerations of National Socialism.  
Thus, other portions of Diederichs’s testimony on behalf of Wirsing can be 
corroborated by outside evidence, such as Wirsing’s private frustrations and 
criticisms of Hitler and Himmler, his contacts with the anti-Hitler resistance 
movement, and his use of the Eugen Diederichs Verlag (and other publications 
avenues) to repudiate the Nazi race concept.2  And as we discussed in an earlier 





originally believed National Socialism was the exterior of a deeper, legitimate 
“movement” that could be pruned and directed.  Seen from this angle, then, the 
Europe-concept was for the figures in this dissertation a means of intellectual 
rationalization - a justification for their complicity in a genocidal regime.  But it 
was also during the war a very real source of ideological dissonance which 
increasingly led to non-conformity, and then ultimately disaffection.  After the 
war, former Nazi Europeanists clung to this dissonance as a tool for reconciling 
with their immediate past.  This was unquestionably a form of opportunistic 
memory politics, but it was also a vital precursor for their eventual de-
radicalization in the 1950s. 
Because Soviet Communism existed as a political model until the end of 
the twentieth century, the literature on intellectual de-radicalization has 
disproportionately focused on disillusionment with Marxism-Leninism, much of it 
written by former Communists themselves.3  The de-radicalization of fascist 
intellectuals, on the other hand, has received comparably less attention leading 
Jerry Muller to argue that historians were neglecting “the other god that failed.”4  
Part of the reason for this neglect is that fascism as a political system largely 
 
3 See, for example, the famous “confession” essays by Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Richard 
Wright, Andre Gide, Louis Fischer, and Stephen Spender in ed. Richard Crossman, The God that 
Failed: A Confession (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1963).    François Furet, The Passing 
of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999).   Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001). 
4 Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God That Failed: Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of German 
Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1987). 
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failed in spectacular and dramatic defeat in 1945 after having committed 
unprecedented crimes against humanity.  This has led many historians to conclude 
that radical right-wing politics in Europe was immediately de-legitimized and that 
its former advocates and adherents preoccupied themselves with the concerns of 
every-day life, religion, and family as an alternative to political fixations.5  Such 
arguments are perhaps less problematic outside of Germany, but as a lens for 
understanding postwar German political culture they do not accurately reflect the 
growing body of work illustrating the extent of ideological radicalization in 
Hitler’s Third Reich.  Postwar Germans, then, were not instantaneously shorn of 
the radical ideological convictions they had accumulated as subjects of a 
totalitarian society.  This is especially true as it pertains to intellectuals who had 
collaborated with the regime, even if after the war their ideological convictions 
made them into a kind of “secret society of the initiated,” to use Jan-Werner 
Müller’s term.6 
One historian, Dirk Moses, who has tackled this question about the de-
radicalization of former Nazis in postwar West Germany divides them and other 
postwar German intellectuals into two camps: on the one hand, the “German-
Germans,”  who refused to repudiate the German past and sought to rehabilitate 
some form of respectable German nationalism; on the other hand, the “non-
 
5 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage, 2000).   
Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005).   
6 See Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).   
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German Germans,” who sought a complete break from the past and the creation of 
a new German national identity.7  In some respects, this is an attempt to read the 
origins of the Historikerstreit debates of the 1980s (about whether or not the 
German past could be salvaged in a democratic political culture) back into the 
early postwar period.8  Such an account misses, however, the extent to which 
national identity was not static.  Former Nazi Europeanists, for example, refused 
to completely repudiate the German past, as well as their actions in the Second 
World War, but at the same time they sought to move beyond German national 
identity by advocating a continuation of their European revolution.  The Europe-
concept, then, problematizes our understanding of right-wing de-radicalization 
and the transition of former Nazis into the postwar period. 
The following chapter contributes to our understanding of the de-
radicalization of Nazi intellectuals by highlighting the importance of ideas that 
preceded and accompanied their intellectual collaboration with National 
Socialism, but which in the postwar period could be leveraged against that same 
collaboration.  Within a few years after the war none of the figures in this 
dissertation had become liberals.  But they were also no longer National 
Socialists.  They were politically homeless, stripped of political loyalties outside 
of their attachment to the Europe-concept which they hoped could salvage the 
 
7 Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
8 Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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Conservative Revolution.  Over the course of the subsequent decade this dream 
for a European revolution died and former Nazi Europeanists began to reconcile 
with liberal democracy.  This chapter argues that the foundation for this process 
of democratization was established in the transition from the Second World War.  
As such, this chapter aims to understand right-wing de-radicalization as a process 
that began before 1945 when Nazi intellectuals began to detach their ideological 
commitments from the National Socialist regime.  This is not to suggest that Nazi 
Europeanists joined the resistance.  To the contrary, despite their misgivings and 
disillusionment they served the Nazi regime until the bitter end.  More narrowly, 
this chapter explores the intellectual preconditions of de-radicalization.  The 
chapter will begin by exploring Giselher Wirsing as a case study for the 
ideological contradictions which accompanied Nazi Europeanists throughout the 
war, but which peaked at the end of the war in the form of defeatism and even 
defiance against Hitler’s regime.  It will then present another unique story of 
ideological insubordination within the conservative military milieu; namely, the 
efforts by Ernst Jünger at the end of the war to covertly spread a defeatist iteration 
of the Europe-concept among fellow conservative militarists, some of whom, as 
discussed in a later chapter of this dissertation, went on to advocate European 
integration from important positions in the postwar West German military. 
 The second half of this chapter will discuss the immediate postwar 
consequences of these figures’ deteriorated commitment to National Socialism; 
namely, a willingness to quickly establish working relationships with American 
secret services at the conclusion of the war and in doing so align themselves with 
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the “West” in the emerging Cold War conflict.  Indeed, a surprising number of 
former Nazi Europeanists covertly cooperated with the Americans in the initial 
postwar years.  This alliance married the Americans’ anti-Communism with their 
ambitions to advance the Europe-concept in the postwar world, and while many 
of these connections broke off in the early 1950s, chapter nine of this dissertation 
will, in contrast, illustrate examples of collaborative longevity.  The predominant 
reasons for their initial cooperation with American intelligence most likely 
revolved around the need for economic sustenance in the postwar period, and, 
more importantly, the need for good standing with an occupying power seemingly 
intent on holding Nazis accountable.  As such, the suspicion of opportunism 
weighs heavily in the following analysis.  Nevertheless, former Nazi 
Europeanists’ initial cooperation with the United States proved to be a crucial 
foundation for their subsequent reconciliation with liberal democracy.  In other 
words, the potential for their future democratization was present during the Nazi 
years in the form of disillusionment and tension with the Nazi regime.  And this 
potential was exhausted by an American intelligence policy which was willing to 
employ compromised figures in the pursuit of democratization.  To be sure, this is 
not to argue that former Nazi Europeanists immediately accepted and adopted 
liberal democracy.  To the contrary, as will be shown throughout Part II of this 
dissertation, they deeply opposed liberalism and felt that contemporary 
circumstances dictated a necessary but temporary alliance with the West as the 
most plausible vehicle for re-establishing Europe as an independent alternative 
force to the East and West.  In fact, as we will see, even in these immediate 
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postwar years some former Nazi Europeanists were drawn to cooperation with 
American intelligence agencies explicitly because they saw such liaison as a 
vehicle for a continuation of their Europe-concept.  But their early decisions to 
side with the West in the beginning stages of the Cold War, however 
disingenuous, set off a trajectory towards eventual democratization. 
War-time Disillusionment with National Socialism 
The evidence for Nazi Europeanists’ war-time disaffection ranges from 
the expression of private qualms, to official disputes with Nazi leadership, to 
instances of defeatism and even treasonous actions taken against the state – all of 
which come together in the interesting case of Giselher Wirsing, the figure at the 
center of our sprawling network of Nazi Europeanists.  As such, this section will 
return our focus to Wirsing, for whom a wealth of documentary evidence 
illustrates a gradual, increasing estrangement from National Socialism in the final 
stages of the war.  But Wirsing was not the only one; in fact, his case epitomizes a 
pattern among Nazi Europeanists.  Thus, before outlining Wirsing’s estrangement 
from the Nazi regime, it is worth briefly reviewing some scattered evidence for 
the similar trajectory of other Nazi Europeanists.   
For starters, Wirsing’s close colleague Klaus Mehnert, who had worked in 
the Tat-Kreis and administered the Foreign Office’s propaganda campaign in the 
Pacific, was shown to have been frequently censored by the Nazi propaganda 
apparatus and to have been torn by his self-described “cosmopolitan” inclinations 
from an early age.  Additionally, cross-referencing his claims with Giselher 
Wirsing’s documents lends credence to his claim that he maintained a close 
339 
 
friendship with Adam Trott zu Solz, a member of the conservative, anti-Hitler 
resistance.  Other members of Wirsing’s Tat-Kreis network likewise had an 
ambivalent relationship with National Socialism.  For example, Ferdinand Fried, 
the Grossraum-economics theorist who published in Wirsing’s publications 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s, was repeatedly censored by Goebbels’s 
propaganda ministry during the war because his arguments about an economic 
Grossraum seemingly contradicted Nazi ideas of national autarchy and 
Lebensraum.  After publishing an article in early 1943 in the highly influential 
Das Reich, he received word from his editor that they had received significant 
reprimand from Goebbels’s office.  A few months later, Fried submitted an article 
to the Leipziger Illustrierte, but Goebbels’s censor prevented the article from 
being published.9   
Europe propagandists in the Foreign Office likewise had an oftentimes 
ambivalent relationship with the Nazi regime.  The reader will recall that Karl 
Megerle, originator of Nazi Europeanism in the Foreign Office and personal 
propaganda assistant to Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, persistently 
advocated for a more audacious and expansive Europe-concept even against the  
desire of many of his colleagues.  Megerle even wrote a bold memo that criticized 
German occupation policies in Eastern Europe, and which, as explained in a 
 
9 John Brech (Das Reich) to Friedrich Zimmermann (pseudonym Ferdinand Fried), May 19, 
1943, Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, Nachlass Ferdinand Fried, N 1208/1.   “Schriftleitung der 
Illustrierten Zeitung in Leipzig“ to Friedrich Zimmermann, August 18, 1943, Bundesarchiv in 
Koblenz, Nachlass Ferdinand Fried, N 1208/1.  
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previous chapter of this dissertation, was circulated in the Foreign Office and put 
him into conflict with Foreign Office official secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker.  
Another foreign office figure who handled academic outreach to non-Germans, 
Axel Seeberg, likewise came up against the opinions of many of his colleagues in 
the so-called “Europe-Seminar” when he advocated for a non-racial and non-
Germanic Europe-concept. 
Even in radically loyal institutions such as the Waffen-SS, important Nazi 
Europeanists came into conflict with their Nazi superiors.  According to 
biographer Mark Gingerich, Waffen-SS general Felix Steiner, the commander of 
the first multi-ethnic Waffen-SS division (Wiking), allowed open criticism of both 
Hitler and Himmler in his units, personally quarreled with Himmler as early as 
1941, and even expressed private sympathy with the conservative Hitler-
resistance movement.10  Nazi Europeanists of all stripes, then, displayed a 
considerable ambivalence in their relationship to National Socialism.  It is worth 
re-calling that many Nazi Europeanists had been members of the Nazi-skeptic 
wing of the Conservative Revolution in the 1920s and early 1930s.  However 
much they reconciled with, aided, and abetted the Nazi regime throughout the 
war, the evidence suggests that their differences were never fully ironed out.  This 
is best illustrated in the story of Giselher Wirsing. 
Giselher Wirsing’s Path to Defeatism and Insubordination 
 
10 Mark P. Gingerich, “Felix Steiner: Himler’s ‘all-time favorite child‘“ in Ronald Smelser and 
Enrico Syring (eds.), Die SS: Elite unter dem Totenkopf: 30 Lebensläufe (Paderborn: Ferdinand 
Schöningh, 2003), 427-428. 
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 The first documented instance of Wirsing’s recalcitrance towards the Nazi 
regime is found in a “declaration” submitted in defense of Wirsing at his postwar 
denazification hearing.  The document, submitted to denazification commissioner 
Phillip Auerbach in 1947, likely contributed to Giselher Wirsing’s ultimate 
discharge with the mere designation of “fellow traveler” in 1950, and offers 
insight into the case Wirsing made in his own defense shortly after the war.  It 
was written by a journalist named Fritz Jaffé, a German-Jewish journalist who 
escaped the Holocaust in 1939.  He was able to do so, he claimed, because of the 
life-saving intervention of Giselher Wirsing.  Unlike Peter Diederichs’s 
“declaration” discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Jaffé did not attempt to 
make Wirsing into a secret resistance fighter.  Instead, he conceded that Wirsing’s 
relationship with the Nazi regime was lamentably opportunistic.  However, Jaffé 
suggested that Wirsing’s denazification court make their decisions based on what 
he believed were Wirsing’s non-political attributes of graciousness.  Jaffé 
explained that he was hired by Wirsing in the 1930s as a writer at the Münchner 
Neueste Nachrichten, a job Wirsing allowed him to complete secretly so as to 
hide his Jewish identity.  After Kristallnacht, Jaffé was imprisoned in a 
concentration camp and Wirsing allegedly used his contacts to have him released.  
Jaffé went on to explain that Wirsing subsequently helped him move to Italy and 
secure employment with an Italian newspaper edited by a friend of Wirsing’s.  
Jaffé was clearly taken in by Wirsing, whom he considered a kind of personal 
savior.  The rest of the “declaration” proceeded to argue that his was not an 
exceptional case, but that Wirsing had in fact been a consistent advocate for the 
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Jews and other persecuted minorities – a claim which could not be further from 
the truth.  Wirsing, of course, was deeply compromised by his antisemitism on 
behalf of the Nazi regime, but Jaffé’s case suggests that Wirsing was involved in 
subservient behavior as early as the 1930s, even if it did not take the form of 
criticizing the regime.  It is impossible to ascertain whether Jaffé’s story was true, 
but American intelligence reports from shortly after the war reported that Wirsing 
did, in fact, save an unnamed Jew from a concentration camp.11  But saving one 
Jew from Nazi persecution hardly qualifies as an act of resistance or even 
deliberate confrontation with the Nazi regime.  The first evidence for such a 
confrontation comes from his relationship with anti-Hitler resistance conspirer 
Adam Trott zu Solz, who was eventually murdered by the Nazi regime for his 
connections to the July 20th, 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler. 
After the war, Wirsing befriended Trott zu Solz’s daughter, Clarita 
Müller-Plantenberg, and in 1969 he wrote her a detailed six-page autobiography 
centered around his relationship to her father.  In this private correspondence he 
claimed to have befriended Trott zu Solz in 1940 in the Information Department 
at the Foreign Office and thereafter begun a close relationship.  Wirsing further 
claimed that Trott zu Solz had fully disclosed with him the anti-Hitler conspiracy 
in 1943 and that he had been a closeted member of the resistance, i.e. supportive 
but not actively involved.  This is a highly unlikely claim – as we have illustrated, 
 
11 United States Department of State, “Biographic Data Form – Wirsing, Giselher,” November, 
1951, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, 
Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
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Wirsing’s pro-Nazi advocacy extended well into 1944.  Yet, Wirsing’s 
relationship to Trott zu Solz does appear to have been founded in shared 
criticisms of the regime.  On the one hand, this is corroborated by Klaus 
Mehnert’s documents in a previous chapter of this dissertation.  But it is also 
corroborated by a startling admission in this correspondence with Müller-
Plantenberg.  Wirsing claimed to have shared with Trott zu Solz in 1943 a secret 
report criticizing Nazi racial policies which he had written to the Foreign Office 
from the Eastern Front as a war correspondent, and he even quoted himself from 
the report.  This report and accompanying quotation were in fact accurate (the 
report is discussed in more detail below).  Even more corroborative, Wirsing told 
Müller-Plantenberg that in 1944 Trott zu Solz placed him in connection with 
Walter Schellenberg, an SS-functionary in the RSHA with whom Wirsing later 
drafted secret pessimistic analyses of the war situation for Heinrich Himmler.  
This, too, was an accurate claim, and will also be discussed in more detail below.  
Other than in private correspondences such as this letter to Müller-Plantenberg, 
these two instances of recalcitrant behavior were kept secret by Wirsing 
throughout his life.12  While Wirsing was certainly no member of the resistance, 
the more likely explanation is that Wirsing and Trott zu Solz did, in fact, build a 
relationship based on some shared criticisms of the regime, but Wirsing never 
 
12 “Wirsing, Giselher, Prosa, Bericht über meine Beziehungen zu Dr. Adam von Trott zu Solz,“ 
in “Briefwechsel Müller-Plantenberg, Clarita, Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1969,“ 
A:Diederichs/Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
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interpreted that as resistance, and Trott zu Solz likely never fully disclosed to 
Wirsing the extent of the anti-Hitler conspiracy.13  
Wirsing’s next documented expression of Nazi criticism was the above-
mentioned report written from the Eastern Front to the Foreign Office at the end 
of August, 1942.  Wirsing, who had been assigned by the Foreign Office as a 
front correspondent, decided at the end of his deployment to write a twenty-four-
page essay to Hasso von Etzdorf, the “representative of the Foreign Office at High 
Command of the Army (OKH),” in which he criticized Nazi occupation policy.  
He also later claimed to have shared this report with Adam Trott zu Solz, who 
subsequently allegedly shared the document with over one hundred people.14  The 
report, titled “The Future of German Rule in Russia,” was separated into multiple 
sections, the first of which began by praising the German war effort on the 
Eastern Front as a justified defensive maneuver against a threatening Bolshevist 
regime.  However, Wirsing argued that maintaining their gains and security “in 
the long run” would require a better policy towards the seventy to ninety million 
Russians under occupation - all of whom would come to associate Germans with 
the treatment they received by occupation authorities (Wirsing used the terms 
 
13 To be sure, Wirsing’s account of Trott zu Solz’s disclosure of the anti-Hitler conspiracy is 
teasingly detailed, including dates of phone calls and places of meetings in 1944.  Wirsing even 
claims to have been cross-examined by the Gestapo on July 22nd, 1944 as a result of his 
connections to Trott zu Solz. 
14 “Wirsing, Giselher, Prosa, Bericht über meine Beziehungen zu Dr. Adam von Trott zu Solz,“ 
in “Briefwechsel Müller-Plantenberg, Clarita, Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1969,“ 
A:Diederichs/Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
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“Russian” and “Eastern European” interchangeably).  Furthermore, Wirsing 
argued, Stalin was turning to a new type of warfare, namely partisan warfare, and 
this new strategy had yet to be countered by German authorities.  Careful not to 
mention explicit errors on the part of German authorities, Wirsing proceeded to 
argue that German occupation had failed to prioritize the “sentiment of the local 
population.”  In section two of his report, Wirsing compared German occupation 
policy to American and Soviet “imperialism.”  The era of imperialism, Wirsing 
argued, was currently coming to an end.  Ironically, though, while peoples across 
the globe were freeing themselves from American and Soviet imperialism, 
Germany was conducting a war which appeared to replace one imperialism with 
another.  In doing so, Wirsing argued that Germans were working against the 
grain of history, missing an opportunity to constructively channel the liberation 
impulse of the Russian masses who had undergone a vicious “displacement, 
agrarian dislocation, and alienation from all existing, familiar, and traditional 
institutions and then made into acquiescent tools.”  Wirsing continued: “If one 
were to instead show these people the happy prosperity and form of life on a 
healthy German farm, then they would be completely taken in.”  He continued: 
To our great fortune, Bolshevism was not able to create a uniform 
population united together behind a new goal.  Rather, the miserable 
circumstances in which most peoples in the Soviet Union live (especially 
the farmers) create the psychological preconditions for winning over 
considerable portions of these populations for a different Order 
determined by us…. 
 
They key to “winning over” Russians, Wirsing argued, was to not only convince 
them that Germany intended to protect their material interests, but, importantly, to 
assign them spiritual worth and in doing so reverse Soviet dehumanization.  
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Bizarrely out of touch with the genocidal policies of Nazi occupation, Wirsing 
argued that the only alternative to such a policy would have to be “radical 
extermination,” something he naively assumed would be deemed implausible by 
the Foreign Office. 
 In section three of his report Wirsing attempted to undermine prejudiced 
assumptions of Russian stupidity and economic incapacity.  These perceptions, he 
argued, were more derivative of the dehumanization policies of Bolshevism, 
which had led too many Germans to accept a false picture of Russians.  In fact, he 
argued that their Christianity was a subtle rebuke of Bolshevism and evidence of 
their ability to resist colonial control (another warning to German administrators): 
“We can therefore only control this land in the future if we are able to convince 
the majority of the population of our usefulness to them.”  Sections four and five 
discussed precisely how Germans could prove such usefulness.  The answer, of 
course, was to contrast the colonial policies of East and West with the German-led 
Grossraum concept and its accompanying program of political “self-
administration.”  Wirsing argued that the economics of Grossraum, if properly 
implemented, would illustrate that Germans did not intend to make slaves of 
Russians, but rather mutually complimentary economic partners.  Wirsing argued 
that such an approach would have the additional benefit of separating the Russian 
market from Western empires, thus weakening the Reich’s enemies to the West.  
Wirsing then argued that Russian participants in the “Selbstschutz” units (today 
remembered primarily as accomplices in the Holocaust) were evidence of the 
Russian ability to reject “Stalinist and Jewish foreign rule” and instead contribute 
347 
 
to the European Grossraum.  Remarkably, Wirsing concluded his report with an 
appeal against “Lebensraum” and “Race” doctrines as presently understood: 
According to our calculations, the concept of Lebensraum has functioned 
in these territories such that the intelligent milieus, but also simple 
farmers, are of the opinion that in our lexicon the term Lebensraum simply 
means that other people will have to work for us…. Our race concept has 
been understood in the same manner.  Never mind that Soviet propaganda 
has made deep inroads against our race concept – if the Order which we 
are currently attempting to achieve is to be something that can stand not 
for decades but rather for centuries, then such concepts that incite 
resentment and mistrust should not be used.  The race concept, for 
example, should not be emphasized with the exception of our forceful 
suppression and extermination of Jewry.  It needs to instead take on the 
character of a secret teaching which can be kept alive in the core of the 
Reich (the Party and the Army). 
 
Aside from the stunning acknowledgement of the Holocaust, the most surprising 
part of the above statements is the blatant disavowal of Nazi race doctrine to the 
point of desiring it become relegated to secrecy.  It is important to note that 
Wirsing’s secret report to the Foreign Office is not only evidence of his 
ideological ambivalence with National Socialism, but that this ambivalence was 
intricately tied to his Europe-concept.  For Wirsing, Nazi occupation policies 
were problematic not from a humanistic standpoint (after all, as the above 
quotation shows, Wirsing was perfectly at peace with the extermination of the 
Jews), but rather because they compromised his vision for a New Order of 
Europe.  A final quotation demonstrates this point particularly well:  
[The German] claim to leadership must be realized and secured in such a 
manner that the people affected by it agree to it.  This means that now is 
the time to develop the key feature of large supranational Reich(s) 
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[übernationaler Reiche]: they have to be established in such a way that the 
peoples within feel safe and secure.15 
 
At the end of the war, Wirsing began to signal his nascent disillusionment 
with the Nazi regime in his writings.  Most notably, he published a secret book in 
1944 titled The Politics of the Oil Region: Soviet Imperialism in the Second World 
War.  The book, authored under the pseudonym “Vindex,” presented itself as a 
dissection and warning of the Soviet rise to power, but it was more than that.  It 
was also a defeatist account of the Second World War and a plea to the Western 
Allies to reverse their condemnation of Europe to Bolshevization.  Repeating 
many of his earlier arguments, he suggested that the war had been transformed 
from a “power struggle” between nation-states to a secular “war of religion” 
(Glaubenskrieg).  For the Axis powers this meant the war had become a 
transformative European revolution.  For the Soviets it had become a war for 
world revolution.  For the Americans, ever since the Atlantic Charta the war had 
become a second Wilsonian crusade for world-wide democracy.  Much of the 
book set out to expose how the Americans, unlike the other two great powers, 
were not acting in accordance with their own “war of religion.”  Increasingly, the 
Americans were ceding ground to reactionary British imperialism and Soviet 
world revolution.  Meanwhile, the Soviets were expanding their grasp on 
continental resources and were positioning themselves for the very likely 
 
15 Giselher Wirsing, “Die Zukunft der deutschen Herrschaft in Russland,“ late August, 1942, 




conquest of Northern and Western Europe.  Thus, the Americans were 
unwittingly advancing the victory of Soviet world revolution and compromising 
their own chances for world-wide democracy.  The conclusion of his book, titled 
“The Third World War and Europe,” masked itself as a plea to the Americans to 
recognize that a Third World War was inevitable and that saving Europe from 
Bolshevist ruin in the Second World War was the only way to prevent Soviet 
victory in the coming global show-down.  Interestingly, this plea did not take the 
form of a suggestion for an alliance with the Axis forces but rather a suggestion 
that the United States recognize the Soviet Union and the Axis as equal enemies.16 
Here Wirsing was signaling an important shift in his intellectual posture 
towards the United States.  As this dissertation has shown, Wirsing and other Nazi 
Europeanists usually presented the United States as an equal, if not superior, 
ideological foe compared to the Soviets.  Now, Wirsing was placing the hope for 
the survival of his European vision in the actions of the United States.  
Importantly, however, this shift was intellectually unscrupulous – America was 
now favored in his mind not based on any kind of principle but based on the more 
pressing, immediate threat of Communism and presumed better chances for 
European survival under American ascendency.  Acquiescence to the Americans 
was in Wirsing’s mind the vehicle for Europe to re-assert its now delayed 
revolution in the future.  Wirsing revealed this at the very end of the book when 
he called on European soldiers to continue the fight to the bitter end and then 
 
16 Vindex [Giselher Wirsing], Die Politik des Ölflecks: Der Sowjetimperialismus im Zweiten 
Weltkrieg (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag, 1944). 
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proceeded to compare their valiant efforts to the 300 Spartan warriors at the battle 
of Thermopylae who were ultimately subdued by an overwhelming enemy but not 
until they had first delayed the Persian invasion of Sparta and inflicted heavy 
casualties.  He ended the book with this final call to arms: 
Back then at the battles of Thermopylae and Salamis a foundation was 
built so that our Europe was able to emerge from the Greeks, Romans, 
French, German, Spanish, and Nordic peoples, and eventually from the 
peoples of the Balkans.  This time we are building a foundation which will 
enable our continent to live and blossom in the future.17 
 
Although more subtly, Wirsing also integrated this defeatism into his final 
Signal articles as the war approached its end.  In late 1944 he penned an article 
titled “About Modern Thinking” and published it conspicuously removed from 
the front-pages.  He argued that “modern thinking” meant acknowledging the 
inevitable unity of Europe.  Unlike so-called “antifascists,” who merely proclaim 
a desire to liberate Europe, true commitment to modern thinking meant 
acknowledging Europe’s true enemies to the East and West.  However, Wirsing 
admitted, Europe had indeed “fallen behind” in the current war.  Paradoxically, he 
argued that although the “time was long ripe” for European unification the 
European peoples themselves were not yet ripe.  Nevertheless, it was worth 
continuing the fight to the bitter end, which he subtly suggested was near.  No 
matter the outcome of the war, he proclaimed, “we are convinced that nothing in 
this world will go lost if it has been summoned spiritually.”18   
 
17 Ibid., 148. 
18 Giselher Wirsing, “Wofür wir Kämpfen,“ Signal, 11th issue 1944, 14-18. 
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A few months later, in a similarly camouflaged article, Wirsing continued 
this idea, arguing that the real victor in a war was not necessarily the military 
victor, but the power which had overcome “nihilism,” such as Europe presently 
was overcoming. “The idea of European unification,” he argued, “will continue 
onwards to the final destination despite everything that is happening now.  That is 
certain...because [Europeans] have shown that they can overcome even the most 
harrowing of situations.”  Europeans would need to patient, he continued, because 
“those ideas capable of defining entire eras are never dependent upon 
constellations of time.  They have their own destiny and follow their own wise 
path.”19  In one of his last articles written during the war he indirectly admitted 
the war was all but lost, and challenged the youth of Europe to consider their 
coming postwar duties to maintain the spirit of the Europe-concept by rejecting 
nationalism and preserving the unity achieved during the war.20  Wirsing even 
appears to have carefully broached his new relationship to the United States in 
Signal.  In early 1945, in an article likewise camouflaged in the middle pages of 
the issue, he argued that while Europeans must remain committed to fighting 
against the Americans: “Maybe one day the time will come in which this North 
American nation realizes that there are other, better ways to peacefully live with 
the European peoples.  But that is not up to us.”21  At the same time he was 
 
19 Giselher Wirsing, “Am Abgrund des Hasses,” Signal, 19th issue 1944, 10-11. 
20 Giselher Wirsing, “Was wird aus der Jugend?“ Signal, 5th issue 1945, 4. 
21 Giselher Wirsing, “Roosevelt in der Endphase,“ Signal, 2nd issue 1945, 10-11. 
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penning these words, Wirsing was, in fact, going to great lengths (even treason) to 
reach out to the Americans. 
According to Wirsing’s postwar American interrogators, at the end of 
1944 Wirsing undertook an operation which was his most defeatist action yet: a 
covert intelligence campaign to convince Himmler to oust Hitler and seek a peace 
deal with the Western Allies. Wirsing told his American cross-examiners after the 
war that the project began in September, 1944, when Adam Trott zu Solz 
arranged a meeting between Wirsing and Walter Schellenberg, the director of 
department six in the RSHA (counter-espionage).  Wirsing was told by Trott zu 
Solz that Schellenberg shared his defeatist attitudes about the war, and that the 
two might find use for one another.  Indeed, they did – from October, 1944 to 
March, 1945, Wirsing was supplied by Schellenberg with large quantities of top-
level intelligence documents about the state of the war and enemy capacities, 
which Wirsing was then asked to combine with knowledge gained through his 
extensive pool of foreign journalists, and subsequently summarize and draft into a 
series of reports code-named the “Egmont reports.”  Wirsing’s name was not on 
the reports, and he was promised total anonymity, but as a co-conspirator in the 
project he met weekly with Schellenberg at his office in the RSHA.22  The 
Egmont reports, of which thirteen were ultimately submitted by Wirsing back to 
Schellenberg, were disguised as intelligence reports, but in reality they were 
 
22 “Draft Reports from MFIU No.3 (Third Army Interrogation Center),” July 30, 1945, United 
States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
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defeatist declarations and, more importantly, calls for a political coup.23  After 
receiving them from Wirsing, Schellenberg covertly disseminated the documents 
through carefully selected networks to leading functionaries in the Nazi regime.   
The initial reports were sent to Hermann Fegelein, Schellenberg’s SS 
contact in the Führer Headquarters, with the hope of reaching Hitler indirectly 
(Fegelein was supposed to carefully relay the arguments to Hitler and convince 
him to change course).  But after just a few reports, Wirsing and Schellenberg 
changed the direction of their conspiracy and instead focused on convincing 
Himmler to initiate a coup against Hitler.  In fact, the eventual code-name for the 
reports, “Egmont,” was a reference to a line from a play by Goethe: “It is not meet 
to oppose the king, yet one must stand in the way of the king who takes the first 
unfortunate steps along the wrong path.”24  These reports sent to Himmler were 
accompanied with instructions on the most successful pitch for each given 
moment in the war vis-à-vis leveraging the German position into a peace 
negotiation with the Western Allies (such as, for example, releasing the remaining 
Jews out of concentration camps and into Western custody).25  Because Himmler 
was ultimately unwilling to take decisive action beyond carefully probing a few 
 
23 United States Department of State, “Biographic Data Form – Wirsing, Giselher,” November, 
1951, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, 
Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
24 “Draft Reports from MFIU No.3 (Third Army Interrogation Center),” July 30, 1945, United 
States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of 




back-channels to the United States, Wirsing and Schellenberg switched strategies 
yet again.  The last few reports from early 1945 were purportedly sent to former 
German Chancellor Heinrich Brüning in exile and to Reich Finance Minister 
Johann Ludwig Graf Schwerin von Kroszig in a last-ditch effort to actualize a 
possible peace with the Western Allies.26 After the war, American intelligence 
officers obtained copies for two of the Egmont reports as well as translated 
summaries for the rest.27  It appears that Wirsing’s most repeated argument in 
these reports was that the U.S.-Soviet alliance was, despite Hitler’s fantasies, very 
much intact and not in fact in danger of dissolution; to the contrary, German 
authorities would have to take audacious steps to pry them apart.28  During the 
Battle of the Bulge in December, 1944 Wirsing even attempted to make contact 
with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, but his advances were not reciprocated.  It 
appears, however, that these advances put Wirsing on the map of the American 
intelligence services, because his first trace and biographical sketch in his folder 
 
26 United States Department of State, “Biographic Data Form – Wirsing, Giselher,” November, 
1951, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, 
Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.”  The reports, then, 
were sent to the following high-ranking figures and in the following succession: Hitler, then 
Himmler, then von Brünung and von Kroszig.  Schellenberg also distributed the Egmont reports to 
diplomat Walter Hewel and Reich Commissioner of the Netherlands Arthur Seyß-Inquart. 
27 “Draft Reports from MFIU No.3 (Third Army Interrogation Center),” July 30, 1945, United 
States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of 




of the collected postwar CIA documents is dated to January, 1945.29  As we will 
see, Wirsing’s treasonous late-war activities certainly prepared him for the 
decision to cooperate and assist American intelligence operations in the first 
months after the war. 
Ernst Jünger and Der Friede 
 Disillusionment and intransigence are more difficult to identify in the 
conservative military institutions of this dissertation.  This is in large part because 
these institutions were in fact less recalcitrant.  The Waffen-SS, for example, was 
a radically ideological and loyal institution which fought to the bitter end in the 
streets of Berlin in May, 1945 (indeed its motto was “my honor is my loyalty”).  
As mentioned above, there is some evidence that Felix Steiner may have butt 
heads with his Nazi superiors, but, as we discussed in a previous chapter, he 
understood his Germanic Europe-concept not as an alternative or revision to 
National Socialism, but rather as its fulfillment.  Nevertheless, one can trace an 
anti-Nazi Europe discourse from the West German military reformers of the 
1950s back to a secret manuscript that circulated among disillusioned German 
military authorities beholden to the Europe-concept.  This manuscript, titled Der 
Friede (“The Peace”), was written by none other than the Conservative 
Revolutionary and infamous nationalist author Ernst Jünger.  Der Friede, 
subtitled “An Appeal to the Youth of Europe,” had three purposes: 1) declare that 
 
29 United States Department of State, “Biographic Data Form – Wirsing, Giselher,” November, 
1951, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, 
Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
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the war was reaching its end; 2) subtly criticize National Socialism; and 3) present 
a blueprint for future peace.  Despite the insubordinate nature of the manuscript, it 
receives relatively little attention in the secondary literature.30  But although Der 
Friede was a far too feeble and ambivalent criticism of Nazi Germany to qualify 
as “resistance” literature, it was far more important in its role as an underground 
promotion of the Europe-concept and therefore as a bridge for those conservative 
militarists who were seeking a way forward after National Socialism.  As we will 
see, Der Friede was an inspiration for several influential German generals who 
relied heavily on the Europe-concept in their postwar careers (which will be 
handled separately in chapter nine of this dissertation). 
 Der Friede, written in 1943 and early 1944, reads quite differently than 
what one typically expects from Jünger’s literature.  Unlike his previous 
romanticization of war as a fulfillment of human purpose, in Der Friede Jünger 
decries the suffering of the present war and calls for lasting and permanent peace.  
 
30 One of the only brief historical accounts of Der Friede was written in the 1950s by a historian 
named Gerhard Loose.  See Gerhard Loose, “Zur Entstehungsgeschichte von Ernst Jüngers Schrift 
Der Friede, Modern Language Notes, Vol. 74.1 (Jan., 1959), 51-58.  A more recent examination 
was completed by Jeffrey Herf as part of an article about the postwar relationship between 
German conservatism and technology.  Herf illustrated that Ernst Jünger’s modernist embrace of 
technology, which began well before the Second World War, was a driving factor in Jünger’s 
eventual rebuke of nationalism after the war.  See Jeffrey Herf, “Belated Pessimism: Technology 
and 20th Century German conservative Intellectuals” in ed.s Yaron Ezrahi, Everett Mendelsohn, 
and Howard Segal, Technology, Pessimism, and Postmodernism (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1994).   
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After the war, in a mass letter he sent out to fellow supporters and friends, 
including Klaus Mehnert, Jünger confronted accusations of hypocrisy by arguing 
that the relationship between his previous work and Der Friede “resembles [the 
relationship] between the old and new testaments.”31  War, he argued in Der 
Friede, was only redemptive if followed by peace.  But such a peace, he argued, 
was only possible if Europeans learned the Hegelian meaning of this war; namely, 
the necessary decline of nation-states and nationalism, and their replacement by 
new forms of continental empires, or “great empires” as he called them.  The task 
for Europeans, then, was to discover their “great empire”: a new Europe.  The 
European empire, according to Jünger, had been on the cusp of arrival for 
hundreds of years, but opportunities for its birth had been squandered: first by 
Napoleon, then by the architects of Versailles, and, finally, by the Nazis 
themselves.  Jünger’s criticism of Nazism was vague and ambivalent.  Although 
he liberally employed adjectives like “totalitarian” and “nihilistic” and 
“tyrannical” when discussing the Nazis, he avoided any precise definition of what 
made National Socialism morally bankrupt, and even made specific room to 
assign the Nazis an unconscious role in uniting Europeans.  The Nazi occupation, 
he argued, “in spite of all the sufferings it brought, also left the seeds of 
friendship.”  He continued: “the best of the peoples came to know each other, for 
such fateful times offer occasion for help.  Respect, friendship, and love, too, spin 
 
31 Ernst Jünger, “Dritter Brief an die Freunde!“ September 1, 1946,  Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, 
Nachlass Rudolf Huber, N 1505/461. 
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a web of fine threads which will endure...."32  Turning towards the future, Jünger 
implored Europeans to take past examples of radical political restructuring and 
boldly consider them for Europe: 
Europe must be created out of its separate members; then will come new 
life, freer breath, a more spacious era.  Yet forerunners and precedents are 
not lacking.  Among them is the creation of the unified state by Bismarck 
and Cavour.  As the nations were born out of the dynasties and fragments 
of old empires, so today they must in turn coalesce to form 
an imperium.  There is no lack of patterns or models: the world knows 
states where the most diverse nations, races and tongues are 
united.  Among them are Switzerland, the United States, the Soviet Union 
and the British Empire.  In these structures a mass of political experience 
has crystallized.  To it we can have recourse.  To set up a European state 
means, therefore, to give geographical and political unity to a territory 
which historical developments were already shaping.  The great difficulty 
lies in the long tradition - the peculiar ways of life which have grown up in 
its nations.  This is what Goethe meant when he said in his day that 
America was more fortunate than our continent.  The time has come, 
however, when the forms have become fluid and ready for recasting.  It is 
a task which may now reasonably be set; the hopes of the nations rest 
upon it.33 
 
Jünger’s political philosophy for accomplishing this task proved to be 
considerably superficial, however.  The new European empire, he explained in 
one chapter, would have to find a way to “reconcile” liberalism and 
authoritarianism.  The chapter actually amounted to a broadside against 
liberalism.  It reduced liberalism to a pluralistic demand for the preservation of 
cultural “diversity”, and consigned politics and economics to authoritarianism’s 
 
32 The original manuscript can be viewed in the German Literature Archive in Marbach, 
Germany.  But the English translations for this chapter have been drawn from an English version 
published in 1948 and translated by Stuart O. Hood.  See Ernst Jünger, The Peace (Washington 
D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1948), 51-52. 
33 Ibid., 58-59. 
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legitimate demand for uniformity and efficiency.  In short, Jünger merely required 
that different religions, languages, races, and cultural practices be allowed to 
coexist in a future authoritarian Europe.34  Jünger’s disproportionate criticism of 
liberalism was not difficult to read between the lines: "The peace must not be 
founded solely on human reason," he explained in one remarkably reactionary 
chapter about the Western philosophical tradition.  “The view is still widely held,” 
he explained, “that to re-establish order it would suffice to return to the liberal 
state.  But that would merely mean returning to our point of departure.”35  Thus, 
Jünger’s Europeanism, although conceived in quasi-opposition to the Nazi 
regime, was nevertheless openly illiberal even in its vision for a post-Nazi future. 
 The evidence for Der Friede and its network of Nazi-criticizers is drawn 
largely from Ernst Jünger’s personal document holdings in the Deutsches 
Literaturarchiv in Marbach, which contains his war-time and immediate postwar 
correspondences as well as his war-time diaries.  Additionally, a few other 
important postwar figures documented private, personal accounts of Der Friede in 
the immediate postwar years, and these are archived in the Bundesarchiv in 
Koblenz.  Take, for example, the well-known conservative historian Gerhard 
Ritter, who wrote an essay in 1946 dedicated to outlining the history and 
significance of the manuscript, which he called “a historical document of the 
greatest significance.”  Although he never published the essay, it can be found in 
his personal document holdings.  In his essay, Ritter, who himself was imprisoned 
 
34 Ibid., 60-62. 
35 Ibid., 69. 
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for his connections to the July 20th, 1944 coup attempt, testified to the 
manuscript’s significant distribution by hand and re-printing throughout 
conservative military milieus critical of the Nazi regime.  Ritter also suggested 
that the manuscript was experiencing renewed interest and distribution 
immediately after the war (and, in fact, it was officially published in 1948 as a 
consequence of this renewed interest).  Ritter apparently wrote his 1946 essay as 
an attempt to intervene into the immediate postwar debate over Der Friede; 
specifically, Ritter hoped to defend Jünger from leftist accusations that he was 
actually a Nazi sympathizer trying to white-wash his past.  Ritter, in contrast, 
argued that Jünger and his manuscript were actually key pieces of the resistance 
movement.  Jünger, he explained, was a “European warrior, intellectual, and 
Nazi-enemy.”  He continued: 
While Hitler was still pursuing the supremacy of the Nordic master race 
disguised as the ‘New Europe’, this illegally [behaving] German 
proclaimed in ‘Friede’ a desire for a federation with equal powers and 
responsibilities.  This was a group of progressive Germans and Europeans 
in Paris and Berlin who, independently of one another, were pursuing the 
idea of a “United States of Europe” as a long-term goal.36  
 
Ritter never published his 1946 essay, perhaps because Jünger himself was 
contradicting Ritter’s uncritical retrospective incorporation of him into the 
resistance.  In the forward to the publication of his war-time diaries, Jünger 
admitted that he was not a member of the resistance even though he had 
befriended many conspirators and was aware of their plans (in his diary Jünger 
 
36 Gerhard Ritter, “Ernst Jünger, ‘Der Friede’,” December 4, 1946, Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, 
Nachlass Gerhard Ritter, N 1166/155.  
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explicitly condemned the coup attempts, arguing that they were the wrong way to 
express dissatisfaction with the Hitler regime).37  Yet, Jünger was not entirely 
dismissive of his role in the resistance either, arguing that the Der Friede was his 
way of indirectly supporting the resistance.  Der Friede, then, became for postwar 
conservatives such as Ritter a kind of romanticized account of a hidden 
conservative predecessor to the postwar enthusiasm for the Europe-concept, thus 
severing conservatives’ guilt association with National Socialism.38  One such 
German conservative who was uniquely animated by this belief was July 20th, 
1944 conspirator and future Supreme Commander of NATO, Wehrmacht General 
Hans Speidel (Ernst Jünger’s co-conspirator in the project).  As will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, Speidel was a key figure in postwar 
West German rearmament who originally suggested to Konrad Adenauer the idea 
of rearmament within an integrated European Army. 
 In 1940, after the defeat of France, Ernst Jünger was transferred to Paris as 
a reserve officer where he spent the duration of the war.  There he became friends 
with General Hans Speidel, who in 1940 was made Chief of Staff of the German 
occupying army in France.  In an unpublished 1946 essay about his relationship 
 
37 Ernst Jünger, “2nd Paris Diary,” in “Jünger, Ernst; Prosa; ‘Strahlungen‘,“ Nachlass Ernst 
Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
38 Seen from this angle, Ritter’s unpublished essay on Der Friede complements his early 
postwar arguments against the Sonderweg.  Ritter argued that National Socialism should not be 
read as a particularly German phenomenon, but rather as an expression of an international trend 




with Ernst Jünger, based on his personal diaries and records, Speidel documented 
Der Friede project from its inception to its dissemination.   According to Speidel, 
around the time of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union Jünger was moved to an 
office in Speidel’s headquarters in Paris and tasked with writing essays on the 
historical significance of recent German victories.  Instead, the two gradually 
developed a friendship around a shared criticism of Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet 
Union and began a secret weekly discussion group in the Parisian “Hotel Georges 
V.” for military men critical of Nazi foreign policy.  That Speidel and Jünger met 
regularly is confirmed in Jünger’s war-time diaries.39  By the end of the year, 
Jünger had allegedly confided in Speidel the belief that the war needed to be 
brought to an end, which was around the same time Speidel joined the anti-Hitler 
conspiracy network that would eventually culminate in the July 20th, 1944 
assassination attempt.  Speidel later testified that he confided in Ernst Jünger his 
involvement in the anti-Hitler conspiracy, and that Jünger refused to join; instead, 
he committed to working on an anti-war manuscript while keeping Speidel 
updated on its progress (at the time it was called the Friedenschrift, or “peace 
manuscript”).  Speidel and Jünger indeed remained in contact throughout the war 
and afterwards.  In 1942 Speidel was transferred to the Eastern Front, but he went 
out of his way to place Jünger under the protection of co-conspirator Carl-
Heinrich von Stülpnagel, who was eventually executed for his participation in the 
July 20th assassination plot.  In late 1942 Stülpnagel helped Jünger attain a six-
 
39 “Jünger, Ernst; Prosa; ‘Strahlungen‘,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches 
Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
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month tour of the Eastern Front.40  Speidel and Jünger remained in written contact 
before and during Jünger’s time on the Eastern Front, and a letter from Jünger to 
Speidel in March, 1943 at the end of his Eastern Front trip confirms that Jünger 
was updating Speidel on his developments with Der Friede.41 
 Jünger’s diary entries from his time on the Eastern Front contain veiled 
criticisms of Nazi barbarism, but equally as many justifications and 
rationalizations of the German soldier’s fight against Bolshevism.  In any case, it 
was during these months that Jünger undertook what he described as a revision of 
Der Friede manuscript.  Because the earlier drafts do not exist, it is impossible to 
surmise what this meant.  But it is very possible that this is the moment when 
Jünger infused his manuscript with the Europe-concept.  A few months after 
returning from the Eastern Front, Jünger’s first engagement with the Europe-
concept can be found in an October, 1943 diary entry discussing the manuscript.  
He explained that one book in particular had given him the inspiration for the 
“second component” of the manuscript (presumably the Europe-concept).  The 
book was titled Europe and the Soul of the East by an obscure writer, Walter 
Schubert.  To be sure, he explains that the book merely helped him summarize 
ideas he had already had, and there is also evidence that he maintained an ongoing 
pen-friendship with Carl Schmitt during and after the war.  Schmitt, with whom 
 
40 Hans Speidel, “Daten für den Aufenthalt Ernst Jüngers in Paris,“ September 2, 1946, 
Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, Nachlass Rudolf Huber, N 1505/461. 
41 Ernst Jünger to Hans Speidel, March 20, 1943, “Jünger, Ernst an Speidel, Hans, 1941-1944,“ 
Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
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he discussed his manuscript in war-time correspondences, may well have 
introduced Jünger to the Grossraum-concept (in fact, the term “Grossraum” does 
indeed make an appearance in Der Friede).42  In any case, all that can be credibly 
established is that Jünger had become a proponent of the Europe-concept by 1943. 
In April, 1944, Speidel was transferred back to Paris as Chief of Staff of 
General Rommel’s army in France, where he continued to work with Jünger on 
his final drafts for Der Friede.  In fact, Speidel claimed that he took drafts of Der 
Friede to Rommel in his attempts to win him over for the anti-Hitler movement.43  
According to Jünger’s diaries, Speidel sent a courier to pick up the final draft of 
Der Friede on May 1st, 1944, at which point Speidel secretly circulated it through 
the ranks of the anti-Hitler conspiracy.44  In February, 1945, Jünger decided to 
expand the secret circulation of the manuscript and gave a copy to a young Panzer 
 
42 Jünger attended a lecture of Schmitt’s about geopolitics in October, 1941 and subsequently 
spent the next few days with him.  See diary entry for October 18, 1941, “Jünger, Ernst; Prosa; 
‘Strahlungen‘,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.   
“Jünger, Ernst an Speidel, Hans, 1941-1944,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches 
Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
43 Speidel claimed that Rommel was particularly moved by Der Friede and attributed Der 
Friede much of the credit for supposedly having nearly convinced Rommel to participation in the 
July, 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler.  See Hans Speidel, “Daten für den Aufenthalt Ernst 
Jüngers in Paris,“ September 2, 1946, Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, Nachlass Rudolf Huber, N 
1505/461. 
44 “Jünger, Ernst; Prosa; ‘Strahlungen‘,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches 
Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
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officer by the name of Manfred Schwarz, whom he had copy and distribute the 
manuscript secretly throughout the rest of the war. 
 Immediately after the war, Speidel and Jünger continued their written 
correspondence about Der Friede.  Speidel, who was working to chronicle the 
history of Der Friede, advised Jünger against publicly publishing it out of a fear 
that such an action would be too early and therefore bring unnecessary criticism 
upon the manuscript.  Instead, Speidel advised, Jünger should use his manuscript 
to work with Speidel to expand the underground network of former military 
figures and the anti-Hitler resistance who “from the other side of darkness 
[National Socialism] found their way to us in the light and who are capable of 
vibrant ideas for our impoverished home and the Occident [Abendland].”45  
Correspondences from 1947 reveal that Speidel was eventually brought around to 
the opinion to publish Der Friede; in fact, he proceeded to help Jünger translate 
and publish it in the Netherlands and France.46  Speidel and Jünger remained in 
contact throughout the 1950s and frequently discussed together the topic of 
European integration.47  Speidel, as we will see in subsequent chapters of this 
 
45 Hans Speidel to Ernst Jünger, November 25, 1946, “Briefe an ihn [Ernst Jünger] von Speidel, 
Hans u. Ruth, 1941-1948,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, 
Germany. 
46 “Briefe an ihn [Ernst Jünger] von Speidel, Hans u. Ruth, 1941-1948,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, 
A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.   “Jünger, Ernst an Speidel, Hans, 1946-
1979,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
47 “Briefe an ihn [Ernst Jünger] von Speidel, Hans, 1954-1960,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: 
Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.   
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dissertation, became an instrumental reformer in the German military who 
buttressed his lobbying against traditional German militarism with the Europe-
concept he had acquired from Jünger. 
 Within a few years after the war Jünger had come into contact and aligned 
himself with Wirsing’s postwar network, the impetus for which came from 
Wirsing’s network.  On October 28th, 1946 Ferdinand Fried, one of Wirsing’s 
chief propagandists going back to the Tat-Kreis in the 1930s, wrote Jünger a long 
letter in the form of an invitation for intellectual collaboration.  Fried opened the 
letter praising Jünger’s Der Friede (he had recently sat in on one of Jünger’s 
lectures about the book).  He explained that he was a friend of Carl Schmitt’s, 
with whom he had discussed Der Friede, and then proceeded to introduce himself 
and the Tat-Kreis, which he explained had admired Jünger from a distance and 
now desired closer contact: “Although we in our circle have kept ourselves distant 
from you, we nevertheless have trafficked in the same ideas and goals; 
consequently, we have gravitated towards you, because we all have more or less 
the same end-goal.”  The postwar years, Fried proceeded to explain, had opened 
his group of thinkers into “a newer, deeper knowledge”; namely, the necessity to 
“gather the youth of Europe.”  Fried finished his letter with an invitation: “Would 
you dare to join us on a great, new adventure called ‘Der Friede’ and 
‘Europe?’”48  Although the correspondence between Jünger and Fried is 
incomplete, it appears that Jünger accepted this offer, which he described in a 
 
48 Ferdinand Fried to Ernst Jünger, October 28, 1946, Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, Nachlass 
Ferdinand Fried, N 1208/1.   
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letter back to Fried as “daring to try and master that which today seems chaotic.”  
“The idea,” he continued, “that greater ordering forces are hidden underneath the 
surface and that we are taking part in purposeful restructuring has never failed me 
before.”49  A month later, on December 8th, 1946, Klaus Mehnert wrote Jünger, 
extended greetings from Fried, introduced himself to Jünger, and invited Jünger to 
sit down with him.  After this letter the archived correspondences between Jünger 
and Mehnert are very fragmentary, but a late 1949 letter from Mehnert reveals 
that a working relationship emerged from this contact.  In this letter, dated 
November 21st, 1949, Mehnert invited Jünger to join Carl Schmitt in writing 
anonymously in his and Wirsing’s recently established periodical Christ und 
Welt.50 
Early Postwar Cooperation with the United States 
Nazi Europeanists, then, increasingly distanced themselves from National 
Socialism as the war ended, sometimes even culminating in treasonous actions.  
The remainder of this chapter will illustrate that this disillusionment transitioned 
at the end of the war into a willingness to collaborate with the United States and 
side with the West in the emerging Cold War.  Remarkably, there is evidence that 
several figures in this dissertation worked secretly with the United States 
 
49 Ernst Jünger to Ferdinand Fried’s wife, November 10, 1946, Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, 
Nachlass Ferdinand Fried, N 1208/1.   
50 Klaus Mehnert to Hans Speidel, November 21, 1949 with attached letter Klaus Mehnert to 
Ernst Jünger, November 21, 1949, “Mehnert, Klaus Dr. An Jünger, Ernst, 1946-1983,“ Nachlass 
Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.   
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intelligence forces after the war, and, in the case of some of them, this 
relationship was maintained throughout the 1950s (especially in the military 
milieu).  The following discussion will leave these substantial military liaisons 
with U.S. intelligence to a separate chapter, and instead focuses on a few of the 
very immediate postwar connections that emerged as the dust was still settling. 
For some of these figures the evidence of their relationship with the 
Americans is very incomplete.  For example, Franz Alfred Six, the head of DAWI 
and the Cultural-Politics Department of the Foreign Office, was, according to 
documents released by the CIA under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, 
mentioned as an employed spy in the West German spy ring in East Germany 
called “Operation Gehlen” run by the U.S. Army and later the CIA.51  The records 
for Axel Seeberg, DAWI director over academic outreach to non-Germans, 
likewise suggest that he had a cooperative relationship with the United States.  In 
his postwar correspondences with Hans Lilje, his postwar publisher, Seeberg 
makes reference to his “secret service people” that helped him avoid a publishing 
censor.52  Yet, like Six, Seeberg’s connections to the Americans cannot be traced 
in more detail.  There are three figures, however, for whom substantial material 
 
51 Timothy Naftali, “Richard Gehlen and the United States,” in ed.s Richard Breitman, Norman 
J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 375-418; 384. 
52 See Seeberg’s postwar testimonials in the personal document collections for Hans Lilje, 
Seeberg’s postwar colleagues in Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/II, Nr. 52. 
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evidence exists to illustrate these connections: Paul Karl Schmidt, Giselher 
Wirsing, and Klaus Mehnert.  
Paul Karl Schmidt, the CIA, and the “ECA-Mission” 
 Within a few months after the end of the war, Paul Karl Schmidt, the 
former head of the Press Department in the Foreign Office, had found his way to 
Hamburg.  There, he immediately sought re-entry into political commentary as a 
journalist, but did so covertly under the pseudonym “P.C. Holm” in order to avoid 
the American censors.  In 1949 he was approached by his former assistant in the 
Foreign Office, Hans Georg von Studnitz, with whom he had published the 
periodical Berlin-Rom-Tokio.  Studnitz had come with a job offer: to work with 
the American CIA to journalistically defend the Marshall Plan and European 
integration.  
The material that resulted from this project cannot be found in public 
archives.  The present author accessed the material with the help of German 
historian/journalist Klaus Körner, who at the time of the writing of this 
dissertation still maintained a personal, private archive of anti-Communist 
pamphlets, brochures, and books produced in the West German occupied zones in 
the late 1940s and the early Federal Republic of West Germany, and allowed the 
present author to sift through this material for writings penned by Paul Karl 
Schmidt’s propaganda circle.  In addition to his personal archival collection, 
Körner personally interviewed and corresponded with Paul Karl Schmidt in the 
1980s and 1990s while he was a journalist for Die Zeit, in which Schmidt was 
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quite open about acknowledging the historical account that follows.  Additionally, 
Körner kindly agreed to an interview with the present author. 
 In 1948 the CIA made contact in Hamburg with a former propagandist of 
the Foreign Office by the name of Bernhard Woischnik, and invited him to lead a 
propaganda initiative writing pamphlets and brochures supportive of the Marshall 
Plan, America’s financial and humanitarian aid to Europe.  The project was run 
through a series of Hamburg publishing houses which had been set up as fronts by 
the CIA; specifically, the “Drei Türme Verlag” and the “Deutscher Buch-Verlag” 
– each of which was owned by the license-carrier Franz Wilhelm Paulus, a co-
founder of the CDU in Hamburg who agreed to publish Woischnik and his 
colleagues anonymously so as to bypass American denazification censors.  The 
“Drei Türme Verlag,” in particular, was set up in 1949 as a vehicle for explicitly 
pro-European integration writings, and in 1950 was overtaken by yet another 
covert publishing house called the “Verlag für Publizistik,” under which most of 
Paul Karl Schmidt’s were ultimately published.  In 1949 Woischnik invited Hans 
Georg von Studnitz to join the project, who in turn invited his former boss Paul 
Karl Schmidt.  The three men together, along with two more former Nazi 
propagandists Rudolf Fust and Eberhard Taubert, set out on what ultimately 
amounted to a three-year project publishing what they called “Europa-Werbung,” 
or “Europe-propaganda.”  Every two to three weeks they were visited by an 
American agent who inspected their material and provided them with 20,000 DM 
in funding which went to printing costs as well as living costs.  Given the duration 
of the Hamburg project, it can be surmised that the United States likely spent 
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hundreds of thousands of DM on the project.53  The material, although not 
accompanied with an author’s name, can be identified by the publishing house 
and unique, colorful publishing style used by Schmidt’s group.  According to 
Schmidt and Studnitz in interviews with Körner, Schmidt took over leadership of 
the Hamburg project and authored most of the material.54 
Schmidt claimed in his interviews with Körner that this Hamburg project 
was part of a larger propaganda project conducted by the Economic Cooperation 
Administration (ECA), an agency created by the Americans to administer the 
Marshall Plan in Europe.  This project was called the “ECA-Mission.”55  This is 
corroborated by documents released by the CIA under the Nazi War Crimes 
Disclosure Act.  On October 12th, 1950 a so-called “Interdepartmental Foreign 
Information Organization,” a joint State Department and CIA committee of the 
ECA, met to discuss what, according to the minutes for the meeting, they called 
“propaganda activity” and “foreign information activities.”  In this meeting they 
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concluded that “the most effective propaganda is frequently that conducted by 
indigenous organizations or groups.”  This included, among other things, 
“financial assistance to European publication[s]” and the “purchase of leaflets or 
other material supporting Marshall Plan objectives.”56  By 1950, Schmidt and his 
writers had expanded the project into a defense of European integration as such.  
According to Körner, the Europe-propaganda project was cancelled and stripped 
of its funding in the summer of 1952 allegedly because the project’s enthusiastic 
backer, John C. McCloy, the High Commissioner for Occupied Germany, was 
replaced by a new, less interested commissioner.57  
The first material from the Hamburg project revolved around the Marshall 
Plan.  In 1950 they published a small ninety-six-page book called “Europe Works: 
the Worker in the Marshall Plan.”  The book was uninhibited in its pro-American 
enthusiasm, describing Americans as benevolent friends of Europe sacrificing for 
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the good of all Europeans.  But it was also frank about the larger purpose of the 
Marshall Plan; namely, preventing “radical and destructive ideas” which are 
fostered in economic emergency.58  After a few chapters identifying the function 
and administration of the Marshall Plan, the last thirty pages of the book, 
beginning with a chapter called “The Great Goals,” appear to have been space for 
Schmidt’s artistic liberty.  The Marshall Plan, he argued, was more than 
humanitarian aid – it was a forerunner for economic cooperation hitherto unseen 
in European history.  In describing the economic developments in process, 
Schmidt deployed none other than the Grossraum concept and even subtly 
suggested that the Marshall Plan was helping Europeans establish an economic 
future in which they could stand up against both the USSR and the USA: 
European mini-states are no longer able to compete with economic 
Grossraum[s] such as America or the Soviet Union!  A Europe that wants 
to live must increase its production well beyond its pre-war levels.  That 
means it has no choice but to establish a European economic Grossraum!  
The Marshall Plan is the means to this end [Italics in original].59 
 
Schmidt and his writers proceeded to discuss economic resources in Europe and 
the optimistic blueprint for an enclosed European Grossraum, but he warned that 
“national egoism” would have to be sacrificed if Europeans were to accomplish 
their task.  Some steps, he explained, would be painful for nationalists, such as, 
for example, the creation of a common European currency.  But in the end they 
 
58 “Europa Arbeitet: Der Arbeiter im Marshallplan,”  most likely 1950, 27-28, historian Klaus 
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59 Ibid., 60-61. 
374 
 
would “strengthen the feeling of commonality.”60  Schmidt, then, was using the 
journalistic space opened to him by American intelligence forces, to advocate 
beyond the Marshall Plan by ascribing it a “higher purpose”: 
The higher purpose of the cooperation produced by the European countries 
in the Marshall Plan is not merely the economic unification of Europe, but 
rather also the political unification of Europe.  The peoples of Europe all 
have the same culture, the same conception of life, the same standard of 
living, the same needs, desires, and hopes.  There is no reason why they 
should not finally bury any and all hate, suspicion, and jealousies in order 
to politically unify for the benefit of everybody and thereby produce a 
truly lasting peace. … Every worker must understand that his work is 
contributing to a New Europe, one in which he and his family and his 
posterity will have a secure life.  Never in the entire history of the 
continent has the opportunity for this been so promising as it is right 
now.61 
 
The last chapter in the book attempted to explain the Second World War as the 
product of a “false and exaggerated nationalism,” and suggested that the only way 
to avoid future wars was to accept Schmidt’s interpretation of the Marshall Plan.  
The entire pamphlet came to an end with the following appeal: 
The European peoples must contribute their part to the unification of 
Europe.  The previous political and economic system of nationalism - 
which in its very essence is very backwards in light of modern 
technological and world-economic developments - will otherwise 
necessarily lead to atom and hydrogen bombs.  Today there is only one 
choice: that between the cooperation of peoples and their downfall.  The 
decision rests with every individual.62 
 
The Hamburg project, then, ostensibly an advocacy group for the Marshall 
Plan, was actually using its funds to advance more audacious ideas about 
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European unification.  But the Americans appear to have both known and 
accepted this, because in 1951 they began commissioning propaganda pamphlets 
in support of the Schuman Plan, or European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
the proposal to combine West European coal and steel industries.  In a sixteen-
page pamphlet titled “What will the Schuman Plan Bring?” Schmidt and his 
writers argued that the ECSC was the first step towards the “union” 
(Zusammenschluss) of the European peoples.  Additionally, they subtly argued 
that the ECSC was evidence that Europeans were in agreement about the true 
cause of the Second World War: British “balance of powers” politics.  To be sure, 
Schmidt and his writers did not use the term “British,” but the use of the loaded 
term was a not so hidden reference to their wartime polemics against an alleged 
British conspiracy to dominate Europe behind the façade of equal powers and 
nationalism: 
Up until the end of the Second World War the division of Europe in all 
things political and economic was the consequence of the principle of 
Balance of Powers.  Nobody was supposed to win the upper hand.  It was 
a complicated political game and constant wars were necessary in order to 
keep this Balance of Powers intact.  But with the advance of the Soviet 
Union to the Elbe this system crumbled in on itself.  Now there is only one 
large power in the European-Asian territories, and it is attempting to 
extend its influence by all means and at the expense of others.63 
 
The pamphlet, conspicuously silent on the economic aspects of the Schuman Plan, 
continued to argue that traditional nationalism, because it had caused the recent 
conflict in Europe, would need to be done away with, and that there were 
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historical examples of using economic unification as a precursor for political 
unification.  Such, for example, was the German “Zollunion” of the 1830s: 
The Zollunion was the precondition for the industrial and economic 
flourishing of Germany in the last century.  The Schuman Plan, however, 
will inaugurate a new European era; because in this age of the airplane it 
will eliminate the archaic borders of old and create for us the Grossraum 
which has been so neglected by the politics of Europe’s peoples.64 
 
The rest of the pamphlet proceeded to assuage concerns about losing German 
“sovereignty,” arguing that, just like a family in a house, each member of Europe 
would have to learn to sacrifice sovereignty.  Indeed, learning to increasingly 
sacrifice more sovereignty was the path for all Europeans to a future European 
state.  And “then a true European patriotism will replace the divisiveness of 
nationalism.”65 
 Sometime in 1950, likely towards the end of the year, Schmidt was 
allowed to publish an eighty-seven-page book as part of the project along with his 
pseudonym “P.C. Holm.”66  Schmidt opened the book, titled Down with Borders!  
Europe is our Salvation, with an introduction that re-packaged many of the 
themes from war-time Foreign Office Europe-propaganda: he described Europe as 
a “divided family” or a “family of peoples” (Völkerfamilie); he called for a future 
 
64 Ibid., 5. 
65 Ibid., 15 
66 P.C. Holm, Die Grenzen Nieder! Europa ist unsere Rettung (Hamburg: Deutscher 
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“United States of Europe” on the model of the USA; he decried nationalism and 
nation-states as a false historical path enticing Europeans to abandon their destiny 
in a Grossraum and political federation; he denounced Europe’s past wars as 
unfortunate “European Civil Wars” for which all peoples shared equal blame; 
and, finally, he appealed for Europeans to remember their historical unity in the 
pre-modern “Occident” (yet made no calls for religious revival).67  Yet, despite all 
the continuity in Schmidt’s Europeanism, Down with Borders! also illustrates that 
Schmidt was in the process of revising his Europe-concept in light of his postwar 
alliance with the United States. 
 Much like his war-time entreaties for European unification, Down with 
Borders! relied on historical narratives to justify its Europe-concept.  In fact, more 
than half of the book, a total of forty-seven pages, functioned as a historical 
account of the Europe-concept.  The goal, as Schmidt himself explained, was to 
“see history from a European perspective, which means examining the question: 
what has led to the unification of Europe and what has led away from it?  In doing 
so, the events of the past and the forces of history acquire different levels of 
importance.”  Most importantly, one could learn that “the path towards Europe” 
encapsulates what he called the “direction of the history of our Raum.”68  But his 
treatment of European history in Down with Borders! took on a much different 
form than his war-time treatments.  Remarkably, he traced the origins of Europe 
to the Jews, who inaugurated monotheism and therefore the “foundation of 
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European culture.”  Schmidt did not belabor this point for more than a few pages, 
but his inclusion of Jews in the origin story of Europe was a complete reversal of 
his heightened antisemitism in Foreign Office propaganda (the rest of the text also 
refrained from antisemitism).  Foreshadowing his tepid reconciliation with 
liberalism later in the text, Schmidt placed the Greeks in the deep genealogy of 
Europe as well, because they implanted in Europe a commitment to democracy, 
which he called “the most humane regulation of mankind’s political 
relationships.”69  
Schmidt then traced Europe’s birth to the Holy Roman Empire of the 
Middle Ages, beginning with Charlemagne, which defined itself during the 
crusades in an identity-building, multi-century struggle against Asians and 
Muslims.  Here Schmidt was continuing one of his war-time themes; namely, that, 
rather than the nation-state, the European Grossraum (defined culturally and 
ethnically against “Asia”) was Europeans’ true cultural nation, or, as he described 
it, “a higher, more encompassing community [Gemeinschaft] than the belonging 
associated with tribe or Volk.”70  The rest of Schmidt’s history lesson was 
intended to trace the decline of Europe and the unfortunate “victory of borders” in 
the Early Modern period.  Like his war-time arguments, Schmidt traced the 
beginning of this “retreat” from Europe to the Thirty Years’ War and the resulting 
rise of “European Civil Wars.”  The Thirty Years’ War, he argued, was not so 
much a religious conflict, but rather the rise of nation-states and their pernicious 
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effect on European history – something Schmidt called the “core problem of 
European history.”71 But unlike his war-time propaganda, Schmidt now found 
moments in the Early Modern period which carried the European spirit through its 
era of nationalist descent.  Most importantly, he went to great lengths to defend 
the Renaissance and humanism as underground carriers of a unified European 
culture unaware of their role in the dialectical metanarrative of Europe’s re-birth.  
Schmidt’s treatment of these Early Modern intellectual developments was 
strikingly liberal-progressive.  For example, he praised the Renaissance for being 
secular and dislodging the dogmatic power of theology.  In other segments he 
praised Galileo and Copernicus for establishing the foundation for modern science 
and research.  Schmidt then continued this progressive account into his reading of 
the Enlightenment (which was likewise presented as an unsuspecting forerunner 
of European unification).   
Although he could not bring himself to use the term “liberal,” Schmidt 
praised “bourgeois” philosophers such as Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, and Kant.  
Schmidt even revised his take on the French Revolution, which had been 
regularly decried in Foreign Office propaganda for cementing the rise of 
inorganic individualism and universalism.  The French Revolution, and its 
“bourgeois” harbingers, he argued, correctly identified mankind’s basic “human 
rights” (Menschenrechte) – which he defined as the right to self-representation vs. 
monarchism; the right to property vs. feudalism; and the right to rule of law vs. 
absolutism.  Schmidt even quoted Thomas Jefferson, and defined these rights as 
 
71 Ibid. 21. 
380 
 
“inalienable.”72  Unlike the war-time propaganda of the Foreign Office, Napoleon 
was presented as an unfortunate revival of monarchism.  Nevertheless, the 
Enlightenment, he argued, was destined to gradually emerge victorious, and with 
it the Europe-concept.  It is difficult to make sense of Schmidt’s seeming 
conversion to liberalism.  But one thing stands out: his silence on the issue of 
individualism.  Although Schmidt correctly identified many pillars of liberalism, 
he did not identify its most central doctrine: the centrality of the individual.  In 
fact, to the contrary, Schmidt incorrectly read collectivist philosophers into the 
Enlightenment such as Herder, who, he argued, had been misunderstood as a 
romantic and nationalist when in reality all he had done was awaken Europeans to 
their internal “national feeling.”   But national feeling, he argued, merely meant 
the highest “organic level of community” and did not find its culmination in the 
Volk but rather Europe.  Repeating a frequent argument from his war-time Europe 
concept, Schmidt presented Herder and the Enlightenment as harbingers of the 
Völkergemeinschaft: “[Herder] reconciled the concept of nation-ness [Volkheit] 
and nationality [Nationalen] with the concept of Völkergemeinschaft.”73  In fact, 
the end of Schmidt’s historical analysis of the Enlightenment was accompanied 
by a subtle condemnation for it having been incomplete; specifically, for it having 
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retreated from the Völkergemeinschaft and instead turned to the dead-end of 
nationalism: 
The peoples [of Europe] were awakened; but they awoke as nations.  The 
wars against one another, caused by the non-presence of a common non-
European threat, prevented the emergence of a supranational 
consciousness in Europe even though humanism had opened the way for 
such an occurrence.74 
 
The nineteenth century in Europe, according to Schmidt, was primarily a 
story about the rise of three things: democracy, capitalism, and nationalism.  The 
rise of democracy he celebrated, the simultaneous rise of nationalism he 
condemned; but his take on capitalism was more nuanced.  Marx, he 
acknowledged, was correct to identify legitimate social ills which emerge from 
industrial capitalism; furthermore, capitalism as an economic system, he argued, 
was intrinsically at odds with the concomitant rise of the nation-state.  But 
capitalism, for all its problems, could not be reversed.  For Europeans to attempt 
to do so, Schmidt argued, would be “suicide” in an age of global capital.75  The 
problems that accompany capitalism, however, were resolved by Schmidt with the 
concept of the Grossraum, which organically ordered the nation-transcending 
movement of goods and could therefore more effectively buttress the social 
welfare state.  Europeans, he lamented, were too slow to recognize this transition 
to the Grossraum.  Indeed, the politics of Versailles – in particular the 
misbegotten doctrine of “national self-determination” – was, according to 
Schmidt, an anachronistic throwback to the nation-state in an age when Europe’s 
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rivals to the East and West were transitioning into Grossraum[s].  In stark contrast 
to his war-time propaganda, Schmidt praised Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-
European movement, the League of Nations, and French Prime Minister Aristide 
Briand’s plans for European integration as a “missed opportunity.”  Nevertheless, 
his attack on the Versailles settlement was a surprising angle in propaganda 
patronized by the United States. 
The second half of Down with Borders! enthusiastically outlined and the 
recent developments towards European unification, something he called the 
“Europe movement.”  It included: Churchill’s 1946 speech advocating a “United 
States of Europe”; the establishment of various think-tanks in favor of European 
integration; the Brussels Treaty Organization; and, most importantly, the 
establishment of the Council of Europe.  Schmidt was clearly caught up in the 
enthusiasm for European integration and interpreted recent events as evidence for 
the inexorable drive towards a new European polity.  Schmidt energetically 
supported Adenauer’s involvement in this “Europe movement” and, importantly, 
was confident that the United States likewise supported it because it was based on 
the principles of democracy and human rights.  Indeed, Schmidt presented the 
“Europe movement” as one piece (the most important piece) in the developing 
Cold War.  “It is indeed natural that the European peoples profess themselves to 
the West,” he argued.  He finished with an appeal for Europeans to be forward-
thinking: “Let’s not forget that Europe is only possible with patriotism; not the 
patriotism of the nineteenth century, but rather the patriotism of the twentieth 
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century.”76  Schmidt further contrasted the patriotism of the two centuries by 
suggesting that the traditional love for a “Fatherland” must “give sway to the 
more encompassing Motherland: Europe.”77 
 It is tempting to interpret Paul Karl Schmidt’s remarkable (if incomplete) 
conversion to liberalism as rank opportunism.  After all, Schmidt was an 
extraordinarily ambitious individual and postwar West Germany, at least initially 
committed to denazification, was not an easy place for former Nazis to find 
money, sustenance, and careers.  Given that Schmidt’s work for the CIA was 
censored weekly, it may appear plausible that Schmidt was merely fulfilling a 
demand and cashing his checks.  A better interpretation is that Schmidt was 
committed to his Europe-concept, the path for which seemingly had to go through 
liberal democracy – which meant that Schmidt had to find ways to salvage 
something out of a hitherto enemy ideology.  In short, the survival of his Europe-
concept required its revision.  This is corroborated by another finding: in addition 
to his work for the CIA Schmidt also regularly worked for the private, 
independent newspaper Die Welt from October 1950 until the end of 1953 as a 
foreign policy editorialist with the same pseudonym (P.C. Holm).  The present 
author was unable to discover whether or not this work was commissioned or 
encouraged by American authorities, but it is unlikely given the fact that he 
continued his work for Die Welt uninterrupted through 1953 (more than a year 
after the CIA project had been disbanded).   In the pages of Die Welt Schmidt 
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forcefully defended the USA’s foreign policy in the early Cold War as a struggle 
for freedom against Soviet tyranny, and admonished Germans to align themselves 
with “the West” and re-make Europe “in the spirit of Western democracy.”78 
But perhaps unrestrained by American censors, Schmidt was also more 
able to articulate illiberal ideas in his writing for Die Welt.  For example, Schmidt 
occasionally flirted with apologia for National Socialism.  In November, 1950 he 
wrote a history article describing an alleged offer by the Soviets to join the 
Tripartite Pact on the condition that the Germans allow further expansion of their 
rule over Finland, Turkey, and Bulgaria.  The Nazis, Schmidt concluded, nobly 
refused on behalf of Europe.79  Even more telling, Schmidt was occasionally 
prone to defend non-German fascists.  Although consistently critical of Hitler for 
misguiding Germany into tyranny, Schmidt was more forgiving to Hitler’s allies 
and accomplices, whom, in Schmidt’s view, had actually been corrupted by 
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Hitler.  One article of his took a stand against the revanchist French public for 
condemning Marshall Petain and the servants of Vichy.80  Likewise, Schmidt 
lamented Benito Mussolini’s decline as the unfortunate story of a man well-
versed in the philosophical dilemmas of his time but ultimately incapable of 
keeping his ideology free from association with Hitler.  Mussolini’s tragedy, then, 
was having squandered his opportunity to change the world with fascism.81  
Finally, Schmidt was frequently defensive of Franco’s fascist regime in Spain.  
He decried condemnations of Franco’s regime, arguing that Franco had proven 
the legitimacy of his fascist rule by refusing to be corrupted by Hitler, and that the 
West should more actively embrace Franco as a potential ally in the Cold War.  
For Schmidt, then, the Cold War struggle for the “democratic West,” as he often 
called it, was perfectly compatible with Franco’s fascism.82 
 The documentary evidence for Schmidt’s life in the mid and late-1950s is 
very fragmentary.83  But it is safe to assume that, like many post-Nazi 
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Europeanists analyzed in this dissertation, Schmidt was discouraged by what was 
ultimately, in his eyes, the incomplete and failed European integration of the 
1950s.  Because in the 1960s he began the postwar activity for which he is most 
famously known for: his career as an amateur military historian.  As historians 
have pointed out, Schmidt’s apologias for the war on the Eastern Front beginning 
in the 1960s and continuing through the 1990s, became a lynchpin for nationalist 
accounts of the Second World War on the far Right of late twentieth century 
German politics.84  Schmidt ultimately traversed one of the most wide-ranging 
intellectual trajectories analyzed in this dissertation: originally a radical student 
nationalist in Weimar Germany, he eventually became a leading exponent of 
antisemitic Europeanism in the Foreign Office only to then sharply turn towards a 
tepid reconciliation with liberal democracy after the war, and ultimately find a 
home in disgruntled late twentieth century German nationalism. 
Giselher Wirsing, Klaus Mehnert, and the Americans 
 Within a few years after the war Klaus Mehnert had made his way from 
East Asia back to Germany and Giselher Wirsing had been released from prison.  
The two quickly reunited and together founded and edited Christ und Welt, one of 
postwar West Germany’s most influential political weeklies (the subject of the 
next two chapters of this dissertation).  But before the two began collaborating on 
a journalistic career, each of them had already begun separately to communicate 
and cooperate with American intelligence.  In November, 1945 Wirsing, who had 





the war’s end, accepted an offer from American intelligence officers to work on 
public relations.  For roughly one month Wirsing toured the American occupation 
zone with an American officer called “Lieutenant Mittelburger” and wrote 
evaluations of public opinions towards the American occupiers.  According to 
CIA documents he completed this operation with a former colleague of the 
Foreign Office by the name of Werner Otto von Hentig, who had been a diplomat 
to the Middle East working on Nazi outreach to the Arab world.85  In all 
likelihood, Wirsing’s primary motivation for engaging in this American 
intelligence operation revolved around his prisoner-of-war status and subsequent 
need to evade postwar justice.  Due to the scarcity of documents for Wirsing’s 
postwar life and career, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not Wirsing’s 
relationship with the Americans continued past 1945, but it is unlikely that a 
direct relationship continued.   As late as 1965, American intelligence was still 
tracing Giselher Wirsing and had come to the position that he was an ally of the 
United States.  The CIA believed that he had become a useful ally because he had 
come around to supporting strong ties to the United States.86  In any case, if 
Wirsing had conducted further work for American intelligence, the CIA document 
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trace file under his name would likely have included that information.  His close 
colleague Klaus Mehnert, on the other hand, maintained a documented 
relationship with the Americans throughout these years.  And this can be 
demonstrated with a wealth of material from Mehnert’s exhaustive personal 
holdings in the state archive of Baden-Württemberg in Stuttgart. 
The evidence indicates that Mehnert himself approached the Americans 
with the desire for a constructive relationship.  In November, 1946 Mehnert wrote 
a long letter to Colonel George E. Arneman, a military attaché at the American 
embassy in Paris.  Mehnert and Arneman had become friends in Hawaii, and upon 
hearing that Arneman was stationed in Europe Mehnert wrote to him testifying of 
his anti-Hitler sentiment and professed a desire to work on the “reconstruction” of 
Germany.87  In 1947 it appears his wish was granted when he was invited to 
participate in the “German Bureau for Peace Questions,” an organization 
established by provisional West German governing authorities in February, 1947 
and subsequently approved and financed by American occupation officials.  The 
purpose of the Bureau was to coordinate reconciliation between German and 
American interests vis-à-vis German occupation.  Mehnert was tasked with 
synthesizing foreign press reports for German representatives.88  According to 
Mehnert’s correspondences with an American friend in 1947 and 1948, Mehnert 
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was involved in this project from its inception until its dissolution in 1948, around 
the time Mehnert began co-publishing Christ und Welt with Giselher Wirsing.89 
Even after the German Bureau for Peace Questions had been dissolved, Mehnert 
continued to work with American occupation authorities.  In early 1949 he 
received a request from the American Office of Military Government for 
Germany (OMGUS) to send in a questionnaire and report on U.S.-German 
relations in which Mehnert commented on the most effective ways to train 
German citizens in the practice of democratic governance.90 
Around the same time, Mehnert’s involvement with the Americans took 
another step forward when he began publishing a “Germany-Yearbook” with the 
Rheinisch-Westfälisch publishing house in Essen.  Based on correspondences 
with German representatives of the High Commission for Occupied Germany 
(HICOG), the book, which summarized yearly developments in German politics 
and therefore German-American relations, appears to have been at least partially 
subsidized by the Americans.91  In one of the correspondences with McCloy’s 
German representatives, in fact, Mehnert was invited to expand his partnership 
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with the occupying authorities further still; namely, by participating in the 
reconstitution of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).92  Indeed, in 
1950 Mehnert was made a member of the DAAD’s managing board, a position he 
maintained throughout the 1950s and beyond.93  Interestingly, it appears that 
Mehnert was eventually even invited to participate in HICOG’s secret discussions 
and meetings about German public opinion on sensitive issues such as 
rearmament and European integration.  In March, 1951, Mehnert received an 
eleven-page secret report from the HICOG office in Stuttgart.  The report, marked 
“restricted,” was an evaluation of German public opinion and the threat of Soviet 
offers of German neutrality in the Cold War.94  Around the same time Mehnert 
appears to have had some relationship with “Radio Free Europe,” an anti-
Communist American operation funded by the CIA.  A few correspondences from 
1951 suggest that he advised Radio Free Europe in some capacity.95  By 1953 
Mehnert had extended his cooperation with American occupation forces into a 
working relationship with West German governing authorities.  In July, 1953 
Mehnert received a 1000 DM payment for having completed a research essay 
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about Soviet-Middle East relations for the reconstructed German Foreign Office.96  
As we will discuss in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, Mehnert continued 
a secret working relationship with the West German government throughout his 
time as chief editor of Christ und Welt. 
In addition to his formal relationships with the United States, Mehnert also 
fostered unofficial ties to the United States.  His personal archival holdings 
contain a variety of correspondences with Americans, including, for example, 
frequent discussions with American historians at prestigious Universities, 
including Yale University and the University of Michigan.97  But his most telling 
unofficial relationship with the United States was his long-standing friendship 
with George F. Kennan.  As discussed in a previous chapter of this dissertation, 
Mehnert befriended Kennan in the 1930s while working as a journalist in 
Moscow.  In 1947 the two figures resumed their written friendship, and continued 
to correspond regularly throughout their lives.  Just between the years 1947 and 
1953, for example, Mehnert’s personal archival holdings contain eighteen 
correspondences between them (and their discussions suggest that this record is 
very incomplete).  Their correspondences suggest that they considered one 
another not just acquaintances, but close friends.  In fact, Mehnert hosted Kennan 
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in his private home in Stuttgart when Kennan visited Europe in the fall of 1951.98  
Their main topic of interest in their correspondences was, of course, the Cold War 
and German-American relations, and the two figures regarded each other as allies 
in the great foreign policy debates of the time.  Mehnert was energetically 
supportive of Kennan’s “containment theory,” and the two figures found 
themselves in agreement that the essential foreign policy for Germans after the 
Second World War was to align themselves with “the West.”99  Mehnert 
frequently shared with Kennan his measurement of German public opinion 
regarding an alliance with the West.  In one particularly revealing correspondence 
from May, 1948, Mehnert explained that he believed most Germans prioritized 
peace and an alliance with the West more than German unity and therefore 
accepted Kennan’s containment theory.  Mehnert proceeded to argue that, despite 
their history, most Germans could actually be won over to the idea and practice of 
democracy.100  
Based on the convergence of their foreign policy priorities, Mehnert and 
Kennan proceeded to use their relationship to advance cultural diplomacy.  In the 
early 1950s Kennan was in and out of work with the U.S. State Department but 
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still desired to influence international politics and sought to use journalism and 
academia as a vehicle for expanding the reach of his anti-Communism.  In fact, 
according to one correspondence from September, 1951 Kennan had shared with 
Mehnert an “assignment” he had received from U.S. Secretary of Defense George 
C. Marshall to influence public opinion through “writing and research.”101  The 
records indicate that Kennan successfully recruited Mehnert as part of this 
unofficial project.  In one correspondence from the summer of 1951 Mehnert 
confirms to Kennan that he had, on Kennan’s request, re-instated the “German 
Society for the Study of Eastern Europe” (Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Studium 
Osteuropas), which, as discussed in a previous chapter of this dissertation, had 
been one of Mehnert’s academic projects in the early 1930s.102  According to 
subsequent correspondences, the re-instated academic society was used to 
frequently publish Kennan and some of his chosen researchers.103  Additionally, 
according to a request made by Kennan in late September, 1951, it appears that 
Mehnert used his journalistic acumen to help Kennan find German publishing 
houses who would accept American funding to publish research chosen by 
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Kennan.104  Mehnert also published Kennan’s writings in Christ und Welt and 
reported this back to Kennan.105  It appears that Kennan, in order to return the 
favors, assisted Mehnert’s colleague Eugen Gerstenmaier, who had recently been 
elected to the West German parliament as well as the parliament of the European 
Council in Strasbourg, with American networking in 1953.106   
Conclusion 
It is tempting to see Wirsing and Mehnert’s postwar liaison with the 
United States as evidence of a quick and thorough conversion to liberal 
democracy.  This is certainly the image they attempted to foster decades later, and 
it appears that they were not wholly unsuccessful in this endeavor.  For example, 
a 1967 article in Der Spiegel, which quoted from Mehnert’s recently published 
book Der Deutsche Standort, reviewed Mehnert’s life since the Second World 
War, explaining: 
From the very beginning he supported ‘progress’ as opposed to traditional 
German ‘cultural pessimism’; he supported ‘the West’ as opposed to 
traditional German animosity towards civilization and the 
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But Wirsing and Mehnert’s cooperation with the Americans, and even their 
professed commitment to the West were more complicated than it may seem at 
first sight.  Even Mehnert’s correspondences with Kennan reveal this point.  In 
the same 1948 report on German public opinion vis-à-vis the Cold War and 
democracy Mehnert implored Kennan to encourage American statesmen to pump 
the brakes on democratic reform.  He argued that, although he agreed Germans 
were receptive to democracy, the Americans should avoid forcing the issue, 
especially via “military occupation.”  These were subtle attacks on the American 
policy of denazification (something Mehnert and Wirsing consistently decried in 
Christ und Welt).   Mehnert suggested that a democratic political culture would 
eventually emerge organically, and that more pressing relations to the United 
States should be highlighted, such as economic aid and European integration.  As 
Mehnert explained: “[m]y suggestion is: not to insist on the Western Germans’ 
anti-East declarations but rather to give them a chance to express their pro-West 
choice by hard work on the Marshall Plan and reconstruction of Europe.”  With 
these comments Mehnert was revealing what was actually a tenuous commitment 
to the West and, in fact, a prioritization of his Europe-concept over and above the 
democratization of Germany.108 
 Mehnert was even more forthcoming in his first postwar ventures in 
domestic journalism.  In late 1947, before beginning the Christ und Welt project, 
he worked for just under a year as the primary political editorialist for a short-
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lived American-licensed newspaper called Neue Woche.109  In his articles for 
Neue Woche Mehnert painted the picture of a “competition for Europe” that had 
broken out between the Americans and the Soviets with Europeans caught in the 
middle.110  In 1948 Mehnert invited a former Nazi official in the Foreign Office, 
Wolf Schenke, to join the staff at Neue Woche.  In a letter to Mehnert regarding 
his vision for Neue Woche, Schenke succinctly summarized Mehnert’s ulterior 
motives for aligning with the West, and in doing so foreshadowed what would 
become Mehnert and Wirsing’s primary political narrative in their 1950s 
journalism: 
In my view we need to work towards creating a ‘second third front’, which 
would encompass the core of Europe, but also any countries of the world 
who, due to their geographic position, find themselves having become a 
battleground for the struggle between the two super powers. 
 
Schenke continued, arguing that “Europe needs to be independent from both 
sides,” and that any military alliance with the West would provoke the Soviets 
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into entrenching Europe as a Cold War battlefield.  “Both the East and the West 
are foreign to us,” Schenke finished.111 
Mehnert, of course, was more careful than Schenke in his public and 
private writings (never willing to so unashamedly decry the West as equally 
foreign to European interests).  But the idea of a unified, independent Europe as a 
“second third front,” or simply “third front,” as it was often called in Christ und 
Welt, became a staple of Mehnert and Wirsing’s foreign policy vision in the 
1950s.  The origins of this “third front” discourse can be traced back to a Christ 
und Welt editorial staff memo from early 1949.  In the document, titled 
“Germany, Europe, and Stalin,” Mehnert attempted to organize the paper’s 
general editorial narrative on foreign policy (about which there had apparently 
been some confusion after Christ und Welt’s first few editions).  He began with 
what he called Germans’ age-old dilemma: “Eastern orientation or Western 
orientation?”  His answer: neither.  Instead, the correct answer, and the answer to 
which most Germans subscribed, was: a “re-united, un-occupied, economically 
vibrant European Germany.”  But Mehnert proceeded to explain that 
accomplishing all of the demands encompassed in such a future Germany was, in 
the contemporary political climate, entirely unfeasible without support from one 
of the super powers.  And so the actual question facing German politicians and 
editorialists, he suggested, was the following: what is the position of the two 
occupying powers to these German aspirations?  The answer he gave was that 
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Germans’ long-term goals most closely aligned with the West, because, unlike the 
East, the West operates within the confines of “negotiable” democracy, and can 
therefore be influenced.  Consequently, he assigned the editorial staff the 
responsibility to abide by a principle he called “utilization of the West” 
(Anlehnung an den Westen), by which he meant using the Western alliance as a 
provisional vehicle for accomplishing his long-term aspirations of an independent 
European federation.  Some people, Mehnert explained, might argue that “West 
Germany needs to completely integrate, by all means at its disposal, into the 
Western world, including the armed Atlantic Pact [NATO].”  Others, he 
continued, would suggest Germany advance claims for reunification and 
neutralization between the two superpowers.  But both of these position were to 
be rejected.  Instead, Christ und Welt would advocate partial integration with the 
West, especially as it pertained to European integration, free trade, and 
humanitarian aid - all of which closely aligned with the future goal of an 
independent Europe.  Mehnert proceeded to argue that this foreign policy 
narrative would need to be complemented by a domestic narrative supporting a 
larger social welfare state (so as to fend off Communist insurgency).  
Additionally, he explained, the paper would need to help make sure that the 
foundations for European unification were prepared by advocating against 
nationalism and strengthening the “will to integrate into a larger European body 
including the forfeiting of national sovereignty.”  At the end of the memo 
Mehnert summarized the editorial vision in two points: 
1) The goal is the de-Bolshevization of as much of Germany and Europe 
as possible via the swiftest possible roll-back of the Soviets from their 
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impressively deep advance westward.  2) Rather than war, the path to this 
goal should be the exploitation of all possible Western political and 
economic precepts, both the positive ones and the negative ones. 
 
The covert purpose of this editorial direction, he warned, was a very “delicate 
concept” and should be kept secret.112   
Wirsing and Mehnert’s postwar cooperation and reconciliation with the 
United States, then, was not born of a new-found commitment to the West, but 
instead originated in a realization of the need to “utilize” and “exploit” the West 
for the survival and success of their Europe-concept.  One day, Europe would 
emerge as an independent, alternative political, social, and economic model 
capable of withstanding intrusion from both East and West.  This was the initial 
formula for former Nazi Europeanists in the postwar period.  Their conservative 
dream of a New Europe could be salvaged from the Nazi past, but doing so would 
require a shrewd and opportunistic alliance with the democratic world.  However, 
there were domestic challenges which they had to confront as well; in particular, 
how to define the Europe-concept in a post-Nazi world and how to propagate it to 
a population still saturated with the legacy of a poisonous nationalism.  How this 
calculus played out in the context of political developments in the first decade of 
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Chapter 7: The Origins of Post-Nazi Europeanism in West 
German Journalism 
Introduction 
The following chapter introduces the surprisingly industrious postwar 
careers of former Nazi Europeanists in postwar West German journalism.  It 
outlines their idiosyncratic path to postwar prominence and discusses the 
challenges they had to navigate in order to attain a voice in West German public 
discourse.  These writers revised and publicized their Europe-concept as a new, 
modern conservatism.  This is a story of how a network of post-Nazi Europeanists 
was established in the immediate postwar years and how they maneuvered 
themselves into positions of political influence.  A textual analysis of their work 
in two of the most dominant periodicals in postwar West Germany will be 
presented in a subsequent chapter.   Early on these former Nazi Europeanists were 
careful to only very rarely employ the term “conservative,” but by the early 1950s 
they were openly encouraging a conservative European revolution.  Anson 
Rabinbach has described postwar German conservatism as a “community of 
silence” suffocated and ostracized from mainstream political thought and 
relegated to careful, private interactions as a result of postwar censors, 
denazification, and war-time association with National Socialism.  And this public 
silencing of postwar conservatism, he and others have argued, was part of a 
broader de-politicization of early postwar intellectualism in West Germany.1  In 
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contrast, this chapter will argue that post-Nazi Europeanists found a unique 
avenue to be openly political and to propagate a new postwar conservativism 
centered around their Europe-concept, and that they did so from positions of great 
influence in West German journalism.   
Historians often assert a widespread aversion to politics as well as a desire 
for a return to “normalcy” in early postwar West Germany.2  To be sure, there is 
certainly evidence that the German public was substantially unpolitical or at least 
defined themselves as such; nevertheless, in June, 1952 twenty-seven percent of 
West Germans still declared themselves “very interested” in politics (including 
forty-six percent of men) and only thirty-two percent declared no interest 
whatsoever.  Furthermore, fifty-four percent of West Germans in the same poll 
admitted to regularly discussing politics.3  The primary means for obtaining 
political information in postwar West Germany was print journalism, which 
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benefited from low printing costs due in part to American-patronized access to 
cheap paper resources.4  In the 1950s television had not yet established itself as a 
primary source of political information, and according to public polling radio had 
not yet overcome the newspaper as the most-used media resource.  Polled 
throughout the early 1950s, roughly sixty to sixty-five percent of West Germans 
consistently reported reading print journalism regularly and only five percent of 
respondents reported never reading print journalism in their daily lives.5  Despite 
the taboos, then, politics in West Germany was an unspoken interest for many 
West Germans.  This was not lost on the occupying Allied authorities, who 
implemented a significant censor regime in the West German press as part of their 
denazification program.  Very soon after the war the Western Allies implemented 
a licensing program, whereby material could only be published in the West 
German zones by an individual or organization which had been granted a license 
after a thorough denazification investigation designed to weed out writers who 
were either Nazi party members or had ever contributed to Nazi propaganda 
material.  The loophole in the system, however, was that license carriers could 
publish former Nazi propagandists anonymously and after 1949 they could do so 
explicitly (this was because the newly formed West German state gained control 
of the licensing regime and refused to take actions against former Nazis that had 
been designated “fellow travelers”).  As historians have shown, this ultimately 
 
4 Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, Vol. 1 (Hoboken: 
Blackwell, 1993), chapter 8. 
5 Noelle and Neumann, Jahrbuch für öffentliche Meinung, 1947-1955, 55. 
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produced a plethora of postwar journalistic careers for former Nazi 
propagandists.6  Two weekly Protestant periodicals in particular, Christ und Welt 
and Sonntagsblatt (hereafter CuW and SB respectively), collected an especially 
large number of former Nazi propagandists and were edited and directed a 
network of former Nazi Europeanists analyzed in this dissertation. 
Origins of the Postwar Network 
CuW and SB, both founded in 1948 in Stuttgart and Hamburg respectively, 
were the two most-read weekly political periodicals in the Federal Republic in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, and throughout the decade they each averaged a 
circulation of roughly 120,000-135,000.  The next three closest competitors in the 
1950s were: Der Spiegel, which was West Germany’s predominant left-liberal 
weekly, eventually surpassing CuW and SB in circulation numbers by the mid-
1950s; Die Zeit, which was a secular weekly that was not explicitly conservative; 
and Rheinischer Merkur (the largest conservative Catholic weekly in postwar 
 
6 Matthias Weiss, “Journalisten: Worte als Taten,“ in ed. Norbert Frei Hitlers Eliten nach 1945 
(Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003).   Peter Köpf, Schrieben nach jeder Richtung – Goebbels-
Propagandisten in der westdeutschen Nachkreigspresse (Berlin: Links Christoph Verlag, 1998).   
Christina von Hodenberg, “Die Journalisten und der Aufbruch zur kritischen Öffentlichkeit“ in ed. 
Ulrich Herbert, Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung: 
1945-1980 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002), 278-311.   Norbert Frei and Johannes Schmitz, 
Journalismus im Dritten Reich (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999).   Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, 
History of West Germany, Vol. 1: From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963 (Hoboken: Blackwell, 
1989), chapter 8.   Lutz Hachmeister and Friedemann Siering, Die Herren Journalisten: Die Elite 
der deutschen Presse nach 1945(Munich: C.H. Beck, 2002). 
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West German journalism).  Die Zeit and Rheinischer Merkur achieved 
circulations roughly half of the size of CuW and SB during the first postwar 
decade and only began to catch up during the 1960s.7  In short, CuW and SB were 
the most prominent conservative political periodicals in the first decade of 
postwar West Germany.  Unlike much of print journalism in the postwar years, 
especially daily newspapers, weekly periodicals such as CuW and SB were openly 
opinionated and political, even on the front-pages, and were therefore essential 
vehicles for public opinion.  As American intelligence officials later noted, CuW 
in particular was “one of the most influential journals of political opinion” in 
West German politics.8  The late historian Axel Schildt’s brief discussion of CuW 
and SB described them as safe havens for Protestant conservative nationalists who 
were tainted by National Socialism and who were opposed to the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU) which was initially dominated by Catholics.9  Some of 
 
7 Christof Lenhard, “Die Marketing-Strategien des Rheinischen Merkur und des Deutschen 
Allgemeinen Sonntagsblattes: Eine ökonomische und historische Betrachtung,“ in Kirchliche 
Zeitgeschichte 6.2 (1993): 467-496.   Klaus Grosse Kracht, “‘Schmissiges Christentum‘: Die 
Wochenzeitung Christ und Welt in der Nachkriegszeit (1948-1958)“ in ed.s Michael Grunewald 
and Uwe Puschner, Das evangelische Intellektuellenmilieu in Deutschland: seine Presse und seine 
Netwerke (1871-1963) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008), 505-531. 
8 Paul R. Sweet (American Consul General in Stuttgart) to the United States Department of 
State, “Dr. Giselher Wirsing and Christ und Welt: A Profile,” November 23, 1965, United States 
National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
9 Schildt, Konservatismus in Deutschland. 
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this assessment is mistaken: first, as the numbers above illustrate, CuW and SB 
were hardly ostracized to the fringe of postwar West German politics; second, as 
we will discuss later, although they were outwardly Protestant and decidedly 
distinguishable from publications of the Catholic Occident movement 
(Abendländische Bewegung), CuW and SB were nevertheless generally supportive 
of the CDU.   
That said, Schildt was correct to identify the two periodicals as a home for 
former Nazis; however, these were not typical right-wing nationalists.  
Specifically, CuW and SB were a gathering ground for a network of former Nazi 
Europeanists whose past careers span across the institutions of this dissertation 
and whose friendships in many cases go back to the 1930s.  Many kinds of former 
Nazis were published in these periodicals, but the chief editors of CuW and SB 
(who also doubled as the primary front-page commentators on politics) had been 
key Europe-propagandists in the Tat-Kreis, Wirsing’s network, and the Foreign 
Office.  The following table outlines the network operating behind CuW and SB -- 

















leader and Chief 












Hans Zehrer also became chief editor at Die Welt in 1953, where he had 
colleagues from both CuW and SB regularly contribute articles throughout the 
1950s (including acting chief editors of CuW and SB Giselher Wirsing, Klaus 
Mehnert, and Axel Seeberg).  Other figures discussed in this dissertation and 
subsequently employed at CuW and SB throughout the 1950s include: Ferdinand 
Fried, Wolfgang Höpker, Hans Georg von Studnitz, Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, 
and Karl Heinz Pfeffer.  In short, former Nazi Europeanists found in CuW and SB 
a two-pronged gathering ground for their network in postwar West German 
journalism.  Indeed, although the two periodicals competed for the same target 
audience (Protestant conservatives), they nevertheless saw themselves as quasi 
partners.  The two periodicals regularly shared writers, maintained 
correspondences, and pushed nearly identical political arguments.10  In fact, on at 
least two different occasions, once in 1949 and once in 1951, CuW and SB were in 
serious conversation about a possible merger.11  Until the early 1950s these 
 
10 The two periodicals even competed over personnel.  Klaus Mehnert was offered the chief 
editor position at both periodicals.  Mehnert ultimately took the position at CuW but introduced SB 
to Hans Zehrer, who was ultimately hired for the position.  See Zehrer to Mehnert, October 21, 
1947, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 4.   Joh. Renatus 
Renner to Mehnert, October 27, 1947, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 4. 
11 Editorial board of the “Hamburger Allgemeine” to Mehnert, July 27, 1949, Landesarchiv 
Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 8.   Mehnert to Zehrer, July 21, 1951 
in Eugen Gerstenmaier’s collection of correspondences related to the Relief Organization of the 
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writers, including the chief editors, published themselves either anonymously or 
under pseudonyms, and their activities had to be pieced together by the present 
author through the use of editorial papers, personal archival holdings, and cross-
referencing other published material.   
Finally, there is evidence of more direct continuities between the Nazi 
Europeanist network of this dissertation and postwar West German journalism; 
namely, coordinated activity in clubs and conferences.  For example, in the fall of 
1950 Klaus Mehnert (CuW) received an invitation to attend along with Axel 
Seeberg (SB) a conference of journalists and intellectuals in Göhrde to which six 
members of the Foreign Office’s covert 1944/1945 Europe-Seminar were in 
attendance (the Europe-Seminar was discussed in chapter four of this 
dissertation).  Also in attendance was Werner Otto von Hentig, the man who 
worked alongside Giselher Wirsing for U.S. intelligence services in 1945.  Much 
like the Europe-Seminar, the conference was a workshop on the concept of the 
nation and according to Mehnert’s invitation the workshop set out to investigate 
“the overcoming of nationalism”; in other words, to organize journalistic 
advocacy against nationalism - the perceived cause of Europe’s mid-century 
problems.  This meant thoroughly criticizing nationalism as not only a political 
problem but also a cultural problem.  “Are nations [Völker] truly the fundamental 
element of European history?” the conference invitation provocatively asked.  
“What other possibilities exist,” it concluded, “for a historically binding and 
 




workable human connection beyond the traditional Volk-concept?”12  Reports on 
the conference suggest that the Europe-concept was one of the central talking 
points at the conference.13  The Göhrde conference gets to the heart of post-Nazi 
Europeanism: the search for a workable national identity in an age of discredited 
German nationalism.  The following section of this chapter will briefly summarize 
their answer to this dilemma (what this dissertation is calling the “revised Europe-
concept” or “post-Nazi Europeanism”) and outline how they positioned 
themselves politically in order to advance their arguments in postwar West 
German politics. 
The Revised Europe-Concept 
The conservatives at CuW and SB believed that, having criticized 
nationalism during the war, their Europe-concept was uniquely situated to help 
Germans find a path forward, a path beyond German nationalism towards the 
fulfillment of their long-held vision for conservative European revolution.  From 
the very earliest issues, CuW and SB openly declared the intention to transform 
German national identity into a European identity.  Training Germans to embrace 
a new imagined community capable of liberating them and their neighbors from 
their own past, or to “think European,“ as they called it, was the Raison d’Être of 
CuW and SB throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s.  In doing so, these figures 
incorporated many aspects of their former Nazi Europe-concept, and chief among 
 
12 Karl Heinz Pfeffer to Mehnert, September 25, 1950, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, 




them was the notion of a völkisch Europe, an organic historical community that 
had been corrupted by universalistic ideologies such as liberalism and Marxism, 
but also nationalism – and which could only be resurrected through a modern 
political, economic, and cultural revolution in Europe.  In the postwar period, 
Hitler’s National Socialism (which was presented as the most radical extension of 
nationalism) was added to the list of anti-Europe ideologies which threatened 
European unity.  This was a unique double-edged postwar political memory.  On 
the one hand, their Europe-concept gave them a tool for establishing critical 
distance to those “few” Nazis whose genocidal racial nationalism had no purchase 
in the postwar world.  For example, CuW and SB writers repeatedly parried 
accusations of radical right-wing extremism directed at their periodicals by 
arguing that they, in their complete disavowal of nationalism, could not possibly 
be neo-fascists.  But on the other hand, the continuation of their Europe-concept 
also gave them a futuristic vision of supranational identity which did not entirely 
repudiate their past beliefs and advocacy.  Hence they could argue that Hitler and 
his cronies had merely abused the Europe-concept in pursuit of immoral goals but 
that the majority of German soldiers and citizens (and Europeans fortunate 
enough to become acquainted with Germans during occupation) had actually been 
changed during the war by an emerging commitment to a new Europe.  
Paradoxically, then, they presented Germany as a historically destined leader in 
European integration, prepared by the war for a special mission to reconcile 
Europeans to one another and usher in their European revolution once and for all.  
But unlike in the Weimar period they chose to advance these claims within the 
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status quo, and they viewed the transnational European integration movement of 
the immediate postwar period as their most treasured ally and a manifestation of 
the inevitability of their European revolution. 
European Integration 
 Indeed, CuW and SB energetically put their support behind the various of 
European integration clubs, associations, and political organizations in the late 
1940s and early 1950s; in particular, they were fierce advocates of the Council of 
Europe in Strasbourg, an international political organization founded in the spring 
of 1949 whose members stretched across Western Europe.  The Council of 
Europe was founded with the stated aim of bringing together European politicians 
in order to organize steps towards a “United States of Europe,” as Winston 
Churchill famously proclaimed at a speech at the University of Zürich in 
September, 1946.  Before the forerunner to the European Union was established at 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and before European integration settled into the 
implementation of “incremental” measures such as the economic market, the 
leaders of the Europe movement in Strasbourg had a more radical vision for a 
European polity which would replace the nation-state.  The writers CuW and SB 
quickly came to the conclusion that their long-held belief in the decline of the 
nation-state and its replacement with a European polity could find its fulfillment 
in the politics of Strasbourg, and they aggressively campaigned on behalf of 
international leaders who put forward the most ambitious proposals for removing 
nation-state sovereignty.  To be sure, they projected onto the European integration 
project many designs which many of the liberal visionaries in Strasbourg did not 
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hold, the most important of which was the notion of making Europe into a “third 
front” capable of asserting its independence from not only Communism but 
liberal democracy as well.  Nevertheless, former Nazi Europeanists were willing 
to marry their ideas onto the European integration project in the hope of directing 
the tumultuous changes that would have emerged.   
From 1949-1954, before West Germany acquired full sovereignty and 
entered NATO as an equal nation-state among its neighbors, the foreign policy of 
both the Federal Republic of West Germany as well as the United States aimed 
for a considerably different and more disruptive outcome in Western Europe: 
namely, the defanging of the “German problem” via the economic, political, and 
military integration of Western European states, including Western Germany, into 
a European federation.  In 1951, at the Treaty of Paris, the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) was signed along with a “Europe Declaration” 
affirming members’ commitment to a “broader and deeper community of 
peoples” including an eventual “European Political Community” as was being 
negotiated in the Council of Europe.  These intentions came together most 
forcefully in May, 1952 when the ECSC members signed a momentous treaty 
agreeing to the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC).  The EDC 
was an unprecedented proposal drafted in 1950 by French Prime Minister Rene 
Pleven and European integration architect Jean Monnet in response to the Korean 
War and subsequent calls for West German rearmament (it was originally called 
the “Pleven-Plan”).  It proposed the amalgamation of Western European militaries 
into a single pan-European armed force administered at the supranational level 
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like the ECSC.  In August, 1954 the French public turned against the process and 
the French parliament torpedoed the EDC by refusing to ratify it.14  Nevertheless, 
from 1950-1954 the conservatives at CuW and SB followed the developments of 
the EDC with a religious-like zeal, interpreting its remarkable repudiation of 
national military sovereignty as the final domino to fall in the process towards the 
end of the nation-state in Europe and the emergence of a conservative European 
nation prepared to defend itself militarily. 
Christian Democracy and the Occident 
The proposal, signing, and ratification of the EDC in West Germany 
dominated West German domestic politics from 1950-1953.  While the West 
German major parties largely converged on the economic policy of a social 
market (Soziale Marktwirtschaft), in contrast, European integration (especially the 
EDC) was a flashpoint of intense division.  Konrad Adenauer’s governing CDU 
and their policies of European integration within an Atlantic Alliance were met 
with adamant disapproval from Kurt Schumacher’s SPD, the center-left social 
democratic party which, in a unique reversal of German political culture, became 
the home for dedicated nationalists.  Schumacher, who famously decried 
Adenauer as the “Chancellor of the Western Allies” for acknowledging Western 
Allied occupation, repeatedly condemned the CDU’s European integration 
politics as a betrayal of the German nation.  In particular, he denounced European 
 
14 For the most comprehensive English-language account of the EDC and, specifically, West 
German rearmament within it see David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German 
Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 111-204. 
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integration as a betrayal of East Germans, the reunification with whom became 
more and more unlikely with every step towards European unification.  In a 1951 
Bundestag debate over the emerging ECSC, for example, Schumacher declared: 
“whoever approves this treaty ceases to be German.”  As an alternative to 
Adenauer’s politics of European integration, Schumacher and his successor Erich 
Ollenhauer pursued a policy dubbed by their opponents as “neutralization,” by 
which the Federal Republic of Germany would reject diplomatic entanglement 
with either West or East in order to remain free to negotiate a neutral, reunified 
Germany which both sides in the Cold War could agree to.  The Soviets saw in 
this as an opportunity to expand their influence and repeatedly dangled the 
prospect of a neutral, reunified Germany, something Adenauer always promptly 
dismissed such as, for example, when he rejected the infamous “Stalin Note” in 
March, 1952.  The SPD vehemently protested his unwillingness to prioritize 
German reunification, and, in fact, was supported by many Protestant pacifists 
and conservatives as well, including the pastor Martin Niemöller, the nationalist 
writer Paul Sethe at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and even CDU 
functionary Gustav Heinemann, who left Adenauer’s cabinet as well as the CDU 
over the issue and founded a briefly relevant nationalist party in 1952 called the 
“Emergency Community for Peace in Europe.”  As we will discuss in more detail 
below, polling from the early 1950s suggests that these foreign policy debates, 
wrapped up in discourses of national identity as they were, became in the eyes of 
voters the most pressing issue of the day.  As a consequence of their 
uncompromising attachment to the EDC, the conservatives at CuW and SB 
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became increasingly entangled in these domestic disputes and quickly rallied to 
Adenauer and the CDU.  For them, especially after the rearmament debates began 
in 1950, the CDU was a combination of an anti-Bolshevist front capable and 
willing to pursue strong policies of rearmament against the dangerous pacifism of 
leftists, as well as a party cognizant of the need to transition from nationalism to 
Europeanism.   
Christian Democracy was, in short, a serendipitous home onto which 
former Nazi Europeanist could project the continuation of their Europe-concept.  
At first glance it would appear that this project mapped onto what was called the 
“Occident Movement,” a conservative movement calling for the resurrection of an 
imagined social, economic, and cultural Christian community from Europe’s deep 
past in order to heal the wounds of modernity.  As Axel Schildt and others have 
shown, Occident-conservatism was an underappreciated concept at the core of 
Christian Democracy.15  A common argument in the historiography of Christian 
Democracy in Europe is that the Occident-conservatism of Christian Democracy 
was a creation of and continuation of transnational political Catholicism.16  Even 
in the German historiography, historians such as Maria Mitchell have illustrated 
that the interconfessional character of Christian Democracy in West Germany 
masked over very real confessional divides and the disproportionately Catholic 
 
15 Axel Schildt, Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur Westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft 
der 50er Jahre (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 1999).   
16 Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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influence and continuity in the young movement.17  But as Stephen Brockmann 
has contended, such analyses, while true, fail to explain how the Protestant, and 
therefore more secular, milieus within the CDU found meaning in Christian 
Democracy, especially the Occident-concept, and therefore chose to associate 
with the politics of the CDU throughout the 1950s.18  For Brockmann, the answer 
lies in finding the Protestant Occident that coexisted alongside the Catholic 
Occident (and in fact, it is true that many Protestant theologians joined the ranks 
of Occident Movement).  But the conservatives at CuW and SB, and their 
accompanying large audience, suggest that Christian Democracy in the early 
Federal Republic included a constituency motivated by notions of a non-Occident 
Europe-concept. 
The Europe-concept developed at CuW and SB was fundamentally 
different than the Occident of their contemporaries, something which the 
conservatives at CuW and SB acknowledged not only by very rarely using the 
term “Occident” (preferring instead “Europe”) but also by directly engaging with 
the Occident-advocates.  The Europe-concept at CuW and SB differed from the 
Occident in three crucial ways: First, unlike Occident-advocates, who presented 
the Occident as a pre-modern antidote to the harmful vicissitudes of modernity, 
the conservatives at CuW and SB were forward looking.  Modernity, including 
 
17 Maria Mitchell, The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern 
Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012). 
18 Stephen Brockmann, “Germany as Occident at the Zero Hour,” in German Studies Review 
25.3 (2002): 477-496. 
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modern technology, capitalism, and collective political identities were not 
necessarily bad, and were in fact necessary components for a true European 
revolution.  Modern nationalism, for example, was only wrong because in 
attaching itself to the Volk it had come to identify the wrong political and 
imagined community.  Substituting the Christian community of faith as well as 
local communities with large and powerful modern political communities was not 
the problem but rather the goal and an inevitable process cresting across the 
world.  The issue was identifying the correct modern nation: Europe.  
Furthermore, while Occident-advocates presented modern civilization through a 
Spenglerian lens of decline, the conservatives at CuW and SB explicitly and 
repeatedly denounced Spengler’s pessimism, arguing that the European 
breakthrough was only possible as a culmination of modern developments.  
Indeed, as will be shown, they saw themselves as revisionists of Spengler.  
Second, unlike Occident-advocates, the conservatives at CuW and SB embraced 
politics as the primary cure to European stagnation and therefore the redemptive 
vehicle of the European revolution.  For them, it did not make sense to denounce 
politics and political ideologies as dehumanizing and proto-totalitarian, because it 
failed to give the new Europe any “concrete orientation” and reduced Europe-
advocacy to “irrational metaphysical” jargon, as the license carrier of CuW, 
Eugen Gerstenmaier, put it.  “All of that noise is useless,” he continued.  “After 
all, European unification does not mean a restoration of Charlemagne’s empire 
under the Pope’s blessing.  Rather, it means understanding the consequences of 
Europe and the world’s technological, economic, military, and political 
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evolution.”  Contrasting his Europe-concept with the Catholic Occident, 
Gerstenmaier explained: “The politics of European integration, in contrast, 
revolves around concrete economic, social, political, and military concepts.”  For 
the conservatives at CuW and SB this meant constructing a new political 
community and accompanying imagined community of unprecedented size and 
power.  This was in direct contrast to the Occident-advocates who disdained the 
reach of modern political life and advocated a return to small, local units of social 
identity and political formation.19  Third, the conservatives at CuW and SB refused 
to center their Europe-concept in Christianity.  The Christian heritage of Europe 
was only relevant to them as a cultural heritage, an expression of a deeper 
European spirit.  Unlike the Occident-advocates, for whom eighteenth and 
nineteenth century secularism was chiefly to blame for Europe’s modern travails 
(liberalism, Marxism, totalitarianism), anti-secularism and calls for religious 
revival were absent in the arguments of CuW and SB conservatives.  As Axel 
Seeberg argued, Europe’s shortcomings were not the result of a deficit in “moral 
capacity.”  Rather: “the actual roots lie in the enslavement to an archaic nation-
state system no longer capable of coping with social, technological, and economic 
developments, on the one hand, and on the other hand in the emergence of non-
European world powers and the inadequate strength of European statesmen.”20  
 
19 See, for example, the influential book by the Occident-advocate Paul Wilhelm Wenger, Wer 
gewinnt Deutschland? Kleinpreußische Selbstisolierung oder mitteleuropäische Föderation 
(Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1959). 
20 Axel Seeberg, “Wie wird Europa wieder lebendig?“ Sonntagsblatt, January 6, 1952. 
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Yet despite their ambivalence towards religion, it was ironically through German 
Protestantism that these former Nazi Europeanists found a public voice in the first 
place.  As the translations of CuW and SB suggest (“Christ and the World” and 
”The Sunday Page” respectively) – the two periodicals were funded and overseen 
by Protestant organizations. 
The Gatekeepers 
Occupation Authorities 
 Because of their tainted past, former Nazi Europeanists were painfully 
aware of the dangers in trying to accumulate an influential voice in public 
journalism.  Yet they were not willing to disavow their connections to Nazi 
propaganda and the radical conservative intellectual tradition.  In addition to 
regularly publishing former Nazis, both CuW and SB covertly published Carl 
Schmitt and Ernst Jünger in their pages as early as 1949.  The evidence for this is 
drawn primarily from correspondences between these figures and the chief editors 
of CuW and SB, in which secret articles were regularly requested and editorial 
apologias for the two intellectuals and their works were coordinated.21  
 
21 See Schmitt/Zehrer, Schmitt/Wirsing, and Schmitt/Mehnert correspondences in Schmitt’s 
personal archival holdings, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, RW 265.   Jünger/Mehnert and  
Jünger/Zehrer correspondences in Jünger’s personal archival holdings in “Mehnert, Klaus Dr. An 
Jünger, Ernst, 1946-1983“ and “Zehrer, Hans an Jünger, Ernst, 1948-1953,“ A: Jünger, Deutsches 
Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.  It appears that Schmitt and Jünger submitted articles which 
were published with no accompanying author name (a regular practice in the early years of CuW 
and SB), although a private correspondence between Mehnert and Hans Speidel suggests that Carl 
Schmitt was at least occasionally published with the pseudonym “j.c.”  See Mehnert to Speidel, 
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Additionally, both CuW and SB offered to finance a trip to either have Schmitt 
travel to the editorial staff or have the editorial staff travel to meet with him in his 
personal home in Plettenberg.22  Wirsing, in particular, had a close friendship with 
Carl Schmitt which was continued decades after the war.  In his correspondences 
with Schmitt, Wirsing discussed the misfortune that Hitler had brought upon what 
he called “the Grossraum thesis that we developed.”  He then expressed the desire 
to re-conceptualize the Grossraum.23  Wirsing and others even secretly published 
in the monthly periodical Nation Europa, a fringe neo-fascist publication which 
published former Nazi Europeanists from across the continent, including the 
British fascist Oswald Mosley.  In short, at the same time CuW and SB writers 
 
November 21, 1949 in Jünger’s personal archival holdings, “Mehnert, Klaus Dr. An Jünger, Ernst, 
1946-1983,“ A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.  
22 Mehnert to Schmitt, November 8, 1949, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, RW 265/9346.   
Zehrer to Schmitt, July 19, 1950, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, RW 265/18491. 
23 Carl Schmitt’s personal holdings contain twenty-seven correspondences between the two 
intellectuals stretching to the year 1974, and the documents suggest many more.  Schmitt even 
dedicated one of his books to Wirsing.  See Wirsing to Schmitt, October 20, 1952 in ed.s Kai 
Burkhardt, Gerd Giesler, and Stefan Krings, Carl Schmitt und die Öffentlichkeit: Briefwechsel mit 
Journalisten, Publizisten und Verlegern aus den Jahren 1923 bis 1983 (Berlin: Duncker und 
Humblot, 1968), 114-115.  See Carl Schmitt, Hamlet or Hecuba: The Intrusion of the Time into 
the Play (Telos Press, 2009).  Schmitt was likewise seeking a new Grossraum theory at the time, 
and had published his first postwar book on the topic of Europe’s position and role in geopolitics.  
See Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Berlin: 
Dunker und Humblot, 1950). 
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began developing their ideas to the mainstream postwar Right they were secretly 
fostering connections to their radical past. 
 This was not lost on their opponents nor on the U.S. occupation 
authorities.  In September, 1950 the press service of the SPD attacked CuW as a 
periodical that “allows one of the most diligent proponents of Ribbentrop’s 
narrative in German foreign policy about a ‘New Order of Europe’ to have 
influence and doesn’t just allow him, but even encourages him to continue 
advocating Europe-politics in merely a new, slightly different spirit….”24  This 
accusation, directed at Wirsing, prompted a response from Wirsing to the editors, 
in which he made his standard claim that during the war he had actually been 
working against the Nazis from within, and in which he pledged himself to 
democracy and the postwar German constitution.25  The editorial staff at CuW 
was similarly intimidated by U.S. occupation authorities in West Germany.  
Wirsing and Mehnert, in their private correspondences during the very beginning 
stages of CuW, frequently lamented the pressure of American denazification and 
censor measures, calling the military governor of the U.S. zone at the time, Lucius 
Clay, “Comrade Clay.”  As Wirsing complained to Mehnert in a letter about 
“chaos in the editorial staff”: “There are just some people who don’t have the 
 
24 Copy of the Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, October 19, 1950, Landesarchiv Baden-
Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 12. 
25 Wirsing to the editors of the Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, October 26, 1950, 
Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 12. 
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nerves to boldly push forward when Comrade Clay raises his eyebrows.”26  Yet, 
despite their private protestations against fecklessness, Wirsing and Mehnert 
themselves were not particularly bold in public.  As the subsequent chapter to this 
dissertation will show, anti-Americanism in the journalism of post-Nazi 
Europeanists was tempered from the onset.  It is not difficult to conclude that this 
was to large degree a product of their being intimidated by the Political 
Information Branch of the American military government in occupied West 
Germany which reportedly declared CuW an “under-cover Nazi paper.”27  In fact, 
in 1949 CuW received an official warning from American occupation authorities 
for radical content, and this is likely the reason why Mehnert appealed to George 
Kennan for help clearing CuW’s reputation in May, 1949.28  U.S. occupation and 
denazification measures, therefore, were important factors in the ultimate 
trajectory of post-Nazi Europeanism.  The United States effectively acted as a 
gatekeeper by reigning in the maneuverability of former Nazi Europeanists and 
 
26 Wirsing to Mehnert, January 25, 1949, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 7. 
27 Köpf, Schrieben nach jeder Richtung, 74.  For an account of the former Nazis who worked 
at CuW see Kracht “’Schmissiges Christentum’.” 
28 Axel Schildt, “Deutschlands Platz in einem ‘christlichen Abendland‘: Konservative 
Publizisten aus dem Tat-Kreis in der Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit“ in ed.s Thomas Koebner, Gert 
Sautermeister, and Sigrid Schneider Deutschland nach Hitler – Zukunftspläne im Exil und aus der 
Besatzungszeit, 1939-1949 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987).   Mehnert to Kennan, May 20, 
1949, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 8. 
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indirectly forcing them to moderate their political activism in order to have access 
to public discourse.  
 But the contribution of the United States to the de-radicalization of former 
Nazi Europe-propagandists went beyond the threat of coercive measures.  As the 
last chapter illustrated, the United States actively courted the cooperation of 
former Nazi Europeanists in various intelligence operations (this practice will be 
further illustrated in chapter nine of this dissertation with an examination of U.S. 
intelligence operations in the postwar German veterans’ community).29  The 
American posture towards former Nazi Europe-propagandists, then, was a 
mixture of both stick and carrot.  One of the most important such carrots in the 
American relationship towards these former Nazis in West German journalism 
was their open and explicit support of European integration including their 
espousal of full German participation in the new European institutions.  During 
the early 1950s, the public debate of European integration included many voices 
calling for radically integrationist proposals such as a European Political 
Community based on the model of the United States of America (“United States 
of Europe”), and the United States repeatedly expressed support for such 
 
29 For a detailed account of the United States intelligence community and its liaison with 
former Nazis during the Cold War, see Richard Breitman, Robert Wolfe, Norman J. W. Goda, and 
Timothy Naftali, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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proposals.30  On May 7th, 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to Konrad Adenauer 
the following lines: 
My associates and I are encouraged…by your determination to overcome 
all obstacles to the integration of Germany into the Western European 
Community by pushing ahead rapidly with the European Defense 
Community Treaty.  I believe, as I know you do, that the hope of all the 
Western European countries lies in their ever-closer association looking 
eventually to their economic and political federation.31 
 
In a private correspondence to his successor as Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe, Matthew Ridgeway, Eisenhower explained that he desired the political 
unification of Europe because it would “fuse together their fragmented strength” 
such that “their capacities will increase manifold so that Western Europe will 
become a strong, independent community of peace and freedom.”32  German 
statesmen subsequently took American statements of support and presented them 
to the West German public as evidence that the United States stood behind their 
policies for European integration.  Take, for example, Konrad Adenauer’s speech 
 
30 Holger Schröder, Jean Monnet und die amerikanische Unterstützung für die europäische 
Integration, 1950-1957 (Berlin: Peter Lang/Europäische Hochschulschriften, 1994).   Leopoldo 
Nuti, “A Continent Bristling with Arms: Continuity and Change in Western European Security 
after the Second World War,“ in ed. Dan Stone, The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 339-355. 
31 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Konrad Adenauer, May 7, 1952, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, B2-61. 
32 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Matthew Ridgeway, April 23rd, 1953, Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, B2-61.  
424 
 
to the West German parliament during the debates over the European Army in 
March, 1953, in which he said: 
Allow me to remind you what Secretary of State Foster Dulles declared in 
a recent visit to Bonn [in 1952]; namely, that the politics of the United 
States sets out to support the integration of Western Europe into a bulwark 
of freedom, peace, and Atlantic defense.  If in 1952 the passing of the 
European Defense Community and the continuation of the Europe-politics 
of the Federal Republic was necessary, they have become all the more 
necessary since the assumption of the presidency by Eisenhower and the 
death of Stalin.33 
 
Former Nazi Europeanists payed special attention to the public posture of 
the United States, especially Eisenhower’s pronouncements.  Oftentimes they 
quoted Eisenhower directly, relaying to their readers statements such as the 
following: 
The only possibility to persuade the Germans into accepting rearmament 
and participating in the defense of Europe requires making them equal 
partners in a continental union.  The population of West Germany will not 
have the conviction that they belong to a political body worthy of defense 
and capable of surviving international conflict unless that body is being 
integrated into something larger, something stronger.34 
 
The evidence suggests that post-Nazi Europeanists took these statements at face 
value.  In fact, as we will see in the next chapter, they even frequently misread 
such statements as a validation of their “Third Front” ideology, having convinced 
themselves that the United States likewise desired an independent Europe as a 
neutral alternative and balance to the East/West divide of the Cold War.  In short, 
 
33 Konrad Adenauer, speech before the German Bundestag, March 19th, 1953 in ed. Josef 
Selbach, Bundestagsreden (Bonn: AZ-Studio, 1967), 173-198. 
34 CP, “Halber Plan lohnt nicht!“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, September 20, 1951.   Steiner, 
“Begleitmusik für Paris,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, November 8, 1951. 
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post-Nazi Europeanists came to see the United States as a pivotal ally in their 
cause and this perception increasingly displayed itself in their domestic debates 
with opponents of European integration.  As we will illustrate in the next chapter, 
these former Nazis increasingly moderated their anti-Americanism in the course 
of the early 1950s to large extent because of this perceived alliance.  This, 
however, was a gradual process.  In the immediate postwar period, the primary 
influence of the United States on the figures of this dissertation was the threat of 
coercion exercised by occupation authorities.  The writers and CuW and SB were 
well aware of the potential restrictions and consequences of political radicalism, 
and this inclined them to moderate their political advocacy and seek ways to 
reconcile themselves with acceptable avenues of political discourse in the Federal 
Republic.  This led them into a close alliance with another gatekeeper: German 
Protestantism. 
Hanns Lilje 
 Both CuW and SB were published by Protestant institutions and were 
overseen by high-ranking religious figures.  They maintained an open relationship 
with the Evangelical and Lutheran churches, respectively.  Yet, ironically, in both 
periodicals a unique compromise with the church developed in which the church 
granted the secular editors near complete independence and in return the editors 
made space in their inner-pages for a theological section in which various 
theologians and preachers were invited to advocate Christian revival.  The front-
pages and political sections, in contrast, were dominated by the editors who 
generally left the topic of religion untouched (an important exception was in the 
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event of a Christian holiday, when theologians were invited onto the front-pages).  
The division was so stark that sometimes the editors openly criticized Christianity 
and embraced the idea of secularization.35  Consequently, the two periodicals 
functioned as secular conservative publications with separate theological sections, 
and this resulted in the two periodicals garnering a reputation as fiercely political 
publications.  The first President of the Federal Republic Theodor Heuss, for 
example, described CuW as “snappy Christianity.”36  This compromise between 
secular editors and religious administrators often produced conflict, especially in 
the case of SB.   
SB was founded in Hamburg as a Lutheran church publication and 
overseen by Bishop Hanns Lilje, a former member of the Confessing Church who 
used his anti-Nazi acumen to help Axel Seeberg achieve a light denazification 
sentence.  Lilje was a conservative Protestant concerned about the presence of 
leftists and pacifists in German Protestantism and was one of the founding 
members of the so-called “Kronberg Circle,” a group of Protestant theologians 
who sought to anchor German Protestantism in a more valiant anti-Communism 
by raising support for rearmament.37  Lilje, who was authorized by British 
occupation authorities as a license carrier in the West German press, sought as 
early as 1946 a path to facilitate these ideas in public opinion by sponsoring a 
 
35 Axel Seeberg, “Ja – Zur Säkularisierung,“ Sonntagsblatt, June 11, 1961. 
36 Kracht, “‘Schmissiges Christentum‘.“ 
37 Thomas Sauer, Westorientierung im deutschan Protestantismus?  Vorstellungen und 
Tätigkeit des Kronberger Kreises (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999). 
427 
 
weekly periodical, and he eventually hired Hans Zehrer to edit the publication 
beginning in 1948.  Lilje’s choice to hire Zehrer, a former Conservative 
Revolutionary, was a contentious decision.  From 1948 until 1953, when Zehrer 
left SB for Die Welt, internal editorial staff documents illustrate that a divide 
emerged within the editing board.  This divide pitted Zehrer and his 
assistant/politics editor Axel Seeberg (who in 1953 took over the chief editor 
position) against the editors of the theology and cultural inner-pages, who 
resented SB’s perceived lack of religiosity as well as Zehrer and Seeberg’s 
contention that political questions should be highlighted and that such questions 
were poorly served by referencing Christianity.38  Lilje was barraged by a torrent 
of requests to remove Zehrer and re-center the periodical on Christian 
principles.39  Nevertheless, despite his own discomforts with Zehrer’s leadership, 
Lilje felt forced to keep Zehrer on due to Zehrer’s ability to attract a large 
 
38 In late 1946 Seeberg wrote a memo titled “Questions for a Politician” which was 
subsequently circulated among the members of the editorial staff of Sonntagsblatt.  See Axel 
Seeberg, “Fragen eines Politikers,” Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/II, Nr. 52.  
39 Friedrich Rasche to Zehrer, January 31, 1948, Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/II, Nr. 
54.   Klassenstein to Zehrer, April 28, 1948, Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/II, Nr. 54.   
Plog, memo, October 31, 1948, Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/III, Nr. 249.   Ruppel, 
memo, August 30, 1951, Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, N60, Nr. 170.   Plog, editorial staff 
meeting notes, August 31 and September 1, 1951, Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, N60, Nr. 
170.   Plog to Zahrnt, June 10, 1952, Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, N60, Nr. 170.   “Bericht 




readership, especially among non-religious readers.40  Lilje, then, was aware of 
the secularization of West German Protestantism (only thirteen percent of West 
German Protestants attended church regularly and fifty-nine percent attended 
seldomly or never).41  This forced his journalistic venture to make concessions to 
a secular conservative tradition, and this is the space which was opened for these 
former Conservative Revolutionaries to re-enter the public sphere.  The former 
Nazi Europeanists, for their part, were well aware of their need to tie themselves 
to German Protestantism.  Zehrer reportedly described Protestantism as a “rear 
cover” for their political activism.  The editorial staff of the Hamburger 
Allgemeine, a competitor periodical that briefly sought to merge with CuW, 
explained to Mehnert in July, 1949: “The main barrier standing in the way of a 
merger appears to still be the peculiar opinion of Zehrer’s that he needs to have 
the church as rear cover.  ‘Without the church,’ he says, ‘we are nothing’.”42  But 
CuW conservatives also knew they had leverage of their own.  As Wirsing wrote 
to Mehnert in January, 1949, the “church connection” was not a problem as long 
as it did not become “dogmatic.”  And the church needed them as well; after all, 
Wirsing continued, most Germans no longer spoke “the language of the church” 
 
40 Undated (January) instructions from Lilje regarding advertising, Hanover Landeskirchliches 
Archiv, L3/III, Nr. 250.   Lilje to Gross, undated (fall, 1951), Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, 
N60, Nr. 170. 
41 Noelle and Neumann, Jahrbuch für öffentliche Meinung, 1947-1955, 12. 
42 Editorial staff of the Hamburger Allgemeine to Mehnert, July 27, 1949, Landesarchiv 
Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 8. 
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because church leaders had become an ostracized “sect” incapable of spreading a 
message beyond a very small crowd.43  
Eugen Gerstenmaier 
Unlike SB, CuW was overseen by a man both very interested and very 
involved in politics and the Europe-concept: future Christian Democratic 
President of the Bundestag Eugen Gerstenmaier.  Gerstenmaier, who had received 
a doctoral degree in theology in the mid-1930s at the University of Rostock, had a 
rocky relationship with the Nazi regime.  During the 1930s he had been briefly 
jailed for anti-Nazi advocacy in the Confessing Church and, most famously, he 
was a member of the anti-Nazi “Kreisau Circle” and as a result was indirectly 
knowledgeable of the July 20th, 1944 conspiracy to kill Hitler.44  For this reason, 
after the war Gerstenmaier quickly developed the reputation of a Christian 
resistance fighter.45  But documents from the Political Archive of the Foreign 
Office in Berlin suggest that his war-time relationship to National Socialism was 
actually more complicated.  In 1939 Eugen Gerstenmaier joined the Foreign 
Office and worked until 1942 in the Information Department fostering 
interconfessional Christian relationships across occupied Europe.46  After the 
 
43 Wirsing to Mehnert, January 28, 1949, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 7. 
44 Biographical outline in Eugen Gerstenmaier’s personal archival holdings, Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung in Bonn, 01-210. 
45 See, for example, Robert Strobel, “Eugen Gerstenmaier,“ Die Zeit, February 3, 1955. 
46 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 501/R 67651, RZ 214/R 
269715, and RZ 214/R 98797. 
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invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Gertsenmaier was primarily tasked 
with visiting Christian leaders in Scandinavia and the Balkans in order to 
strengthen ecumenical unity in the war against the much-feared atheistic leanings 
of Soviet Communism.47  The evidence suggests that Gerstenmaier passionately 
pursued this work and that he embraced the Nazi Europeanism of the Foreign 
Office, giving speeches about how the New Order of Europe was a safe haven for 
all Christian denominations, each of which would be preserved in their 
peculiarities.48  After the war Gerstenmaier frequently claimed that this work was 
forced upon him under threat of penalty for his previous anti-Nazi behavior.  And, 
to be sure, there is some documentary evidence that Gerstenmaier completed this 
work begrudgingly.  His handlers in the SS and Foreign Office were often 
skeptical of his loyalty, occasionally summarizing his work with a warning about 
his potential as a subversive threat.49  But other summaries from other handlers 
 
47 Gerstenmaier to Büttner, September 1, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, Germany, RZ 214/R 98797. 
48 See, for example, Gerstenmaier’s report on his trip to the Balkans in the fall of 1941.  “Dr. 
Habil. Gerstenmaier Konsistorialrat; Berlin-Charlottenburg, den 24. September, 1941; Betr: 
Orthodoxe Nationalkirchen des Suedostens; Reisebericht, September 1941,“ October 20, 1941, 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 214/R 98797. 
49 Müller (Amt 4, “Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD“) to the Foreign Office, November 
24, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, Germany, RZ 214/R 98797.  
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sometimes pushed back, praising Gerstenmaier as admirably efficient and 
trustworthy.50  
In 1941, on behalf of the Foreign Office, Gerstenmaier edited a collection 
of anti-Communist essays from various theologians across occupied Europe.  The 
book, titled Orient and Occident: Contributions to Religious Sociology and 
European Intellectual History, was introduced by a passionate anti-Communist 
essay written by Gerstenmaier himself.  In the essay, Gerstenmaier not only 
decried Bolshevism as a threat to Christian Europe, but even more importantly 
espoused the Nazi New Order of Europe: 
The historical evolution of Europe is activating the depth of our spiritual 
and religious existence.  The fight for the efficient New Order of the 
political and economic relationships of the peoples of our continent is 




In all sincerity and with a destined fortitude, there is emerging from the 
ashes of this war a new face of occidental unity.  It is secured by the 
sacrifice of men who have preserved the history of the Occident on the 
battlefields of Russia and thus secured its future.51  
 
Going beyond anti-Communism and energetically embracing the Foreign Office’s 
Europe-narrative was not a necessary step, and therefore difficult to square with 
the notion of a resistance warrior forced into working for the Foreign Office.  As 
 
50 Illegible author, SD report, May 5, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
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this dissertation has illustrated with other Nazi Europeanists, Gertsenmaier likely 
oscillated between the oftentimes fluid boundaries demarcating anti-Nazism and 
collaboration, and the Nazi Europe-concept was an integral piece of that 
ambivalent relationship.  Although, to be sure, Gerstenmaier’s complicity in 
National Socialism does not begin to match the scale achieved by the other active 
propagandists in this dissertation.  Nevertheless, his association with the Nazi 
Europe-program, however ambiguous, was enough to create postwar connections 
with figures in this dissertation. 
 After the war, Gerstenmaier was appointed director of the Relief 
Organization of the Evangelical Church in Stuttgart.  But, like Hanns Lilje, 
Gerstenmaier was passionate about postwar politics and concerned about the 
perceived pernicious influence of Martin Niemöller and other Protestant 
pacifists.52  He convinced Bishop Theophil Wurm to allow him to begin 
publishing a weekly periodical (CuW) on behalf of the Evangelical church in 
Stuttgart, and secured permission to publish from his friend Otto Heinrich 
Fleischer, a U.S.-authorized license carrier.53  The first person who briefly held 
the chief editor position was Ernst Hepp, a Nazi party member who had worked 
for Paul Karl Schmidt in the Press Department of the Foreign Office.54  Either 
through Hepp or through his own war-time work in the Foreign Office, 
Gerstenmaier had somehow become acquainted with Giselher Wirsing and Klaus 
 
52 Gerstenmaier to Dibelius, July 16, 1949, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn, 01-210-014/2. 




Mehnert, both of whom he brought onto the editorial staff from the beginning.  
Wirsing, Mehnert, and Gerstenmaier quickly developed a close friendship and by 
1949 Gerstenmaier had elevated them to the highest positions in the editorial staff 
and made Klaus Mehnert chief editor.55  Around the same time, Gerstenmaier 
decided to begin a career in politics while leaving the control of CuW to Mehnert 
and Wirsing. 
 In the summer of 1949 Gerstenmaier began to campaign for a seat in the 
Bundestag as a member of the CDU, and immediately pressed Mehnert to publish 
advertisements and editorial advocacy for his campaign (something which 
Mehnert obliged and which subsequently became regular practice throughout the 
early 1950s).56  Already in his very first campaign speeches, Gerstenmaier 
presented himself to the voters as a Europe-advocate who would help reverse 
German Protestantism’s great historical error: the alliance with German 
nationalism.  His purpose in office, he declared, was to help German Protestants 
find a new “political home”: namely, unified Europe.  And this meant pushing 
back against an unholy Protestant alliance between pacifism and nationalism, as 
 
55 Wirsing to Mehnert, January 25, 1949, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, 
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represented by Niemöller and others.57  In a speech at the end of the year after 
having already won office he explained that his political program would seek to 
create a more robust welfare state but that the “most important debate” to which 
he was devoting himself was foreign policy; specifically, he promised to advocate 
a “rejection of the theory of national sovereignty” and replace it with a: “unified 
living community of destiny [Lebens– und Schicksalsgemeinschaft] in the form of 
a great European political community.”  He continued: “[p]referably, we would 
call this ‘the United States of Europe’, because that would signal that the hour in 
which the restoration of many sovereign countries in Europe is finally over.”58  
The language of a “living community of destiny” was strikingly reminiscent of 
Nazi Europeanism.  It is difficult to say whether this was intended, but it quickly 
became a pattern in his campaign material, including calls for a “European 
Community of Peoples” (Europäische Völkergemeinschaft) that referenced past 
victories against Asiatic invasions from the East and that was supposed to resolve 
the modern need for “community” (Gemeinschaft). 
 Take, for example, a lengthy speech by Gerstenmaier held in February, 
1950 at an academy in Karlsruhe.  The speech, titled “Christian Occident in the 
Europe-politics of the Present,” actually consisted of a long discussion of the 
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history of the Occident-concept.  It began with an attack on the French 
Revolution, which, according to Gerstenmaier, resulted in an unfortunate 
“diversity of nations” at odds with one another and in opposition to their 
traditional harmony as united members of Europe.  This fateful error, he argued, 
produced “totalitarianism” and the disasters of the Second World War.  In this 
way, Gerstenmaier was echoing a common argument in the Catholic-dominated 
Occident movement that secular modernity created Hitler.  But the speech also 
displayed what would become an important theme in Mehnert and Wirsing’s 
writings as well: namely, a partial reconciliation with the liberal tradition that 
emerged from the French Revolution.  The Occidental tradition, he argued, shared 
blame in catastrophe of mid-twentieth century Europe; specifically, it had 
anchored politics in the supposedly divinely-ordained institution of monarchical 
absolutism.  Therein, he suggested, was the contribution of the liberal philosophic 
tradition: specifically, the replacement of unholy absolutism with the principle of 
majoritarian rule.  The utility of the Occident-concept, Gerstenmaier continued, 
should therefore not be drawn from the political models it had erected in the past 
or the specific religious denominations that had dominated Europe’s various 
successful defenses against “Asian” invasion (Catholicism).  Instead, the Occident 
should be looked towards as historical fountain of a more transcendent cultural 
unity it had produced:   
In ways different than the Mohammedans who imagine a European unity 
under Islam, Christianity has shaped European life down to our times in a 
transcendent way.  Although it hasn’t established a lasting political or 
otherwise institutional unity of the European peoples, it has nevertheless 




The evidence for this transcendent cultural heritage, Gerstenmaier argued, could 
be seen in the fact that Europe became the most powerful continent in the world 
despite political and denominational divisions.  Therefore, Gerstenmaier 
concluded his speech arguing that in addition to political and economic 
unification as a “United States of Europe,” any conclusive Europe-politics of the 
present must also seek the creation of a “European Community of Peoples” 
(Europäische Völkergemeinschaft): “After all, the United States of Europe should 
not be an abstract unit of various independent particles, but rather a community 
[Gemeinschaft], an indestructible union of individual völkisch units and unique 
national cultures.”  This vision of Europe, Gerstenmaier pointed out, was at odds 
with the Catholic-dominated Occidental movement, which he criticized for its 
obsession with Catholic renewal.  The creation of a European Community of 
Peoples and therefore the true Occident, he argued, was a project of much higher 
importance than denominational disputes.59  
 Over the course of 1950 Gerstenmaier took his political Europe-advocacy 
to another level when he became the head of the foreign policy committee in the 
Bundestag (Auswärtiger Ausschuss) and joined and presided over the German 
delegation to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.  His work in this committee 
and at the Council of Europe became the defining initiative of his time as a 
representative of the Bundestag until he was appointed President of the Bundestag 
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in 1954.  Gerstenmaier was of crucial assistance to Konrad Adenauer when his 
plans for West German rearmament within a European Army were leaked to the 
press in 1950 and portions of the CDU coalition threatened to break up over the 
issue.  One of Adenauer’s cabinet members, Gustav Heinemann, led a Protestant 
pacifist faction within the CDU and eventually split from the party over the issue 
of rearmament.  Gerstenmaier, as a leading Protestant in favor of rearmament 
within the European Army, was a crucial support to Adenauer’s political coalition 
during this time.  Gerstenmaier was again of assistance to Adenauer when in 1952 
the treaty for the European Army was signed with a clause requiring any future 
reunification of Germany only permissible alongside the continuation of German 
participation in the European Army (the so-called Bindungsklausel).  For many 
Protestant nationalists, this clause doomed the prospects of German reunification 
and prioritized European integration over German nationalism.  Once again, 
Gerstenmaier worked to rally Protestant support for the politics of the 
administration.60  Gerstenmaier’s loyalty to Adenauer in these years was born of a 
belief that the European Army was one piece in a larger movement towards the 
European Political Community as proposed in the “Europe Declaration” of 1951 
and his diplomatic negotiations in Strasbourg. 
Throughout the early 1950s Gerstenmaier travelled and spoke to dozens of 
pro-Europe organizations and clubs where he presented his Europe-politics – and 
this was in addition to his speeches to constituents which likewise emphasized his 
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Europe advocacy.  In his speeches to the Council of Europe, Gerstenmaier 
repeatedly and consistently called for the most radical steps towards European 
unification and even advocated the “third front” conceptualization of Europe 
between East and West.61 During these years Gerstenmaier developed an 
important relationship with Konrad Adenauer, with whom Gerstenmaier regularly 
consulted vis-à-vis European integration.  Anticipating future rearmament 
debates, as early as December, 1949 Gerstenmaier was suggesting in his speeches 
to constituents that German rearmament was an urgent foreign policy need, and in 
1950 he subsequently became Adenauer’s negotiator for the European Army 
(EDC) in the Council of Europe.62  From 1950 to 1954 Gerstenmaier conducted 
diplomacy on behalf of the EDC in the Council of Europe and advised Adenauer 
in meetings and correspondences.  A consistent thread in his arguments towards 
Adenauer was the importance of rejecting any compromise that would result in 
West German entry into NATO as an alternative to the EDC.  Gerstenmaier 
repeatedly warned Adenauer against publicly even admitting that West Germans 
would consider this as an alternative, because such a mistake would weaken their 
negotiating position on the EDC and therefore compromise the most important 
 
61 Eugen Gerstenmaier, speech at the council of Europe, “Was wird aus Europa? Zur Krisis der 
europäischen Einigung,” undated, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn, 01-210-067/1. 
62 Eugen Gerstenmaier, political speech, untitled, December 15, 1949, Swabia, Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn, 01-210-066/2.   Gerstenmaier to Adenauer, December 16, 1950, 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn, 01-210-014/2.   , Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn, 01-210-
015.   , Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn, 01-210-035/2.     
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goal of the moment: European integration.63  In the summer of 1954, as the EDC 
appeared destined for failure, Gerstenmaier helped Adenauer conduct last ditch 
diplomacy in the Council of Europe trying to salvage the treaty.  When this 
brought no returns he pled desperately, to no avail, for Adenauer to reject 
suggestions from other advisers regarding an alternative NATO solution, and to 
instead seek an alternative, revised EDC treaty.64 
Conclusion 
 Wirsing and Mehnert’s journalism in CuW, then, was part of a larger 
political project.  They saw Gerstenmaier as the politician who most embodied 
their Europe concept and energetically made CuW double as a political organ for 
the CDU and Gerstenmaier’s specific vision within it.  This represented a crucial 
contrast to their conservative politics in the Weimar period, in which their ideas 
were constructed in explicit opposition to the existing political order.  Hanns 
Lilje, Eugen Gerstenmaier, and the censor regimes of the Western Allied military 
governments ultimately exerted a decisive moderating influence on former Nazi 
Europeanists whose only path to influence in the postwar period was through 
these gatekeepers.  From the beginning of their postwar public advocacy, former 
Nazi Europeanists were deeply invested in the procedures of democratic politics 
and therefore committed to effecting change from within the constitutional order 
and from within one of the its mainstream political parties.  In the following 
 
63 Gerstenmaier to Adenauer, March 3, 1953, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in 
Berlin, Germany, B2-15. 
64 Gerstenmaier to Adenauer, June 25, 1954, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn, 01-210-015.   
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chapter we will turn to a textual analysis of the Europe-concept in CuW and SB 
respectively from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s.  As we will see, these figures 
ultimately reconciled with liberal democracy, a surprising process set into action 
by the failure of the European Army and the resulting disillusionment with the 
prospects for a sweeping political unification of Europe.  But it is important to 
note that the preconditions for this deradicalization were already present in the 
form of institutional gatekeepers that exerted a consistent pressure on post-Nazi 
Europeanists to situate their Europeanism squarely within the acceptable 
parameters of postwar West German politics. 
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Chapter 8: Christ und Welt and Sonntagsblatt  
Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the establishment of a post-Nazi 
Europeanist network in West German journalism.  In this chapter we will proceed 
by analyzing the body of their intellectual work in Christ und West and 
Sonntagsblatt (hereafter, CuW and SB, respectively).  Immediately upon 
beginning publication in 1948, both of these magazines anchored their political 
and intellectual commentary in what this dissertation calls a “revised Europe-
concept.”  Many key elements were maintained, such as, most importantly, the 
assertion of an organic European community historically destined for political, 
economic, and social actualization in the near future.  On the other hand, the new 
Europe-concept immediately denounced National Socialism, Hitler, antisemitism, 
and the Third Reich.  In fact, the recent past became yet another example of the 
historical tragedy of nationalism.  This is not to suggest that CuW and SB 
conservatives completely retreated from all of the components of National 
Socialist ideology to which they had become committed as war-time Europe-
propagandists.  To the contrary, as we will see, one of the most important patterns 
in their writings was a repeated flirtation with Nazi-inspired ideas ranging from 
irredentist aspirations for the New Europe to an anti-Bolshevism and anti-
Americanism that frequently echoed war-time propaganda.  Like Nazi 
Europeanism, the revised Europe-concept directly engaged with Oswald 
Spengler’s thesis of civilizational decline and promised that a reversal was on the 
near horizon.  But whereas the Nazi regime had provided the political vehicle for 
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the realization of Europe in their war-time propaganda, post-Nazi Europeanists 
turned to the democratic politics of European integration in the early 1950s as the 
means for their renewed postwar European revolution.  
In part because post-Nazi Europeanists became so deeply committed to the 
politics of European integration, their initial concerted effort to revise and 
maintain the radical German conservative tradition eventually and ironically 
culminated in the de-radicalization of German conservatism by the end of the 
decade.  This is because post-Nazi Europeanists attached their Europe-project to 
the politics Christian Democracy in West Germany as well as the foreign policy 
of the United States of America – each of which were central harbingers of liberal 
revival in postwar Europe.  As we will see, post-Nazi Europeanists sought to 
advance a European revolution from within the institutions of liberal democracy 
and in 1954, when it failed to come to pass in the form of a European Army and 
European political federation, they found themselves disenchanted with the 
Europe-concept and simultaneously accustomed to a new, liberal status quo.  The 
following paragraphs will proceed with separate textual analyses of CuW and SB, 
followed by a concluding section that traces this ironic process of intellectual 
liberalization that began in roughly the year 1954. 
Christ und Welt 
 As explained in the previous chapter, Giselher Wirsing and Klaus Mehnert 
were the dominant influence in CuW from its very beginning.  This, despite the 
fact that their influence was initially covert.  This was confirmed by Wirsing years 
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later to the American consulate in Stuttgart.1  For the first three years Wirsing 
used the acronym “er” to sign his editorials and Mehnert, the acting chief editor, 
was the writing hand behind front-page political editorials (usually signed 
“CuW”).  By 1951 they began using their full names as editorialists.  Despite 
having worked for U.S. intelligence services in 1945 Wirsing was imprisoned at 
the interrogation center in Nenndorf until 1948 where he completed the several 
interviews with American interrogators which have been utilized in this 
dissertation.  He was initially fined 2000 DM for his role in the Nazi dictatorship 
but, as explained in a previous chapter, a few years later he was declared a mere 
“fellow traveler” and his fine was substantially reduced.2  Mehnert, in contrast, 
largely avoided denazification.  At the end of the war he, along with hundreds of 
other suspected Germans in Shanghai, were detained for eight months but 
eventually cleared for travel back to Germany in late 1946 where he was once 
again detained for a brief four-month period in Ludwigsburg only to be released 
 
1 Paul R. Sweet (American Consul General in Stuttgart) to the United States Department of 
State, “Dr. Giselher Wirsing and Christ und Welt: A Profile,” November 23, 1965 United States 
National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, Records of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.” 
2 United States Department of State, “Biographic Data Form – Wirsing, Giselher,” November, 
1951, United States National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 263, 
Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, box 57, folder “Wirsing, Giselher.”   “Abendland: 
Intelligenz hat Seltenheitswert,” Der Speigel, April 30, 1952. 
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without penalty in early 1947.3  Already in 1947 Mehnert and Wirsing were 
contacting each other and fellow members of their pre-war and war-time network 
in the hope of cooperating their postwar careers.4  By 1948 they had begun their 
undertaking at CuW. 
Opposition to Nationalism 
 The very first issue of CuW established its founding narrative when Eugen 
Gerstenmaier declared that the publication’s stated purpose was to “transform the 
national consciousness.”5  But the same opening issue also ran an article explicitly 
denouncing National Socialism and Adolf Hitler as one of the darkest chapters in 
German history.6  Over the course of the first months of publication, CuW settled 
into what would become its overarching argument: the era of the nation was the 
great historical impediment to a coming European revolution, and the National 
Socialist disaster was the epitome and climax of the historical tragedy known as 
nationalism.  Effectively, CuW conservatives folded the recent Nazi past into their 
 
3 Mehnert to Kennan, July 3, 1947, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 2. 
4 Mehnert to Eschmann, August 27, 1947 in “Mehnert, Klaus an Eschmann, Ernst Wilhelm, 
27.8.47,“ A:Diederichs/Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.   
Mehnert to Eugen Diederichs Verlag, July 24, 1946 in “Mehnert, Klaus an Eugen Diederichs 
Verlag, 1933-1946,“ A:Diederichs/Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, 
Germany. 
5 Eugen Gerstenmaier, “Eine neue Wochenschrift,“ Christ und Welt, June 6, 1948. 




polemics against nationalism by adding Hitler to the already long list of enemies 
of their Europe-concept.   Combined with a deafening silence regarding their own 
tainted past as Nazi Europeanists, such arguments detached the Europe-concept 
from the Third Reich and attempted to re-situate it on the right side of history.  
Nevertheless, anti-nationalism retained many of the aspects it had accumulated in 
Nazi propaganda.  Take, for example, one of the earliest featured articles, written 
by an unnamed author in March, 1949.  The author declared the era of nation-
states and nationalism to have reached its end.  However, the article’s anti-
nationalism was explicitly constructed against cosmopolitanism and 
“internationalism.”  Establishing what would become a theme in CuW, the article 
explained:  
Whoever flees from nationalism into internationalism has been deceived 
by a terrible trick.  Whoever flees from internationalism into nationalism 
likewise.  The era that lived in the struggle between national-international 
has met its destined end, and whoever thinks in those categories is lost.7 
 
The middle-way answer to this dilemma was, of course, the historically and 
culturally destined New Europe.  As Klaus Mehnert explained in one of the many 
front-page articles celebrating West Germany’s entry into the Council of Europe 
and its ratification in the German parliament: “it is a testament to the very real 
evolution of Germans’ national identity [nationales Selbstbewusstsein] that there 
is no nationalist resentment capable of breaking the will of the German people to 
irrevocably tie its future to that of other peoples….”  “The evolution of the 
German national identity,” he continued, was driven by a resolute march “towards 
 
7 Unnamed, “Ein Zeitalter geht zu Ende,“ Christ und Welt, March 10, 1949. 
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Europe.”  Such a “revision of nation-state identity towards a workable European 
state for the future,” he explained, “demands responsible men courageous enough 
to continue towards this goal with strict concentration.”8 
Anti-nationalism in CuW was not disingenuous, and CuW writers 
committed themselves to a disavowal of even implicit German nationalism, such 
as when they wrote a front-page article criticizing the planned construction of a 
monument to the fallen German soldiers of the World Wars in Rüdesheim 
because it fostered “anachronistic historical ideas” that threatened to bolster 
nationalism and aggravate the resentments of “European Civil Wars” and in doing 
so compromise progress towards a “conscientious Europe.”9  Even more 
important, CuW conservatives began to recognize in the early 1950s that their 
espousal of a European revolution was, in the context of Cold War politics, at 
odds with German reunification.  This, of course, was a central claim of their 
center-left political opponents, and although they originally echoed Adenauer’s 
contentions that reunification and European integration were not mutually 
exclusive, over the course of the 1950s they gradually came to accept that they 
were prioritizing Europe at the expense of reunified Germany.  As Mehnert 
argued on the front-page in December, 1951, European integration may for the 
time being decrease the chances for reunification, but a new Europe would 
eventually have the political power to reunify not only Germans but all Europeans 
 
8 -CuW, “Entscheidung für Europa,“ Christ und Welt, June 22, 1950. 
9 -CuW, “Germania – 1870 und 1950,“ Christ und Welt, July 27, 1950. 
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by rolling back Bolshevism.10  During the EDC debates in subsequent years, CuW 
conservatives such as Giselher Wirsing went as far as to describe advocacy for 
reunification as useless “breath-holding” and he even reprimanded German voters 
for such sentiments because they damaged West Germany’s standing in the eyes 
of the French.11  
Echoes of Nationalist Resentment 
 Yet, simultaneous to their repeated Francophile enthusiasm for German-
French rapprochement, there was occasionally present a soft undertone of 
resentment towards Germany’s arch-enemy.  It was not uncommon, for example, 
when deceleration in European integration occurred to find articles that blamed 
such set-backs on an alleged French narcissism and hatred of Germany.12  This 
was but one of many echoes of nationalist resentment that ironically found 
expression in CuW’s Europeanism.  In the same vain, CuW conservatives were 
obsessed with Allied denazification measures, which they fiercely condemned as 
witch-hunts directed at mostly innocent Nazis.  In one article, written by an 
unidentified “former Nazi,”  the author pled for deliverance from denazification 
on the grounds that former Nazis were often more “European” than their accusers:  
I can only speak for myself, but I am less ‘nationalist’ than many Bonn-
politicians….  I am more genuinely committed to the idea of the ‘United 
States of Europe’ than many European politicians that accuse us Germans 
of nationalism.  I believe that I have learned a lesson from the unfortunate 
German past that the dream of a German ‘great-state’ is exhausted.13 
 
10 -CuW, “Unsere Einheit,“ Christ und Welt, December 27, 1951. 
11 Giselher Wirsing, “Sprengt Frankreich Europa?“ Christ und Welt, September 24, 1953. 
12 -CuW, “Gegensätzliches Europa,“ Christ und Welt, March 16, 1950. 




CuW conservatives also recurrently demanded the return of German prisoners of 
war in the Soviet Union and similarly advocated for the state-funded assimilation 
of German refugees from the Eastern territories given to Poland after the war 
(Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia).14  Both groups, CuW conservatives argued, 
were the most down-trodden victims of the war having been subjected to the 
ruthless and murderous barbarism of Bolshevism.  Finally, a not so subtle 
irredentism presented itself in the pages of CuW regarding those same Eastern 
territories, which, CuW conservatives repeatedly suggested, were wrongly 
annexed by Poland at the behest of the Soviets and should subsequently be seen as 
a mere temporary state of affairs.15   
 Perhaps the most incriminating activity strewn throughout CuW’s pages 
was the writers’ apologetic handling of the Second World War.  Already in 1949 
Gerstenmaier, in a campaign speech, signaled a readiness to defend German (if 
not Nazi) conduct during the Second World War.  The “European Community of 
Peoples” (europäische Völkergemeinschaft) coming into life in the Marshall Plan 
and the Council of Europe actually had roots in the Second World War, he 
argued.  Germans during the war, he explained, slowly yet surely came to accept 
the “historical end of the German nation” and replace it with a hopeful 
 
14 See, for example, the special September 4, 1948 edition of Christ und Welt about the 
prisoners of war missing from the Eastern Front. 
15 See, for example, unnamed author, “Die Oder-Neisse-Grenze und der Marshall-Plan: Die 




commitment to “a new spiritual, social, economic, and political form of life 
between the peoples [of Europe] who came to this position as a result of their 
lived experience dying for one another.”16  The Second World War, repeatedly 
handled in editorials as well as special historical article series, was presented as a 
tragedy with blame to spread around.  This included a constant stream of 
criticisms directed at the Western Allies, not only for their bombing campaigns, 
but also for even aligning with the Bolshevist East in the first place.  Wirsing, for 
example, ran a multi-week article series titled “How the World was Divided into 
Two,” where he recapitulated the arguments of his 1944 covertly published book 
Die Politik des Ölflecks (discussed in the previous chapter), in which he had 
argued that the Americans committed the great error in the Second World War of 
treating the Soviets as a lesser threat than Nazi Germany.17  Such arguments were 
flanked with denunciations of the alleged Western Allied capitulation to the 
Soviets at the Yalta Conference, which was presented as the cause and beginning 
of the Cold War.18  Other article series lamented the German failure to more 
productively occupy Eastern Europe and others chronicled the history of the 
Eastern Front from the congratulatory perspective of the German soldiers, such as 
 
16 Eugen Gerstenmaier, political speech, “Deutschlands Beitrag zum Frieden in Europa,“ 
November 15, 1949, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn, 01-210-066/2. 
17 -er, article series titled“So Kam es Zur Zweiteilung der Welt,“ Christ und Welt, early 1949. 
18 -CuW, “Fünf Jahre Jalta,“ Christ und Welt, February 2, 1950.   Giselher Wirsing, “Der Kalte 
Krieg begann in Jalta: Ideologische Verblendung des Westens bereitete dem Bolschewismus den 
Weg nach Europa und China,“ Christ und Welt, February 10, 1955. 
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the many historical essays written by former SS-propagandist Jürgen Thorwald.19  
Importantly, however, all these echoes of nationalist resentment were fused with 
CuW’s Europeanism.  The condemnations of denazification measures, for 
example, were often advanced with the argument that opening the wounds of the 
past hindered European unity and merely continued the past half-century’s 
“European Civil Wars” in a more subtle form.20  The German refugee problem 
was frequently folded into a broader European refugee crisis that perhaps even 
carried the potential to force more European cooperation; after all, there were 
millions of displaced persons from across Europe.   As one former general of the 
Africa Corps argued, the refugees were European pathfinders whose experiences 
uniquely qualified them to advance the great “European solution” of the day: 
If we want to adopt the European solution, then the questions of borders as 
well as a right to your homeland or original place of settlement 
[Heimatrecht oder des Siedlungsraumes] can only be solved in a 
European manner, in other words together.  Former national borders 
must one day only have the meaning of administrative units.  That’s why 
the refugee organizations have so decisively and in a European manner 
liberated themselves from the old nation-state way of thinking [bold in 
original].21 
 
Unlike Konrad Adenauer and other leaders in the CDU, many of whom had 
themselves been persecuted by the Nazi regime, CuW conservatives found it more 
 
19 For an apologetic article series on German occupation policies in Eastern Europe see 
“Deutsche Ostpolitik im Krieg,” Christ und Welt, early 1950. 
20 See, for example, the front-page of Christ und Welt, December 22, 1949. 
21 Hans Karl Freiherr von Esebeck, “Besinnung unter den Vertriebenen: Sie sagten sich von 
nationalstaatlichen Grenzforderungen los,“ Christ und Welt, August 20, 1953. 
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difficult to completely sever their postwar political activism from their complicit 
past. 
As the above quotation hints at, CuW conservatives even integrated their 
tepid irredentism into a European framework.  Returning the Eastern German 
lands was not a German project in the pages of CuW but a common European 
project to reclaim European land.  The German Eastern territories, for example, 
were presented as an economic heartland without which Western Europe could 
never reclaim its position in the world.  “The German East is an economic 
necessity for Western Europe!” as one article concluded.22  Accompanying this 
claim, CuW conservatives also argued that reclaiming the Eastern territories was 
only one part of a broader European mission to reclaim Eastern Europe from 
Bolshevism and re-integrate it into the European community, or, as the title of one 
of Mehnert’s front-page articles emphatically put it: “The Elbe river is not the 
border of Europe!”23  One article from the spring of 1953, written by Mehnert, 
even explicitly admonished Germans to re-conceptualize their advocacy for a 
return of Germany’s Eastern territories.  Too often “German politics toward the 
East,” he explained, was strikingly nationalist, and such activism was only 
appropriate if it was transformed into a “European politics toward the East,” in 
which the purpose of reclaiming the Eastern territories was stripped of racial and 
 
22 Unnamed author, “Die Oder-Neisse-Grenze und der Marshall-Plan: Die wirtschaftliche 
Leistungsfähigkeit der deutschen Ostprovinzen,“ Christ und Welt, November 19, 1948. 
23 -CuW, “Die Elbe ist nicht die Grenze Europas!,“ Christ und Welt, December 15, 1949. 
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ethnic claims to German unity.24  Such irredentism, however subtle and carefully 
stripped of racialized claims, was nevertheless a far cry from the pragmatic 
politics practiced by Konrad Adenauer’s administration. 
The historical apologias in CuW were likewise clothed in Europeanism.  
Take, for example, CuW’s coverage of Wehrmacht general Erich von Manstein’s 
guilty verdict for war crimes on the Eastern Front.  CuW followed Manstein’s trial 
with a fervor, combining their resentment towards denazification with their 
defense of German soldiers on the Eastern Front.  In one article they published 
half a dozen German soldiers’ letters to the editor, all of which echoed the editors’ 
claim that: 
From their experiences in war and captivity, the young German generation 
has emerged with a realization: the German future can no longer be sought 
after in the nation-state but rather in European togetherness.  There is 
probably more willingness for that among them than anywhere else. 
 
Just like Germans are putting the bombing campaigns behind them for the sake of 
European unity, the editors continued, so too should the Western Allies leave 
German atrocities in the past.  After all, Europe was ostensibly the real reason 
Germans got involved in the messy Eastern Front: 
It is not made easy for today’s front-soldiers to say…that he went into 
Russia in 1941 not to defend Hitler, but to defend Germany and Europe.  
He was completely convinced that the war against Communism was a 
crusade for Europe against a danger no less threatening as the Turks.  That 
concept of a crusade, just like the Americans propagated in their war 
against Hitler-Germany, resided deep within every German that fought 
against Bolshevism. 
 
Soldiers‘ letters to the editors backed up these claims, but with an added threat: 
 
24 -CuW, “Deutsche Ostpolitik – Europäische Ostpolitik!,“ Christ und Welt, April 2, 1953. 
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If we [soldiers] who understand Europe’s present vulnerability to 
Bolshevism have any political motivation whatsoever, then it is, and can 
only be, an uplifting European one. …[T]he only thing that is important 
and decisive is that we see clearly our responsibility to the future, namely 
Europe, and that we don’t forget this just because presently injustice is 
being committed against us.25 
 
In other words, any Europeans interested in European integration would do well 
to remember that German soldiers’ support was predicated on a whitewashing of 
the past.  Another article series covered the Waffen-SS and their postwar travails, 
and titled them as “European freedom warriors” who had been and still were 
committed to the “Europe-concept” (Europa-Gedanke).26  Defending the Waffen-
SS was a favorite editorial pursuit in CuW, and sometimes even reached the front-
pages.27  These absolutions of German soldiers made CuW an obvious friend to 
the postwar German veterans’ organizations.  CuW reported frequently and 
sympathetically on various veterans’ organizations, and even advertised for them 
(sometimes on the front-page) by inviting leading members to write editorials 
outlining activities and upcoming events.  CuW proclaimed veterans’ 
organizations a “bridge to the future,” whose experiences fighting for Europe 
positioned them to lead on the biggest issue of the day:  
The great majority of Germans would have preferred it if the entire 
conversation of a military detachment [to the European Army] would not 
have been necessary.  However, geo-political developments have changed 
things.  But if a German military contribution will one day be required, 
 
25 -CuW, “Europa – Manstein - Heimkehrer,“ Christ und Welt, March 2, 1950. 
26 For the first article in the series, see unnamed author, “Ende seiner Illusionen: Von der SS-
Junckerschule zur Front,“ Christ und Welt, August 10, 1950. 
27 -CuW, “Unbelehrbare Rechts raus!“ Christ und Welt, November 6, 1952. 
454 
 
then we should allow those very men who at the end of the day would 
carry the greatest burden of such a decision…to have the say.28   
 
On this point, there was arguably some convergence with Konrad Adenauer’s 
CDU; after all, Adenauer famously declared German soldiers “honorable” in 1952 
and even extended this declaration to the Waffen-SS.  Nevertheless, CuW’s 
elevation of German veterans to the position of “leaders” in European integration 
stands in contrast to Adenauer’s maneuvers towards the German veterans’ 
community which were considerably more reluctant and tactical. 
 As explained earlier, CuW conservatives were able to parry accusations 
against these problematic editorials by pointing to their well-established aversion 
to nationalism.29  Another related topic which distanced them from their 
conservative past, and which likewise provided cover for their more radical 
narratives was their consistent rejection of imperialism.  Giselher Wirsing in 
particular, as early as 1949, began to regularly comment on world affairs and took 
an early and consistent position against Western imperialism, which he likened to 
the “red imperialism” of the Soviets.  Wirsing regularly defended the colonial 
liberations movements around the world, lumping them into broader communities 
such as “Arabs” or “Asians” and comparing them to Europeans who were 
likewise discovering their commonalities and historical need for unification and 
independence.  Europeans’ residual attachment to imperialism, he argued, was a 
 
28 -CuW, “‘Soldaten – Kameraden’: Soldatentreffen – Rückschau oder Brücke in die 
Zukunft?“ Christ und Welt, July 12, 1951.   -CuW, “Soldaten und Kriegsverbrecher,“ Christ und 
Welt, August 9, 1951. 
29 -CuW, “Christ und Welt nationalistisch?,“ Christ und Welt, October 2, 1948. 
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barrier in the way of a New Europe; after all, the New Europe would be capable 
of providing the economic and political power that Europeans had come to rely 
upon in their colonialism.30  These arguments, of course, mirrored their earlier 
Grossraum-propaganda on behalf of National Socialism, which presented the 
emerging European community as an enclosed social, economic, and political 
alternative to the universalistic imperialisms of the West and East.  Furthermore, 
Wirsing and other Nazi Europeanists had often denounced imperialism in their 
war-time propaganda and advocated on behalf of liberation movements opposing 
British imperialism in Asia and the Arab world. 
The Grossraum Reconfigured 
 The actual term “Grossraum,” most likely because of its association with 
their war-time propaganda campaigns, was largely avoided in CuW.  An 
exception was a review by Wirsing of Carl Schmitt’s book Nomos der Erde, 
published as a special highlighted article in January, 1952.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Wirsing had discussed a way forward for the Grossraum 
concept in postwar correspondences with Schmitt, and this article was apparently 
an attempt to take those thoughts public.  Wirsing presented Schmitt’s book as a 
new take on their shared war-time argument that “there must emerge a new 
balance of powers in the world between Grossraum(s) constrained by a 
prohibition against the intervention of foreign [raumfremd] powers.”  This thesis, 
 
30 See, for example, Giselher Wirsing, “Schicksalstage im Orient,“ Christ und Welt, February 
7, 1952.   Giselher Wirsing, “Indochina – Europa – Deutschland: Ein zielloser Krieg, in dem 
Zehntausende deutscher Legionäre kämpfen,“ Christ und Welt, September 4, 1952. 
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Wirsing sympathetically explained, was a legitimate response to the broken 
“universalisms” of Americanism and Bolshevism as well as the discredited 
nationalism of old.  And although it failed during the war, Wirsing continued, 
today “it mustn’t necessarily be realized in the same way it was advanced in 
Europe between the years 1940 and 1944.”31  How it would be realized was the 
subject of his first postwar book, Schritt aus dem Nichts (“Stepping Out of the 
Void”) published in 1951 by Eugen Diederichs Verlag, the same publishing house 
that had been his home for his pre-war and war-time books and magazines.32   
The book was a long philosophical interpretation of history, and argued 
that Europeans were experiencing a social, political, and economic “interregnum” 
between two eras.  Combining many of his earlier concepts, Wirsing argued that 
the Second World War ceased being a nationalist conflict and became an 
ideological conflict (Glaubenskrieg) that not only caused unprecedented human 
destruction and atrocities, but also set competing conceptions of the world against 
one another on an increasingly shrinking globe.  Wirsing set out to argue that, 
although the seemingly dominant ideologies in this conflict were the two 
universal ideologies of the superpowers (Americanism and Bolshevism), the 
actual “step out of the void” for Europeans must be to rediscover the principle of 
“community” (Gemeinschaft) in a new form capable of preserving the age-old 
 
31 Giselher Wirsing, “Carl Schmitt – zwischen gestern und morgen,“ Christ und Welt, January 
24, 1952. 
32 Giselher Wirsing, Schritt aus dem Nichts: Perspektiven am Ende der Revolutionen (Eugen 
Diederichs Verlag, 1951). 
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truth of natural human “connections” (Bindungen).  Wirsing spent considerable 
effort arguing that the modern curse of universalism, or “world-state” (Weltstaat) 
ideologies, was the historical outgrowth of the French Revolution and 
Enlightenment which had injected utopianism and alienation into European 
political culture.  Conservatives, he explained, had failed to confront this 
utopianism because they were too attached to a backward-looking utopianism of 
their own (a “restoration,” as he called it).  Furthermore, nineteenth century 
romantics, although they had correctly identified the need for reinvigorated 
“cultural communities” (Kulturgemeinschaften) as opposed to “Civilization” 
(Zivilisation), they nevertheless failed to find these in their delusional quest to 
create national myths.  The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were, for 
Wirsing, the story of a great European failure to discover the true path to organic 
social solidarity. 
 The second half of Wirsing’s book set out to prescribe solutions to the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ failures.  His prescriptions, of course, 
revolved around the identification of Europe as the historically destined space and 
Europeans as the historically destined cultural community capable of resolving 
recent centuries’ failures.  Specific discussions of how such a Europe would 
accomplish those tasks included: a political federation strong enough to reassert 
Europe on the world stage, a unified economy which would provide material 
security and therefore independence to Europeans, and a cultural community 
which would mobilize the unique but currently latent European “lifeform” 
(Lebensform) and fulfill the human need for connection and solidarity.  Schritt 
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aus dem Nichts, then, encapsulated CuW’s Europe-narrative in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s; namely, the Grossraum silently reconfigured.  Throughout the book, 
Wirsing carefully avoided discussing National Socialism in depth and entirely 
suppressed his involvement in Nazi propaganda.  But at one point he suggested 
the cunning logic of European history by arguing that National Socialism 
ironically contributed to the European evolution in its own way.  The following 
quotation from the end of the book is worth quoting at length: 
Perhaps National Socialism will have a lasting meaning in Europe: it 
destroyed for us Europeans the ideology of nationalism and rooted it out 
entirely; similarly, it threw the internationalism of the previous nineteenth 
century overboard.  The irony of history, which always uses people for 
unconscious purposes, wanted it this way.  A person who considers 
himself a nationalist following the precepts of National Socialism, and 
who praises the nation as the highest unit of existence comes across 
pathetic these days, much like those who call upon the ‘international 
solidarity of the Proletariat’.  That explains why today Social Democrats 
labor to be as nationalist as possible without appearing absurd, and why 
traditional nationalists now only choose to speak of Europe.  This reversal 
of roles speaks to a new development.  Nations are neither linguistic 
communities nor are they mythical constructs.  They are conditions born 
of consciousness [Bewusstseinszustände]…. Such a condition is what we 
are now striving for in Europe.  The super-nation is emerging.33 
 
National Socialism, then, discredited itself and in doing so discredited 
nationalism, but it also somewhat heroically led the struggle to delegitimize 
internationalism, thus planting the seeds for a new European “super-nation.”  The 
concluding chapters then did something very important: they connected Wirsing’s 
reconfigured Grossraum to the mainstream German and European politics by 
arguing that the CDU and Council of Europe were effectively carrying out 
Wirsing’s “step out of the void.”    
 




 As early as the fall of 1948 CuW openly aligned itself with various 
European unification clubs and organizations such as the “Europa-Union” as well 
as early discussions for the creation of the Council of Europe.  CuW conservatives 
proceeded to report on the contemporary politics of European unification on the 
front-pages throughout the early 1950s.  In the spring of 1949, around the time of 
the creation of the Council of Europe, Giselher Wirsing began to report weekly or 
bi-weekly on the negotiations and diplomacy regarding European unification, and 
this was continued throughout the early 1950s, although eventually taken over by 
Klaus Mehnert.34  The term CuW and Sblatt writers generally used for the 
ongoing European Revolution was “The European Consolidation” (Der 
europäische Zusammenschluss); however, sometimes terminology from the 
Second World War was also employed, such as “European Community of 
Peoples” (Europäische Völkergemeinschaft).35  It is important to note that their 
advocacy for the European Consolidation preceded the North Korean invasion of 
South Korea – a pivotal moment, to be sure.  Already in late 1949 and early 1950, 
CuW conservatives had amalgamated the Marshall Plan and the Schuman Plan 
(eventually the ECSC) into their postwar Europe-program as pivotal stepping 
stones towards what they called “Small-Europe” (Kleineuropa).  Here they were 
 
34 -er, “Auf den Baugerüsten Europas: Ist die europäische Eiheit nähergerückt? Das Netz der 
Organizationen,“ Christ und Welt, April 7, 1949. 
35 -er, “Das Ende der Neutralität: Keine Pufferzone mehr in Europa – Die Tragweite der 
Entscheidung Norwegens – Eisenhowers Einfluss,“ Christ und Welt, March 17, 1949. 
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establishing a parallel between the economically integrative steps in the mid-
nineteenth century that preceded the unification of Germany as well as the 1848 
Frankfurt debates between advocates of Kleindeutschland and Grossdeutschland.  
This parallel is how they justified unifying Western Europe first (even without the 
recalcitrant United Kingdom) while keeping an ultimate eye on the inclusion of 
Eastern Europe as well.36  In the elections of the fall of 1949, they identified 
Adenauer’s CDU as an ally and attacked the SPD as a nationalist barrier in the 
way of European Consolidation, and by the spring of 1950 they drew the small 
radical-right parties (Deutsche Partei and Sozialistische Reichspartei) under their 
criticism as well – after all, CuW conservatives argued, both right-wing and left-
wing extremists had one thing in common: nationalism.  Although less common 
than the polemics against left-wing parties, the attacks on the right-wing fringe 
parties were an important step towards political moderation, because it was an 
early indicator of their rejection of political extremism.37  Mehnert even suggested 
that the real political threat to European Consolidation was not a conservative 
“restoration” as left-wing critics alleged, but rather an alliance between the radical 
right and radical left as manifest in the nationalist alliance between the SPD, DP, 
and SRP.38  In other words, CuW presented itself as the sensible center.  Although 
 
36 -er, “Die klein-europäische Lösung,“ Christ und Welt, November 10, 1949.  Mehnert 
continued the Small-Large Germany-Europe parallels into 1952.  See Klaus Mehnert, “Kleinst-
Europa ist nicht alles,“ Christ und Welt, October 9, 1952. 
37 -CuW, “Auf Europa zu“ Christ und Welt, November 24, 1949. 
38 -CuW, “Wir all bestimmen den Kurs!“ Christ und Welt, May 4, 1950. 
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enthusiastic about the tangible gains in European integration such as the ECSC, in 
the early 1950s CuW conservatives actually began to express frustration that 
European integration was progressing too slowly despite the will for rapid 
unification among the European populace.  By 1951 this frustration had spilled 
over into criticism of alleged fifth-columnists in Strasburg who were only 
advocating European integration as a pragmatic, half-way constraint on the 
nation-state rather than a revolution against it.  Wirsing and Mehnert began 
opining on these internal Strasbourg debates, throwing their weight behind 
Gerstenmaier and his coalition in Strasbourg who called themselves “Federalists” 
and supported movement towards a European constitution and parliament.39  
These conversations, however, were ultimately drowned out by CuW 
conservatives’ shift in attention to the European Army in the early 1950s.  This 
was a consequence of the Korean War. 
The European Defense Community and the “Third Front” 
After the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June, 1950 CuW and 
SB made the subsequent three-year long negotiations for a European Army the 
center of their political advocacy for European Consolidation.  The idea of a 
European Army encapsulated their belief in a strong, militant Europe, and the 
 
39 Giselher Wirsing, “Echte und unechte Föderalisten,“ Christ und Welt, July 19, 1951.  See al 
additionally so the article series by Eugen Gerstenmaier titled “Was wird aus Europa? Zwischen 
einem Paktsystem souveräner Staaten und den Vereinigten Staaten von Europa – Die historischen 
Gegensätze,“ Christ und Welt, summer of 1951.   -CuW, “Europäische Verfassung,“ Christ und 
Welt, January 15, 1953. 
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Communist behavior in Korea appeared to confirm their belief that the Cold War 
was eventually going to turn hot.  Already in the late 1940s, CuW conservatives 
saw the emerging Cold War as an all or nothing struggle, and although they 
stopped short of calling for an explicit military invasion of the East, they 
nevertheless consistently spoke of “rolling back Bolshevism” and depicted the 
Cold War conflict as an intermission in the long historical struggle between 
European civilization and the “Asian” East.  A spring, 1949 article titled “Soviet 
Asia: Arsenal of the World Revolution,” declared CuW’s official position that a 
delayed victory for Genghis Khan was inevitable if Europeans could not move 
beyond a mere defensive posture.  Europe’s very survival was contingent upon a 
perceived urgency to not only contain but even defeat Bolshevism, and the 
planned European Army became for CuW conservatives the primary evidence of 
Europe’s life impulse as a historically organic community.40  Military 
confrontation, then, was constantly in the sub-text of CuW’s Europeanism, and 
they viewed the candidacy and early presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower as an 
ally in this aggressive posture.  However, this alliance with the United States was 
designedly utilitarian. 
In one of his first articles in 1948 Wirsing assured his readers that the 
geopolitical carving of the world into Soviet and American spheres was 
unsustainable, and that a new “European Community of States” would eventually 
 




emerge in order to restore a new-age “balance of powers” between continents.41  
Then, in 1949 Wirsing began emphasizing to his readers the difference between 
the coming “European unification” on the one hand and the “Atlantic community” 
on the other, warning them not to confuse the two and prioritize their commitment 
to the former.42  At various moments of euphoria, such as when the Schuman Plan 
was gathering momentum in 1950, CuW conservatives even went so far as to 
pronounce the beginning of the end of the Atlantic Community.43  But in the 
summer of 1951 CuW conservatives fully came into their argument and began 
consistently articulating what they called the “Third Front” thesis; namely, that 
Europeans had been forced by the threat of Bolshevism into a tactical alliance 
with the United States, but that within this same alliance an embryonic 
independent Europe was emerging that would eventually remove itself from the 
Atlantic Alliance and become a Third Front between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  This European Third Front would be a political, economic, and 
social alternative to the West and East, and the European Army was the most 
important step in European self-assertion: 
A united Europe needs a united military.  Perhaps in one hundred years it 
will be seen retrospectively that nothing contributed more to the unity of 
Europe than the European Army. … We want a European Army not 
because we want to help Monsieur Pleven or Mr. Eisenhower, but rather 
because we desire Europe, and because we want an upright Europe to 
stand on its own feet without American crutches, and because we are 
 
41 -er, “Die Aussenpolitik des Monologs: ist Rückkehr der Diplomatie möglich?  Kollektive 
Sicherheit und Gleichgewicht der Mächte,“ Christ und Welt, August 7, 1948. 
42 -er, “Strassburg und die Dollarkonferenz,“ Christ und Welt, September 22, 1949. 
43 -CuW, “Von der Marne bis zum Niger,“ Christ und Welt, May 18, 1950. 
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realistic enough to know that in this imperfect world those without 
weapons are immediately disempowered.44  
 
 The national debate over the EDC tied CuW even more tightly into 
Adenauer’s political camp and put them squarely at odds with the center-left and 
far-left pacifists, neutralists, and Communists who opposed the EDC with the 
nationalist argument that it inhibited German reunification.  These debates came 
to a head in March, 1952, when Stalin attempted to obstruct progress towards a 
European Army by dangling an offer for a reunified, neutral Germany as an 
alternative.  CuW stood behind Adenauer’s rejection of the offer and his 
subsequent signing of the so-called General Treaty in May, 1952, committing 
West Germany to the EDC.  The General Treaty was particularly contentious 
because Adenauer presented it as a step towards “integration with the West” 
(Westbindung).  Interestingly, CuW conservatives described Adenauer’s summer, 
1952 diplomacy without hardly ever referencing Westbindung and instead argued 
that the real significance of the treaty was its preparation for the ratification of the 
EDC and subsequent path towards a European political federation.  As far as they 
were concerned this was also Adenauer’s primary diplomatic motivation.45  This, 
of course, was wishful thinking.   
In 1951 Klaus Mehnert had taken over the weekly or bi-weekly 
commentary on European integration and continued this commentary through 
1954 with a special focus on the evolution of the European Army.  During these 
 
44 -CuW, “Deutsche Aussenpolitik im Herbst 1951,“ Christ und Welt, November 1, 1951. 
45 Klaus Mehnert, “Noch fehlt die deutsche Antwort,“ Christ und Welt, April 3, 1952. 
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same years Mehnert was contracted with one of the leading radio transmitters in 
Germany (Süddeutscher Rundfunk) to give a bi-weekly segment on European 
integration.46  Mehnert consistently defended the EDC as a vehicle for European 
consciousness, independence, and self-assertion.  Some Europeans, especially 
French opponents to the EDC such as Charles de Gaulle, argued that Europeans 
should instead establish a coalition of national armies as an alternative to the 
EDC, but Mehnert strongly denounced such suggestions as masked nationalism, 
insisting that the European Army must break down national military institutions 
and bring units together from across the continent.47  Similarly, Mehnert 
consistently denounced suggestions of West German participation in NATO as an 
alternative, because it would reinstate the nation-state as the supreme political 
unit:  “We don’t want to be misunderstood,” Mehnert explained after rejecting 
NATO proposals, “all of our considerations on this issue revolve around a single 
purpose: the creation of a European Army as a step on the path towards the 
creation of a United Europe.”48  Remarkably, the personal holdings for former 
Wehrmacht General Hans Speidel reveal that Mehnert, in addition to his 
journalism, had an active advisory role assisting the negotiations for the EDC.  
Speidel, before assisting Adenauer in the negotiations for NATO (and eventually 
 
46 Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 263. 
47 -CuW, “Der Kampf um Europa,“ Christ und Welt, December 6, 1951. 
48 Klaus Mehnert, “Mit – nicht gegen Frankreich,“ Christ und Welt, February 19, 1953.  Even 
after the EDC failed, Mehnert initially continued to reject Adenauer’s push for a NATO 
alternative.  See Klaus Mehnert, “Die nackten Tatsachen,“ Christ und Welt, September 9, 1954. 
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becoming a NATO general), was the head of Adenauer’s diplomatic mission 
during the EDC negotiations and a member of the “Blank Office,” the predecessor 
to the eventual West German Defense Ministry.  In fact, Speidel was the figure 
who initially suggested to Adenauer the idea of West German rearmament in an 
integrated European Army.49  Speidel’s correspondences with Mehnert in these 
years suggest that Mehnert regularly sent him advice on the ongoing negotiations 
as well as various copies of his CuW articles, and even conducted for Speidel 
“sensitive”-marked research reports on European political leaders’ opinions vis-à-
vis the EDC based on his political and journalistic contacts.50   
Sonntagsblatt 
 In 1948 Bishop Hanns Lilje offered Hans Zehrer the chief editor position 
for SB.  Zehrer had recently been forced out of his position as chief editor at Die 
Welt due to his association with the Tat-Kreis.51  It is unclear how Axel Seeberg 
became the second-in-command – it is possible that Klaus Mehnert, who was 
originally considered for the position of chief editor, recommended Seeberg, with 
whom he had become acquainted in the propaganda apparatus of the Foreign 
Office.  In any case, internal documents of the editorial staff reveal that he had 
 
49 David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era 
(University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 48-50. 
50 Mehnert to Speidel, June 9, 1952, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/1544.   
Speidel to Theodor Blank, July 20, 1954, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/2300.   
51 Ebbo Demant, Von Schleicher zu Springer: Hans Zehrer als Politischer Publizist (Mainz: 
Hase und Koehler Verlag, 1972). 
467 
 
been brought on to the hopeful project in its infant stages already by the end of 
1946 as a provisional politics editor after having been considered for the position 
of chief editor which was ultimately given to Zehrer.  He quickly became an ally 
of Zehrer’s in the editorial divide over religion (discussed in the previous chapter) 
and functioned as a de facto assistant editor with a weekly front-page politics 
column.  Eventually this column was titled “Barometer of World Politics.”52  In 
1953 Zehrer left SB to once again preside over Die Welt, and Seeberg took over 
leadership of SB until 1969.  Seeberg, as front-page politics editor and eventual 
chief editor, left the most influential footprint on the pages of SB; in fact, it 
appears that even the style of SB was based on the newspaper where Seeberg had 
worked before and during the Second World War (the Berliner Börsenzeitung).53  
Zehrer and Seeberg then brought Ferdinand Fried, an original Tat-Kreis member 
 
52 Unnamed secretary to Hanns Lilje, internal memo, November 13, 1947, Hanover 
Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/II, Nr. 54.   Seeberg to Lilje, December 17, 1946, Hanover 
Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/II, Nr. 52.  See additionally the editorial staff conference minutes 
titled “Bericht über die Hamburger Besprechungen in der Zeit vom 26. bis 30. 1948,“ July 26-30, 
1948, Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/III, Nr. 249.   “Autorenliste Nr. 6 vom 5.2.1950,“ 
February 5, 1950, Hanover Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/III, Nr. 250.   editorial staff conference 
minutes titled ”Redaktionsbesprechung am 6. Juni 1952 in Locum,” Hanover Landeskirchliches 
Archiv, N60, Nr. 170.   
53 Plog, memo titled “Entwurf für die erste Ausgabe des ‘Sonntag‘,“ undated, Hanover 
Landeskirchliches Archiv, L3/II, Nr. 52. 
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and Grossraum-economist for Wirsng, onto the project as economics editor.54  
The ideological content and political trajectory of SB did not differ drastically 
from CuW; in fact, the two periodicals read nearly like twin projects.  
Nevertheless, there were a few important idiosyncrasies in SB that will be the 
subject of the following paragraphs. 
The Occident 
 Unlike at CuW, SB conservatives regularly engaged with the concept of 
the “Occident” (Abendland) and often employed the term in addition to the more 
common “Europe” and “European Consolidation.”  In fact, during the first few 
years of SB there appeared to be a divide between Axel Seeberg and Hans Zehrer, 
the latter of whom originally wrote about the Occident in much the same 
apolitical way Occident-advocates elsewhere discussed the concept.55  This divide 
made its way subtly onto the pages of SB when Zehrer, in a special highlighted 
article, criticized Europe advocates who over-emphasized the political 
development of the Occident as opposed to the spiritual-cultural project that was 
most pertinent.56  But by mid-1950, perhaps in part due to the Korean War and 
rearmament discussions, Zehrer was brought over to Seeberg’s position.  In 
March, 1950 Zehrer agreed with Seeberg that a true commitment to the Occident 
 
54 Fried carefully continued to promote Grossraum-economics - not only in SB but even in a 
separate book published in 1950 with Eugen Diederichs Verlag.  See Ferdinand Fried, Das 
Abenteuer des Abendlandes (Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1950). 
55 Hans Zehrer, “Europa und das Abendland,“ Sonntagsblatt, February 15, 1948. 
56 Hans Zehrer, “Westwind - Ostwind,“ Sonntagsblatt, January 15, 1950. 
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meant preserving Europe from becoming a political, economic, and cultural 
extension of Sovietism or Americanism by establishing a Europe as a “third 
power” between East and West.57  
Criticism of Spengler 
 Part of the reason why SB conservatives employed the term Occident is 
because they spent more time than CuW writers engaging with the Spenglerian 
thesis of an Occident in decline.  In March, 1950 SB began what would become a 
five-part series criticizing Spenglerian conservatism.  The series began with an 
article by Ferdinand Fried about the economic potential of a unified Europe.  It 
was accompanied with a forward by Seeberg proclaiming Spengler’s thesis wrong 
despite the recent world war seeming to have confirmed it.58  Seeberg himself 
wrote the second piece of the series, arguing that Spengler was correct to identify 
organic, living cultural groups that transcend the nation; however, Spengler failed 
to see the enduring strength of European culture and the potential in modern 
politics, economics, and technology to preserve, or “garden-keep,” the living 
spirit of Europe by giving it new, modern institutions to grow and express itself.  
The Europe-movement in Strasbourg was purportedly doing just that.59  The next 
 
57 Hans Zehrer, “Abendland im Untergang?  Das Ende des politischen Humanismus in 
Europa,“ Sonntagsblatt, April 2, 1950. 
58 Ferdinand Fried, “Abendland im Untergang?  Umriss einer europäischen Wirtschaftsbilanz,“ 
Sonntagsblatt, March 12, 1950. 
59 Axel Seeberg, “Abendland im Untergang?  Die Bedeutung Europas für Weltgleichgewicht 
und Frieden,“ Sonntagsblatt, March 19, 1950. 
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article in the series was written by Johann von Kielmansegg, a former Wehrmacht 
general whom we will introduce in more detail in the next chapter.  As a former 
general it fell to Kielmansegg to explain how European rearmament was one of 
the essential modern institutions for the reinvigoration of the Occident.  
Anticipating the European Army, he argued that a combined European military 
could both defend Europe in what he described as an uninterrupted war with 
Bolshevism as well as serve as a vehicle for overcoming the nation-state.  But a 
European military could do even more, he argued: “It has become a repeating fact 
of history that armament and war unite nations.  A nation will not be produced 
until war has become an end in and of itself.”  Kielmansegg went on to argue: 
“This is all revolving around the creation of a European nation [Nationwerdung 
Europas] – that’s what everything must work towards.”  In contradiction to other 
Occident-advocates, then, SB conservatives refused to scorn modern politics, 
economics, and national identity; instead, they presented the Occident as the 
supreme manifestation of modernity.60 
European Historicism and Nazi Continuities 
 Kielmansegg’s essay went even further, however.  He explicitly connected 
the “creation of a European nation” to the recent past: 
It is not some disingenuous propaganda to claim that precisely the German 
soldier would be a good European.  He has ‘experienced’ Europe in the 
truest sense of the word (even if he was led to it by those with other 
intentions).  And he brought with him home either a conscious or 
unconscious feeling for Europe [Europagefühl].  It was often made 
 
60 Johann von Kielmansegg, “Abendland im Untergang?  Die Notwendigkeit einer 
militärischen Macht Europas,“ Sonntagsblatt, March 26, 1950. 
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painstakingly clear to him that the only salvation of Europe is the 
restoration of unity to all of its constituent members.61 
 
Much more explicitly than at CuW, SB conservatives repeatedly defended the 
Europe-movement of the Axis powers in the Second World War, suggesting that 
it was betrayed by Hitler who was unable to see beyond the lens of nationalism.  
In one article defending the politics in Strasbourg Seeberg went so far as to argue: 
The unification of Europe became during the Second World War the 
convincing mission of the future.  We learned to emphasize commonalities 
and resist peculiarities.  We articulated the economic advantages of larger 
Raum(s).  We believed that the evils of that war (which was seen as a 
European Civil War) would provide the impulse to restructure the old 
forms of singular states into one state.  The politicians did not commit to 
these necessities.  But remarkable men in all countries put themselves in 
the service of the Europe-concept.62  
 
In another article, Seeberg reviewed the tragic history of German nationalism and 
acknowledged that Germany had a historical problem with the mistaken view that 
the racial Volk was the primary unit of moral and political philosophy.  However, 
the culmination of this historical blunder was not the Second World War, but 
rather the First World War.  And while National Socialism initially appeared to 
continue this catastrophe, the correction eventually came not in spite of 
“converted National Socialists” but in part because of them.  Nationalists and 
even many Nazis, he argued, understood that nations were “progressive forces in 
European history” and the war merely corrected their reductive commitment to 
the German Volk: 
 
61 Ibid. 
62 Axel Seeberg, “Für eine aktive Kontinental-Politik: Deutschland und Frankreich müssen 
sich suchen,“ Sonntagsblatt, October 16, 1949. 
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They discovered that a Volk was predicated on the existence of other 
Volk(s); in other words, that the community of peoples 
[Völkergemeinschaft] was just as important as the Volk.  They learned that 
the unique community of destiny [Schicksalgemeinschaft] could only be 
found in Europe.63 
 
In a later article, Seeberg even connected Ernst Jünger’s Der Friede (discussed in 
the previous chapter of this dissertation) to this very process of war-time 
nationalist revisionism.64  In the last issue of 1950, which was a special review of 
progress towards European integration, one author explicitly summarized the rise 
of Nazi Europe-propaganda in 1940 arguing that although it was abused by Nazi 
leaders it nevertheless had an important and positive effect on many Europeans 
throughout the continent.65   
The reason for SB’s more audacious Second World War apologias lies in 
part with their repeated endeavor to give their notion of an organic European 
community a historical genealogy.   Much like Nazi Europeanism, dozens of 
articles in SB set out to outline the chapters of history in which the European 
community was ascendant contrasted against moments of Europe’s decline.  In 
December, 1950, SB ran a special end-of-year edition devoted to examining the 
history, present, and future of the Europe-concept.  The issue, titled “For a Third 
Europe,” eerily echoed the Nazis’ use of the historical term “third.”  One of the 
articles, an introductory historical essay written by an unidentified author, set the 
tone of the issue by arguing that Europe emerged in the form of the Holy Roman 
 
63 Axel Seeberg, “Nationalisten - Patrioten,“ Sonntagsblatt, February 27, 1949. 
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Empire.  This “European empire,” the article argued, was forged in war; 
specifically, in a series of mostly defensive struggles against Asian invasion over 
the course of the Middle Ages: the Huns, the Arabs, the Hungarians, the 
Crusades, and the Turks.  Each chapter of ancient history was told through the 
lens of an organic Europe drifting apart only to be saved by the cunning of 
history: an invasion that forced the European peoples into a recognition and 
defense of their shared European belonging and identity.  As the article explained 
in its introduction:  
While the peoples of this old empire underwent repeated disintegration 
and fragmentation, there always emerged, as a result of difficult blows 
landed by foreign peoples and far-away barbarians a cunning new 
consciousness, a new unity, indeed a new concept: Europe!66   
 
Hans Zehrer penned the final article in the special issue, which carried the same 
title as the special issue: “The Third Europe.”  He began: “[Europeans] should be 
clear about one thing: that they stand today in one of the most decisive and 
significant moments of history, a moment that approaches the significance of both 
the first and the fifteenth centuries.”  Zehrer implored SB readers to embrace the 
“Occident” movement for having the insight to connect Europe’s past to its 
present.  But if Europeans were to seize their historical moment, he continued, 
then they must learn to merge the past with the present; in short, they must fuse 
the “Middle Ages” and “modernity.”  “It’s all about a fusion of authority with 
freedom, faith with knowledge, capitalism with socialism, bourgeoisie with 
 




proletariat.”  The rest of the article proceeded to explain what Zehrer meant by 
“Third Europe,” which turned out to be yet another articulation of the “Third 
Front” concept.  Finding this reconciliation of past and present, Europeans would 
be able to avoid becoming a “cushion and intermediary between East and West.”  
Zehrer concluded, saying: “Actualizing the Third Europe and thereby making this 
Europe a Third factor in the world, that is what is demanded from every single 
European.”67 
Völkisch Europeanism 
 As many of the above examples hint at, SB conservatives were particularly 
bold in their advocacy for a völkisch Europe capable of preserving the 
praiseworthy aspects of the radical völkisch tradition and expanding them.  
Seeberg even deployed völkisch terminology directly from Nazi Europe-
propaganda such as when he called Europe a “Völkergemeinschaft,” a 
“Grossraum,” or, in one particularly interesting case, a “Romantic-Germanic-
Slavic Family of Peoples.”68  Throughout Seeberg’s writings Europe was 
described as a kind of super-modern Volk.  In one article he argued that Europe’s 
most powerful historical legacy was its “creative vitality,” but that political 
unification was the only historically prescribed method for preserving and 
strengthening such a cultural inheritance.  The historical tradition of nationalism 
was pernicious for precisely this reason: it had politically fragmented the people 
of Europe and in doing so indirectly weakened its organic cultural strength such 
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that European influence was increasingly challenged by Americans and Soviets.  
In the same article, Seeberg even assailed German nationalists for prioritizing 
German reunification at the expense of European integration and in doing so 
repeating the historical tragedy of nationalism.  He implored Europeans 
everywhere to embrace their special mission to “preserve for white humanity the 
vitality of the foundations of the past, the foundations of ancient inheritance, and 
in doing so establish a counter-weight against the superficialities of technology.”  
“The exorbitance of European nationalism in the last forty years,” he concluded, 
“is perhaps the deepest source of European decline from its position of leadership.  
The European task of the present is, in fact, especially difficult in this way 
because the past must be integrated into the future, diversity must be integrated 
into unity.  We can only accomplish this if we are able to assert our independence 
spiritually and politically against others.”69  Aside from yet another articulation of 
the “Third Front” concept, an important line from the above quotations was the 
insistence that nationalism had left Europeans the burden of diversity.  In this 
way, Seeberg was channeling a traditional völkisch argument of nationalism in 
the name of anti-nationalism: the value of homogeneity as opposed to diversity. 
 Another article of Seeberg’s investigated the history of nationalism and 
suggested that rapid modernization in the nineteenth century had led to an 
obsessive fascination with language as the primary source of identity among 
millions of Europeans increasingly in contact with their neighbors.  This led to the 
belief that the language-group, the Volk, was the only conceivable political unit, a 
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mistaken interpretation of the world that Europeans even began to read into the 
past, thus creating the “myth” of the Volk:  
It seemed an incontrovertible guarantee that the Volk had been the 
intended political life-form since the creation.  Everywhere in the world 
nation-states appeared to be the driving-force, and even ancient history 
appeared to be the history of the Greek and Roman Volk(s) (what 
idiocy!)…. Man also believed to see that human culture actualized itself in 
Volk(s) and through Volk(s). 
 
But the two World Wars, Seeberg concluded, had disproven these errors and 
inaugurated the “path into the European,” which Seeberg described as 
“patriotism” rather than “nationalism.”  This European patriotism revealed that 
the European community, not the Volk, was the actual motor of history and 
carrier of culture that Europeans had forgotten and neglected in the age of 
nationalism.  Already during the war, Europeans began to see through the fog of 
nationalism towards the “European Community of Peoples” 
(Völkergemeinschaft): 
We realized that this unique community of destiny only exists in Europe, 
that Americans in the USA were a completely different Volk, as well as 
the Chinese and Indians.  We were won over to the argument that only a 
small era of history had been the history of Volk(s) [Völker] – this was a 
crucial occurrence.  We saw that in this European realm all great 
achievements that we call culture were produced by many different 
Volk(s) [Völker].70 
 
In order to compliment this völkisch Europeanism, Seeberg defined European 
culture in much the same way he had during his war-time propaganda: namely, by 
contrasting it with the ostensibly materialistic ideologies of West and East: the 
collectivism of Bolshevism, the individualism of Americanism, and the 
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universalism that underpinned both Bolshevism and Americanism.71  The key 
point in all of the above examples is that Seeberg continued his war-time quest to 
disentangle the völkisch concept of ethnic community (Gemeinschaft) from 
German nationalism as well as racialism, and re-attach it to Europe.  As he had 
during the war, Seeberg declared the emerging European community to be a 
“conscious group” (Bewusstseinsgruppe) in contrast to both the atomized 
individual and the culture-erasing “world-mission concept” of liberal modernity.72  
Similar to his Nazi Europe-propaganda, Seeberg anchored the realization of his 
European imaginary in the politics of the present; but this time in the service of 
the politics of European integration.  And, like CuW, SB threw its weight behind 
Konrad Adenauer and the CDU, culminating in a fever of enthusiasm for the EDC 
in the early 1950s. 
West German Public Opinion 
It is, of course, difficult to assess the impact CuW and SB had on West 
German public opinion, but it is important to note that during the height of their 
Europe-advocacy in the early 1950s West Germans polled their highest levels of 
support and enthusiasm for European integration.  In 1952, when asked their 
thoughts on the “unification of Europe,” fifty-nine percent of West Germans 
responded positively while only fourteen percent responded negatively or 
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skeptically.73  In 1953 forty-one percent of West Germans even believed they 
would live to see the “United States of Europe,” while twenty-nine percent 
disagreed.74  There is evidence that this enthusiasm was tightly connected to the 
EDC, which was the most salient issue for voters between 1952 and 1954.  By 
1954 only three percent of West Germans did not know what the EDC was.75  
When the European Army was first introduced in 1950 West Germans rejected 
the proposal fifty-two percent to thirty-three percent.76  By 1953 public opinion 
had shifted to forty-four percent in favor and thirty-three percent against, totaling 
a thirty-point swing.  More polling evidence suggests that the EDC was a primary 
factor in Adenauer and the CDU’s surging popularity in the early 1950s.  In 1952 
West Germans were largely split over how they viewed the CDU.77  But by the 
fall of 1953, at the height of the EDC debates, Adenauer and the CDU obtained 
one of their most impressive postwar victories at the polls, something CuW and 
SB conservatives interpreted as a democratic confirmation of their Europeanism.  
There is at least some evidence to suggest they were correct.  When voters were 
given a list of reasons why Adenauer and the CDU had been so successful and 
were asked to choose which answer they believed best explained the electoral 
victory, only thirty-five percent chose the economy while fifty-nine percent chose 
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an answer relating to foreign policy such as his “negotiation” skills in 
international relations.  In fact, thirteen percent of West Germans specifically 
stated that his support for the EDC was the primary reason for his electoral 
success.78  The important point here is that the policies of European integration, 
specifically the negotiations over the European Army, were the most salient 
political topics of the early 1950s.  As David Clay Large has argued, West 
German rearmament was not a but rather “the primary question in West German 
domestic politics of the early 1950s.”79  And as the above pages have shown, the 
CDU’s smashing 1953 electoral victory at the climax of these debates was 
accompanied by a network of post-Nazi Europeanists at the two most influential 
political periodicals of the day who sought to rally a significant portion of 
Protestant conservatism into the CDU’s rearmament voting bloc.   
Democratization in Christ und Welt and Sonntagsblatt 
 By 1954, CuW and SB conservatives had become fully committed to the 
success of the EDC.  As Seeberg explained in a 1952 article: “there will be no 
Europe without a European Army…if the European Army fails, then the concept 
of European unity will be lost for a generation.”80  Consequently, when the 
French parliament torpedoed the EDC in late August, 1954 CuW and SB 
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conservatives experienced the defeat not as a mere policy set-back but as a 
ground-shaking crisis of faith in their Europe-concept.  For Mehnert, the day the 
French parliament voted the EDC down was “the black day of Europe.”81  And 
while they did not immediately repudiate their Europe-concept, from August, 
1954 onwards they began a process of gradual disillusionment and eventually 
distanced themselves from their former European idealism.  This process mirrored 
what appears to have been a similar thaw in public opinion.  A 1953 poll found 
that thirty-seven percent of West Germans felt a future “European Parliament” 
should have the last word in legislating politics while only fourteen percent 
desired such power in the national parliaments.  But the same question asked in 
1955 only resulted in thirty-two percent of West Germans choosing a European 
parliament while forty-two percent chose national parliaments – a thirty-three 
point swing.82  Similarly, by 1955 neither a statistical majority or even plurality of 
West Germans believed any longer that they would live to see the “United States 
of Europe.”83  The year 1954, then, marks a rupture point not only in the history 
of post-Nazi Europeanism but also in the history of European integration.  The 
remaining paragraphs of this chapter will set out to illustrate how former Nazi 
Europeanists initially carried over much of their war-time anti-liberalism into 
their postwar journalism, but beginning around the year 1954, and in conjunction 
with their disillusionment vis-à-vis the Europe-concept, CuW and SB 
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conservatives began a gradual reconciliation with liberal democracy.  Having 
advocated from within the institutions of West German politics they had 
accustomed themselves to the banality of liberal democracy, and with their 
European dream shattered they filled their intellectual vacuum with a gradual 
long-term acceptance of liberalism. 
Early Illiberalism 
Their hostile relationship with liberal democracy was apparent from the 
beginning of CuW and SB, both of which rose to prominence during the debates 
over the German constitution (Das Grundgesetz).  The writers in both periodicals 
initially carefully criticized the emerging constitution only to eventually 
begrudgingly accept it.  Gerstenmaier, for example, set the tone in CuW by 
attacking the principle of popular sovereignty in liberal democracy as anathema to 
the political traditions of Europe.84  As late as 1952 Wirsing was still theorizing 
about alternatives to the West German constitution, saying: “We most certainly 
desire to live in freedom, but we don’t have the slightest reason to believe that the 
current form of democracy is the only possible way to imagine having that.”  It is 
true, he continued, that Germans and other Europeans had failed to find a 
legitimate alternative to liberal democracy and that the necessary end result was 
the West German Federal Republic.  But the West German constitution, he 
continued, could still be supplemented with some kind of “strong institution” not 
 




subject to popular election.85  As mentioned earlier, these direct confrontations 
with the West German constitutional order were rare – most of the time CuW and 
SB conservatives criticized West Germany indirectly by suggesting its hypocrisy 
in matters of denazification.  In contrast, liberal democracy in theory was 
subjected to a torrent of critical examination.  The over-arching “Third Front” 
narrative provided ample opportunity to define Europe in contrast to Marxism and 
liberalism, most often by tying together these “foreign” ideologies as products of 
individualism or globalism rather than organic community (Gemeinschaft).  These 
criticisms, of course, were strikingly similar to war-time arguments in Nazi-
Europeanism. 
Sometimes these criticisms were subtle emulations of the Occident-
advocates, such as decrying “Humanism” and the Enlightenment project as the 
origins of mechanistic liberalism.86  Another subtle critique of liberalism was the 
occasional argument that representative democracy’s claim to supervising the 
implementation of popular will was exaggerated, and that popular enthusiasm for 
a new Europe was the most genuine expression of popular will regardless of 
politicians’ trepidation vis-à-vis European integration.87  Such arguments were a 
reformulation of political sovereignty anchored in völkisch nationalism.  Other 
criticisms of liberalism were more explicit.  Take for example Hans Zehrer’s 
contribution to SB’s Spengler series in 1950.  In the article he repeated the often 
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stated, yet vague, “revolutionary” aspirations of the emerging Europe: “European 
unity will only be accomplished through revolution – it will never come about 
through conferences and parliaments and committees and clubs!”  But then he 
went a step further defining the upcoming revolution.  The political status quo, he 
argued, “will witness with it a transformation of the political institutions that 
created it.”  Those “political institutions” according to Zehrer were the: nation-
state, democracy, and socialism.  “A European polity,” he explained  
can only be administered and led in a European manner, and it would be 
too large to be based on free and secret elections.  Democracy, originally 
the political institution of the city-state, must be made secondary to the 
responsibility of administering and planning a Grossraum.  It is already 
failing everywhere in our modern mass-states.… The individual is not, as 
Humanism teaches, good and rational….88  
 
Zehrer’s commitment to working within democracy, then, was actually quite thin.  
A few weeks later Seeberg picked up on this argument in a special highlighted 
article by taking to task what he called the “political terminology of the West.”  In 
Seeberg’s view the West spoke of freedom, but in reality only misused the 
concept of freedom as a “political punch-line.”  Real freedom, Seeberg argued, 
was found in the community rather than the individual: “Human relations should 
not be governed by free trade and rational, good individuals, because they require 
order.”89  At the end of the year Seeberg even directed a threat to the politicians of 
liberal democracy.  The article was titled “Europe Now, Finally!” with a subtitle: 
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“Five years of struggle to no avail – if democracy fails, other movements will 
intervene.”  The essay, written during the initial debates about German 
rearmament in the context of the Korean War suggested the possibility of a 
military coup conducted continent-wide and backed by a spontaneous European 
army.  “The prospects for European unification,” Seeberg began,  
by which we mean a deconstruction of the nation-state system in favor of 
European sovereignty, appeared to be good after 1945.  The Europe-
concept over-shadowed the nation-concept.  This was the case in all 
countries…liberals as well as conservatives and socialists, indeed even the 
defamed National Socialists. 
 
“The nominal way of democracy,” he continued, was not making the desired 
progress in Strasbourg.  Even worse, Seeberg argued, European democracies 
appeared to be in the process of emasculating the contemporary natural strength 
of “Europe-concept” by re-focusing its energy on an expansion and entrenchment 
of NATO which was nothing more than a “pseudo-European solution” and 
therefore a “repudiation of the Europe-concept,” as well as a rejection of the will 
of Europeans.  Seeberg concluded his article with a thinly veiled threat: if 
“democracy in Europe does not prove capable of the great task, the task of the 
twentieth century” then “other, undemocratic forces would necessarily avail 
themselves of the Europe-concept.”90 
 CuW and SB conservatives were sensitive to accusations of radical right-
wing politics, and, as discussed earlier, they confronted these accusations by 
suggesting that the shifting debates over national identity created a new coalition 
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of radical reactionaries: left-wing and neo-fascist nationalists.  A corollary to this 
argument was the recurrent notion that the left-right metaphor of politics no 
longer functioned in the era of European unification, and that a new conservatism 
was emerging that was neither right nor left; rather, it was “progressive.”  In one 
article, titled “’Right’ or Conservative?” CuW argued that an older nationalist 
conservatism of the nineteenth century had died with National Socialism.  The 
new conservatism, in contrast, was anchored in the Europe-concept: “it is a matter 
of course that a coming European Order is being articulated according to the 
precepts of progress.  After all, progress is inevitably our destiny.”  The article 
continued, arguing that this “progressive Europe” would ultimately fail if it was 
not born of conservative principles.91  This was a reinvention of the Conservative 
Revolutionary tradition which juxtaposed liberalism and Marxism against a new 
European conservatism.  As Mehnert often argued, if Europeans were to compete 
with the East and West, then they would need to find a compelling “idea” to 
contrast with the ideologies of the two superpowers.  And until they discovered 
that the Europe-concept was precisely that idea, they were destined to second-rate 
world status.92 In short, European völkisch nationalism was the intellectual 
competitor to Marxism and liberalism. 
Reconciliation with Liberalism after 1952 
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The above confrontations with liberalism in CuW and SB primarily 
spanned the years 1948-1952.  Beginning in the year 1952 CuW and SB 
conservatives began to slowly reconsider their ardent opposition to liberalism, and 
after the failure of the EDC in 1954 they even began to adopt it.  A key early 
factor in this transition was the perception that the United States was their most 
faithful ally in the debates over European integration.  Already in 1950 Ferdinand 
Fried published a book with the Eugen Diederichs publishing house in which he 
argued that the United States was the “inheritance” of Europe.  In an interview 
published in Die Welt he was pressed by an interviewer who suggested that the 
United States was in stark cultural opposition to European values, to which Fried 
agreed but argued that the European revolution underway was capable of 
“embed[ding] the spirit of the defeated into the spirit of the victor.”  In other 
words, a united Europe was capable of not only re-establishing itself as a third 
power in the world, but also reshaping the United States in its image.93  Similar 
arguments found their way into the pages of CuW and SB over the course of 1952 
to the point where Europe began to be described as a member of “the West” 
(albeit a distinct and equal member to the United States).94  Their willingness to 
see the United States as culturally salvageable was to large extent a product of 
their perception that the United States under Eisenhower was a fierce advocate of 
the European Army as well as remaking Europe into the United States of Europe.  
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For example, in early 1952 Seeberg wrote an article about the history of the 
disintegration of the nation-state in Europe with a special section on the role of 
the United States.  He explained that although some unfortunately loud Americans 
were under the impression Europe was a “dying continent” being remade into an 
extension of the United States, most Americans and especially their political 
leaders knew differently: 
It must be emphasized again and again that these positions [RE: a dying 
continent] are in no way the view of leading American statesmen.  Men 
like Acheson or Jessup or Kennan most certainly do not want some kind 
of Atlantic imperialism.  They want to give back to Europe its 
independence because they are aware of the limits of American resources.  
This is why Eisenhower has spoken out in favor of the European Army.95 
 
Remarkably, a year later Seeberg was arguing that a “European Community in 
possession of enough power to assert itself against not only the Soviet Union but 
also against the United States” was actually the “long sought-after goal of the 
United States.”96 
 Eventually this enthusiasm about the perceived posture of the United 
States bled over into a willingness to consider a role for liberal democracy in the 
coming European polity.  In May, 1953, for example, Seeberg wrote a long article 
titled “Parties and Democracy,” in which he attempted to revise his previous 
hostility towards liberal democracy.  While it was true that liberal democracy had 
many shortcomings, he explained, 
[t]he modern state cannot survive without the unification of state and 
citizen, in other words without the integration of the individual.  The 
participation of the citizen in public matters (which was originally the goal 
 
95 Axel Seeberg, “Wie wird Europa wieder lebendig?“ Sonntagsblatt, January 6, 1952. 
96 Axel Seeberg, “Neue Ansatzpunkte zwischen Ost und West,“ Sonntagsblatt, August 2, 1953. 
488 
 
of democracy) has become today an outstanding method of the democratic 
states as it pertains to this integration.97 
 
In other words, Seeberg was coming to reject his earlier suspicions that 
representative democracy could not genuinely facilitate public will.  As discussed 
above, for CuW and SB conservatives what actually defined the legitimacy of 
modern politics was whether or not it advanced what they already ostensibly 
knew was the will of the people: namely, European integration.  In 1953 the 
winds of democratic politics appeared to be blowing in their direction and this 
softened their opposition to liberal democracy.  This was especially true after the 
fall, 1953 decisive electoral victory for the CDU which CuW and SB 
conservatives interpreted as a democratic confirmation of the European Army and 
the Europe-concept as such.98  
 The defeat of the EDC in August, 1954 had two crucial long-term 
consequences for the intellectual trajectory of CuW and SB conservatives.  First, 
their hope for a European revolution was broken.  Over the next few years their 
Europe-advocacy gradually declined, and although they officially maintained the 
desire to eventually see European unification they openly admitted that this was 
unlikely in the near future and in their originally desired form.99  Many of the 
writers, especially Giselher Wirsing and Klaus Mehnert, shifted much of their 
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focus towards world affairs and even began travelling the world, sending back to 
CuW usually non-political essays about world cultures while ceding the 
diminishing European discussion and domestic politics to other authors.  The 
Europe-concept ceased to dominate the front-pages of either periodical. The 
second long-term consequence was the gradual reconciliation with liberal 
democracy.  Initially, in the sting of defeat, both periodicals criticized Adenauer’s 
swift pivot towards West German entry in NATO at the London and Paris 
Conferences, and they pleaded for Europeans to rally to Gerstenmaier and his 
colleagues in Strasbourg who were seeking alternative routes to European 
rearmament as an substitute to NATO.100 But by the end of 1954 writers at both 
periodicals as well as Eugen Gerstenmaier had come around to begrudgingly 
supporting West German entry into NATO.  By 1956 both periodicals had 
become energetic supporters of NATO (in fact, both chief editors, Wirsing and 
Seeberg, were separately invited to NATO headquarters and then reported on 
these visits very sympathetically).101  Even more importantly, both periodicals 
now defined the geopolitical struggle in West-East terminology and confessed 
themselves supporters of the previously derided “Atlantic Community.”102 
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 In short, after 1954 CuW and SB conservatives rapidly lost their faith in 
the Europe-concept while simultaneously transitioning from an exploitative 
“Third Front” relationship with the Western world to a substantive and emulative 
relationship.  Only a few weeks after the London and Paris Conferences Seeberg 
wrote an article titled “Conservatives and Liberals” in which he for the first time 
explicitly accepted liberalism.  After outlining the history of liberal philosophy he 
acknowledged that conservatism had emerged and been driven in opposition to 
liberalism.  But he declared to his readers that conservatism must fuse with 
liberalism.  The bourgeoisie had won its long social struggle against the 
aristocratic and working classes and had gradually forced conservatives to adopt 
to this reality, and democracy, too, had proven itself functional.  Going forward, 
then, conservatives would need to seek a way to combine their left-over 
conservatism with the victorious liberalism.103  Around the time of this article 
Seeberg joined and became a long-term member of the “Kronberg Circle,” a 
group of Protestant theologians and intellectuals founded to advance Konrad 
Adenauer’s Westbindung position within German Protestantism.104  Seeberg 
began advocating Westbindung in the pages of SB, imploring his readers to end 
Germany’s “back-and-forth politics” (Schaukelpolitik) between West and East.105  
By the 1960s both CuW and SB had become ardent advocates of the democratic 
West and even passionate defenders of the United States in an era when public 
 
103 Axel Seeberg, “Konservative und Liberale,“ Sonntagsblatt, November 7, 1954. 
104 Sauer, Westorientierung im deutschen Protestantismus, 232-233. 
105 Axel Seeberg, “Das Gespenst von Rapallo,“ Sonntagsblatt, January 30, 1955. 
491 
 
opinion was beginning to turn against the United States.  For example, they 
focused much of their commentary on a criticism of De Gaulle and his arguments 
for an independent “Europe of Fatherlands,” which they interpreted as 
camouflaged nationalism and a threat to the Atlantic Alliance.106  In 1958 Seeberg 
ran a special highlighted article criticizing the German tradition of deriding the 
United States as a spiritually empty civilization.  Not only were the Americans 
equally productive in high culture, he argued, but their political institutions were 
also an example for Europeans to strive towards.107  CuW likewise rallied to the 
United States.  The final CIA trace on Giselher Wirsing in 1965 stated that 
“Mehnert and Wirsing are now convinced advocates of the American alliance, 
and Mehnert is probably the most effective commentator at present on German 
TV.”  The analysis emphasized that Wirsing in particular had been an 
“outstandingly effective advocate of German support for American cultural policy 
in Germany.”  Specifically, they noted that Wirsing had repeatedly espoused 
continuing West German funding for the so-called “America-Houses,” bi-national 
centers for American cultural diplomacy funded by both the American and West 
German governments.108 
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Conclusion: Different Trajectories 
 The general evolution of CuW and SB conservatives towards liberalism 
should not obscure the varying paths and degrees of reconciliation that 
accompanied this transformation.  Mehnert, who rapidly embraced liberalism 
along with his former employer Eugen Gerstenmaier, was an exception to the 
rule.  Within months after the inclusion of West Germany in NATO Mehnert had 
become an advocate of liberal democracy, and, as the above CIA document 
suggests, he even became a leading defender of the United States in West German 
television.  In fact, in the 1970s and 1980s Mehnert travelled multiple times to the 
United States as a guest lecturer at various prestigious American universities and 
also began publicly criticizing what he described as an unacceptable rising tide of 
“anti-Americanism” in European politics.109  He also remained a committed ally 
of the West German state and was even invited to accompany the centrist 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on his diplomatic trip to China in 1975.110  Mehnert 
was also uniquely successful in journalism after the 1950s whereas most of the 
conservatives at CuW and SB fell into obscurity during the 1960s when both 
publications experienced rapid declines in readership.  By the late 1960s Der 
Spiegel ran an article about Mehnert’s continued celebrity, reporting that his 
publishers had published more than one million copies of his postwar books.  One 
especially successful book, titled The German Position, declared an end to the 
 
109 Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 197.   
Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 184. 
110 Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 197. 
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traditional German “cultural pessimism” and “animosity to the Enlightenment.”  
Germans, he argued, had found their way to accepting “progress” and “the 
West.”111 
 Wirsing, on the other hand, had a more fraught path towards liberalism.  
While Mehnert and other colleagues of his at CuW were, by the end of 1954, 
energetically cheering West German inclusion in NATO, Wirsing’s support was 
more timid.  In his last article of the year Wirsing opened with the admission that 
underneath the surface of the euphoric events in recent months he felt a certain 
“discomfort.”  This discomfort, he explained, was a feeling for him and many 
other Germans that something was missing in their identity as Germans and 
Europeans as the “Middle” between West and East: 
Historically we have always been the Middle.  But this Middle no longer 
exists geographically or strategically.  The concept of the Middle portends 
that there is a self-dependent realm between two extreme poles.  Is that 
what is causing our discomfort?  This missing law?  Not to be 
misunderstood, if we may be so bold one might call it the missing Reich.  
Our discomfort is born from the mistrust that they are trying to perhaps 
make us permanent satellites of the superpowers in the West and East.  We 
don’t want either…. Some like to say that we should be a “bridge between 
West and East.”  But the Middle is more than a bridge.  She is also more 
than a “third power” or any other similar political terminologies that might 
be used.  Being in the Middle – that used to be an existential question for 
us. 
 
Coming to terms with “the West” was a tortured process for Wirsing, but at the 
same time no longer something he rejected – merely a “discomfort.”  Wirsing 
proceeded to explain that this ambivalence was a product of suddenly losing the 
dream of a European Middle:   
 
111 Golo Mann, “Die Welt – Gar Nicht so Böse?“ Der Spiegel, August 14, 1967. 
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For a while we hoped that the Europe-concept would fill in the vacuum.  It 
seemed that there was a chance for a re-birth of unity out of the ashes of 
diversity…. Even though we have not entirely lost our faith in a greater 
European unity, one must admit that quite often the magical word 
‘Europe’ was a fantasy.  It was a replacement for so much that was 
missing.  And it can’t replace that.  Neither a remote association nor a 
comprehensive and powerful economic organization can create this 
Europe.  These ‘transactional-Europeans’ will not fill the vacuum…. The 
history of the last few years has illustrated that exaggerated expectations 
for the Europe-concept keep leading into a dead-end…. The empty 
phrases have trailed off in muffled halls.112 
 
Wirsing proceeded to declare the Europe-concept another one of the many 
misguided “utopias” of the early twentieth century such as fascism.  This stunning 
comparison was an attempt by Wirsing to draw a line under his previous 
revolutionary aspirations for politics.  Indeed, Wirsing’s political commentary 
from 1955 onwards became a kind of disgruntled acceptance of liberal democracy 
as the best, albeit banal, alternative to utopian politics.  This put him into conflict 
with colleagues still attached to the Conservative Revolution.  In 1963 Wirsing, 
who had briefly stepped down as chief editor at CuW, was brought back on as 
chief editor in order to resolve a conflict between conservatives and liberals in the 
editing staff.  Wirsing condemned the conservative fire-brands for living in an 
alternate reality, ultimately severing his friendship with one of the most well-
known Conservative Revolutionaries, Armin Mohler, who subsequently left the 
paper.113  By the mid-1960s Wirsing had become a convinced ally of the United 
States not only in foreign policy but even in domestic cultural diplomacy such as 
 
112 Giselher Wirsing, “Hoffen allein genügt nicht,“ Christ und Welt, December 29, 1954. 
113 Nils Asmussen, “Hans-Georg von Studnity: Ein Konservativer Journalist im Dritten Reich 
und in der Bundesrepublik“ in Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 45.1 (1997), 75-119. 
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the “America-Houses.”  In 1971 Wirsing even had a quarrel with his long-time 
friend and associate Klaus Mehnert over the latter’s support for Ostpolitik, the 
SPD’s foreign policy of rapprochement with East Germany.  For Wirsing, 
Ostpolitik denied the real and unsurmountable ideological differences between 
Western freedom and Eastern totalitarianism.  Equally as important, it threatened 
to weaken their alliance to the United States.  As Wirsing told Mehnert in private 
correspondence: “our own problems [in Germany] have to be understood within 
and subordinated to the larger relationship with the West.”114 
 A final unique trajectory worth discussing is Axel Seeberg’s extraordinary 
embrace of cosmopolitanism.  Unlike Wirsing, Seeberg did not shed his desire for 
utopian solutions to the nation-state.  However, he found a new utopia in liberal 
cosmopolitanism, or what he called “world democracy.”  Seeberg, as discussed 
above, had been an especially vigorous proponent of völkisch Europeanism which 
attacked Western and Eastern “universalism” as an affront to the organic 
community principle.  But in May, 1955 Seeberg wrote an article titled “A 
Receipt for 1945-1955,” in which he attempted to come to terms with the failure 
of the Europe-concept and proclaimed a desire to finally embrace liberal 
universalism.  The Nazi Reich, he explained, failed to establish itself as the leader 
of a New Europe, and Europeans were subsequently on the verge of fulfilling that 
task collectively in the early 1950s.  Alas, the forces of nationalism proved too 
 
114 Wirsing to Mehnert, January 15, 1971, Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 439.   Mehnert to Wirsing, January 3, 1971, Landesarchiv 
Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Q 1/30, Bü 439.  
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strong and Europe had failed.  This left Europeans, he argued, with no recourse to 
defeat nationalism except to return to what he believed was Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s original ideology: “world democracy.”  If technological, economic, 
and social evolution made the nation-state unsustainable, he explained, then some 
greater community would need to fill the vacuum where the European revolution 
had failed.115  Therefore, Seeberg admonished Germans to discard their traditional 
cultural pessimism about American civilization and find the cultural parallels 
between Europe and the United States.116  He also acknowledged that a new 
“world democracy” required rejecting his hitherto held notion of incontrovertible 
organic community differences between Europeans and Americans and any other 
democratic populations.  West Germans must foster in themselves the will power 
to accept “the commonality of Western peoples” rather than European 
peculiarities.  He finished: “The United States of Europe can be found in 
America.  The history of America can be found in Europe and the future of 
Europe is both in Europe and in America.”117  By the early 1960s Seeberg went so 
far as to argue that the West must work towards a political “super-state” in the 
future.  “World democracy,” he argued must be more than a defensive “alliance” 
such as embodied in NATO: 
The currently superbly functioning integration of militaries [in NATO] 
originally happened, not because of the realization that it would increase 
military strength, but rather due to concern over independent German 
rearmament.  At the time there was much spoken about a supranational 
 
115 Axel Seeberg, “1945 - Eine Zwischenbilanz - 1955,“ Sonntagsblatt, May 8, 1955. 
116 Axel Seeberg, “Amerikanisches,“ Sonntagsblatt, May 4, 1958. 
117 Axel Seeberg, “Abendland beiderseits des Atlantiks,“ Sonntagsblatt, July 7, 1956. 
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community [EDC], but all those beautiful words ultimately produced 




As long as this system is not fundamentally altered, then there won’t be 
any room in the Atlantic Alliance to maneuver regarding demands for a 
common Atlantic politics in other areas [other than the military] …. 
Naturally, then, we must consider the question whether the time has come 
to advance the integration of the Western powers through a conscientious 
transformation of the nation-state character of the coalition. 
 
Seeberg concluded that this necessitated an eventual political “Western super-
state” and admonished his readers to patiently advance this long-term vision.118  
By “politics in other areas” Seeberg meant, among other things, furthering 
economic free trade and democratizing the third world.119  Remarkably, it turns 
out that Seeberg, like Mehnert, was working unofficially for West German 
officials as early as the spring of 1951.  Correspondences in the personal archival 
holdings of Johann von Kielmansegg (the Wehrmacht General and author of an 
above-mentioned article in SB) suggest that Seeberg had promised Kielmansegg, 
who worked as a public relations agent in the Blank Office, heightened emphasis 
and positive coverage on the European Army negotiations in the pages of SB.120  
At the end of 1952 Seeberg was even offered a position working in public 
relations in the Federal Press Department (Bundespresseamt) which he ultimately 
 
118 Axel Seeberg, “Sand im Getriebe des Westens,“ Sonntagsblatt, March 26, 1961. 
119 See, for example, Axel Seeberg, “Lehren vom Kongo,“ Sonntagsblatt, July 14, 1960. 
120 Seeberg to Kielmansegg, April 14, 1951, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 




turned down because it was not accompanied with a promise of eventual 
employment in the Foreign Office.121  Seeberg’s turn to liberalism, much like 
Mehnert’s, was preceded by a working relationship with the West German state 
beginning in the early 1950s. 
 By the end of the 1950s, then, CuW and SB conservatives had abandoned 
their radical conservative opposition to liberal modernity; in fact, as the Seeberg 
case illustrates, in some cases they came to use some of the most significant 
journalistic positions in the young Federal Republic to eventually advocate a 
universal politics of liberalism that went beyond even American postwar 
liberalism.  The conservative network at CuW and SB, therefore, offers an 
important case study in the history of democratization and de-radicalization in 
German politics.  The story of CuW and SB illustrates that some of the most 
influential conservative propagandists in National Socialism were, from positions 
of considerable influence, openly adopting Western liberalism already by the mid-
1950s.  The key to this process was a confrontation with the legacy of völkisch 
national identity through what initially began as a revised continuation of their 
war-time Europeanism but ultimately culminated in their abandonment of the 
Europe-concept having become accustomed to the stale but realistic politics of 
liberal democracy.  But, as has been implied in this chapter and the previous 
chapter, this transformation could not have happened without American and West 
 
121 Kielmansegg to Seeberg, December 2, 1952, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 




German intervention.  In fact, the final chapter of this dissertation sets out to show 
how the American and West German authorities played an important role 
deliberately facilitating and accommodating this transformation in the postwar 



















Chapter 9: Post-Nazi Europeanism in Veterans’ 
Organizations and Intelligence Operations 
Introduction 
One of the key social groups in this dissertation is the conservative 
German military milieu.  Earlier chapters of this dissertation have examined the 
Europe-concept in Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht propaganda as well as Ernst 
Jünger’s faction of conservative military critics of National Socialism which 
transitioned into the postwar period with a belief in a new European empire 
without the Nazis.  The following chapter picks up on this continuity by 
presenting what this dissertation calls “post-Nazi Europeanism” as it existed in 
West German veterans’ organizations.  As will be illustrated, the Europe-concept 
was continued but also significantly revised in postwar West German veteran 
culture; specifically, in the most-published veterans’ periodical of the postwar 
period (Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung) as well as the largest officers’ association of 
the early postwar period (Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde).  Importantly, both of these 
veterans’ organizations were founded, funded, and directed by covert U.S. 
intelligence operations which, by 1953, had handed over the projects to West 
German authorities who subsequently continued the covert operations (one of 
them until well into the 1960s).  The CIA project-codenames for Deutsche 
Soldaten-Zeitung and Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde were Project KMMANLY and 
Project QKSNITCH, respectively.  As this chapter will show, the CIA coopted the 
Europe-concept as a vehicle in their attempt to democratize postwar West German 
military conservatism; however, in order to do so they had to work with some of 
the compromised Nazi Europeanists of this dissertation (most prominently 
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Waffen-SS general Felix Steiner) who subsequently used the above operations as 
a space for their Europe-concept.  As such, each of these veterans’ affairs 
operations initially continued some of the illiberal elements of Nazi Europeanism.  
Yet, by the mid-1950s these intelligence operations had successfully integrated 
liberal concepts into the center of their political narratives, expelled Felix Steiner 
as a leader of the projects, and begun embracing NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. 
In one of the most important monographs on the West German veterans’ 
organizations of the early postwar period, Jay Lockenour argues that veterans 
accommodated themselves to democracy rather quickly in the postwar period 
because the Federal Republic of Germany was their only means to address their 
grievances with Allied denazification and retribution measures against German 
soldiers and because the politics of the Cold War presented a bridge to their anti-
Communism.1  But this interpretation does not fully explain why West German 
veterans not only accommodated themselves to democratic politics but 
specifically aligned themselves with the politics of Christian Democracy.  As 
historian Alaric Searle has discussed, the vast majority of politically active 
postwar German veterans in the 1950s either supported Konrad Adenauer’s 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) or its coalition partner the Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) while scorning the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) which 
 
1 Jay Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1945-1955 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2001).   Jörg Echternkamp, Soldaten im 
Krieg: Historische Deutungskonflikte und westdeutsche Demokratisierung, 1945-1955 (Munich: 
De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014). 
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was itself avowedly anti-Communist and which put forward considerable effort to 
win over veterans.2  Furthermore, as discussed throughout this dissertation, 
postwar West German political culture experienced a curious reversal in 
nationalism, and West German veterans ultimately rallied to a political Right that 
fiercely rebuked nationalism while the political Left energetically embraced it 
(albeit shorn of its racial and irredentist inclinations).  It is essential to understand 
how German military conservatism attached itself to the anti-nationalism politics 
of Christian Democracy in the early 1950s when nationalism had hitherto in 
German history been the organizing principle of not only German conservatism 
but especially the German military.  In 1955 this alliance ultimately produced the 
West German contribution to NATO, the Bundeswehr, which was anchored with 
a liberal “military constitution” and was thus a key piece of Konrad Adenauer’s 
politics of “Western integration.”3 
This chapter will address this question by investigating how the Europe-
concept was both a continuity and break with the past, a discourse of identity 
transformation which was heavily present in the ideological material of postwar 
West German veterans’ organizations.  The de-radicalization of German military 
conservatism, then, was not only a product of opportunism and Cold War anti-
Communism, but also a story of ideas; specifically, the idea that the primary 
 
2 Alaric Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 
1949-1959 (New York: Praeger, 2003). 
3 David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era 
(University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 205-264. 
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rearmament proposal in the European democracies of the early-1950s (the 
European Defense Community, or EDC) was the redemptive fulfillment of the 
European revolution.  This idea was at the center of U.S. and West German 
democratization initiatives vis-à-vis veterans as well as the work of a handful of 
key military reformers in the former German career officer corps who newly enter 
our story: Robert Knauss, Johann von Kielmansegg, Erich Dethleffsen, and A.W. 
Uhlig.  The first half of this chapter will introduce the two covert CIA operations 
that initially enabled a widespread illiberal Europeanism in German veterans’ 
organizations which was remarkably similar to that found in the early years of 
Christ und Welt and Sonntagsblatt.  The second half of this chapter will outline 
the democratization of these projects and the role played by liberal military 
reformers connected to the West German government.  The source materials for 
this chapter are drawn from several archives.  First, the Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv in Freiburg, which supplied the personal holdings for various 
figures in this chapter as well as the documents from the “Blank Office,” the 
predecessor to the West German Ministry of Defense.  Second, the Bundesarchiv 
in Koblenz, which likewise supplied personal holdings, but also documents from 
the Federal Office of Press and Information, which oversaw the West German 
takeover of the U.S. intelligence operations in 1953.  Finally, once again the 
records of the United States Central Intelligence Agency disclosed in the Nazi 
War Crimes Disclosure Act will be utilized.  
Context: The Postwar Veteran Milieu 
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 The veterans of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS were a very substantial 
demographic in postwar Germany.  Altogether, there were roughly nine million 
veterans in postwar West Germany in the late 1940s, and another one million 
prisoners of war would return to West Germany from Soviet captivity throughout 
the first postwar decade.4  Out of a population of sixty-five million, veterans were 
thus roughly fifteen percent of the West German population.5  Yet, at first glance 
it might appear that the German military milieu had an only very limited impact 
on postwar West German politics due to a broad public aversion to militarism 
after the war.  For example, in 1949 roughly seventy-five percent of West German 
men rejected the idea of ever becoming a soldier again and there was very little 
protest to Allied military occupation and the disbandment of the Wehrmacht.6  
There is evidence, however, that anti-militarism waned during the height of public 
 
4 Frank Biess, “Survivors of Totalitarianism: Returning POWs and the Reconstruction of 
Masculine Citizenship in West Germany, 1945-1955” in ed. Hanna Schissler, The Miracle Years: 
A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 
57-82.   
5 The overall number of service members in the German armed forces during the Second 
World War (including the Waffen-SS) = 18.5 million, of which five and half million died in 
combat.  Three million were in Soviet captivity, of which one million died, and another one 
million remained missing.  See Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitler's Wehrmacht, 1935-1945 (University of 
Kentucky, 2016), 44.  
6 Jens Scholten, “Offiziere: Im Geiste unbesiegt,“ in ed. Norbert Frei, Karrieren im Zwielicht: 
Hitlers Eliten nach 1945 (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Sachbuch, 2001), 132. 
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support for rearmament in the European Army in the early 1950s.7  It was at this 
time, for example, that Konrad Adenauer felt compelled to pronounce the famous 
“declaration of honor for the German soldier” (Ehrenerklärung für den deutschen 
Soldaten), in which he pronounced that members of the former Wehrmacht had 
served honorably.  This declaration on December 3rd, 1952 was subsequently 
extended to veterans of the Waffen-SS a few weeks later in correspondences with 
Waffen-SS leaders and then publicly before the Bundestag in the summer of 
1953.  As David Clay Large has illustrated, even the leader of the SPD, Kurt 
Schumacher, felt compelled to appeal to Wehrmacht soldiers as well as the 
Waffen-SS.8  Thus, veterans had an increasing presence in postwar West German 
political culture during the early 1950s.  This was to large extent the result of an 
organized and energetic postwar veterans’ movement that emerged during these 
years. 
 As Lockenour has shown, West German veterans were very politically 
active in various influential veterans’ organizations: throughout the entire postwar 
period over three million soldiers participated as members of various veterans’ 
organizations which proactively sought to influence political parties, particularly 
on issues denazification, repatriation and, importantly, anti-Communist foreign 
 
7 Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-
1959, 192. 
8 David Clay Large, "Reckoning without the Past: The HIAG of the Waffen-SS and the 
Politics of Rehabilitation in the Bonn Republic, 1950-1961," The Journal of Modern History 59.1 
(1987): 79-113, 98-101. 
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policy.9  According to Arnd Bauerkämper, in the first few years of the 1950s 
postwar veterans’ organizations already totaled upwards of 600,000 members.10  
Broadly speaking, this veterans’ movement can be compartmentalized into three 
kinds of veterans’ organizations in order from their smallest to largest: a) local, 
decentralized communities such as the Waffen-SS “Interdependent Aid-
Communities” (Hilfsgemeinschaften auf Gegenseitigkeit or “HIAGs”; b) so-called 
“Tradition-Communities” (Traditionsgemeinschaften) which brought together 
Wehrmacht veterans who had fought in a particular division or campaign; and, 
lastly, c) “Ceiling Organizations” (Dachorganizationen), or as they were also 
called “Soldiers’ Federations” (Soldatenverbände), which organized HIAGs and 
Tradition-Communities into over-arching, cooperative political lobbies.  The 
largest “Soldiers’ Federation” by far was the so-called “Federation of German 
Soldiers” (Verband Deutscher Soldaten or VDS), which was organized in 1951 
when most of the largest “Ceiling Organizations” combined together and 
successfully brought in most “Tradition-Communities” and HIAGs under their 
umbrella.  At the time of its creation VDS already had over 75,000 members.  
Within a few years it totaled over 100,000 members and represented the largest 
 
9 See Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens, 6-7. 
10 Arnd Bauerkämper, “Reisen in die Vergangenheit: Westdeutsche Soldaten, 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge und ‘Schlachtfeldtourismus‘ von 1945 bis 1990 in transnationaler 
Perspektive,“ in Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 76.1 (2017): 104-131, 117-118. 
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veterans’ organization in postwar West Germany.11  While it is true that most 
West German veteran enterprises took place at the local level in smaller 
organizations and emphasized associational, recreational, and humanitarian 
activities, VDS was nonetheless very important for a few reasons.  First, VDS 
coordinated veterans’ postwar political demands.  Indeed, the primary political 
activity of VDS and other veterans’ organizations in the early postwar period was 
leveraging their political power to obtain pensions and civil service membership 
for former soldiers and officers, denounce the perceived vilification of German 
soldiers, put an end to postwar trials against German officers, and advocate for the 
repatriation of prisoners of war from Soviet captivity.  This produced significant 
legislation in their favor, especially in the form of amnesties favorable to former 
members of the armed forces and the Nazi Party.12   But as it pertains to this 
dissertation, the VDS is primarily important because it declared the above 
mentioned Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung as their official magazine, and this 
magazine was actually overseen by the CIA. 
Project KMMANLY, Felix Steiner, and the Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung 
 
11 Ibid., 110.  The next most populous “Soldiers’ Federation” was the Kyffhäuserbund, which 
had a membership of over 24,000 members by 1954.  See additionally the VDS collections, 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 48/81 and BW 48/53.   
12 See Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and 
Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).  As Steven P. Remy has shown, many 
American administrators and political elites contributed to this public leniency vis-à-vis postwar 
justice and the German military.  See Steven P. Remy, The Malmedy Massacre: The War Crimes 
Trial Controversy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). 
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 In 1947 the newly established CIA created the Office of Policy 
Coordination (OPC) for conducting covert intelligence operations across the 
globe.  Project KMMANLY was a covert CIA operation run by the OPC which 
began in early 1951 and was designed to infiltrate the West German veteran 
milieu.  The goal was to target West German veterans with printed propaganda 
material supporting German rearmament by specifically encouraging support for 
the European Defense Community (EDC, or the European Army).  KMMANLY 
is largely unknown and has been ignored in the literature of postwar West 
Germany, yet it was an extensive two-year operation that ultimately cost the 
United States upwards of 400,000 Deutsche Marks and resulted in the publication 
of roughly 2,000 open letters to influential periodicals and newspapers, over 
60,000 posters, between 450,000-500,000 leaflets and pamphlets, and upwards of 
4,000,000 printed issues of the Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung and its ancillary 
publications discussed below.13  Only one historian, Badis Ben Redjeb, has 
 
13 The above costs and numbers are estimates made by the present author based on an analysis 
of the monthly CIA reports for project KMMANLY.  The costs for KMMANLY were redacted or 
were absent from the documents and are therefore difficult to ascertain.  Nevertheless, a rough 
estimate can be made based on the revelation that West Germany’s costs for taking over the 
Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung were 10,000 DM per month.  If it is assumed that OPC maintained that 
or a similar level of funding for the Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung during their twenty-six months 
administering the project, then the total comes out to roughly 260,000 DM (plus another assumed 
100,000 DM for the ancillary projects).  A decent estimate for KMMANLY overall project costs is 
somewhere between 300,000-400,000 DM.  Other indirect costs likely made the project even more 
expensive, and so the above figures are low estimates.  The statistical tallies for published material 
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recently summarized KMMANLY, but limited his analysis to the CIA documents 
rather than the operation’s source material.  As such, Redjeb defines the project 
primarily as an anti-pacifist and anti-neutralist propaganda campaign fixated on 
the danger of Communism but misses the centrality of the Europe-concept in the 
operation.14  The following paragraphs will attempt to expand the examination of 
KMMANLY by looking at the actual authors involved in the project as well as the 
texts it produced. 
 KMMANLY was first discussed in OPC in November, 1950 with the 
following postulated project objective: 
This project is designed to combat overt and covert opposition to West 
German integration into the defense of Europe by initiating appropriate 
action against the chief sources of dissension, vis: 1) Communist fronts, 2) 
The SPD, 3) Certain elements of the German Evangelical Church, 4) 
Extreme rightist groups, 5) Some tactics of the Bonn government 
coalition.15 
 
are more reliable, because, in contrast to project costs, they were explicitly outlined in OPC’s 
detailed monthly status reports and were cumulated by the present author.  See “Monthly Project 
Status Report for Month of November 1952” and “Project Status Report; Reporting Period: 
December 1952” and “Memorandum for: Deputy Director (Plans); Subject; Request for Budget 
Allotment under Project KMMANLY; 16 January 1953,” Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of 
Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].”  
14 Badis Ben Redjeb, “Project KMMANLY: U.S. Intelligence and the Subversion of Media in 
Post-War Germany” in International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies 2.4 (2016): 384-
395. 
15 “Project Outline; Project KMMANLY; Type: Operational,” Central Intelligence Agency 
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].”  
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Later documents reveal that KMMANLY, which ultimately began operations on 
February 27th, 1951, was approved because the CIA had come to the believe that 
veterans were an increasingly relevant political factor in West German politics.  
As one project status report put it: 
Since veteran opinion on the German rearmament question is considered 
significant, since German veterans represent the nucleus of a future 
German army, and further, since existing organizations are likely to 
gravitate toward extremism, it is felt that OPC must attempt to gain a 
greater degree of influence over the rapidly coalescing veterans’ groups in 
West Germany.16 
 
As the project gathered momentum three ideological goals emerged as the 
comprehensive objective for KMMANLY: a) secure “Germany’s participation in 
Western defense”; b) encourage “democratic ideals and objectives and the aims of 
U.S. foreign policy”; c) bolster the prospects for underground “resistance” to 
Communism in the case of Soviet invasion and/or occupation.17  KMMANLY 
case officers quickly became convinced that their project had been successful and 
even proposed to OPC that it should be expanded into a larger “master project 
 
16 “Monthly Project Status Report for Month of November [1951],” Central Intelligence 
Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection 
“KIMMANLY[sic].”  , “Monthly Project Status Report for Month of August [1951],” Central 
Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection 
“KIMMANLY[sic].” 
17 “Monthly Project Status Report for Month of November [1951],” Central Intelligence 




(HTANGERD)” which, however, appears to not have been approved.18  The 
monthly status reports suggest that KMMANLY case officers were overly 
optimistic about their project, having assumed that the anti-Communist and pro-
rearmament narratives produced in KMMANLY propaganda materials 
necessarily translated into success in the larger democratizing mission.  A large 
reason for that misplaced optimism has to do with the way OPC’s method of 
control allowed former Nazi Europeanists to use the project to their own ends 
KMMANLY was run indirectly by a case officer named Joseph K. 
Limming who regularly supervised a Frankfurt-based German editorial staff 
which was largely granted editorial independence.19  Limming’s task was to 
monitor the work of this German editorial board rather than directly control it.  As 
a KMMANLY report explained: “Control…is exercised through editorial 
guidance and financial aid by an OPC staff officer in Frankfurt.”20  An analysis of 
KMMANLY materials reveals that the vast majority of the work was produced 
directly by German military conservatives, and although the material was couched 
 
18 Ibid. 
19 Almost all names of American operatives in the KMMANLY documents are redacted.  
However, the final KMMANLY summary report revealed the name of the staff officer who 
supervised the project in Frankfurt: Joseph K. Limming.  It is possible that Limming was the 
author of all monthly status reports referenced in these pages.  See “Project Status Report; 
Reporting Period: March 1953,” Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act 
Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].” 
20 “Monthly Project Status Report for Month of May 1952,” Central Intelligence Agency 
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].” 
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within a pro-West framework, upon closer inspection it becomes clear that the 
German writers were carefully pushing the boundaries of liberal democracy.  
KMMANLY’s American operatives actually acknowledged as much, and, in fact, 
even encouraged it.  As one monthly status report put it: KMMANLY material 
“carries just enough anti-western sentiment (largely concerned with German 
equality of rights) to hide the United States interest in it.”21  Another report 
explained: 
Occasionally the [Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung] attacks a Western policy, or 
prods the Bonn Government.  Such activity does not compare in scope 
with the firm anti-Communist stand taken by the paper, but does 
contribute toward the preservation of its indigenous character and appeal 
for the German reader.22 
 
In other words, KMMANLY operatives understood that German military 
conservatives were a potentially radical constituency and the believability of their 
project relied upon partially catering to an illiberal mindset in order to gradually 
bridge them into their democratization program.  This created space for former 
Nazi Europeanists to satisfy OPC’s demands for anti-Communism, anti-
neutralism, and anti-pacifism while simultaneously developing their Europe-
concept anew – something that KMMANLY operatives do not appear to have 
grasped, as evidenced by an important admission in their final summary report in 
1953:  
 
21 “Monthly Project Status Report for Month of August [1951],” Central Intelligence Agency 
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].” 
22 “Monthly Project Status Report for Month of March 1952,” Central Intelligence Agency 
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].” 
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This project was originally designed to counter the actions of pacifist and 
neutralist groups in West Germany who were opposed to ratification of the 
[General Treaty of 1952].  In practice KMMANLY engaged primarily in 
efforts to win support for the EDC in the areas of veterans’ affairs and 
military publishing.23  
 
In short, what began as a counter-propaganda operation ultimately evolved into a 
journalistic space for former Nazi Europeanists to advocate for the European 
Army through a revised Europe-concept.  The key figure for understanding this 
process was former Waffen-SS general Felix Steiner. 
 As discussed in earlier chapters of this dissertation, Felix Steiner, the 
former commander of the first multi-national Waffen-SS division (Wiking), 
became after the war a leading spokesman of the Waffen-SS who published books 
presenting the Waffen-SS as the harbinger of a European revolution against 
nationalism.24  Already by 1948 Steiner had established himself as one of the 
most important voices in postwar German military conservatism, and the CIA 
opened a trace under his name.  Originally, U.S. intelligence officials were 
interested in Steiner as one of many potential leaders of an underground anti-
Communist resistance movement should the Soviets invade or occupy Western 
Germany.  In fact, Steiner was one of several former career officers who 
approached American authorities with the request of organizing precisely such an 
 
23 “Project Status Report; Reporting Period: March 1953,” Central Intelligence Agency 
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].”   
24 For more on postwar Waffen-SS veterans’ organizations see Karsten Wilke, Die 




underground army (the request was denied).25  But Steiner appears to have really 
captured the attention of U.S. officials with a book he wrote in 1948 under the 
pseudonym “Felix Y. RYK” titled “The Collapse of Total War.”  In the words of 
one CIA agent, Steiner argued in the book that Europe found itself in a new 
historical struggle against a “Mongol invasion” and that victory demanded a 
“categorical European unification against the Bolshevist danger.”  In order to 
avoid another total war, Steiner went on to argue that Europeans must erect a one 
and half million strong army of elite European soldiers trained in modern 
technologies and equipped with the necessary resources to take the fight “as fast 
as possible to the East.”26  Such an elite formation, he argued, could rapidly defeat 
Communism without descending into total war.  In 1949 Steiner created an 
officer’s club based in Munich called the Schutz-Bund Deutscher Soldaten (BDS).  
By 1951 BDS had over forty chapters in Bavaria and over 4,000 members.27  By 
the end of the year they totaled over 7,000 members.28  In mid-1950 U.S. 
 
25 Unnamed “USFA agent,” untitled CIA memorandum, November, 1948, Central 
Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection 
“Steiner, Felix Martin.” 
26 Untitled CIA memorandum, September 17, 1949, Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of 
Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “Steiner, Felix Martin.” 
27 Untitled CIA memorandum marked “secret,” April 18, 1951, Central Intelligence Agency 
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “Steiner, Felix 
Martin.” 




intelligence agents began considering a working relationship with Steiner who 
had started to assemble an editorial team for a German veterans’ periodical to be 
published beginning in 1951, and even though one CIA trace explicitly counseled 
against working with Steiner due to his “bad character,” OPC went ahead and 
took ownership of the periodical at the very end of 1950.29  The periodical, 
Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, or “German Soldiers’ Paper” (hereafter DSZ), first 
published in February, 1951, was published weekly and funded by the CIA until 
1953 after which West German authorities picked up the project.  It had a 
circulation of 35,000-40,000 throughout the 1950s.30  The DSZ was the largest 
veterans’ periodical in West Germany as well as the largest and most important 
publication of Project KMMANLY. 
 
29 “Chief of Base, QKFence,” untitled CIA memorandum, November 12, 1952, Central 
Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection 
“Classen, Wilhelm.”  See additionally an untitled CIA memorandum marked “secret,” April 18, 
1951, Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special 
Collection “Steiner, Felix Martin.”  The original idea for the Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung can be 
traced back to a prisoner of war camp where Steiner, along with Waffen-SS officer Joachim Ruoff 
and two other former Nazi journalists Helmut Damerau and Heinrich Detloff von Kalben came up 
with the plan.  See Günther Paschner, Falsches Gewissen der Nation: Deutsche National-Zeitung 
und Soldaten-Zeitung (Rheinland-Palz: Institut für Staatsbürgerliche Bildung, 1967).   Peter 
Dudek and Hans Gerd Jaschke, Die Deutsche National-Zeitung: Inhatle, Geschichte, Aktionen 
(Munich: Information Verlagsgesellschaft, 1981). 
30 Although CIA documents suggest 30-35,000, documents from the Verband deutscher 
Soldaten (VDS) claimed that the circulation was as high as 40,000.  See secretary Linde (VDS), to 
Paul Hausser, June 15, 1953, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 5002/11. 
516 
 
 Just a few months into the operation KMMANLY officers wrote a secret 
memo justifying the decision to work with an organization so tightly connected to 
the Waffen-SS.  BDS, they explained, may have many members of the Waffen-SS 
but it also had many more members from the Wehrmacht and was in general a 
“sensible” group.  More importantly, BDS had allegedly  
confined its activities to functioning as a routine pressure group 
advocating military pensions, disability rights, and a more general 
recognition of the past and present honor of the German soldier. 
Intelligently led by well-balanced individuals, it has successfully avoided 
entanglement with such organizations as the Bruderschaft, Rusty, etc 
[underground neofascist organizations]. 
 
The memo admitted that BDS is “traditionalist, authoritarian and rightist” but 
insisted that it “strongly denies Fascist or Nazi-ist tendencies.  Its head, Felix 
Steiner, was during the war a four-star SS-General of good repute, not of the war 
criminal type.”  “On balance,” the memo concluded: 
weighting (a) the disadvantages of associating covertly at the birth of what 
might develop into a new Black Reichwehr against (b) the advantages of 
bringing into being a serious para-military body that may be of some 
assistance in time of war, we recommend that OPC continue with this 
project, and exploit General Steiner’s capabilities to the fullest.31 
 
KMMANLY, then, began as conscientious compromise with known radicals 
precisely in order to moderate them.  The Americans were also likely comforted 
with the fact that BDS had already declared its support for the Federal Republic of 
 
31 Untitled CIA memorandum marked “secret,” April 18, 1951, Central Intelligence Agency 




West Germany as well as Adenauer’s rearmament policies.32  KMMANLY not 
only funded DSZ costs, but also paid for a large advertising campaign in West 
German journalism.  The DSZ quickly became the most prominent veterans‘ 
periodical in West Germany; in fact, one of the liberal military reformers who is 
introduced later in this chapter (Erich Dethleffsen) negotiated in the fall of 1951 a 
contract between the DSZ and the largest veterans’ organization of postwar West 
Germany, VDS.  KMMANLY, then, successfully maneuvered itself to become 
the official publication of the largest veterans’ organization in West Germany.33 
Although the DSZ was frequently burdened with pseudonyms and initials 
instead of author names, especially in the first year of publication, Steiner’s 
leadership and outsized editorial influence was not in doubt.   A U.S. intelligence 
agent confirmed that the DSZ’s political course was directed by Steiner in one of 
the last reports on KMMANLY.34  Steiner’s articles were also not difficult to 
identify – his were usually the front-page articles and were accompanied with the 
initial “S.” and eventually with his entire name.  Similar to other post-Nazi 
Europeanists analyzed in this dissertation, Steiner claimed that radical leftists 
 
32 See, for example, Schutzbund Deutscher Soldaten (BDS) to CDU representative Holzapfel, 
January 17, 1951, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/3085. 
33 Verband deutscher Soldaten (VDS), “Arbeitsausschuss,“ 28.11.1951, Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 648/7.  See additionally the archival files for the official VDS 
newsletters in these years, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, MSG 3/266 and MSG 3/2440. 
34 Wilhelm Classen, official criticism of Steiner in the appendix of “Denkschrift über die 
“Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde,” December 10, 1952, Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of 
Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “Classen, Wilhelm.”   
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were the true extremists in the postwar period; German soldiers, in contrast, had 
learned by experience during the war, fighting hand in hand with Europeans 
across the continent, that nationalism was dead.  Germans soldiers, he explained 
in one article, had solemnly experienced the death of a “conscious German 
community” (deutsches Gemeinschaftsgefühl).35  To remain a nationalist, he 
proclaimed in another article, was to be a modern-day “Metternich,” because it 
had become a historically reactionary rejection of necessary and inevitable 
modern changes in economics, technology, and social relations.36  Very similar to 
Waffen-SS propaganda during the war, Steiner argued that the answer to the 
modern decline of nationalism was a European revolution ushered in by military 
elites who had been endowed with leadership responsibilities in the new Europe 
as a result of their war-time experiences.  Steiner inaugurated this thought in one 
of his earliest articles in the summer of 1951 titled “Foundations of the Future,” in 
which he opened with a racially tinged Europeanism reminiscent of Germanic 
Europeanism in the Waffen-SS: 
Looking back retrospectively on [the wars of the recent past], they seem to 
have been unholy European civil wars between Occidental 
[Abendländische] peoples who are no more different in their culture, 
philosophies, and entire way of life than the members of a family.  How 
often have we had to experience conflict between literal blood-relatives?  
When we look closer at the peoples who have fought we see various 
streams of blood that flow in and out of each other.37 
 
 
35 Felix Steiner, “Die Extremisten,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, October 11, 1951. 
36 Felix Steiner, “Metternichs Schemen,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, February 28, 1952. 
37 Felix Steiner, “Fundamente der Zukunft,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, July 12, 1951. 
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The subtle racial Europeanism in these lines was not an exception to the rule.  
Sometimes the racism was even explicit, such as in an article titled “The 
Mongolian Storm of the Twentieth Century has Begun”: 
Those who have gotten to know Bolshevism and Soviet methods 
understand what these shock-troops from the Far East really are: a 
threatening Asiatic invasion marching into Germany, the heartland of 
Europe, while methodically infiltrating Eastern European peoples with 
biologically-foreign racial forces….38 
 
In contrast to post-Nazi Europeanism elsewhere in West German 
journalism, the DSZ under Steiner’s leadership was considerably less interested in 
the politics of Strasbourg (such as following the activity at the Council of Europe 
or the negotiations for the Schuman Plan).  In fact, in one article Steiner explicitly 
dismissed Strasbourg as inorganic and therefore nothing but mis-placed energy.  
Referencing the failed 1848 national revolution in Frankfurt, Steiner declared 
Strasbourg the “European Paulskirche.”  The European idealists at Strasbourg 
were honest, their hearts in the right place – but they failed to realize that the laws 
of European unification are not political: “they don’t let [Europe] grow 
organically, but instead want to pontificate about it theoretically.  But history 
doesn’t let itself be pontificated.  It follows its own laws.”  How then, could the 
European revolution be advanced, Steiner asked.  The answer, he explained, was 
grass-roots activism led by social elites such as soldiers and veterans’ 
organizations who were historically tasked with the ability to overcome the past 
“with all of its errors, mistakes, and bitterness, and perhaps allow a new light to 
 
38 M., “Mongolensturm des 20. Jahrhunderts hat begonnen,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, 
October 11, 1951. 
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appear in the form of a true, fair, and organic New Order.”39  If Europe was to 
emerge not from political deliberation but grass-roots activism led by soldiers, 
then the sub-text in Steiner’s writings was that it would necessarily emerge from 
war.  Steiner was advocating an anti-political Europeanism, and this was an 
important reflection of the German radical conservative tradition: the birth of a 
new völkisch community (Europe) was for Steiner a violent, organic society that 
stood apart and above the state.  To be sure, it is important to note that Steiner 
was not advocating revolution against the West German state and, as noted, had 
explicitly anchored his postwar activism in declarations against “extremism.”  But 
this hardly amounted to an endorsement of democracy; rather, it was than an 
acquiescence to democracy accompanied with the suggestion that democratic 
politics was unimportant and perhaps even a hindrance to the creation of a 
völkisch Europe. 
 The military, on the other hand, was for Steiner and the DSZ not merely a 
better ally than politics but rather a defining element of the Europe-concept.  
Europe, they argued, was created historically by a series of military victories over 
the East, the latest of which had erupted during the Second World War.  One of 
the recurrent arguments in Steiner’s writings at the DSZ was to compare postwar 
West Germany to Prussia – a bold argument in an era when “Prussian militarism” 
was widely seen as a source of the recent war.  Prussia, he explained in one 
article, had a proud tradition defending Europe militarily from foreign threats.  
But equally as exemplary was its fateful decision in the early nineteenth century 
 
39 Felix Steiner, “Von Hamubrg nach Europa,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, October 4, 1951. 
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to reconsider “hitherto untouchable concepts” such as “state” and “community” 
(Gemeinschaft).  Steiner devoted a great deal of attention to the Prussian reformer 
Heinrich Stein, traditionally understood by German conservatives as a forerunner 
of German nationalism and unification.  For Steiner, Heinrich Stein was indeed a 
“harbinger of the future” but for reasons lost on German nationalists.  The true 
significance of Heinrich Stein, he explained, was that he was an anti-nationalist: 
“From the very beginning he was entirely convinced that a future Prussia could 
only survive in the long-run in a larger community [Gemeinschaft] because the 
era of small absolutist states was necessarily being replaced by larger orders.”  
Heinrich Stein’s lesson for modern postwar Germans, then, was the necessity of 
constructing a new “community-concept” (Gemeinschaftssinn).  Steiner then 
broadened this interpretation of Prussia into a larger interpretation of the long 
narrative of European unification underwritten by a repeating law of history: 
Europe unifies when outside threats force a consolidation.  Whenever Europe had 
made progress towards unification, Steiner argued, this was because “the powers 
of a nation had proved too weak to stand up against a consolidated, armed 
[foreign] continent,” and so Europeans were forced to consolidate a continent of 
their own.  Steiner concluded the article arguing that this is why German veterans 
had such an important role to play as “banner-carriers” of the new, postwar 
“European federation.”40  After all, veterans were the heroic unifiers who had 
saved at least half of Europe from destruction and were prepared to redeem the 
lost half.  Indeed, in order to encourage soldiers to identify with this mission, the 
 
40 Felix Steiner, “Fundamente der Zukunft,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, July 12, 1951. 
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DSZ regularly published soldiers’ and generals’ letters to the editor, even from 
non-German soldiers who had fought with the Germans such as a Norwegian 
Waffen-SS volunteer who wrote a letter titled “Back Then We already Thought 
Europe [Europa dachten]” and argued that the multi-national war against 
Bolshevism had broken archaic “feelings of solidarity with the Volk.”41  For 
obvious reasons, Steiner quite often defended and praised the Waffen-SS in the 
pages of the DSZ.42  By centering their postwar Europe-concept around a 
continuity bridging the European Army and Axis veterans, DSZ writers were 
engaging in a fiercely illiberal form of militarism.  Behind all these argument 
lurked the suggestion that a state was defined by military strength rather than 
democratic politics.  As Steiner argued in an article titled “To Be or Not to Be,” 
Europeans could only prove themselves worthy of existence if they demonstrated 
a “will to life” (Willen zum Leben).  And the “will to life,” he continued, was 
above all else founded in a “determined will to defend oneself” (entschlossenen 
Willen zur Verteidigung).  Steiner went on to defend the traditional German 
concept of “Soldatentum” (translated roughly as “soldier-ism” or “militarism”) 
which he suggested had always been a manifestation of a “will to life” rather than 
 
41 HAFP, “Wir dachten damals schon Europa,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, September 20, 
1951. 
42 See, for example, Felix Steiner, “Gebt der Waffen-SS Gerechtigkeit!“ Deutsche Soldaten-
Zeitung, August 23, 1951 
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German nationalism.43  In other words, Soldatentum, not democratic politics, was 
the foundation of a new Europe. 
 The big exception to the anti-political Europeanism in the pages of the 
DSZ in 1951 and 1952 was, of course, the EDC.  Because it was a military policy 
proposal, the European Army was an opportune bridge to politics for West 
German veterans.  A common argument throughout the DSZ’s coverage of the 
EDC was that the European Army was a reincarnation of the pan-European fight 
against Bolshevism in the Second World War.  Take, for example, an article by 
Steiner called “The Oder-Front in 1945 - The Bundestag-Front in 1952.”  As the 
title suggests, the article argued that those advocating for a European Army in the 
German parliament and elsewhere were comparable to those who valiantly 
continued to fight on the Eastern Front at the end of the war.44  Like other post-
Nazi Europeanists in West German journalism, during the early negotiations for 
the EDC the writers in the DSZ advocated passionately for the most decidedly 
integrated proposals of a European Army, castigating suggestions of a 
diplomatically aligned coalition of national armies as incomplete and even as 
harmful steps backward on the path towards complete “European 
consciousness.”45  
 
43 Felix Steiner, “Sein oder Nichtsein,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, August 30, 1951. 
44 Felix Steiner, “Oderfront 1945 – Bundestagsfront 1952,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, 
February 7, 1952. 
45 No author, “Um die Konstruktion der Europa-Armee,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, 
September 20, 1951. 
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 Although the vast majority of the DSZ’s EDC coverage revolved around 
anti-Communism, the idea of a powerful European Army rivalling the multi-
national Axis forces of the Second World War was also an indirect challenge to 
the United States and its Allies, because it was consistently described as the 
nucleus of an assertive and independent Europe.  But because it was funded and 
supervised by the CIA, the DSZ had to be very subtle in its anti-Americanism.  As 
such, DSZ writers frequently and vaguely criticized the Americans for having 
failed to recognize the threat of Bolshevism during the Second World War, such 
as when Steiner maligned the United States for enabling the Soviet “Eurasian 
continent” a chance to dominate the globe during the present Cold War instead of 
quelling the Soviets during the “Hot War.”  The insinuation, then, was that the 
United States should have aligned with Nazi Germany during the Second World 
War.46  Steiner also repeatedly criticized the United States for refusing to ally 
with fascist Spain in the Cold War.47  His insistence that fascist Spain should be 
an equal member of the new Europe was yet another indication of the shallowness 
of Steiner’s commitment to democracy. 
Another example of the DSZ’s subtle anti-Americanism was its unique 
patronage of the “Third Front” ideology.  Unlike the “Third Front” ideology 
discussed elsewhere in this dissertation DSZ writers did not use the term “Third 
Front”; instead, they turned to the terminology of war-time Nazi Europeanism: 
“Grossraum” and “Lebensraum.”  Suggesting that Europe was an independent 
 
46 Felix Steiner, “Weltpolitischer Horizont,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, August 23, 1951. 
47 Felix Steiner, “Sein oder Nichtsein,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, August 30, 1951. 
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Grossraum or Lebensraum does not appear to have caused consternation with the 
American censors, and this is likely because such arguments were consistently 
made in the service of attacking “nationalists” and “neutralists” who opposed 
German rearmament and integration into Western defense systems.  Take, for 
example, Steiner’s article titled “Political Convalescence.”  The neutralists 
opposing Bonn’s rearmament politics, he argued were just camouflaged 
nationalists who had not drawn the correct lesson from German history.  “They 
believe they can renew the Greater German Reich [Grossdeutsches Reich],” he 
argued.  This “childish-seeming nationalism,” he explained, was a naïve yet also 
dangerous supposition because it unwittingly serviced the Soviet destruction of 
Europeans’ sense of common “Volkstum” (roughly translated as völkisch 
essence).  Indeed, he proceeded to argue that a European Grossraum was a 
necessary biological advancement.  Answering the question why Germans should 
come to terms with the end of nationalism, he explained: 
Because the European peoples are too biologically weak to individually 
assert themselves in the Conflict of Continents.  Because nationally 
isolated they are not economically capable of holding their own in 
continental economics and technologies, and because they live on a 
narrow space [Raum] and are therefore unable to initiate a global strategy 
in terms of territory.  Because at their borders they have so much national 
fluidity that they could never survive the conflicts that would result from 
any attempt at a resolution other than peaceful unification…. [bold in 
original]48 
 
Steiner repeatedly came back to the Grossraum principle, arguing that the “Raum-
calculus” (Raumverältnisse) was causing the “break-down of the national 
 
48 Felix Steiner, “Politische Rekonvaleszenz,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, October 18, 1951. 
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order.”49  Much like war-time Nazi Europeanism, Steiner extended the Grossraum 
principle to the rest of the world as well:   
From Indochina to Morocco, from India to Egypt…. All these peoples are 
now trying to fight for their independence.  But it is somewhat of a 
tragedy that the historical conditions for acquiring freedom have changed.  
Just as Europe has the spiritual task to fatefully overcome the nationality-
principle in order to make room for larger concepts, so too will these 
peoples only be capable of overcoming the world dichotomy Freedom-
Bolshevism if they subject their newly won freedom to a higher Raum-
calculus [Raumordnungen].50  
 
The carefully worded “world dichotomy” between “freedom” and 
“Bolshevism” is revealing: for Steiner, the creation of a völkisch European 
Grossraum was a kind of alternative to both Communism and Western liberalism.  
Another DSZ contributor, former Western Front general Georg von Sodenstern, 
carefully engaged with the role and meaning of the United States in the European 
Grossraum.  After all, how could Europe be both independent and yet also aligned 
with the United States in the Cold War conflict?  For Sodenstern, in an article 
titled “Decision for Europe,” the answer could be found in the historical transition 
of leadership made necessary by the disaster of the Second World War.  For 
thousands of years, he argued, Germany had “carried the burden of confrontation 
between two mutually exclusive worlds”: namely, the Germanic Europe and 
Slavic East: 
It is hardly necessary to say that we Germans greet every attempt to 
overcome the historical conflict between Germanics and Slavs - because 
we believe that, after the outcome of the Second World War, the time is 
ripe to transcend it.  But we are confident that a peaceful coexistence 
between the two Lebensraum(s) is impossible as long as the Slavic people 
 
49 Felix Steiner, “Der Würfel ist gefallen,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, January 17, 1952. 
50 Felix Steiner, “Weltpolitische HKL,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, October 25, 1951. 
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are subjected to Bolshevist rule and the totalitarian claims of Moscow 
threaten the Occidental Raum and therefore us [Germans] at their border. 
 
These lines, which are reminiscent of the racially supremacist Germanic 
Europeanism in Nazi Europeanist propaganda, were followed by the admission 
that Germany had been emasculated and could no longer lead the defense of 
Europe.  The United States had necessarily stepped into the leadership position.51   
Sodenstern frequently penned articles in the DSZ, and this is because he 
was one of the leading figures in Operation KMMANLY behind Steiner.  As 
mentioned above, KMKMANLY headquarters in Frankfurt published more than 
just the DSZ: pamphlets, brochures, posters, and letters to the editors of leading 
periodicals and newspapers.  But KMMANLY also exclusively financed one 
more periodical originally called Europäische Sicherheit (“European Security”) 
when released in February, 1951 along with the DSZ, but changed to 
Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau (“Military Science Review”) in July, 1951.  
Sodenstern was the chief editor of this smaller military specialist magazine which 
mostly handled technology, strategy, and global military policies and was 
published monthly.  Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau appears to have acquired a 
reputation as a leading journal for Cold War military studies; in fact, U.S. 
intelligence agents proudly boasted that they had been contacted by the West 
German government with the request to purchase Wehrwissenschaftliche 
Rundschau and make it into the “semi-official publication when the German 
 




Defense Army is formed.”52  But Sodenstern also occasionally penned articles on 
the history and theory of European unification, and in these articles he expanded 
on his thoughts on the United States.  He argued that historically exclusive 
“cultural groups” (Kulturkreise) such as Europe were conglomerating into 
geographic Lebensraum(s).  These organic communities were defined by their 
unique “will to live” (Lebenswillen), and because the United States ultimately 
emerged out of Europe it carried with it a germ of the Occidental “will to live” 
and thus found itself pressed to help defend the European Lebensraum.  But 
Sodenstern conspicuously described the United States as a temporary 
“representative” of the European cultural group whose ultimate goal was to 
“awaken” Europeans to their destiny.53  Thus, KMMANLY’s two largest 
journalistic endeavors trafficked in subtle forms of illiberalism and anti-
Americanism.  On the one hand, this was a cunning way to use American 
resources to their own ends.  But as a later section of this chapter will illustrate, it 
ultimately proved an achievement on the Americans’ part to have attained in 
leading German military publications even an ambivalent espousal of America’s 
leadership role in the Cold War, however “temporary” it was labeled.  As we will 
see, this became a foundation for more liberalization in the course of the 1950s. 
Project QKSNITCH and the Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde 
 
52 “Monthly Project Status Report for Month of August 1952,” Central Intelligence Agency 
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].” 
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 Project KMMANLY was accompanied by a twin operation that began a 
year later and was patronized with roughly the same amount of funds.54  This 
operation was called Project QKSNITCH, and entailed the creation of a veterans’ 
organization for former officers in the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS called 
Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde (hereafter GfW).  GfW was a collection of local 
clubs, or “chapters,” each of which met multiple times a month under the 
direction of QKSNITCH offices in Frankfurt in order to discuss politics and the 
future of German military institutions.  Officers who wanted to join had to 
petition for membership, which was granted after a vote by the administrative 
committee in Frankfurt.  It is difficult to identify the total number of members in 
GfW.  According to CIA documents there were 60 branches with upwards of 
1000 members by August, 1952.55  But by the end of American involvement in 
early 1953 there were seventy-eight branches in operation with another twenty-
nine in the process of being founded, meaning that membership in GfW nearly 
 
54 Project QKSNITCH was founded in January, 1952, and roughly 240,000 DM were spent by 
OPC on Project QKSNITCH during its two-year duration under American control.  Funds were 
camouflaged as donations from a local scientific institution.  See “Monthly Project Status Report 
for Month of May 1952,” Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic 
Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].”   Agent file “Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Classen,” 
undated (most likely early-1953), Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act 
Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “Classen, Wilhelm.” 
55  “Monthly Project Status Report for Month of August 1952,” Central Intelligence Agency 
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].”   
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doubled in under one year.56  As we will discuss in more detail in a separate 
section below, GfW was eventually taken over, continued, and even financially 
expanded by West German officials, but the documents for the West German 
tenure over the project are unclear about membership numbers.  In any case, it is 
safe to assert that GfW ultimately contained thousands of members of the former 
German officer corps, and as such was among the most important institutions in 
the political culture of postwar German military conservatism.  Unlike 
KMMANLY, there is not a project file for QKSNITCH in the CIA documents 
released by the Freedom of Information Act.  However, there is a trace file under 
the name of the German manager of the operation, Wilhelm Classen, and it 
contains some of his summary reports for QKSNITCH as well as memos about 
him and the operation.  One memo, dated in 1953 near the end of American 
supervision of the project, outlined the original objective of the operation: 
In full awareness of the nationalist-tinged tendencies of its potential 
membership, it was decided to restrict membership to those ex-officers 
and others who were willing to openly promise to oppose political 
extremism of both Right and Left, to work constructively for the 
democratic association of West Germany with the Western Allies, and 
who were willing to accept as respected comrades those former officers 
who participated in the 1944 plot to overthrow the Hitler regime.57 
 
In short, QKSNITCH set out to reform the German military milieu by creating an 
organization for social elites in the military and restricting membership to men 
 
56 Agent file “Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Classen,” undated (most likely early-1953), Central 





whose political opinions could be fused with American goals of democratization.  
QKSNITCH, in other words, recognized the value of social elites and their vital 
position as disseminators of ideas and values, and hoped to reform German 
military conservatives from the top-down.  The founding document of 
QKSNITCH, which can be found in Classen’s CIA trace file, divided 
QKSNITCH’s propaganda narratives into four groups.  Like KMMANLY, three 
of these directives emphasized anti-Communism, German rearmament in the 
EDC, and anti-pacifism/anti-neutralism.  But unlike KMMANLY, QKSNITCH 
was also founded with a fourth guiding principle which explicitly emphasized the 
goal of combating the “radical Right movement.”  This directive, listed as the first 
of all four, stated: “Fostering a defense of Western democracy against Communist 
threat as well as against the threat of other totalitarians; in particular the radical 
Right movement.”58  It is all the more surprising, then, that QKSNITCH, like 
KMKMANLY, was founded on the initiative of Felix Steiner. 
In early 1952, roughly one year after he had founded the DSZ magazine 
with the CIA, Steiner approached the Americans with the idea of expanding his 
original Munich-based officers’ club (the Schutz-Bund Deutscher Soldaten, or 
BDS) in a new name: Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde.59  The Americans quickly 
 
58 Wilhelm Classen, “Denkschrift über die “Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde,” December 10, 
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accepted the proposal and Steiner was immediately made “deputy chairman” of 
the newly formed GfW, now funded by the CIA as a second West German 
veterans’ operation.  But in a signal of American distrust towards Steiner, the 
Americans added two figures (designated “chairmen”) to the administrative board 
alongside Steiner: Vollrath Hellermann, about whom very little can be 
ascertained, and the above-mentioned Wilhelm Classen.  Interestingly, Classen 
was simultaneously made into the covert “general secretary” and primary 
American liaison for the project, thus creating a divide in GfW leadership that 
lasted throughout the years of American supervision.  In short, Classen was the 
highest authority in private, facilitating American demands behind the scenes, 
while Steiner was the highest authority in public.60  Even though Classen was 
recommended for a role in administration of the project by Steiner himself (based 
 
60 “QKSNITCH Final Report,” April 11, 1953, Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of 
Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “Classen, Wilhelm.”   
Identification card, “Classen, Dr. Wilhelm,” Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information 
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on their work together at the DSZ magazine), the administrative and ultimately 
ideological divide between the two figures was bitter from nearly the onset of the 
operation.  According to CIA documents Classen had served some unidentified 
role in Wehrmacht propaganda from 1942-1944, and according to West German 
intelligence he had even served an administrative position in what one memo 
called the “NS-Rasseamt,” by which the West German operatives presumably 
meant the SS-Race and Settlement Main Office.61  Thus, Classen clearly had his 
own baggage with National Socialism.  Nevertheless, as will be discussed in more 
detail in a later section of this chapter, Classen’s memos and reports on 
QKSNITCH consistently indicate that he saw his primary role in QKSNITCH as a 
Westernizer, devoted to re-making German political culture in the image of the 
United States, and QKSNITCH documents written by unidentified American 
agents suggest that this is why Classen was put into the ghost-leadership position 
as an American liaison.62  They felt confident about Classen’s commitment to 
liberal democracy and saw him as a balance to Steiner.  Much to the chagrin of 
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Classen, in the first year of its operation, QKSNITCH, much like KMMANLY, 
was dominated by Steiner’s influence.  As the final summary report on 
QKSNITCH admitted:  
Although not personally popular with his colleagues (Classen explains this 
well in [a separate document]), Steiner, by virtue of his alleged role as 
foster father of the Gesellschaft, and by his aggressive personality, 
entrenched himself in the organization’s leadership circle.63 
 
GfW’s primary method for communicating ideas to former officers was to 
fund and host occasional large conferences (Veranstaltungen) held in the various 
local chapters.  Most local chapters were granted at least one large conference 
during the early 1950s, and some of the larger chapters were the recipients of 
numerous large conferences.  The final summary report on QKSNITCH claimed 
that a total of eighty-seven large conferences had been held during the years of 
American patronage with attendance ranging between forty and 350.  The same 
summary reported that sixty-six of the eighty-seven large conferences “were 
devoted directly to promotion for the European Defense Treaty….”64  The small 
monthly publication for GfW members, called Wehrkunde, included regular 
reports on the large conferences which were sent in by the local chapters.  These 
reports confirm the CIA’s assessment that the majority of large conferences 
revolved around the European Army and its broader significance.  Furthermore, 
as the same summary explained: “Not included in [the above large conference] 
 
63 “QKSNITCH Final Report,” April 11, 1953, Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of 




figures are the literally hundreds local Gesellschaft discussion evenings to which 
non-members were invited and debate was stimulated on the European Defense 
Treaty issue.”65  In other words, local leaders of GfW chapters likewise organized 
their smaller meetings around discussions of the European Army.  Articles in 
Wehrkunde reveal that such discussions in GfW went beyond technical details and 
extended into conversations about history, nationalism, and the Europe-concept.  
As one GfW member, former Lieutenant-General O.V. Natzmer, proclaimed in a 
speech about the EDC which was re-printed in Wehrkunde: 
Let’s celebrate the great task before us!  Our Europe is venturing its first 
tentative steps.  Our task will be giving this Europe-Idea some substance 
that will provide new impetus at the political level and will be welcomed 
by the leadership of our countries. … Our will to shape the European 
future should be irrepressible!66 
 
The large conferences, according to U.S. intelligence agents, “proved very 
popular…and served as an effective means of presenting U.S. policy….”67  
Reports in Wehrkunde illustrate that leading political figures in Adenauer’s 
political coalition, such as cabinet members Franz Josef Strauss and Theodor 
Blank, were invited in order to boost attendance and raise the profile of the 
conferences in the press.68  Unfortunately, the present author was unable to obtain 
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issues of Wehrkunde for the year 1952, but it is important to note that during this 
initial year of Steiner’s leadership, GfW conferences, much like the DSZ 
magazine in Project KMMANLY, most likely trafficked in illiberal Europeanism 
in addition to fulfilling the CIA’s demands for anti-Communist and pro-
rearmament propaganda.  Wehrkunde issues from 1953 illustrate that although the 
large conferences were organized and directed from Frankfurt, Steiner’s outsized 
influence in the first year of GfW meant that he contributed many lectures himself 
while also controlling the admission of other guest lecturers.  For example, 
leading figures in Steiner’s Project KMMANLY, such as Georg von Sodenstern, 
were regularly invited to participate as guest lecturers and even other post-Nazi 
Europeanists discussed in this dissertation, such as Klaus Mehnert of Christ und 
Welt, also contributed.69 
American Inroads 
As has been illustrated, the American-sponsored veterans’ operations were 
initially founded and administered by a network of former Nazi Europeanists, led 
by Waffen-SS general Felix Steiner, who exploited the projects as a vehicle for 
continuing their Europe-concept, much of which was still anchored in a deeply 
illiberal view of politics and the world.  This was not lost on their political 
opponents to the left.  An official SPD newspaper called Volksrecht, for example, 
published an article in September, 1951 titled “Unappointed Europeans,” in which 
it was argued that the DSZ magazine, as the official organ of the largest veterans’ 





revival that camouflaged their recalcitrant Hitlerism “behind European 
curtains.”70  This appraisal of the DSZ was not entirely fair because it failed to 
take into account the way DSZ writers genuinely distanced the periodical from 
Hitler and National Socialism (albeit not the war on the Eastern Front).  More 
importantly, the DSZ, as well as other projects in the American-sponsored 
operations, were more complicated than the SPD newspaper claimed.  While it is 
true that these projects regularly trafficked in historical apologias, denounced 
postwar justice and denazification, and sought to maintain a militaristic society, 
they actually also made tentative steps towards reconciliation with liberal 
democracy.  The American democratization program, in other words, was able to 
make more progress than appears at first glance. 
 The evidence for this can be found in documents which suggest that 
Steiner’s presence in the intelligence operations was not uncontested.  As 
explained above, the American operatives carefully placed Wilhelm Classen in a 
leadership position in order to balance the authority of Steiner with a more 
trustworthy liberalizer.  Near the end of the American tenure over the projects, 
Classen wrote a summary of his conflict with Steiner, or what he described as two 
“tendencies” in the project: 
There were two mutually opposed tendencies that burdened the internal 
functioning of GfW.  The one tendency, represented by Steiner, was trying 
to develop the GfW into a domestic political instrument that would 
eventually be turned against Bonn in right-wing opposition.  The other 
tendency…wanted to make the GfW into an instrument for combating 
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Communism in the Cold War.  Neither of these tendencies were ever able 
to gain the upper hand and over time deep internal divisions emerged. 
 
The quotation reveals that Classen perceived his role as a moderator pushing 
German veterans towards stronger ties with the United States and West German 
government, and he believed that Steiner ultimately had radical anti-democratic 
intentions for the projects.  He went on to outline the different spheres where the 
above competing “tendencies” had the upper hand.  Steiner, he explained, had 
amalgamated near full authority over the DSZ magazine as well as newsletters to 
GfW’s local officer chapters.  But the Americans, he explained, exercised strong 
control over the pamphlet project.  This occasionally led to forced re-drafting and 
conflict with German writers.71  The pamphlets, for the first few months originally 
published by KMMANLY but then by QKSNITCH, can actually be better 
described as small books published once per month.  Over 212,000 copies were 
printed and distributed during the American tenure of the operation.  These pro-
Europe propaganda pamphlets, which can be found in a separate document folder 
in the German federal military archive in Freiburg, represented a striking contrast 
to the average front-page of Steiner’s DSZ.  Most importantly, they consistently 
praised the foreign policy of the United States and advocated German alignment 
with the “Atlantic” or “Western” alliance in the Cold War.  Some even attempted 
to reevaluate traditional German perceptions of the United States.  Take, for 
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example, the pamphlet titled “The USA in the Perspective of a Soldier,” authored 
by Günther Blumentritt, a former Wehrmacht general who served on the Western 
Front.   
In his introduction, Blumentritt explained that Germans were accustomed 
to seeing the United States as something inherently “foreign.”  But it was time to 
re-consider this, he continued: “in a much deeper sense, the values and principles 
of Western Europe are linked with this America.”  Blumentritt proceeded to argue 
that German soldiers need to “foster a mutual understanding between the soldiers 
of the Western world.”  “I will attempt to deepen,” he argued, “appreciation 
between the European (especially the German) way of thinking and the often-
misunderstood world of the West….”  After a chapter which suggested that the 
American Revolution was actually esteemed by Prussian generals and 
philosophers, Blumentritt went on to outline the military excellence of the U.S. 
army and its proven record of success since the American Revolution, a success 
based on principles similar to the traditional Prussian ethos of order, obedience, 
and discipline.  Recent history, he explained, illustrated the power of the 
American military in both World Wars, each of which were fought with the 
selfless intent to liberate Europeans, especially Germans, from dictators.  In his 
conclusion, Blumentritt even made an appeal for democracy tailored to the world 
view of German soldiers: “The Western world, to which we have always 
belonged, desires nothing other than peace and freedom.”  He continued: 
If we contemplate the history of democracy all the way back to antiquity, 
then it is impossible not to conclude that this world ideology and form of 
governance was always ready, when necessary, to defend its ideas and 
ideals with weapon in hand.  It is interesting to examine democracy’s 
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powerful, united will [Willen] to defend itself throughout all eras, from the 
Greek and Roman democracies of antiquity all the way up to the modern 
days. 
 
Democracy, he concluded, had consistently proven that it possessed the “will” 
(Willen) to defend its existence.  And the fact that the United States was investing 
humanitarian and military aid in Europe was evidence that this “will” was very 
much alive and Germans would do best to contribute to it.  In other words, 
democracy was supreme not because of its lofty philosophical values but because 
it had proven itself in the survival of the fittest.  In fact, Blumentritt’s pamphlet 
also made appeals to illiberal sentiments, even racism, such as when he discussed 
the origins of the United States.  The United States, he argued, was populated by 
Europeans whose “Lebensraum” was too small.  Consequently, the United States 
was founded with a “closer blood-based connection [to Europe] than most 
commonly accepted.”  There were, of course, exceptions such as the “negros,” 
Blumentritt went on to explain, “[b]ut if we look away from the negro-question, 
then it’s impossible not to recognize that we are actually of the same clan 
[Stamm]!”72  In short, Blumentritt trafficked in a racially-tinged defense of liberal 
democracy.  Nevertheless, the presence of such an energetic defense of the United 
States and even democracy, however compromised, is an important example of 
the way American QKSNITCH operatives counter-balanced the influence of 
Steiner with early inroads for liberalism in the West German veteran milieu. 
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 Even the DSZ magazine, otherwise under the influence of Steiner, 
exhibited signs of liberal rapprochement.  It appears that Steiner, in order to 
obtain approval for printing the DSZ, regularly allowed the paper to champion the 
United States in its coverage of Cold War developments, albeit carefully and 
vaguely.   This even included direction quotations from leading American 
statesmen on the front-pages, such as frequent quotations from Dwight D. 
Eisenhower.  Often, such quotations involved Eisenhower praising European 
unification but in the context of a broader Western family of nations: “[European 
integration] is about the future of civilization.  We must make place for Germany 
in the family of Western nations in such a way that it will not need to feel 
ashamed.”73  To be sure, most of these tepid appeals were rhetorical rather than 
substantive.  Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to devalue the impact of 
language in the most read military periodical in West Germany.  Furthermore, the 
American influence even occasionally made itself felt substantively.  CIA 
documents suggest, for example, that American operatives attempted to influence 
German writers on the July 20th plot to kill Hitler.74  The July 20th plot, for most 
German veterans after the war, was still a very distasteful if not outright 
scandalous rebuke of the German military tradition.  But the DSZ regularly ran 
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articles defending the conspirators.75  The Americans, in short, were not naïvely 
exploited by German radicals.  A better interpretation is that they consciously 
accommodated illiberal sentiment among German veterans in order to moderate 
it, all the while carefully imbedding the germ of liberalism into the propaganda 
material of the operations.  This paved the way for a broader liberalization 
undertaken by the West German government upon their taking over the operations 
in 1952.  Before examining this transition in more detail, it is important to first 
introduce some of the key actors on the German side. 
West German Liberal Military Reformers 
 The German military ceased to exist as an institution in 1945 when 
Germany was occupied by the Allied forces and subjected to a process that was 
called “demilitarization.”76  Even in 1949, when West Germans regained partial 
sovereignty with the creation of the Federal Republic, they were explicitly 
deprived of a military force or even a defense ministry.  In the context of the re-
militarization debates of the early 1950s, however, the Americans allowed 
Adenauer to authorize an “administrative office” (Dienststelle) for researching 
questions relating to internal security and a potential future military.  This office, 
eventually led by Theodor Blank and ultimately named after him (the Blank 
Office), basically amounted to a preliminary defense ministry in Adenauer’s 
cabinet, and was indeed transformed into the German Federal Ministry of Defense 
 
75 Hans Christoph Graf von Stauffenberg, “Die Konjunktur ist am ablaufen!“ Deutsche 
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in 1955.  The Blank Office conducted research and organizational preparations for 
rearmament, and also handled international negotiations on Adenauer’s behalf for 
the EDC and ultimately, in 1955, Germany’s reconstructed military under the 
umbrella of NATO (the Bundeswehr).  In the early 1950s, a few key members of 
the Blank Office were tasked with the responsibility of accumulating a large 
influence over German veterans’ organizations.  This effort was planned and led 
by former Western Front Wehrmacht general Johann von Kielmansegg, who, 
among other things, directed an organized effort to infiltrate GfW (especially after 
it came under direct West German control in 1953).  Kielmansegg, introduced in a 
previous chapter regarding his work in Sonntagsblatt, had a long career in the 
Bundeswehr.  Upon its creation he served as a German representative of the 
Bundeswehr at NATO’s supreme headquarters in Europe (SHAPE), after which 
he served as a divisional general.  In the 1960s he worked yet again for SHAPE 
where he ultimately held key leadership positions.  Kielmansegg has a reputation 
in the literature as a leading liberal reformer and founding father of the 
Bundeswehr, who along with Hans Speidel, led a movement to reform the 
German military into a democratic institution.  Specifically, he is credited with 
cementing the doctrine of “Internal Leadership” (innere Führung) in the 
Bundeswehr.  In fact, in 1965 he was awarded the so-called Freiherr vom Stein 
Prize for his role democratizing the German military.77  The Internal Leadership 
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concept was a liberal reevaluation of traditional German military ethics which 
stipulated that soldierly obedience to military authority must coexist with 
soldierly obedience to internal morality, and was developed and propagated in the 
early 1950s by Kielmansegg and a few others (Robert Knauss, Erich Dethleffsen, 
Wolf Graf von Baudissin, and Karl Ernst Ulrich de Maizière).78  These figures 
developed the Internal Leadership concept alongside another concept called 
“Citizen-Soldier” (Bürgersoldat), the idea that a German soldier’s responsibility 
to fulfill military commands was equal to the responsibility to uphold democracy.  
The concerted efforts to reform traditional German military codes based in strict, 
unquestioning obedience to military authority made these figures into the most 
significant liberal military reformers at the time of the Bundeswehr’s founding.  
But Kielmansegg was more than a liberalizer.  Another traditional problem in the 
German military, according to Kielmansegg and fellow reformers, was the 
suspension of all morality in the service of the racial nation (Volk).  Indeed, as we 
will see, West German military reformers such as Kielmansegg were also 
passionate believers in the Europe-concept and developed the Internal Leadership 
and Citizen-Soldier ideas as a component of their anti-nationalistic Europeanism.  
 
78 Wolf Graf von Baudissin in particular was, alongside Kielmansegg, one of the founding 
liberal reformers of the German military.  He worked with Kielmansegg and others on the 
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They spent the early 1950s working to advance their concepts of Internal 
Leadership, Citizen-Soldier, and the Europe-concept in German veterans’ 
organizations, especially the GfW.   
The Origins of the Himmerod-Conference 
 The Blank Office originally emerged out of an informal network of former 
generals who were in unofficial contact with the Adenauer administration about 
participation in a future national defense organization, and who have been 
outlined in a book by historian Alaric Searle.79  This network was led by Hans 
Speidel, the German general discussed in previous chapters because of his 
connection to Ernst Jünger and the latter’s secret Europeanist tract Der Friede.  
Konrad Adenauer had been privately meeting with Speidel to discuss ideas for 
West German rearmament since as early as 1948 when Speidel recommended the 
idea of a European Army.80  Speidel and his fellow generals met regularly, 
discussed contemporary politics and the future of the German military, 
maintained loose contact with Adenauer’s cabinet, but were advised to keep quiet 
due to the political damage that would be dealt the West German state if their 
lobbying for rearmament became public.  In fact, Adenauer’s administration 
further offended Speidel’s group when a general from outside their network, 
Gerhard von Schwerin, was appointed Adenauer’s initial military and security 
adviser and head of the secret preliminary defense ministry discussed above 
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(Dienststelle).  Schwerin, who would eventually be replaced by Theodor Blank, 
was forced to work with Speidel’s network when Speidel, after the invasion of 
South Korea in the summer of 1950, announced the creation of an “Experts-
Committee” to discuss potential plans for German rearmament.  Schwerin, who 
wanted to put a stop to the Experts-Committee, was persuaded by Adenauer to 
work with the “Experts-Committee” and help organize a conference that autumn 
with the purpose of putting together a detailed memorandum for Adenauer 
outlining a path forward for the reconstitution of a West German military.  Fifteen 
former German generals ultimately attended the conference which took place in 
October, 1950 in Himmerod, Germany.  Most of the fifteen generals were drawn 
from Speidel’s network, including Kielmansegg.  The result of the conference 
was the so-called “Himmerod-Memo,” a blueprint for not only the organizational 
reconstitution of the German military, but also a “spiritual” or “psychological” re-
founding, as they called it.81  One of the chapters in the Himmerod-Memo was 
titled “Internal Structure” (inneres Gefüge), which argued that plans for a new 
German military would have to consider more than technical and organizational 
details.  This chapter instead outlined a set of “new” values and traditions upon 
which the German military would have to be founded if it were to overcome its 
weighted past.  It was while working on this chapter that Kielmansegg first began 
advancing his Europe-concept and liberal reformism on behalf of the West 
German government, and it secured him a position working for the Blank Office 
in subsequent years.  
 
81 Ibid., chapter 3. 
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 Because his personal archival holdings are scarce in the years leading up 
to the Himmerod-Conference, it is difficult to ascertain when and how 
Kielmansegg first became attached to the Europe-concept and his liberal 
reformism.  But the more detailed available material for his colleague at the 
Himmerod-Conference, Robert Knauss, are instructive.  Robert Knauss was a 
veteran of the First World War who had obtained a Ph.D in economics in the 
1920s and then became a leading figure in the Luftwaffe in the early 1930s where 
he became known for his pro-Nazi arguments that the German military should 
adopt mass strategic bombing at the heart of their war-planning because the Nazi 
“national revolution” had made Germans better prepared than their neighbors to 
withstand the psychological strains of an air-war conflict.  He ultimately became 
director of the “Air War Academy” in Berlin.82 After the war Knauss became a 
member of Speidel’s network and ultimately worked along with Kielmansegg and 
others as one of the contributors to the “Internal Structure” chapter of the 
Himmerod-Memo.  But the evidence from his personal archival holdings suggest 
that he had come to the Europe-concept already during the war.  His collection of 
personal essays dated to the war years, and likely given at the Air War Academy, 
contain speeches that subtly criticized nationalism and the Nazi racial concept for 
hindering European solidarity against Bolshevism.83  His memoir written shortly 
 
82 Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of 
America, 1985), 8-11. 
83 See, for example, Robert Knauss, “Sittlichkeit und Geschlechtsmoral,“ undated (based on 
surrounding documents most likely 1943), Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 758/91.  
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after the end of the war likewise suggests he had been beholden to Nazi 
Europeanism.  It included an entire chapter titled “The New Order of Europe” in 
which he lamented Hitler’s missed opportunity to fulfill Germany’s “calling”: 
namely, unifying Europe against the threat to the “Asiatic” East.  National 
Socialism, he explained, contained a “fresh spirit and healthy concept of a social 
community with a future,” but Hitler squandered the opportunity to extend this 
principle to Germany’s European neighbors because he failed to “bring them into 
the European community as valuable equal members.”84  Knauss’s archival 
material also suggests that he was an enthusiastic reader of Ernst Jünger and even 
maintained a written correspondence with Jünger, whom he convinced to give a 
special guest lecture at his Air War Academy.85  In fact, according to Knauss’s 
archival material he received a personal copy of Ernst Jünger’s Europe essay, Der 
 
Other leading figures in the GfW likewise have archival holdings that contain essays exhibiting 
war-time Nazi Europeanism.  See, for example, Georg von Sodenstern, essay titled “Der 
‘Feldherr‘ Adolf Hitler, Niederschrift vom Sommer 1943, um Vorwort und Fußnoten ergänzt 
1946,“ Summer, 1943, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 594/9. 
84 Robert Knauss, untitled testament, May 20, 1946, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, 
N 758/32. 
85 Robert Knauss to Ernst Jünger, February 17, 1942, “Knauss, Robert an Dr. Jünger, Ernst, 
1942-1956,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.   
Ernst Jünger to Robert Knauss, July 21, 1942, “Dr. Jünger, Ernst an Knauss, Robert,“ Nachlass 
Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.   Ernst Jünger to Hans 
Speidel, July 19, 1942, “ Jünger, Ernst an Speidel, Hans, 1941-1944,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: 
Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany. 
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Friede, at the beginning of 1946 before Jünger had published it, suggesting that 
he likely was aware of it during the late stages of the war as well.86  Indeed, 
Speidel’s network of generals, especially those generals who ended up working 
on the Himmerod-Memo, appear to have been closely connected to Jünger’s 
network of generals who transitioned from the war beholden to his arguments in 
Der Friede.  Indeed, Knauss appears to have been introduced to Speidel by Ernst 
Jünger (the reader will re-call that Speidel assisted Jünger in the completion and 
distribution of Der Friede).  Knauss maintained written contact with Jünger after 
the war, and in his correspondences with Jünger from the late 1940s Knauss 
reported meeting with Speidel.87   
 There is no evidence that Kielmansegg likewise came to Speidel’s 
network through Ernst Jünger, although it is very possible.  However, there is 
evidence in his archival holdings that he most likely also was a proponent of Nazi 
Europeanism and maintained many of its tenets throughout the 1940s.  In early 
1946 he wrote a short, unpublished thirty-one page history of Europe as a kind of 
coming to terms with the catastrophe of the Second World War.  He argued that 
Germany, because of its geographic location, had become the battleground of 
Europe’s confrontation with the East: “Ever since Europe emerged as a political 
concept and ever since we have been struggling and fighting for Europe, most of 
 
86 Ernst Jünger, Der Friede (copy), February 24, 1946, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in 
Freiburg, N 758/36. 
87 Robert Knauss to Ernst Jünger, January 2, 1947, “Knauss, Robert an Dr. Jünger, Ernst, 
1942-1956,“ Nachlass Ernst Jünger, A: Jünger, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach, Germany.   
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Europe’s wars have, all the way up until the present day, been played out on 
German land.”  Prussia, he continued, had been historically called to serve as 
Europe’s “border against different völkisch substance and against foreign 
völkisch influences [gegen ein anderes Volkstum und gegen fremdvölkische 
Einflüsse].”  Unfortunately, however, at the same moment Prussia was leading the 
European defense in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the French 
infected Europe with the disease of nationalism, and this eventually spread to 
Germany.  This led to further catastrophes such as the “European Civil War” that 
was the First World War, as well as the ostensibly nationalistic and anti-German 
Treaty of Versailles.  Indeed, he argued, Germans’ nationalistic turn to Hitler was 
paradoxically a negative by-product of unjust nationalistic treatment.  Notably 
silent on the events of the Second World War, Kielmansegg turned to the postwar 
period and argued that the time was ripe to reverse the mistakes of the past: “The 
European question is today the pressing political reality.  The exuberance of this 
space [Wohnraum], especially its heart in Central Europe, will influence the entire 
European transformation and the European reconstruction.”  Germany, he 
concluded, would have to play a leading role in the transformation of Europe, and 
in doing so finally fulfill its long-assigned historical calling.88  Other essays 
written shortly after the war confirm that Kielmansegg considered this 
interpretation of Europe a continuation of his war-time experiences, such as an 
 
88 Johann von Kielmansegg, essay titled “Zwischen den Zeiten,“ undated (based on 
surrounding documents and the text most likely spring of 1946, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in 
Freiburg, N 626/329. 
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essay that proclaimed to have learned of the true anti-European nature of Asiatic 
barbarism through firsthand experience during the war.89  
 By 1949 Kielmansegg had become even more explicit in his 
correspondences with infamous Blitzkrieg theoretician Heinz Guderian.  
Apparently, Guderian had written to Kielmansegg and expressed criticism of 
Western Allied intervention in the Second World War.  In a letter from June, 
1949, Kielmansegg replied that such an argument was akin to a “second stab-in-
the-back legend” as well as an implicit suggestion that National Socialism was 
acceptable.  However, Kielmansegg then vaguely conceded that the Western 
Allies made a “great mistake” to have so callously allowed their anti-Nazi foreign 
policy become a tool to “tear down the thousand-year border wall against the 
East; namely, Germany.”   Kielmansegg then finished with a lengthy appeal to a 
new Europeanism in Germany.  It is worth quoting at length: 
I just want to say a few last things: if Europe is to survive and not once 
again become…an extended island of Asia, then it is the Occidental 
responsibility to ward off the Eastern storm.  This much is obvious.  Also 
obvious is the fact that Germany will have a part to play in this 
responsibility.  On the one hand economically, but also politically and 
militarily.  For precisely this reason I reject any attempt to restore Old-
Germany to its traditional great-power-politics (even if political 
contingencies were to enable this).  Not because I automatically have 
something against nationalism or a strong Germany, but rather because 
this would be a step backwards – because this old era has come and gone.  
Such a politics would erase the only advantage that we gained from this 
war: the demolition of all possible national barriers (something the other 
[peoples of Europe] will also have to do, whether they like it or not).  We 
must start over and only pursue a Germany within a larger system.  Once 
we are in, then I have no doubt that our natural dominant position 
(biologically, geographically) will automatically accrue for us a deserved 
 
89 Johann von Kielmansegg, essay on the “Russian Soldier,” undated (between 1946-1950), 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 626/467. 
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leadership role.  But take note: leadership, not rule.  Because that’s what 
Hitler wanted and that’s why he was unable to fulfill the European 
responsibility of Germany, even if he honestly believed in that (which is 
doubtful).90 
 
Kielmansegg apparently won Guderian over to his vision, because by the end of 
the year he had begun helping Guderian publish a book that Guderian had written 
and titled Can Western Europe be Defended?  The book recapitulated these 
arguments alongside a fiercely apologetic account of German soldiers’ and even 
Hitler’s European crusade on the Eastern Front: “You can judge Hitler’s deeds 
however you want, but looked at retrospectively his struggle was European – 
regardless of the terrible mistakes and errors he made.  Our soldiers fought and 
fell for Europe, even if not all were aware of this fact.”91  
 As discussed in an earlier chapter of this dissertation, Kielmansegg 
eventually began publishing this rather apologetic Europeanism, such as writing 
in early 1950 an article for Sonntagsblatt that connected contemporary steps 
towards European integration with the Eastern Front.92  Around the same time he 
wrote a personal memo that exposed the illiberal side of his Europeanism before 
attending the Himmerod-Conference.  The essay, titled “Thoughts about the 
Situation in Early-1950,” was accompanied with a note: “do not publish.”  In the 
 
90 Johann Kielmansegg to Heinz Guderian, June 6, 1949, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in 
Freiburg, N 626/247. 
91 Heinz Guderian, Kann Westeuropa verteidigt werden? (Göttingen: Plesse Verlag, 1950), 30 
92 Johann von Kielmansegg, “Abendland im Untergang?  Die Notwendigkeit einer 
militärischen Macht Europas,“ Sonntagsblatt, March 26, 1950.  See additionally Kielmansegg’s 
correspondences with publishers, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 626/477. 
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essay, Kielmansegg defended the “Third Front” ideology discussed elsewhere in 
this dissertation; namely, an equivalence between the Bolshevist East and the 
liberal West and the notion of working towards a future independent Europe 
situated between East and West politically and ideologically.  Bolshevism, he 
argued, was imperialistic and founded on the core concept of dominating the 
world (Weltherrschaft).  The United States, he continued, “has no spiritual idea 
comparable, much less superior, to Bolshevism.”  What, then, was the European 
answer?  Nationalism, he explained, had been exposed as anachronistic by the 
emerging “Grossraum-Order” of the modern world.  Kielmansegg’s answer to the 
dilemma was an organic conceptualization of Europe.  Once again, it is worth 
quoting at length: “Only a free, unified, and strong Europe can, as a ‘Third Front’, 
once again be a factor that will guarantee freedom,” he argued.  He continued: 
The fundamental world-ideological [weltanschauliche] concept of a new, 
united European nation is based on the notion of an integrated organism, 
which does not see the whole as a mere sum of its parts, but rather as a 
fabric [Gefüge].  In the same way, human society is not at all a mere sum 
of rational atoms, but rather a living, growing, hierarchical, dynamic 
fabric, wherein every individual – with his specific tasks given at specific 
times and places - is an irreplaceable piece.  Just like the greater whole 
cannot survive without the irreplaceable accomplishment of the individual 
fulfilling his tasks at specific times and places, so too can the individual 
never find fulfillment outside of the fabric. 
 
He then distanced this concept from the ideologies of East and West: 
This conceptualization from an organic perspective…stands in contrast to 
the mechanistic world ideology of individualism (the ideal of the New 
World) as well as to collectivism (the ideal of Bolshevism).  Even though 
both of these try to oppose one another, they are actually two sides of the 
same coin.  They both go back to the interpretations of society formulated 
during the French Revolution, which construed human society as a mere 
sum of equally rational pieces and privileged individuals…. Their slogan 




“Realizing the unification of the West-European peoples on the basis of an 
organic Europe-concept,” he concluded, “is the responsibility of the war-
generation of all these peoples who experienced the suffering of the last few 
decades ultimately as a kind of common, unifying experience.”93  
 Remarkably, however, the summer of 1950 proved to be a turning point in 
Kielmansegg’s Europeanism.  The above private essay was the last time 
Kielmansegg articulated an explicitly illiberal vision of Europe.  In fact, from late 
1950 onward, Kielmansegg espoused a vision of Europe which can best be 
described as Atlanticism: a unified Europe integrated into the West politically, 
diplomatically, economically, and intellectually.  The key moment that appears to 
have unlocked a shift in his thinking was the Soviet-backed North Korean 
invasion of South Korean in June, 1950.  As a result of this aggression, 
Kielmansegg came to the opinion that a new Europe could only be achieved and 
defended as part of the broader Cold War, and this meant aligning closely with 
the United States.  In July, 1950 he sought out contact with Winston Churchill and 
was allowed to meet privately with Churchill’s personal secretary.  He described 
his meeting in a letter to Speidel and included a draft of a letter he was planning 
to send Churchill.  The letter argued that Germany must be allowed to rearm in 
either NATO or some kind of European combined forces, and that a unique group 
of former German career officers (himself included) were committed to creating a 
new kind of German army amenable to such a rearmament.  This reformist group, 
 
93 Johann von Kielmansegg, essay titled “Gedanken zur Lage im Frühjahr 1950,“ April, 
1950, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 626/371. 
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he admitted to Churchill, “is probably not incredibly large at the moment.”  
However, they had  
pondered the past, and while they think like Germans, they don’t think 
nationalistically.  They have realized that the dream for German power is 
over and should stay that way.  They are convinced that Germany can only 
live in a larger Western community and that Western freedoms must be 
protected. 
 
Furthermore, he added, the older, traditional German career officer corps had 
been “utterly destroyed” during the war.  There was, in other words, a well-
positioned group of reformers that could be worked with to rearm Germany in 
Western image.94  In August, 1950, Kielmansegg wrote a memo to members of 
what he called the “leadership committee of Speidel, Heusinger, and Foertsch” – a 
reference to Speidel’s declaration of the formation of the “expert committee” that 
eventually became the Himmerod-Conference.  In the memo, Kielmansegg 
outlined his view that a Third World War was imminent and that such a war 
would require German rearmament and radical steps towards European political 
integration.  This meant, he continued, that West Germany must “consciously and 
immediately seek out a partnership with America” and that West German leaders 
must make these intentions clear to the United States.95  Such language must have 
impressed Speidel and the other members of the “expert committee,” because 
within a few weeks Kielmansegg was invited to not only participate in the 
 
94 Johann von Kielmansegg to Hans Speidel, July 6, 1950, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in 
Freiburg, N 626/374. 
95 Johann von Kielmansegg, “Sätze zur Lage,“ August 16, 1950, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv 
in Freiburg, N 626/185. 
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Himmerod-Conference, but to also take a leadership role as secretary of the 
conference.96 
The Himmerod-Conference and its Aftermath 
 The actual Himmerod-Conference has been described as both the “Magna 
Carta” of the new democratic West German army as we all as a “restorationist” 
bastion of former conservative traditionalists seeking military continuity across 
1945.  This is because both the reformist and traditionalist visions were present at 
Himmerod, and the memo sent to Adenauer was a compromise, or, better said, the 
first battle in a tug-of-war that would last for years into the founding of the 
Bundeswehr.97  The “reformists,” as they came to call themselves in the Blank 
Office, were represented by Wolf Graf von Baudissin who introduced the 
concepts Internal Leadership and Citizen-Soldier.98  The memo was signed by all 
fifteen participants and individual chapters were not signed, so it is difficult to 
ascertain who directly contributed which sections of the memo.  However, based 
on their writings, correspondences, and political advocacy before and after the 
Himmerod-Conference, Kielmansegg and Knauss most likely worked with 
Baudissin to craft the above-mentioned chapter of the memo called “Internal 
Structure” (inneres Gefüge), in which the Europe-concept as well as the Internal 
 
96 Gerhard von Schwerin to Johann von Kielmansegg, September 28, 1950, Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/3102. 





Leadership and Citizen-Soldier concepts were presented as a new “spiritual” or 
“psychological” foundation for the German military.  “Just as important as a 
soldier’s training,” the chapter declared “is his character-building and education.”  
It is important for the new German military, the chapter continued, “to create 
something fundamentally new without relying on the traditions of the old 
Wehrmacht.”  Ironically, the terms “Internal Leadership” and “Citizen-Soldier” 
must have been too controversial to use explicitly in the memo, but the ideas were 
tentatively put forward nonetheless. This chapter of the Himmerod-Memo is most 
well-known for declaring the German soldier responsible not only for defending 
the nation physically but also defending “freedom in the sense of self-
determination.”  As it was stated later in the chapter: “German armed units will 
not be allowed to become a ‘state within the state’.  Each individual and the forces 
as a whole will affirm an inner commitment to the democratic state and form of 
life.”  This was a stark contrast to the apolitical ethos of the Reichswehr and 
Wehrmacht.  But it is important to note that the liberal ideas espoused in this 
chapter were attached to the coming European revolution: “These values are 
inalienable,” the chapter continued.  “The commitment to Europe, within which 
these ideals emerged and from which they will emanate, transcends all traditional 
national commitments.”  Or, as it also stated: “Each soldier will perform an oath 
upon entering [the armed forces] – a solemn promise that they confess themselves 
to Europe and the democratic state.”  One final example is worth quoting:  
The creation of a European history framework and the introduction of 
political, social, and economic issues of the time can be a decisive 
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contribution to the development of a citizen and European soldier that will 
have consequences well beyond military service.99  
 
In short, Europe functioned in the Himmerod-Memo as a stand-in for the now 
discredited German nation.  Whereas classical liberals might have anchored the 
principles of “Internal Leadership” and “Citizen-Soldier” in abstract natural law 
or human rights, the Himmerod writers anchored it in the new, European nation. 
Shortly after the Himmerod-Memo had been sent to Adenauer, 
Kielmansegg wrote down his personal “concluding thoughts” on the conference, 
in which he specifically praised the “Internal Structure” chapter.100  In fact, by the 
end of the year Kielmansegg had joined the Blank Office as a permanent member 
and established himself as the leading voice on the Internal Leadership concept.  
At the end of the year Kielmansegg was invited to give a presentation to leading 
figures in the Blank Office titled “Introduction to the concept of ‘Internal 
Leadership’.”  Kielmansegg’s notes for the presentation likewise illustrate how he 
intertwined the Europe-concept into his liberal reformism: The “Political Order,” 
he declared, was marked by three characteristics: “social equality,” the “transition 
from nation-state to supranational community of states,” and “the transition to 
modern democracy.”  This transition was caused by, among other things, the 
emergence of economically and technologically enclosed continental 
Grossraum(s).  These historical changes, although challenging, were good.  
 
99 Draft of the “Himmeroder Denkschrift,“ Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 
626/186. 
100 Johann von Kielmansegg, “Schlussbemerkungen,“ Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in 
Freiburg, N 626/186. 
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“Internal Leadership” and “Citizen-Soldier,” he went on to argue, were important 
concepts precisely because they were necessary for navigating these historical 
transformations.101 
Democratization  
Democratization in Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde 
 The internal documents of the Blank Office reveal a division between self-
identified “reformers” on the one hand (or “revolutionaries” as they were called 
by their opponents), and on the other hand “traditionalists” (or “restorationists” as 
they were called by their opponents).  According to general Adolf Heusinger, 
who, along with Hans Speidel, was one of the top military advisers to Theodor 
Blank in the Blank Office, Kielmansegg was the most visible representative of the 
“revolutionaries” while general Bogislaw von Bonin was the leading 
“restorationist” voice.102  Adolf Heusinger, in correspondence with Erich 
Dethleffsen, Kielmansegg’s colleague and fellow reformer, expressed frustration 
with the divisions but was especially critical of the “revolutionaries” due to their 
“impractical” over-emphasis on the Internal Leadership and Citizen-Soldier 
concepts.103  The traditionalists in the Blank Office largely outweighed the 
 
101 Johann von Kielmansegg,“Einführung in das Gebiet der ‘Inneren Führung’,“ late-1950, 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 626/516. 
102 Konrad von Kraske (Blank Officer) to Theodor Blank, October 17, 1952, Bundesarchiv-
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103 Erich Dethleffsen, “Aktennotiz über meine Besprechung mit General Heusinger,“ 
November 3, 1952, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 648/11. 
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reformists during the 1950s before and after the creation of the Bundeswehr, but 
the reformists had the ear of Adenauer, his representative Theodor Blank, and the 
media, and therefore ultimately advanced their reforms over time.104  Yet 
documents from the early 1950s, during the EDC negotiations, suggest that even 
Theodor Blank pumped the brakes on reformists’ enthusiasm, arguing against 
Kielmansegg and Dethleffsen in one closed meeting in October, 1952 that “[i]t 
would be nonsense to believe that, within a people so undemocratic as the 
Germans, we could create in the army all of the necessary connections to the state 
and allegiances to rationality which are missing.  The army is, after all, just a 
reflection of the people.”105  This meant they had to advance their ideas from the 
ground-up; specifically, by appealing directly to veterans.  Not long after joining 
the Blank Office, Kielmansegg was appointed the director of the “military-
political department” tasked with overseeing public relations for the Blank Office 
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York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 251-268. 
105 Erich Dethleffsen, “Aktennotiz über meine Besprechung bei Staatssekretär Lenz,“ October 
22, 1952, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 648/11.  Konrad Adenauer likewise signaled 
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(in fact, Kielmansegg had already been tasked with reporting to the Blank Office 
about large veterans’ gatherings even a month before the Himmerod-
Conference).106  This made him the third-highest ranking military representative 
of the Blank Office behind generals Heusinger and Speidel.  Kielmansegg used 
this public relations authority to make his arguments directly to veterans’ 
organizations in the form of countless guest lectures, which included lectures at 
local GfW chapters.107  Dethleffsen was Kielmansegg’s assistant in these so-
called “military-propaganda” endeavors, and also toured West Germany himself 
as a guest lecturer.108  In late 1952, Dethleffsen and Kielmansegg worked with the 
above-discussed Günther Blumentritt, who wrote the pro-United States pamphlet, 
as well as other liberal reformers as members of the so-called “Workshop for 
Democratic Circles,” a CDU-aligned club and think-tank which was publicly 
supported by the West German government and which had the stated purpose of 
“strengthening the democratic idea in Germany” by sponsoring conferences and 
guest lectures throughout Germany, and especially in the veterans’ community.  
Many of Kielmansegg and Dethleffsen’s guest lectures were given through this 
organization, and once again many of these were presented in collaboration with 
 
106 Johann von Kielmansegg, Blank Office memorandum titled “Notiz,” September 18, 1951, 
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the GfW.  Kielmansegg‘s efforts to influence the GfW and tie it to democracy 
were reinforced by the West German government when it took over and continued 
the covert patronage of GfW in 1953.109 
 In late 1952 American CIA operatives declared their mission 
accomplished, decided to discontinue Projects KMMANLY and QKSNITCH, and 
secured a final funding package for the operations through the first months of 
1953.  However, the West German government was contacted by German officers 
tied to the projects and decided to intervene and take over the operations.110  In 
fact, over the course of the next two years the West Germans increased the budget 
for the two projects, ultimately maintaining their patronage of the DSZ until 1955 
and GfW well into the 1960s.111  The Blank Office had already explored possible 
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working relationships with the largest veterans’ organization, VDS, throughout 
late 1951 and 1952, but these efforts were to no avail.  Ultimately, they 
determined that the leaders of VDS could not be successfully coopted as public or 
covert participants in the Blank Office’s rearmament lobby because they were too 
nationalistic, too stubbornly preoccupied with soldiers’ material demands, too 
trepidatious vis-à-vis the EDC treaty, and in general too apolitical.112  In fact, this 
likely contributed to Kielmansegg shifting his attention towards GfW already 
before the official West German take-over of the organization.113  In any case, in 
the winter of 1952/1953 the German participants in KMMANLY and 
QKSNITCH scrambled to find an alternative to American patronage, and 
appealed to West German authorities in Bonn, even directly to Konrad 
 
Koblenz, B 145/3508 and B 145/3509.   “Marcks,” (Blank Office), memorandum, June 12, 1954, 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/768. 
112 Unsigned Blank Office memorandum on the VDS, “Bericht über die Gosler Tagung der 
Soldatischen Verbände,“ undated (contained in a folder for the years 1951 and 1952), 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/3086.  See additionally an unsigned Blank Office 
memorandum on the VDS, “Notiz,” May 5, 1952, ), Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 
9/3089.   “Drews” (Blank Office), “Notiz zu S2-Aufzeichnung Nr. 45/52,” May 5, 1952, 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/3089.   “Marcks“ (Blank Office) to “Redaktion des 
‘Notwegs‘,“ July 16, 1952, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/3089. 
113 According to CIA documents, even Hans Speidel, Kielmansegg’s superior, began to 
regularly participate in GfW activities in mid-1952.  See “Monthly Project Status Report for 
Month of August 1952,” Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic 
Reading Room, Special Collection “KIMMANLY[sic].” 
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Adenauer.114  Bonn responded with a demand:  Felix Steiner, due to his 
association with the SS, would have to be removed from all operations.115  Steiner 
was subsequently approached by German officials in the Federal Office of Press 
and Information and asked to step down.  Surprisingly, he did so without a fight, 
explaining that the work was too important to be discontinued.116  
 Immediately after the West German take-over of GfW Kielmansegg was 
appointed liaison officer and tasked with monitoring GfW conferences while 
continuing to contribute guest lectures.  Dethleffsen continued to assist him in 
these duties.117  Correspondences between GfW and Blank Office illustrate that 
during the transition GfW administrators were especially concerned that their 
 
114 Vollrath Hellermann (GfW) to Konrad Adenauer, January 14, 1953, Bundesarchiv in 
Koblenz, B 145/3508 
115 “QKSNITCH Final Report,” April 11, 1953, Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of 
Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “Classen, Wilhelm.”   Agent file 
“Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Classen,” undated (most likely early-1953), Central Intelligence Agency 
Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection “Classen, Wilhelm.”   
“Marcks” (Blank Office), “Stellungnahme zum Schreiben der Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde an den 
Herrn Bundeskanzler vom 14.1.53,“ January 29, 1953, Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, B 145/3508.   
“Rakke“ (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) to “Lenz,“ January 30, 1953, Bundesarchiv in 
Koblenz, B 145/3508. 
116 “Marcks” (Blank Office), “Diskussion mit General der Waffen-SS a.D. Steiner über die 
Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde (GfW) am 7.2.53,“ February 9, 1953, Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, B 
145/3508.   
117 Illegible (Bundeskanzleramt) to Johann von Kielmansegg, February 17, 1953, 
Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, B 145/3508. 
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advocacy of the Europe-concept might not be continued.  As Classen stated in a 
concerned letter to Blank: “We are experiencing a daily inpouring of questions 
from our members suggesting that once again unclarity about the EDC [treaty] 
and even skepticism are once again emerging.”  It continued:  
Due to the hundreds of meetings held last year, as well as the over 200,000 
total copies of printed pamphlets, we were able to dismantle the often 
times strong skepticism of the EDC-politics conducted by the 
administration in Bonn (at least in the former officer milieu). So now we 
are especially interested that this accomplishment not be reversed by the 
opponents of EDC-politics….118  
 
This made Kielmansegg the perfect liaison officer to GfW, because in addition to 
his credentials as a liberal reformer he had established himself in the Blank Office 
as an outspoken advocate of the European Army.  In January, 1953 he had given a 
presentation to military advisers in the Blank Office in which he argued 
passionately against those in the Blank Office who were advocating a German 
national army in NATO as opposed to the EDC.  This alternative solution, 
although perhaps militarily feasible, Kielmansegg argued, failed to acknowledge 
the EDC’s important political purpose: paving the way for the political unification 
of Europe.119 
 Indeed, Kielmansegg and Dethleffsen’s work in GfW in 1953 and 1954 
revolved around Europeanism.  According to the GfW’s official monthly, 
 
118 Wilhelm Classen to “Drews“ (Blank Office), July 28, 1953, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in 
Freiburg, BW 9/769. 
119 Johann von Kielmansegg, “Vorschlag für eine Sprachregelung zu der Frage: ‘Ist ein 
deutscher Wehrbeitrag am EVG-Rahmen einer Nationalarmee innerhalb einer Koalition 
vorzuziehen?‘,“ Blank Office, January, 1953, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 626/251. 
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Wehrkunde, which listed speeches and events in GfW chapters across West 
Germany, Kielmansegg and Dethleffsen drastically increased their GfW activities 
in these years, touring GfW chapters with speeches titled “Wehrmacht and 
Democracy,” “The Internal and External Structure of the Europe-Soldier,” “The 
Contribution of Community to Future Soldierly Life,” and “The Spiritual and 
Social Situation for today’s Career and Non-Commissioned Officers.”  But the 
speeches themselves were not re-printed in Wehrkunde.  In order to ascertain the 
substance of their speeches it is necessary to rely on personal copies printed, 
among other places, in their personal archival holdings.  For this task, 
Dethleffsen’s printed speeches were particularly well recorded. 
 Erich Dethleffsen had served as a captain on the Eastern Front where he 
was awarded the Iron Cross and subsequently promoted to General-Major and 
member of the Army General Staff (OKH).  Although the documents in his 
archival holdings for the late 1940s are scarce, it is evident that he was an early 
convert to liberal democracy.  In 1947 he established a political lobbying 
organization called Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, which advanced 
a pro-American foreign policy vision.  Around the time of the Himmerod-
Conference in late-1950 this organization was purchased by the West German 
government and subsequently used to secretly channel funds to local veterans’ 
organizations that supported West German democracy and the EDC treaty 
(Dethleffsen organized and monitored these investments).120  It is possible that 
 
120 See Erich Dethleffsen’s archival holdings, Bundesarchiv-Militärarhiv in Freiburg, N 648/8 
and N 648/10. 
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Dethleffsen began working for Office Blank before Kielmansegg; in any case, the 
two quickly gravitated toward one another after the Himmerod-Conference due to 
their shared commitment to reform the German military tradition.  Indeed, one of 
Dethleffsen’s most frequently given speeches was titled “Wehrmacht and 
Democracy,” in which he argued that the German military tradition, as evidenced 
in the history of both the inter-war Reichswehr as well as the Wehrmacht, was 
antithetical to democracy because it hoisted the soldier to a destructive sphere 
outside of the state thus weakening the soldier’s “political responsibility” and 
“individuality” (Individuum).121 
 Dethleffsen’s liberal reformism was an audacious argument in a military 
culture seeped in illiberal and authoritarian ideas since the nineteenth century.  
Indeed, these arguments were not always received well.  For example, the Bonn 
chapter of GfW explicitly sent GfW administrators a complaint against 
Dethleffsen in January, 1954, arguing that his “Citizen-Soldier” concept was a 
“seemingly grotesque” assault on the apolitical “roots” of a good military, and 
that he was suggesting the creation of an unrealistic army of intellectuals, and, 
finally, that the military had too many responsibilities to also be preoccupied with 
creating good democrats.  The same letter, however, also conceded a point of 
agreement with Dethleffsen: namely, his European “community-ideal” 
(Gemeinschafts-Ideal).122  This complaint letter hints at an important dynamic at 
 
121 Erich Dethleffsen, “Wehrmacht und Demokratie,“ Wehrkunde, issue 3, 1953. 




play in Dethleffen’s strategy for inculcating in West German veterans a 
commitment to democracy.  This can be better understood by examining copies of 
Dethleffsen’s speeches given at GfW chapters.  These offer important insights 
into the way he and Kielmansegg integrated the Internal Leadership and Citizen-
Soldier concepts into their advocacy of a new Europe.   
 Take, for example, a speech Dethleffsen regularly presented titled “The 
Contribution of Community [Gemeinschaft] to Future Soldierly Life.”  He began 
the speech by introducing the Citizen-Soldier and Internal Leadership concepts, 
listing a series of new principles upon which the European Army would be based: 
sanctity of the individual, soldiers as “agents” not “objects,” democratic 
education, and commitment to the constitutional state.  Some might contend, he 
continued, that these new principles dismiss the German heritage of belonging in 
a Gemeinschaft.  But this was not so, he argued, because there was a larger “order 
of life as represented by the European Family of Peoples [Europäische 
Völkerfamilie]” which was finding its realization in the “conflict between East 
and West.”  The task of the new, democratic German military force in the 
European Army, he continued, was to reinvigorate a new “sense of community” 
(Gemeinschaftsgefühl).  This restored sense of community, he argued, must 
preserve the soldier’s “ethical responsibility” to transcend selfish and empty 
individualism.  But it must also avoid devolving community into nationalism, 
which he described as “a dangerous thing leading us to forget that technology, the 
reality of Grossraum(s), and the interconnectedness and interdependence of 
singular states – that these things have overcome the nation-state concepts with 
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which we were raised during the age of exaggerated nationalism….”  The answer 
to the dilemma, for Dethleffsen, was the “Western world.”  The “Europe-idea” 
alone, he lamented, was unfortunately failing to realize itself as an independent 
political reality.  But an increasingly connected Europe was still emerging as a 
constituent member of a larger Western community, and this “Western world” 
was to be the new psychological home of the German soldier.123  This was an 
avowedly liberal Europeanism.  In short, Dethleffsen and Kielmansegg grafted 
their liberal reformism into the Europe-concept.  For Dethleffsen, joining the 
“Western world“ was more than a temporary and tactical alliance.  In fact, he 
explicitly addressed the “Third Front” argument of other Europeanists and 
rejected it as just another form of “neutralism” – the pejorative designation for 
pacifist opponents of Adenauer’s foreign policy.  In one of his GfW speeches 
titled “Is Neutrality an Option for Us?” Dethleffsen began by trotting out all the 
familiar Europeanist arguments for the necessity and inevitability of European 
integration: the geographic scope of modern warfare, the reach of modern 
technology, and the economic Grossraum.  Germans, he added, were especially 
well-suited to lead on European integration: 
We can and should be the impetus for the integration of Europe, because 
we are the most endangered by Bolshevism as a consequence of our 
geographic position, and because it will be the easiest for us to integrate 
ourselves into a supranational community since we do not have any 
sovereignty to give up at this point. 
 
But Dethleffsen denounced the next step taken by Third Front Europeanists: 
 
123 Erich Dethleffsen, “Der Beitrag der Gemeinschaft zum künftigen Soldatentum,” 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/2532. 
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We are the West.  There is no doubt on this question.  It is a historical 
lunacy to believe Germany is the heart of Europe – we were and are the 
border [of Europe].  It has always been to the detriment of Europe when 
we – whether through our own fault or the fault of others – have 
mistakenly fought against the West. 
 
But Dethleffsen’s liberal Europe-concept went beyond situating Europe in the 
“Western World.”  Germans must move beyond the “negative” reasons for joining 
the “Western community,” Dethleffsen continued.  There must also be a 
“positive” affirmations of Western values as well; specifically: “the freedom of 
the individual, of capital, and of goods.”124  This was a routine argument for 
Dethleffsen – even in his closed-door speeches in the Blank Office.  For example, 
in a presentation to Blank Office military personnel, Dethleffsen argued that their 
effort to promote European integration “will only make sense and be justified 
inasmuch as it strengthens those forces in this great conflict that are advancing the 
freedom of nations and individuals.”  The reason for this, he continued, was 
because “[t]he traditionally preserved foundations of the German military have 
been utterly shaken in recent decades.  Discipline has become dubious as a result 
of its perversion during the Third Reich.  The notion of duty has lost any once-
upon-a-time relationship to ethics.”  Consequently, the German soldier must learn 
the sanctity of the individual in a society:  “Each officer must venerate in all 
office duties human dignity and the conscience of the individual.  All collectivist 
 
124 Erich Dethleffsen, “Gibt es für uns eine Neutralität?” Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in 
Freiburg, BW 9/81. 
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inclinations harking back to early times (especially in military life) must be 
countered.”125 
 Already by the early summer of 1954, weeks before the EDC treaty was 
torpedoed by the French parliament, Dethleffsen had switched from advocating 
for the European Army integrated in the “Western world” to advocating German 
participation in NATO as an alternative.126  Not long after, Kielmansegg followed 
suit.127  After the failure of the EDC, the floodgates were opened for 
Kielmansegg, Dethleffsen, and other liberal reformers throughout the rest of 
1954, and the topics of NATO, Western values, Internal Leadership, and Citizen-
Soldier dramatically increased their presence in GfW activities.128  Then, at the 
beginning of the new year in 1955, a long memo was sent by the Blank Office to 
local chapter administrators as an instruction manual for scheduled workshops 
and conferences in 1955.  The memo, titled “Materials for Civics Workshops in 
the GfW,” began with a recommendation that local chapter administrators 
purchase a copy of the West German constitution.  The first chapter instructed 
 
125 Based on surrounding documents, this is very possibly the same speech given by 
Dethleffsen at the 1952 meeting in which even Theodor Blank expressed concern at the extent of 
Dethleffsen and Kielmansegg’s liberal reformism.  See Erich Dethleffsen, “Der Geist des neuen 
Offizier-Korps,“ Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 648/20. 
126 Chapter report, “Sektion Wetzlar,“ Wehrkunde, June issue, 1954. 
127 Chapter report, “Sektion Hamburg,“ Wehrkunde, August issue, 1954. 
128 This is based on a review of GfW chapter reports in Wehrkunde in late 1954 as well as a 
review of the activities of the local GfW chapter in Bonn in these months.  See GfW Bonn chapter, 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv BW 9/766.   Wehrkunde, 1954. 
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them to have a discussion on the “meaning” of democracy, emphasizing that 
German soldiers learn the difference between tyrannical political ideologies that 
make disingenuous reference to democracy on the one hand, and real democracy, 
or “representative democracy,” on the other hand.  The latter, it was explained, 
was based in two principles: a) the rights of individuals; and b) the principle of 
democratic sovereignty through free elections.  Later sections educated 
administrators on how to confront various traditional arguments against 
representative democracy.129  By the end of 1954, then, Bonn had transformed the 
original GfW project, designed to propagate the European Army, into an 
operation with the primary purpose of advancing liberal democracy in the West 
German veteran milieu.  A similar evolution can be examined in the other covert 
veteran project: the DSZ magazine.   
Democratization in the Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung 
 The West Germans’ chosen replacement for Steiner at the DSZ was a 
writer who had already written some articles for the magazine while under 
Steiner’s leadership: Arno Werner Uhlig.  Practically nothing has been written in 
the secondary literature about Uhlig, and his file in the West German Federal 
Office of Press and Information does not contain biographical information.  But 
according to these West German records, Uhlig worked in public relations on 
 
129 “Materialien für Staatskundliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde,“ 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv BW 9/768.   
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behalf of the West German Federal Office of Press and Information until 1969.130  
Based on his writings, it is very likely that he had been a lower ranking officer in 
the Wehrmacht.  The West Germans had, since as early as 1951, recognized the 
influence the DSZ had as the largest soldiers’ periodical and had even attempted 
to gain influence over it.  For roughly one year, starting in June, 1951, they were 
in conversation with the DSZ through their Blank Office liaison, Erich 
Dethleffsen, who unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate the purchasing of DSZ by 
a Bonn insider.  Dethleffsen and the Blank Office were likely unaware that the 
DSZ had already been infiltrated by the Americans.131  After taking over the 
project at the beginning of 1953, the West German Federal Office of Press and 
Information exerted their influence over the paper through Uhlig, who had already 
established himself as a liberal reformer in the pages of DSZ, and who was 
subsequently made chief editor upon Steiner’s expulsion from the project.  Uhlig 
served as chief editor of the DSZ from late 1952 until mid-1954, after which he 
was transferred to other projects.  West German officials were pleased with the 
work he performed during those two years; in fact, future influential conservative 
politician Franz Josef Strauss wrote a memo upon Uhlig’s release from the DSZ 
project in which he highly recommended him: “He was the chief editor of the 
DSZ and deserves considerable merit for having steered it out of its radical and 
 
130 Arno Werner Uhlig’s file in the archival documents of the Federal Office of Press and 
Information, Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, B 145/5427. 
131 Erich Dethleffsen’s archival holdings, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, N 648/9. 
574 
 
militaristic course and into reasonable, clear waters.”132  Uhlig’s commitment to 
liberal democracy and intentions to reform the political culture of the German 
military were already evident in his early writings in the DSZ, and became even 
more pronounced upon assuming the chief editor position of the paper. 
 At the end of 1951 Uhlig began publishing regularly in the DSZ, and over 
the course of 1952 increased his presence on the front-pages, arguing, like 
Steiner, for a complete and total European revolution against nationalism and the 
nation-state.  But unlike the apolitical Steiner, Uhlig regularly reported on the 
politics of Strasbourg and Konrad Adenauer’s foreign policy (both of which he 
expressly supported).133  In late 1951 Uhlig began expanding his editorials by 
promoting the American-style of democracy.  In one article, Uhlig reported on a 
conversation with a local U.S. occupation authority about the “poor democrat” in 
German history.  He argued that Hitler had mobilized a traditional German 
sentiment against democracy and that West Germans’ future relied upon reversing 
that sentiment and discovering a “passion” for democracy and membership in the 
 
132 Franz Josef Strauss to “von Eckart“ (Federal Office of Press and Information), July 29, 
1954, Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, B 145/5427. 
133 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Entschliesst sich Europa zur Tat?“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, 
November 1, 1951.   Arno Werner Uhlig, “Die europäischen Zauderer in der Entscheidung,“ 
Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, December 6, 1951.   Arno Werner Uhlig, “Jetzt hat Die Welt ihren 
Beweis,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, January 17, 1952.   Arno Werner Uhlig, “Die Zeit des 
Redens ist Vorbei,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, October 18, 1951.   Arno Werner Uhlig, “Hat 
Adenauer eine Schlacht verloren?“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, February 14, 1952.     
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“free world.”134  In his next article, Uhlig praised “Western reeducation” of 
Germans in the “methods of clear, democratic politics.”135  Throughout 1952 
Uhlig’s advocacy for a politically unified Europe was mapped over the Atlantic 
Alliance.  A succinct example is how he portrayed the signing of the EDC treaty 
in the spring of 1952: “a fateful step on the path towards Europe and towards a 
Europe in the Free World.”136  Other examples of Uhlig’s emerging liberalism in 
late 1951 and 1952 include a consistent defense of American foreign policy and 
Adenauer’s “Western integration” policies, which he connected and described as 
a “partnership” and a “European-Western Commitment to Defense.”137  Over the 
course of 1952 Uhlig increasingly wrote about the importance of strengthening 
West German democracy, and appealed to the anti-Communism of West German 
veterans by arguing that Communist parties should be banned.  Communism’s 
greatest threat to the well-being of Europeans, he argued, was its threat to 
democracy.138 
 
134 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Der Aufruf zur Wagnis,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, November 1, 
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135 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Das Spiel mit dem Feuer,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, November 8, 
1951.   
136 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Über Bonn nach Europa,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, May 29, 
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137 See, for example, Arno Werner Uhlig, “Partnershcaft auf der Waage,“ Deutsche Soldaten-
Zeitung, November 29, 1951.   
138 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Die falschen Wächter der Demokratie,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, 
February 28, 1952.  Uhlig also repeatedly argued that the Social Democrats were likewise a threat 
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 One of the most important articles written by Uhlig was titled “Ideas are 
more Important than Bullets.”  Like many Europeanists examined in this 
dissertation, Uhlig felt compelled to engage with Spengler’s thesis of 
civilizational decline and proclaimed the new Europe to be the answer and 
solution to Spengler’s pessimism.  But, importantly, Uhlig explicitly distanced 
himself from other post-Nazi Europeanists who defined the European revival as 
an independent “Third Front” between West and East.  It is “lunacy” he declared, 
to believe in “playing the part of a Third Front in the contemporary, global 
division of the world into two parts, and this will very soon become obvious in the 
course of time.”  Such arguments, he suggested, were ironically similar to the 
very nationalism proponents of the Europe-concept were decrying: 
The politicians and statesmen in Europe have still not yet grasped that they 
lie within the Grossraum of a world-power [the United States], and that 
they will gradually need to do away with the concepts of 1914 and the 
method of promoting nationalist interests in politics.139 
 
Uhlig, then, was distancing the term “Grossraum” from Europe and instead 
arguing that Europe found itself within an even larger Grossraum – the West.  To 
reject Europe’s belonging in the Western world was, for Uhlig, to repeat 
Germany’s nationalist disaster of proclaiming its spiritual exclusivity from the 
West at the beginning of the First World War.  As we have seen in previous 
 
to democracy.  See, for example, Arno Werner Uhlig, “Feuer im Staatsschiff: Woher drohen 
eigentlich unserer Demokratie enrsthafte Gefahren?“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, March 6, 1952. 
139 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Ideen sind wichtiger als Kugeln: Die Überwindung des 
Bolschewismus bedarf einer aus der Zeit geborenen geistigen Erneuerung in Europa,“ Deutsche 
Soldaten-Zeitung, December 13, 1951.   
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chapters of this dissertation, Nazi Europeanists regularly embraced the German 
völkisch tradition (the “concepts of 1914“) and marshalled it into a new European 
framework.  What Uhlig was doing was wholly different: he was openly rejecting 
the völkisch, anti-West German political tradition, and superimposing the 
Grossraum over the Western world instead. 
 Over the course of 1952 and 1953 Uhlig’s liberalism became increasingly 
explicit.  In one article, Uhlig argued that West Germans must do more than align 
geopolitically with the United States – they must also adopt the “American way of 
life.”140  Uhlig also began printing articles celebrating the French Revolution and 
the Enlightenment as necessary precursors for the democratization of Europe.141  
Another important evolution in the DSZ was the addition of the “Citizen-Soldier” 
argument to the front-pages.  In March, 1953, Uhlig ran an article on the front-
page titled “Psychological Foundations for Military Cadres.”  The article 
positively reviewed a recent public conference administered by the Blank Office 
about the political values being prepared for the new German detachment in the 
European Army.  “A Soldier in a democracy, and especially a soldier who thinks 
in a European way and is committed to Europe,” it argued, was to be a “Citizen-
Soldier.”  This meant upholding “the personal freedom of the individual” as well 
 
140 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Ohne Deutschland keine Sicherheit,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, 
April 11, 1952.   
141 Friedrih Wilhelm,“Masse und Persönlichkeit,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, May 1, 1952. 
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as representative democracy as a higher mission than fulfilling military orders.142  
It is clear that such editorials came at the suggestion of the Blank Office; in fact, 
in April, 1953, Uhlig ran a conversation on the front-page between himself and a 
liberal representative of the Blank Office, Wolf Graf von Baudissin, about the 
“Citizen-Soldier” concept.143  Such conversational articles with the Blank Office 
became a regularity.144  As the fall, 1953 federal elections were approaching, 
Uhlig put the “Citizen-Soldier” concept into practice, running front-page articles 
which argued that the veteran generation had a special responsibility to go to the 
polls and vote because political apathy had killed the first German democracy – 
the Weimar Republic.  Uhlig’s defense of the Weimar Republic was, of course, a 
significant departure in German military culture.145  The DSZ also instructed 
veterans about the correct way to use their vote: namely, for Konrad Adenauer, 
whose domestic achievements were perhaps “inconsequential,” but whose foreign 
policy of Western integration was hailed as decisive.146  Adenauer’s enormous 
 
142 W...g, “Psychologische Fundamente vor militärischen Kaders,“ Deutsche Soldaten-
Zeitung, March 19, 1953.   
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Soldaten-Zeitung, New Year’s special edition, 1954.    
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und ihre Bedeutung,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, September 3, 1951.   
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victory in that election was subsequently interpreted by Uhlig as a victory for 
democracy against its political threats from both left and right.147  Additionally, 
the election was also described as a victory for the Europe-concept. 
 Indeed, Uhlig’s advocacy of democracy and Adenauer’s administration 
was intertwined with what he described as Adenauer’s central accomplishment: 
the European Army.  One article after the election described Adenauer’s victory 
as a confirmation of the European Army and therefore proof that West Germany 
was a “fountain of democratic stability on the continent.”  The French, Uhlig 
argued, now needed to prove their democratic identity as well by likewise 
confirming the EDC treaty.  In other words, Uhlig saw advocating the new 
Europe as inseparably connected to democratization.148  This idea was strewn 
throughout his editorials in the DSZ.  In early 1953, for example, Uhlig printed a 
feature article on the front-page titled “What We Have to Defend: The 
Commitment to Human Dignity is the Strongest Weapon against Bolshevism.”  In 
it, Uhlig argued that German soldiers must support the EDC because it 
symbolized the German military’s new commitment to human rights and 
democracy.149  Like post-Nazi Europeanists examined elsewhere in this 
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dissertation, Uhlig devoted great effort advocating for the most far-reaching 
policies of European integration, including the eventual formation of a “European 
political community” undergirded by a new “European patriotism” which together 
would overcome the nation-state and nationalism.150  Typically, such arguments 
were accompanied with a rejection of partial or moderate steps towards European 
integration such as the suggestion to create a coalition of European national 
armies under NATO as an alternative to the EDC treaty.  But like the liberal 
reformers in the Blank Office, Uhlig, too, was prepared to pursue the NATO 
alternative well before the EDC treaty failed.151  In short, over time Uhlig’s 
loyalty was with the Atlantic Alliance over and above the new Europe. 
 It is important to note that Uhlig’s injection of liberal democracy into the 
pages of the DSZ was not by any means immediate or comprehensive.  In fact, 
following the pattern established by the American operatives of KMMANLY, 
Uhlig frequently balanced his liberalism with outright illiberalism.  Allied 
denazification efforts, for example, were attacked specifically because they were 
undemocratic, such as in an article titled “Dangerous Concepts” with a subtitle: 
“If a democracy is politically healthy then it need not take action against 
 
150 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Soldaten wollen Europa,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, March 19, 
1953. 
151 In fact, Uhlig signaled that NATO was an acceptable alternative to the European Army as 
early as January, 1953.  See Arno Werner Uhlig, “Europa – oder Nationalarmee,“ Deutsche 
Soldaten-Zeitung, January 15, 1953.   
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extremists.”152  Another article celebrated the anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights only to proceed arguing that any genuine 
commitment to human rights must entail complete amnesty for German soldiers 
of the Second World War.153  In fact, Uhlig went as far as to argue that the 
Wilsonian ideal of self-determination entailed a Western commitment to returning 
to Germany the Eastern territories annexed by Poland after the war.154  
Sometimes, Uhlig appealed explicitly to illiberal Europe-concepts, such as in 
May, 1953, when he printed full excerpts from Ernst Jünger’s secret, war-time 
European tract Der Friede.155  
 In a similar vein, Uhlig likewise advanced his Atlanticism by frequently 
trafficking in anti-American sentiments.  One especially recurrent tactic of his 
was to denounce the Yalta agreements as undemocratic and antithetical to the 
Western alliance of the Cold War.  Take, for example, an article by Uhlig titled 
“At the Grave of Yalta-Germany.”  The Yalta conference, he argued, was the 
“highpoint” of the mistaken Western alliance with Bolshevism.  At Yalta, he 
argued, Western politicians sacrificed Germans and other Central Europeans to 
Soviet tyranny, and in doing so compromised the democratic rights of those 
 
152 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Gefährliche Komplexe: Eine politisch gesunde Demokratie hätte es 
nicht nötig, sich gegen Extremisten zu wehren,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, November 15, 1951.   
153 Unnamed, “Anbruch einer neuen Welt-Epoche,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, December 
13, 1951.   
154 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Der schwere Weg,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, October 15, 1953. 




victims.  Fortunately, however, the Americans had come to acknowledge the 
“horrendous mistake of Yalta” and initiated a Cold War alliance to rectify this 
mistake.  Postwar veterans’ organizations, he continued, had established 
themselves as leaders in this crusade and had identified the unification of Europe 
as their predominant task: “German soldiers are among the strongest and most 
reliable factors in this emerging anti-Bolshevist front – their commitment to the 
European community is honest and serious.”  If there were German soldiers who 
were ambivalent about the Cold War, Uhlig finished, then it was precisely 
because the Americans were not fully committed to replacing “Yalta-democracy” 
with true democracy: “What is the source of [some German soldiers’] distrust?  Is 
it a matter of an honest commitment to democracy?  No, today’s former soldiers 
have become disciplined citizens, their commitment is to democracy – but not to 
the Yalta-democracy of 1945.”156  What Uhlig was doing in the above lines was 
making postwar democracy palatable to German veterans by distancing it from 
the war-time democracy of the United States.  “Yalta-democracy” became a kind 
of Leitmotif in the DSZ for disparaging the war-time behaviors of the United 
States, justifying German veterans’ war against the United States, and criticizing 
the perceived mistreatment of postwar German veterans at the hands of the United 
States.  Most importantly, the “Yalta-democracy” trope made German soldiers 
into something more respectable than a conquered force coerced into accepting 
democracy; it made German soldiers into the avant-garde of democracy.  It is 
 
156 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Am Grabe Yalta-Deutschlands,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, 
October 11, 1951. 
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difficult to ascertain whether Uhlig’s appeals to illiberalism and anti-
Americanism were genuine or tactical, but the important point is that Uhlig’s 
arguments were made in the explicit service of the American-led postwar 
international order.  Precisely at critical moments such as March, 1952 when 
Stalin attempted to appeal to German nationalists by dangling an offer of a 
reunified but neutral Germany Uhlig was arguing that to accept such an offer was 
to return to the politics of Yalta.  The Yalta conference, he explained in an article 
at the end of the month, was nothing more than the neutralization and therefore 
subjugation of Germany.  By rejecting the “Stalin-note” of March, 1952, he 
argued, Germans could once and for all repudiate the historical tragedy of 
“excluding themselves from the Western community just to flail around as 
political independents between East and West.”157   In the end, this was just a 
camouflaged re-statement of Adenauer’s “Western Integration” foreign policy.  In 
short, Uhlig’s leadership of the DSZ trafficked in the an occasional anti-
Americanism, but in the service of Atlanticism. 
Unlike the GfW which was funded into the 1960s, the funding for the DSZ 
was discontinued at the end of 1954 around the time of the establishment of the 
German Bundeswehr within NATO as well as the realization of complete West 
German national sovereignty at the London and Paris Conferences.  The 
documents suggest that Uhlig’s liberal reformism had butt heads with more 
traditional-minded militarists working on the DSZ project, and so Bonn decided 
 
157 Arno Werner Uhlig, “Das Ende von Yalta und Potsdam,“ Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung, 
March 27, 1952..   
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that their larger project had been victorious.158  Over the course of the 1950s the 
DSZ lost its position as the exclusive paper of the largest German veterans’ 
organization (VDS) and gradually became a fringe, far-Right nationalist 
publication.159  Still, it is important to consider the impact that the DSZ as well as 
the GfW had on postwar West German veteran culture in these important years 
leading up to the West German defense treaties of 1954 when they had 
tremendous influence due to the patronage of U.S. and West German intelligence 
forces. 
Conclusion: Successful Operations or Vehicles for Extremists? 
 The objective of the covert veterans’ affairs operations examined in this 
chapter was two-fold: a) increase veterans’ support for rearmament in a European 
Army by revising the German nationalist tradition; and b) democratizing West 
German veterans’ culture by revising the illiberal German military tradition.  The 
impact that these intelligence operations and their German military reformers had 
on West German veterans should not be underestimated.  First, on the issue of 
rearmament, it can be credibly surmised that the veterans’ affairs operations had 
an important impact.  One of the most important developments in West German 
veterans’ culture was the gravitation of veterans to Konrad Adenauer’s CDU 
coalition; in particular, their embrace of European integration and the European 
 
158 Arno Werner Uhlig to “Marcks“ (Blank Office), May 29, 1954, Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, 
B 145/5427. 
159 See Günther Paschner, Falsches Gewissen der Nation.   Peter Dudek and Hans Gerd 
Jaschke, Die Deutsche National-Zeitung. 
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Army – important preconditions for eventual rearmament within the less 
integrative national army in the American-led NATO.  This was never a forgone 
conclusion; after all, the argument for “neutralization” between East and West, 
which was advocated with nationalist rhetoric by the SPD and other Protestant 
conservatives in the early 1950s, could very well have been a more natural home 
for the German military milieu seeped in the völkisch-nationalist tradition.  
Indeed, the polling evidence suggests that West Germans in general were initially 
skeptical of both European and NATO rearmament proposals, and over the course 
of the early 1950s had to be won over to Adenauer’s position.  When the 
European Army was first introduced in 1950 West Germans rejected the proposal 
fifty-two percent to thirty-three percent.  By 1953 public opinion had shifted to 
forty-four percent in favor and thirty-three percent against.  This represented a 
thirty-point swing in three years.160  The early 1950s, then, were a period of 
remarkable movement in public opinion vis-à-vis rearmament and European 
integration.  This important shift in public opinion did not bypass West German 
veterans.  Although the present author was unable to obtain polling evidence for 
West German veterans exclusively, the documents explored in this chapter 
suggest that although West German veterans at the beginning of the decade were 
 
160Ed.s Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, Jahrbuch für öffentliche Meinung, 1947-
1955 (Allensbach am Bodensee: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1956), 357.  A year-by-year table of 
public opinion evolution on the European Army reveals that the biggest shift took place during the 
year of 1952.  See Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on 
Rearmament, 1949-1959, 192. 
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more supportive of the European Army than the public writ large, they were 
nevertheless still divided on the issue.  As illustrated above, the American 
intelligence agents in KMMANLY and QKSNITCH originally initiated their 
projects precisely because they were convinced that too many veterans were being 
drawn to the nationalist and neutralist factions of West German politics thus 
undercutting chances for German rearmament.  In 1953, in contrast, they felt 
comfortable enough with veterans’ support of the EDC to call off American 
funding.   
The difficult question is to what extent this shift was assisted by the covert 
operations of this chapter.  And on this point the internal documents of these 
projects as well as the Blank Office offer some important insight.  In May, 1953, 
the Blank Office, having recently taken over the veterans’ affairs operations, 
conducted a survey of fourteen GfW local officer chapters.  The goal was to 
ascertain how these sections believed the German military should be spiritually 
re-established; in other words, how effectively GfW had influenced the soldiers at 
the grass-roots level.  Each of the fourteen sections was asked to complete a 
conference on the topics of spiritual re-founding and acceptable military traditions 
after which the director of the section would complete a summarized report of his 
sections agreed-upon conclusions.  These local chapter summaries are revealing 
regarding the penetration of the Europe-concept in the GfW.  All of the 
summaries agreed that West Germans should rearm as members of the European 
Army, and most of them discussed the need to reform the German nationalist 
tradition in the German military.  Take, for example, the following lines from the 
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summary of the local chapter Clausthal-Zellerfeld: “In a new armed detachment 
[of the European Army] it seems more important to produce a European esprit de 
corps than dwelling upon conventionally understood traditions anchored in 
historical events.”  “Hopefully,” the report continued, “as a result of two lost 
wars, pride in the anachronistic age of nation-state conflicts will not lead to 
resentments which could decisively hinder healthy developments.”  The report 
then concluded:  
In this age of difficult questions (for the present and future), it seems vital 
to liberate ourselves from illusions and destructive emotions such as 
hurrah-patriotism (!)  We have to overcome the past and dedicate all of 
our energy into creating a new purpose and a new spirit.161 
 
Other local chapter reports echoed the above sentiments, but also exhibited a 
residual nationalism that soldiers were unwilling to give up, such as the report 
from Mönchen-Gladbach which suggested that German forces should be educated 
with both European and nationalist values since “there is not yet a uniform 
military history” for a European army.162 
 The stubborn attachment to nationalism even in the GfW, an officers’ 
association designed to facilitate support for the European Army and founded by 
practitioners of the Europe-concept, speaks to an important reality: at the end of 
 
161 Erich Ferdinand Pruck (“Sektion Clausthal-Zellerfeld“), “Ausarbeitung; Abt.: 
Wehrwissenschaftlicher Arbeitskreis; Gruppe: I, Wehrwesen, allgemein; Arbeitstheme: 
‘Traditionspflege‘,“ May 5, 1953, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/765. 
162 “Oberstleutnant Taubert” (“Sektion München Gladbach-Rheydt“), “ Ausarbeitung; Abt.: 
Wehrwissenschaftlicher Arbeitskreis; Gruppe: I, Wehrwesen, allgemein; Arbeitstheme: 
‘Traditionspflege‘,“ May 5, 1953, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/765. 
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the Second World War most West German veterans were still attached to 
traditional German nationalism.  This is the tradition against which post-Nazi 
Europeanists were working.  In fact, while the veterans’ organizations of this 
chapter sought to revise German nationalism with the Europe-concept, other 
veterans’ organizations were recalcitrant.  Take, for example, the largest veterans’ 
association, the VDS.  As discussed above, the Blank Office originally turned 
towards coopting the American veterans’ operations in part because they were 
unable to infiltrate the apolitical and nationalist leadership of the VDS.  Gottfried 
Hansen, the leader of the VDS during the early 1950s, was persistently non-
committal and even dismissive of the European Army, writing Adenauer at the 
end of 1950 that his organization would only support it if denazification were 
immediately ended, and he inflexibly held to this position in correspondences 
with the Blank Office as well as Adenauer personally through 1954.163  As a 
result, the Blank Office decided to invest in the former American intelligence 
operations as a basis for their public relations work towards veterans.  But that did 
not mean that the Blank Office stopped trying to influence the VDS; in fact, it 
began trying to infiltrate the VDS through its covert officers’ club, the GfW, 
because many former German officers had a double-membership in both 
organizations.  By the fall of 1952 VDS sent out an official declaration 
encouraging its members to obtain a double-membership in the Blank Office’s 
 
163 Gottfried Hansen to Konrad Adenauer, January 30, 1952, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in 
Freiburg, BW 9/3089.   Gottfried Hansen to Konrad Adenauer, April 7, 1954, Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/756.   
589 
 
GfW.164  And in the spring of 1954, at their largest yearly conference called the 
“Vertreterversammlung,” the VDS hosted guest speakers of the Blank Office to 
advertise the European Army.165  What explains this shift?  A potential answer to 
this question can be found in a letter to VDS leadership written by the leaders of 
VDS in the West German state Nordrhein-Westfalen.  The letter explained that 
their chapter had had no choice but to begin advocating for European integration 
and the European Army.  The reason for this, the letter explained, was the 
consequence of grass-roots activism within their local chapters driven by “various 
organizations advocating for European unification and for German soldiers’ 
sympathy for [European unification].”166  In other words, during the early 1950s 
VDS was increasingly pressured from below to take a more active and supportive 
posture on behalf of the EDC and other measures involving European integration.  
GfW and the Blank Office were, of course, among the most influential of such 
organizations advocating the Europe-concept.   
 On the issue of the European Army and revising the German nationalist 
tradition, then, the veterans’ affairs operations appear to have been an important 
player in the evolution of West German public opinion in the early 1950s.  On the 
 
164 Directive for all VDS chapters, September 19, 1952, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in 
Freiburg, BW 48/110. 
165 Report on the “Jahrestagung” (VDS), Süddeutscher Rundfunk, March 16, 1954, 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/756.   
166 Local VDS chapter in Nordrhein-Westfalen to “Bundesleitung,“ April 22, 1953, 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 48/13. 
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issue of democratization, in contrast, there is very little evidence that the veterans’ 
affairs operations significantly moved West German veteran opinion towards an 
embrace of liberal democracy.  In fact, on this issue the project administrators 
often received push-back.  As discussed above, Dethleffsen and Kielmansegg’s 
liberal reformism even occasionally produced official complaints from local GfW 
chapters.  As one such report from the local chapter in Wiesbaden stated: 
It is becoming clearer and clearer that the theories about a 
‘democratization’ of the German military and about a ‘liberal’ Citizen-
Soldier are causing incredible confusion in the public’s mind and 
consequently inflicting great damage to the rearmament argument.  Such 
theories are more or less perfect tools to denigrate the troops as pathetic 
from the onset. 
 
The report pleaded with GfW administrators to rein in “over-zealous reformers,” 
arguing that: “Many [reformers’] theories seem to just be influenced by the spirit 
of the ‘democratic reeducation camp’ and from the aftermath of the defamation 
years.”  By “defamation years,” the report was referencing the immediate postwar 
years when the so-called “defamation” of veterans was perceived to have been 
particularly virulent.  The report concluded with a direct repudiation of the 
Citizen-Soldier concept as antithetical to the German military tradition: 
The new ideal for soldiers is not the liberal ‘Citizen in Uniform’ but rather 
the hard and ideologically resolute ‘fighter’, who is driven by an internal 
commitment to ‘duty’ and ‘readiness to sacrifice’, because he knows that 




167 E.V. Pfister (“Sektion Wiesbaden“), “Ausarbeitung; Abt.: Wehrwissenschaftlicher 
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This complaint from the Wiesbaden chapter of GfW is indicative of many 
expressions of frustration in veterans’ organizations articulated against liberal 
military reformism.  And unlike the Europe-concept, there is very little evidence 
in the documents of these veterans’ organizations suggesting positive or receptive 
responses to the “Internal Leadership” and “Citizen-Soldier” concepts.  
Furthermore, as discussed above, the liberal reformers were themselves a minority 
within the Blank Office and their historical reputation as the founders of the West 
German Bundeswehr has largely been retrospectively ascribed.  But here, too, the 
impact of the veterans’ affairs operations should not be dismissed.  
 First, there is some evidence that by 1954 West German veterans were 
beginning to acknowledge the need for reform.  One local chapter of GfW in 
Bremen, for example, conducted a poll of its more than fifty members on whether 
the “underlying values” (das innere Gefüge) of the rehabilitated German military 
would need to be changed.  Roughly half of the respondents replied in the 
affirmative while half disagreed.  When asked whether German soldiers should 
undertake education courses about the West German state 100 percent of 
respondents replied in the affirmative.168  That said, the primary liberal 
accomplishment in these veterans’ affairs operations was not the penetration of 
liberal democracy into the hearts and minds of most West German veterans, but 
rather a tepid rapprochement with the American-led international order as well as 
the West German Federal Republic.  By articulating a few fundamental principles 
 
168 K. Chr. Trentzsch (head of the local GfW chapter in Bremen) to “Drews” (Blank Office), 
January 21, 1954, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, BW 9/768. 
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of liberal democracy in military affairs, and by combining it with anti-
Communism and the Europe-concept, the liberal reformers in these veterans’ 
affairs operations not only planted a seed for democratization, but also made more 
palatable an alignment between West German veterans and the Atlantic alliance 
led by the United States.   
Most likely, relatively few West German veterans were transformed by 
these veterans’ affairs operations into ideological liberals.  What the projects did, 
rather, was foster a political culture within which liberal democracy was presented 
as an ally and acceptable alternative to the new Europe which was supposed to 
emerge from the EDC treaty.  When that treaty failed, and when that Europe did 
not emerge, and instead a national army built on liberal principles within NATO 
became the immediate substitute – this new course was in fact received as an 
acceptable alternative.  As discussed throughout this chapter, this subtle 
compromise with liberal democracy was frequently accomplished hand-in-hand 
with considerable moral compromise.  Both KMMANLY and QKSNITCH were 
originally organized and administered by political radicals from the Wehrmacht 
and Waffen-SS, and the materials and activities in both projects repeatedly 
trafficked in reactionary illiberal sentiment.  As this chapter has illustrated, the 
Europe-concept offered veterans a community which, unlike the ethnic national 
community (Volksgemeinschaft), could be credibly understood as the common 
denominator of their past and present struggles stretching across the year 1945.  
This meant that the Second World War was retold as a quasi enduring European 
struggle within which liberal democracy ironically became understood as an ally.  
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This was an important early origin in the de-radicalization of German military 





Chapter 10: Conclusion - Konrad Adenauer and Post-Nazi 
Memory Politics 
Konrad Adenauer 
 This dissertation has largely avoided Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s 
posture towards post-Nazi Europeanism from his position as chief executive of 
West Germany and leader of Christian Democracy during the first decade of the 
Federal Republic.  This is in part because such an examination was beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  But an additional reason is because Konrad Adenauer’s 
relationship towards post-Nazi Europeanism was practically non-existent.  
Konrad Adenauer appears to have prudently cultivated a distant relationship to the 
journalists, politicians, and military reformers examined in this dissertation, 
instead opting to associate with this conservative demographic through the 
intermediaries who administered the covert West German public relations projects 
analyzed in part II of this dissertation.  Most likely, he chose this distant 
affiliation for the same reason he maintained a remarkable degree of silence 
towards former Nazis in general: because although their electoral support was 
important, such voters also threatened to delegitimize his democratic project.  
Although Adenauer occasionally felt compelled to acknowledge former Nazis and 
the military (such as, for example, when he issued the Ehrenerklärung, or 
“declaration of honor,” for former German soldiers in late 1952), his default 
posture was to neither antagonize nor venerate Germans who had been tainted by 
complicity in the Third Reich, meanwhile passing amnesty laws that averted any 
public conversations and legal proceedings pertaining to historical justice.  In 
doing so, he permitted the membership of former Nazis in his party and 
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consequently their participation in the democratization of West Germany, without 
simultaneously compromising that very democratization.  This approach to 
politics in postwar West Germany has been described by some historians as 
“integrative.”1  As Axel Schildt explained: 
Adenauer’s achievement was to integrate the conglomeration of ideologies 
of the contemporary governing coalition into one doctrine of statecraft, 
ranging from neo-liberals, liberal-democrats, Christian-socialists, 
Catholic-Occidentals, to nationalist-conservatives – all of whom were 
bound together by anti-totalitarianism. … [Adenauer] endeavored to 
appease his own followers but also, additionally, the conservative sceptics.  
Family-ideology, housing subsidies, and demonstrated proximity to the 
church for the CDU/CSU; nationalist and military-friendly tones for the 
FDP, solidarity and support for the demands of the refugee 
organizations…and accommodation of the wide-ranging right-wing of the 
political spectrum….2 
 
Adenauer had very good reason to avoid direct association with post-Nazi 
Europeanists in particular.  Unlike the post-Nazi Europe-concept, Adenauer’s 
political ideology and motivations for European integration were liberal-
democratic.  In contrast to notions of a European alternative to Western liberalism 
and Eastern Communism, Adenauer’s long-term goal for West Germany and 
Western Europe was to join the liberal international order led by the United 
 
1 Hans Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: A German politician and Statesman in a Period of 
War, Revolution and Reconstruction: The Statesman, 1952-1967 (New York: Berghahn Books, 
1997).   Axel Schildt, Konservatismus in Deutschland: Von den Anfängen im 18. Jahrhundert bis 
zur Gegenwart (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998).   
2 Schildt, Konservatismus in Deutschland, 227, 230. 
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States, or what he called Westbindung (“integration into the West”).3  That 
Adenauer’s concept of Europe was different in this respect can be confirmed by 
the extent to which the postwar West German public relations projects under his 
administration used the Europe-concept as a wedge to create support for the 
Atlantic alliance and liberal democracy.  Thus, Adenauer’s cautious approach to 
post-Nazi Europeanists suggests that he considered a direct relationship with them 
to be an unnecessary risk.   
However, despite his distance from post-Nazi Europeanists it would be 
difficult to conclude that he was unaware of this significant milieu in West 
German conservative politics.  Take, for example, Konrad Adenauer’s speech 
before the German parliament in the spring of 1953 during the heated debates 
over the ratification of the European Army.  He began the speech declaring the 
European Army to be the “foundation for the political and economic unification 
of Europe” and the only way to “redeem Europe from impending doom and 
downfall.”  The rest of his speech proceeded to outline the reasons why West 
Germans should support a more politically, economically, and militarily 
integrated Europe.  At the very conclusion of his speech he argued that European 
unification would “once again make Europe into a meaningful factor in world 
politics and world economics” at which point he was interrupted by a 
representative of the Communist Party, Friedrich Rische, who shouted “that’s 
 
3 Heinrich August Winkler, Germany: The Long Road West (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006).   Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).   
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what the Nazis said!”4  This interruption caused a stir in the parliament, but 
Adenauer completely ignored the comment and finished his speech asking 
parliamentary representatives to ratify the treaty.  The legacy of Nazi 
Europeanism, then, was present even in the official West Germany parliamentary 
debates of the early 1950s.  Surely Adenauer was aware of Communist attempts 
to tie his European integration policies to the Third Reich and to the former Nazi 
Europeanists supporting his administration, but throughout his parliamentary 
speeches about European integration during the early 1950s, in which he was 
consistently heckled by Communists and other delegates described in the minutes 
as “on the left,” Adenauer never responded or even addressed such criticisms.5 
A more difficult question is whether or not Adenauer and his 
administration ever actively encouraged the post-Nazi Europeanists.  On the one 
hand, Adenauer and various leading officials in his administration occasionally 
published articles in the publications associated with the covert West German 
public relations operations as well as Christ und Welt and Sonntagsblatt.6  
 
4 Konrad Adenauer, speech before the German Bundestag, March 19, 1953 in ed. Josef 
Selbach, Bundestagsreden (Bonn: AZ-Studio, 1967), 173-198. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See, for example, Konrad Adenauer, “Deutschland und die Europa-Armee,“ 
Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, January issue, 1951.   Theodor Blank, “Der deutsche 
Verteidigungsbeitrag,“ Sonntagsblatt, March 22, 1953.  Franz Josef Strauss even frequently spoke 
at officer conferences of the Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde.  See “’Eine Dauerlösung anstreben‘: 
Abgeordneter Strauss zum EVG-Vertrag vor der Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde,“ Deutsche 
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Furthermore,  Adenauer’s public speeches frequently spoke in a language that 
would have been attractive to post-Nazi Europeanists.  Take, for example, the 
same speech in which he was interrupted by the Communist Friedrich Rische.  
Earlier in the speech, Adenauer proclaimed the European Army to be just one 
important step in a larger process of “escaping the ideologies of nation-state 
concepts.”  The technological and economic evolution of the world as proven in 
the Second World War, Adenauer then argued, necessitated this transition: 
As the last war illustrated, the development of military technology and 
technology in general has created entirely different and new world 
circumstances.  There are two world-states: the United States and Soviet-
Russia.  And then there is the British Commonwealth.  And then we have 
the Western European countries, to which we belong.  These countries 
have been economically and politically impoverished as a result of the 
war, such that each country is not in a position to guarantee its inhabitants 
freedom and a decent standard of life. 
 
Adenauer continued, arguing that these “new world circumstances” necessitated 
European integration so that Europe could be empowered to overcome their new 
disadvantages: 
These Western European countries are no longer in a position to defend 
themselves each one independently.  They are no longer in a position to 
save European culture each one independently.  All of these goals that we 
have in common, ladies and gentlemen, can only be achieved when the 
Western European countries unify – politically, economically, and also 
culturally. 
 
This, he went on to explain, was the real reason for supporting the European 
Army: 
 
All these reasons necessitate this treaty, which at the end of the day has to 
be seen as a fundamental step in the further progress towards Europe.  
This is the only politics that will enable the European peoples to establish 
peace, to build up Europe, to save European culture, and to once again 
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make Europe into a meaningful factor in world politics and world 
economics.7 
 
Unquestionably, lines like this must have appealed to former Nazi Europeanists 
who would have seen them as a confirmation of the post-Nazi Europe-concept 
they were advancing in West German journalism and veterans’ organizations.  
However, this is not proof that Adenauer intended such an interpretation.  In fact, 
other quotations of Adenauer’s explicitly repudiated such an interpretation.  Just a 
few months before the above-mentioned quotations, for example, Adenauer had 
likewise given a speech to the parliament about the European Army in which his 
Atlanticist convictions were explicitly articulated: 
Whether or not to accept this treaty is, in short, a question about whether 
or not the Federal Republic of Germany should join the West or not; 
whether it will join the defense of the Atlantic defense system or not; 
whether it will be included in the integration of Europe or not; whether it 
wants the free reunification of Germany in a free Europe or whether it is 
prepared to tolerate the reunification of Germany, or perhaps its division, 
in tyranny.8 
 
Hans Peter Schwarz has argued that Adenauer saw no contradiction between his 
commitment to a rejuvenated Christian Europe and his commitment to Western 
integration.  For him, the two commitments were one and the same – a 
 
7 Konrad Adenauer, speech before the German Bundestag, March 19, 1953 in ed. Josef 
Selbach, Bundestagsreden (Bonn: AZ-Studio, 1967), 173-198. 
8 Konrad Adenauer, speech before the German Bundestag, July 9, 1952 in ed. Josef Selbach, 
Bundestagsreden (Bonn: AZ-Studio, 1967), 131-160. 
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commitment to Western civilization.9  This fusion worked conveniently 
politically, because it allowed him to speak to multiple constituencies at the same 
time.  Post-Nazi Europeanists were likewise able to interpret his pronouncements 
as a confirmation of their vision. 
 As such, post-Nazi Europeanists almost always selectively highlighted and 
distributed quotations from Adenauer that could be construed to advance their 
Europe-concept.  The best example of this is when Adenauer used the term dritte 
Kraft, or “third front,” in a press conference about European integration on May 
9th, 1950.  It is not clear whether or not Adenauer was intentionally channeling 
this term that was so widely used among post-Nazi Europeanists, but they 
certainly interpreted that to be the case.  The full quotation from Adenauer is as 
follows: 
In our opinion the purpose behind the development of the European 
Council can only be one thing: to create a federal Europe that will be an 
eminently peaceful factor in the world.  You all know the situation in the 
world right now.  You know that both of these great-powers – Soviet-
Russia on the one side and the United States of North America on the 
other side – are as a result of ideological differences, as a result of each of 
their specific development, and as a result of their entire world views 
completely divided in the Cold War.  A conflict that, we all hope, will 
never evolve into another war.  But they are both standing across and 
against one another.  After both world wars that we have experienced, no 
other state in the world is strong enough to compete with these two states.  
Even if this acute tension that we are currently experiencing in the Cold 
War were to come an end, then there will nevertheless continue to be a 
latent tension so long as the world is governed for all intents and purposes 
by each of these two great-powers.  So, it must be our goal to create in a 
unified Europe a dritte Kraft, a force that will not be nearly so large as 
 
9 Hans Peter Schwarz, “Konrad Adenauer – Abendländer oder Europäer? Zur Bedeutung des 
Christlichen in seiner auswärtigen Politik” in ed. Ulrih von Hehl, Röhndorfer Gespräche, Band 
17: Adenauer und die Kirchen (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1999). 
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each of these two great-powers, indeed a force that never could be as 
large.  But a force that will nevertheless be strong enough, economically 
and politically, such that when latent differences threaten to devolve into 
acute tensions, it will be able to throw its weight behind the preservation 
of peace.  That is, in our opinion, the goal we must keep in sight when we 
conduct Europe-politics.  In other words, an eminently peaceful goal, the 
pursuit of which sets out to achieve lasting peace for the peoples of the 
world.10 
 
Despite the explicitly non-confrontational and nearly pacifist tone of Adenauer’s 
use of the term “dritte Kraft,” post-Nazi Europeanists picked up this quotation 
and presented it as a confirmation that the Chancellor stood behind their calls for 
a Europe independent of the Western alliance system.  Axel Seeberg of 
Sonntagsblatt, addressing critics of his Europe-concept, asked the provocative 
question: “So do we want to build up Europe as a dritte Kraft, such as Adenauer 
newly believes, or do we want to watch Europe be an instrument in the division of 
the world into two great groups?”  Seeberg, in other words, believed that 
Adenauer had authorized the idea of Europe as an independent force in the Cold 
War rather than a member of the Atlantic Alliance.11 
Post-Nazi Memory Politics 
 Understanding the influence, then, of post-Nazi Europeanism on the 
political culture of West Germany requires focusing on the politically ostracized 
former Nazis who were granted a large public voice to articulate an interpretation 
of current events which they could approve of.  Because they were working 
towards Adenauer and his administration by finding ways to reconcile their past 
 




to the present, this dissertation is also a study of political memory.  The literature 
on postwar political memory tends to treat collaboration in what we might 
describe as “static” categories.  Because fascism was so fiercely nationalistic, the 
assumption often made is that the postwar political memory of the Second World 
War was similarly nationalistic.  Peter Lagrou, for example, famously described 
postwar West European memory politics as a “nationalization of victimhood” 
which used the tragedy of mass death to paradoxically reinforce nationalism at the 
expense of the war’s most victimized groups.12  In the German literature 
specifically, historians have debated whether postwar memory politics can best be 
described as “amnesia” (a selective silence concerning national crimes) or “war 
stories” (an active construction of German national victimhood at the expense of 
national complicity).13  In both arguments, national categories are accepted as the 
starting point.   
This dissertation suggests that, however important national victimhood 
was, an important piece of the story is missing.  Post-Nazi Europeanism shifted 
the categories of national identity for many Germans by creating new European 
 
12 Peter Lagrou, “The Nationalization of Victimhood: Selective Violence and National Grief 
in Western Europe, 1940-1960” in ed.s Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, Life and Death: 
Approaches to a Cultural and Social history of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 243-257. 
13 Norbert Frei, Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and 
Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).  Robert G. Moeller, War Stories; The 




concepts of identity which subsequently assisted the transition from a tainted 
nationalism to a new form of “Europe” identity politics.  This allowed them to 
part ways with their Nazi past without having to discard what Fritz Stern called 
the “temptation” of nationalism, by which he meant the yearning for a 
transcendent escape from modernity.14  As this dissertation has shown, Europe 
functioned as a kind of imagined community which offered a more promising 
escape from modernity than nationalism.  It did so by offering nationalism in a 
new form, transferring the hopes, sentiments, and ideas behind nationalism onto 
more expansive categories.  But Europeanism was also effective because it 
enabled a workable bridge to the past that nationalism was no longer capable of 
fulfilling.  By attaching themselves to the Christian Democratic politics of 
European integration (especially the European Army) they could perceive that 
their dedication to Europe transcended the “Zero Hour” of 1945; they could 
continue their war-time quest for a “New Europe” via the postwar politics of 
European integration, especially the transnational European war of unification 
against Soviet Communism.  And they could do so without carrying any 
culpability for the nationalist disasters of the Second World War and without 
immediately embracing liberal democracy.  On the one hand, Europeanism gave 
collaborators a tool for establishing critical distance to those “few” radically 
nationalist Nazis whose genocidal racial supremacism had no purchase in the 
postwar world; on the other hand, it also gave them a futuristic vision of 
 




supranational identity which allowed them to maintain some aspects of the past.  
This was, undeniably, a form of evasive and apologetic memory politics.  But it 
might also have been essential for the democratization of German conservatism.   
Some historians have argued that European attempts throughout the 
twentieth century to construct Europe as an alternative identity to the nation have 
been nothing more than a dangerously dishonest continuation of nationalism in a 
new name, thus shielding and extending the damaging effects of nationalism and 
dodging a confrontation with the very notion of an exclusive cultural nation.15  
The post-Nazi Europeanists in particular could certainly be regarded as an 
especially egregious example of this criticism.  After all, in all three time periods 
their Europe stood in stark contrast to liberal or cosmopolitan discourses of 
Europe.  But the story of post-Nazi Europeanists forces us to consider the 
arresting question regarding the relationship between memory politics and the 
democratization of right-wing radicalism.  Norbert Frei has argued that the 
formation of a West German liberal democracy in the half-decade between 1949 
and 1954 was built upon a broad political consensus to forgo a genuine 
confrontation with the crimes and complicity of the past, or what he calls 
Vergangenheitspolitik (“politics of the past”).  Further, Frei argues that this 
historical amnesty, although morally empty and an affront to historical justice, 
was perhaps necessary in order to circumvent a German revolt against their new 
 
15 Bo Stråth, “Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity, and Demarcation of the Other” in ed. 




democracy.  Without “politics of the past,” he argues, postwar German democracy 
may have foundered from the onset.  According to Frei, this delayed reckoning 
with the past may even have prepared the ground for the ultimate 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coming to terms with the past”) that began in 
earnest in the 1960s.16  The story of conservative Europeanists and their trajectory 
from National Socialism to resigned liberals aligns with Frei’s argument.  The 
uncomfortable truth of postwar European history is that liberal democracy had no 
other path except through illiberal citizenries saturated with complicity in fascist 
dictatorships (this was especially the case in Germany).  The post-Nazi Europe 
concept functioned as one of the most important intellectual discourses in postwar 
West Germany that deflected a revolt from within German conservatism.  In other 
words, the memory politics of post-Nazi Europeanism helped many conservative 
Germans to sanitize their political radicalism while at the same time gradually 











16 Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and 
Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).   
17 The above three paragraph are drawn substantially from an article published by the present 
author.  See Josh Klein, “Nazi Europeanism as Transnational Collaboration and Transnational 


































Responsibilities and pertinent figures 
 
Ministerbüro (Ribbentrop’s main office) 
 
 
• Organized and distributed cross-
department propaganda narratives  
-Karl Megerle, Beauftragter für 




Presseabteilung (Press Department) • Infiltrated foreign press by running 
articles via occupying administrations 
or diplomatic embassies, by placing 
hired journalists, and by financing 
Foreign Office-operated periodicals 
 
-Paul Karl Schmidt, department director 
-Hans Georg von Studnitz, assistant to 
Schmidt and editor of Berlin-Rom-Tokio. 
-Klaus Mehnert, Director of Foreign 






• Completed and conveyed research on 
propaganda and opinions abroad and 
produced propaganda material 
 
-Giselher Wirsing, journalist and foreign 
correspondent 
-Karl Megerle [originally], journalist 




18 For a more detailed and chronological breakdown of the departments within the Foreign 
Office propaganda apparatus, including an account of their evolution, change, and rivalries, see 
Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg, 47-68. 
608 
 
Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung (Radio 
Department) 
• Financed radio programs in occupied, 
neutral, and allied radio broadcasts as 
well as radio programs which were 
broadcast into foreign countries 
Kulturpolitische Abteilung (Cultural-
Politics Department) 
• Organized or financed 
cultural/intellectual programs, 
conferences, and other venues in order 
to intensify relationships with 
occupied, neutral, and allied countries 
 
-Franz Alfred Six, department director 
after 1943 






















Appendix B: Speakers (German and non-German) at the Foreigner Courses, 
1940-194519 
Dr. Paul Karl Schmidt 
Dr. Franz Alfred Six 
Axel Seeberg 
Karl Heinz Pfeffer 
Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart 
Fritz Sauckel 






Prof. Dr. Reinhard Höhn 
Oberst Ritter Rudolf von Xylander 




Dr. Hermann Reischle 
Dr. Bruno Kiesewetter 
Dr. Friedrich Syrup 
Fritz Reinhardt 
Dr. Wilhelm Ziegler 
Dr. Friedrich Sieburg 
Dr. Albrecht Haushofer 
Erich Albrecht 
Prof. Dr. Rudolf Mentzel 
Dr. Carl Diem 
Dr. Albert Prinzing 
Generalkonsul Rudolf Karlowa 
Albrecht Haushofer 
Oberstleutnant George Soldan 
Dr. Friedrich Wimer 
  
Reichsbankdirektor Dr. Rudolf Eicke 
Dr. E. Helfferich 
Walther Sommer 
Dr. Will Decker 
Walter Hebenbrock 
Prof. Dr. Fritz Lenz 
Prof. Dr. Heinz von Loesch 
SS Brigadeführer Ulrich Greifelt 
Prof. Dr. Friedrich Berber 
Prof. Dr. Gerhard von Mende 
Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff 
Prof. Dr. Walter Groß 
Dr. Wolfgang Pohl  
Dr. von der Declzen 
Gesandter Dr. Carl August Clodius 
Dr. Wilhelm Rentrop 
Dr. Herbert Scurla 
Hans von Tschammer und Osten 
Prof. Dr. Egon von Eickstedt  
Prof. Dr. Werner Frauendienst 
Dr. Eugen Diesel 
Dr. Hans Severus Ziegler 
Colin Roß 
Nichifor Crainic 
Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Grewe 
Prof. Dr. Alfred Baeumler 
Wehrmacht Captain Bentmann 
Prof. Dr. Andreas Predöhl 
Admiral Frierich Lützow 
SS Sturmbannführer Jeff van de Wiele 
Ward Hermans 
General Konrad Zander 
Justice Dr. Albert Weh 
 
 
19 Due to fragmentary and often illegible documentary sources the above list is incomplete.  
Notable guest lists are only available for the first three Foreigner Courses, for example.  There is 
no available guest list or speaker list for the final Foreigner Course.  Finally, some of the records 
are barely legible and therefore spelling errors are likely. The above information was drawn from 
review articles in Zeitschrift für Politik, as well as Franz Alfred Six’s budget requests sent to the 
Party Chancellory.  See Axel Seeberg, “Fragen der neuen Ordnung,” Zeitschrift für Politik, 
December issue, 1942.  Axel Seeberg, “Grundlagen und Aufgaben europäischer 
Zusammenarbeit,” Zeitschrift für Politik, January/February issue, 1944.  Axel Seeberg, “Europa in 
der Entscheidung,” Zeitschrift für Politik, January/February/March issue, 1945.   Franz Alfred Six 
to Hans Heinrich Lammers, March 16, 1942 and “Jahresbericht des DAWI, 1940/1941,“  
Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43-II/947a, frames 100 and 125-173.  
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Appendix C: Selected, highlighted guests at DAWI’s Foreigner Courses, 
1940-194520 
Gheorghe Rasu (Romania) 
Einar Anderberg (Sweden) 
Nils Sonesson (Sweden) 
Jämastare G. Tamm (Sweden) 
Hans Oehler (Switzerland) 
Luis Diez del Corral (Spain) 
Nicolas Ramiro (Spain) 
Stasys Reatikis (Lithuania) 
Karya Kirpa (Lithuania) 
Dr. Jahan Beethowwers (Netherlands) 
B.H.C. te Hennepe (Netherlands) 
Thor Halse (Norway) 
Antonio de Menezes (Portugal) 
Dr. Harilau Biala (Romania) 
Stefan Hlavaty (Slovakia) 
Professor Ludwig Knappek (Slovakia) 
Otto Wallen (Sweden) 
Dr. Andreas von Keoves (Hungary) 
Kalman von Moricz (Hungary) 
Oberstleutnant Antonov (Bulgaria) 
Dr. Berbarov (Bulgaria) 
 
Margarita Johow (Chile) 
Ejaar Hovalt (Denmark) 
Andreas J. Pappas (Greece) 
Professor Dr. Giuseppe Lo Verde 
(Italy) 
Professor Dr. Giovanni Sandrini 
(Italy) 
Mr. Pokrajeic (Yugoslavia) 
Wilhelm Rasmussen (Norway) 
Geza Birkas (Hungary) 
Elemer Buocz (Hungary) 
Dr. Sipoz (Hungary) 
Edmond de Goeyze (Belgium) 
Oberst Guillermo Gaalzer-Netto 
(Brazil) 
Warna Dimiter Sarafov (Bulgaria) 
Agnar Christensen (Denmark) 
Vilho Helanen (Finland) 
Phandit-Bhatts (India) 
Paolo Amisano (Italy) 
Gastone Guzzoni (Italy) 
Madshiko Izaji (Japan) 



















20 Ibid.   
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Appendix D: Europe-Seminar attendees and accompanying positions in the 
Third Reich21 
DAWI academics: 
• Prof. Dr. Gerhard von Mende  
• Prof. Dr. Heinz von Loesch 
• Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Grewe 
• Karl Heinz Pfeffer 
• Karl Haushofer 
• Prof. Dr. Werner Frauendienst 
• Dr. Bruno Kiesewetter 
• Karl Epting 
• Axel Seeberg 










Other academic institutions: 
• Hans-Joachim non Merkatz 
• Walter von Puttkammer 
• Gerhard Isenberg 
• (?)Wissler 
 
Ministry for Science, Education, and 
Culture: 
• Herbert Scurla 




• Axel Seeberg 
• Klaus Achenbach 
• Franz Alfred Six 












Secret Service (SD): 
• Eugen Steimle 









• (?)Vasiljevic (Belgrad) 
• (?)De Vries (Leiden) 
• (?)Genechten (Netherlands) 
• (?)Korinistu (Finland) 
• (?)Milkovic (Bulgaria) 
• (?)Wladikin (Sofia) 
 
Others: 
• Wolfgang Pohl 







21 The above information is drawn from a table put together by the anonymous finder of the 
Europe-Seminar files as well as a table of attendees within the folder itself.  Many names have 
been cross-referenced with the present author’s research in order to provide many first names 
otherwise missing.  Where a first name could not be identified it has been replaced with “(?).”  See 






Ministry for Propaganda: 
• Paul Hövel 
• Wolff Heinrichsdorff 
 
Ministry for Nutrition and 
Agriculture: 
• Karl Müller 
 











• (?)Van Huffel 
• (?)Praet 
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